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Theories o f the Company, Em ployees and Takeover Regulation
"Company law does not set out to recognise the interests o f the employee. Its dramatis 
personae are directors, shareholders, creditors, auditors, but not the company's workers. 
With trivial exceptions they fmd no mention in the Companies Act."1
Introduction and Methodology
Part One: The Three Models
"The managerial firm may not be dead, but it is under intense pressure."2
General company law in the UK and the US is at present based on a managerialist model 
in which management owes its duties to the corporate entity rather than any particular 
corporate constituency. In recent years, this model has been under sustained challenge 
from the doctrine of shareholder value, which asserts that management should exercise 
their discretion solely in order to produce value for shareholders. While company law 
itself does not (yet) reflect shareholder value as the sole purpose of the company, hostile 
takeovers and adaptive market mechanisms provide management with strong incentives 
to pursue that aim.
The first part of this thesis draws on a range of theoretical material, taken from law, 
economics and political science to develop and critique three alternative heuristic models 
of the corporation against which to judge the contents o f company law, and, in particular, 
takeover regulation. This modelling is given manageable scope through a focus on the
! Wedderbum, Lord, Company Law Reform (1965) at 14; see also Deakin, S and Hughes, A, "Comparative Corporate Governance: An Interdisciplinary Agenda" (1997) 24 Journal o f  Law and Society 1 who note at2 that "In the common-law world, internal company structures are largely designed to deal with the relationship between the board of directors and the principal corporate constituents - and these are, above all, the shareholders...Employees are not the subject of special treatment; their contractual rights are supplemented by certain statutory protections for the individual worker, and by collective rights of bargaining and consultation. However, it is significant that many of these labour law rights do not necessarily operate at the level of the company..."
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relationship between the company and its employees. Each model offers a different 
rationale for employee involvement or representation of their interests (or the absence 
thereof) in corporate decision-making, and accordingly their treatment by company law. 
The way in which each model answers this "delicate and politically sensitive question"2 3 
rests on an analysis of employees' relationship with the company and their contribution to 
the productive process.
It is important to note at the outset that the thesis deals with the large, publicly-held 
corporation whose shares are listed on a public exchange, rather than the small privately- 
owned corporation. Companies falling into these two broad categories raise very different 
issues of governance. In the small private company, shareholders, board and employees 
are often the same people, with the result that there are fewer "agency" and representation 
problems. By contrast, the shareholders of the large public corporation are normally 
dispersed and have little or no contact with the business of the corporation or the board, 
meaning that there is normally little or no monitoring o f management by shareholders.4
The "agency" or "neoclassical" model deconstructs the corporate entity to reveal a "nexus 
of contracts". Its central assumption is that employees are protected from risk by fully 
"presentiated"5 or express contracts, and that as long as there are liquid labour markets, 
then an employee who loses his job will generally suffer minimal losses. Employment 
contracts are dealt with either individually or collectively under labour law and are 
generally of no concern for Anglo-American company law. On the basis of these 
assumptions, it is asserted that the only constituency with a "residual" or variable claim
2 Osterman, P, Securing Prosperity (1999) at 1503 Becht, M, Bolton, P, and Rowell, A, "Corporate Governance and Control" (ECGI Finance Paper No2, October 2002 at 15 fn 21* Although hopes that institutional investors may be willing to play a more active role in monitoring and containing management are periodically raised and dashed. A good recent example of raised hopes was the successful pressure exerted by institutional shareholders for Michael Green to step down as chairman of the newly-merged ITV company (see The Economist, “The Shareholder’s Revolt”, 23ri October 2003). The limits to such interventions became clear shortly afterwards as institutional investors failed to prevent the appointment o f James Murdoch as chief executive of BskyB, on the insistence o f his father, the chairman o f BskyB and its main shareholder through Newscorp (see further, The Economist, 8th November 2003).5 This term originated with Macneil who analyses contracts in relational terms; see for example Macneil, I, The Relational Theory o f  Contract: Selected Works o f  Ian Macneil (2001) ; Macneil, IR, "Economic
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against the company are the shareholders, and that if their returns are maximised, then the 
wealth of society as a whole will be too. The precise way in which the maximisation of 
shareholder value should be ensured remains at the heart o f mainstream debate about 
corporate governance, which concentrates on the ’’agency" problem of making 
management more accountable to shareholders.
The traditional challenger to the neoclassical contractual model, the "political 
stakeholder" model, sees the employees as the "governed" of the enterprise and argues 
that they should have some input into decision-making, either on the basis of the 
democratic imperative, or on the basis that companies, as an integral but differentiated 
part of society, should be socially responsible. A reform programme along these lines, 
assert its advocates, would not only be a good in itself, but could be instrumentalised to 
improve the motivation and productivity of the company's employees. Ideally, such joint 
governance should be established voluntarily, but if those in control of corporations are 
reluctant to share decision-making power, the law should compel them to do so.
Finally, the "productive coalition" model attempts to steer a middle course between these 
two opposing paradigms. It makes an economic argument that employee interests often 
require articulation within the company, and that this should occur either by 
strengthening managerial autonomy from interference from other constituencies, or by 
reforming decision-making structures to make them more pluralistic. While this model 
adopts the same contractual methodology as the "agency" model, the key difference lies 
in its recognition that corporations are a framework of both "explicit" and "implicit" (or 
unenforceable) contracts. While this latter category may seem counter-intuitive to 
lawyers, sociological (and increasingly socio-legal) research into the practical operation 
of contracts demonstrates a low level o f reliance on strict legal rights and a greater use of 
"understandings" or "conventions" which reduce transaction costs.6 Implicit promises
Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus"" (1980) 75 Northwestern University Law Review 1018.6 The ground-breaking article is Macaulay, S, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business" (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 55; see also Macneil, I (2001) (supra note xx); Campbell, D and Harris, D, "Flexibility in Long-term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-operation" (1993) 20 Journal o f Law and Society 166; Collins, H, Regulating Contracts (1999); Campbell, D, "Reflexivity and Welfarism in the Modem
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about the treatment they can expect in the future may encourage employees to make 
investments in firm-specific skills (or "human capital") which will be o f less value in 
other employment contexts. Of course, in the absence o f legal protection, these 
investments may become vulnerable to opportunism in certain exceptional situations (like 
takeovers). This means that, contrary to the assertions of the agency model, employees 
may also be "residual claimants", in the sense that they also bear some risk in the event of 
the firm failing or the termination of their relationship with the firm. Since such 
specialised skills are essential to many companies' competitive advantage, and therefore 
form a part society's wealth-generating capacity, appropriate governance structures 
should be put in place to encourage and protect them. In the light of these arguments, 
reasons for and against legal intervention on the grounds of improving allocative 
efficiency are then discussed.
Within the wide body o f literature surveyed in the first part o f this thesis, it is often made 
clear that the perspective being advanced is either descriptive o f the legal system or a 
normative statement aimed at, for example, improving efficiency or social justice. 
However, at other times, the nature o f  the arguments being advanced is glossed over or 
ignored altogether. Often, their advocates, coming from a non-legal perspective appear 
not to consider the extent to which their theoretical approach is reflected in the law's 
provisions. Therefore, wherever possible during the first part o f the thesis, the nature of 
the claims being made for each of the theories will be clarified by reference to legal 
provisions.
Law of Contract” (2000) 20 OJLS A ll .  Reliance on strict legal rights is only likely to occur where there is no relational context (and therefore no operational reputation mechanism) or where the relationship has broken down: see Campbell, D (2000) (supra this note) at 485 and Collins, H (1999) (supra this note) at 102.
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Part Two: Application of the Models to Takeover Regulation
The second part o f the thesis analyses various regimes o f takeover regulation with 
particular reference to these models, and attempts to identify their underlying theoretical 
assumptions. Particular attention is paid to the ability of the board to take defensive 
measures, and to the rights (if any) which are granted to employees. Takeovers are an 
appropriate area for analysis because the conflicts between the various corporate 
constituencies and between the various models of the firm developed in the first part are 
highly visible. It is also notable that, as a capital market measure, takeover regulation 
clashes with the dominant norm of company law, namely managerialism.
First, the dominant theory of the market for corporate control is discussed, and critiques 
of it are offered. UK and US systems of takeover regulation are then analysed, and 
measured against agency and productive coalition models of takeover regulation. These 
jurisdictions were chosen because of the striking differences in their systems of takeover 
regulation despite the shared theoretical orientation of their systems of company law and 
corporate governance. While the UK system of takeover regulation clearly rests on the 
agency model and underpins a market for corporate control, analysis of US takeover laws 
elicits a more cautious response as managerialism remains a significant influence. 
However, it is suggested that the effect of these differences is lessened by the widespread 
use of adaptive mechanisms which align the interests o f management and shareholders, 
and leave the hostile takeover as a mechanism of last resort.
Next, the newly-introduced German takeover regulation, and the extent to which it 
reflects that country's very different system of corporate governance, is briefly 
considered. Finally, the recently adopted European takeover directive is considered. First, 
its evolution and the various rationales which have been advanced during its lengthy 
gestation period are considered. The various drafts and the reports which accompanied 
them are analysed by reference to the theories of the company developed in part one. It is 
concluded that market integration (the creation of a "level playing field") was not in itself
5
a sufficient rationale to explain the legislative choices made in the various drafts of the 
directive: those drafts, which treated the takeover directive as a pure capital market 
measure, were centred on an agency model conception of the company. Various EC 
labour law measures on the information and consultation o f employees were cited in 
response to fears expressed by the European Parliament that the interests o f employees 
were not adequately protected by the various drafts o f the directive. These measures are 
briefly analysed in terms of the level o f protection they would provide in the takeover 
context. It is concluded that the recently reached compromise is understandable in the 
light o f the persistence of different varieties of capitalism within the EU. This state of 
affairs necessarily led to opposition to capital market measures being taken in isolation 
from other issues of corporate governance. Broader harmonisation o f corporate 
governance structures would be a Herculean task and is very unlikely. In the absence of 
some strong employee participation provisions, an outright ban on defensive measures by 
the board was wholly acceptable to the Member States (in particular, Germany) whose 
systems of corporate governance are influenced by considerations from the second or 
third models. Accordingly, the compromise reached, which allows Member States some 
flexibility in the way they apply the directive, makes sense because it respects the 
evolved diversity of European systems o f productive organisation and therefore allows 
Member States to retain their competitive advantage.
It is concluded that most financial market regulation is based on an agency model of the 
corporation; social issues, including the treatment of employees, which are highlighted by 
the political stakeholder model are dealt with both by voluntary measures such as the 
Commission’s exhortation to CSR and by weak-form ex post participation measures like 
information and consultation. This compartmentalisation of the economic and the social 
appears to be largely unchallenged in the legislative agenda o f the Commission. Any 
"social externalities" arising from financial market regulation are dealt with by remedial 
social legislation which does not impinge upon the operation o f capital markets and the 
pursuit of a solution to the agency problem. The "productive coalition" model puts 
forward a challenge to the current conventional division between economic and social 
matters by producing arguments based on economic methodology for greater
6
representation of employee interests within corporate governance. It is suggested that this 
model, while more challenging to implement, offers a more realistic basis on which to 
deal with corporations at the supranational level, and, if  adopted, will provide European 
enterprises with sustained competitive advantage in international markets.
7
Methodology
Much of this thesis is concerned with an analysis of the company in contractual terms. 
Accordingly, neither the shareholders nor anyone else are treated as the "owners’' of the 
company. Instead, the rationale for the allocation o f rights in company law is sought in 
the nature of the relationship in question.
Rejection of the Property Rights Model
An important strand of contractual analysis o f the firm has been in terms of property 
rights.7 Where the regular supply of a factor of production is essential for the success of 
an enterprise, the firm must decide whether to hire or own it. Since owning an asset gives 
the owner residual rights to decide what to do with that asset where it is not contractually 
committed, ownership will eliminate the risk of "hold-up" (opportunistic hard bargaining) 
where the factor has become essential to the future of the business (for example, because 
it has become co-specialised with an asset which the firm owns). However, there is a 
trade-off. Ownership by the firm also imposes costs in the form o f reduced incentives on 
the part of those using the factor in the course o f the business to take proper care o f it.8 
The decision whether to rent or own the asset in question is a balancing exercise between 
these two sets o f costs.
The property rights theory is very important in broader contractual analysis of the firm, in 
particular because it considers an important consequence of ownership to be the right to 
fill gaps in incomplete contracts. However, the theory either excludes labour from 
consideration altogether, on the basis that it cannot be owned,9 or suggests that the
7 Hart, O, "An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1757; see also Bratton, WW, "Enron and the Dark Side o f Shareholder Value" (George Washington University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 35 o f  2002 available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=30I475 at 18 fh 68.8 These costs are characterised as agency costs by Jensen, M and Meckling WH, "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination" (1979) 52 Journal o f Business at 15-169 Vertical integration of labour is impossible since it would amount to slavery. According to some contractualist perspectives, the specialisation o f  labour creates extensive opportunities for "hold up" by both parties to the “contract”. This risk is exacerbated where labour and other assets of the business become
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suppliers of labour should, in appropriate circumstances, also be the owners of the 
enterprise.10 This latter suggestion is not considered further in this thesis, which 
concentrates on the position of employees in company law qua employees, not qua 
shareholders.11
For the same reason, and for reasons of space, employee share ownership schemes are 
also excluded. Many theorists contemplate a role for employees in corporate governance 
through the mechanism of share ownership.12 They suggest that employees are free, and 
should be encouraged, to become shareholders in the shareholder-value orientated 
corporations which employ them, and in this way exercise influence over corporate 
decision-making. Employee share ownership certainly raises intriguing possibilities and 
important difficulties as regards the articulation of stakeholder interests within the 
corporate governance structure.13 However, this thesis is confined to considering 
justifications for the provision of governance rights to employees in their capacity as 
employees rather than as shareholders.
In contrast to the property rights approach, agency perspectives on corporate governance 
tend to exclude labour from their scope on the basis that it is a static, uniform 
(commodity) input, rather than one of a number of factors of production in dynamic
co-specialised or "complementary". As we shall see in Chapter 3, this is one of the prime concerns of "productive coalition" theorists.10 For a detailed discussion of the difficulties which arise when labour is the "owner" of a business, see Hansmann, H, The Ownership o f Enterprise (1996).11 For an attempt to model the labour input's interaction with the firm in terms of "access" precisely to get around the inability of firm's to own the labour input, see Rajan, R and Zingales, L, "Power in a Theory of the Firm" (1998) 113 Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 387.12 See for example, Parkinson, J, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory o f  Company Law (1993) at 423-6 and the sources cited there.13 For example, while employees would certainly obtain valuable rights as shareholders which could conceivably complement their position as stakeholders of the company, they would necessarily also have to face the shareholders’ collective action problem, which is discussed in detail in chapter one. Their influence on management as one of a number of dispersed shareholders is likely to be small. Their interests as shareholding employees are also likely to diverge from those of purely financial investors, both as regards the time frame for return on their investment and the division of rents. In addition, and more importantly, as the aftermath of Enron demonstrates, where employees invest a large proportion of their savings in their employer as opposed to the market as a whole, this exposes them to an unacceptable degree of risk, as the insolvency of their employer leads to loss of both employment and savings for retirement. For a more detailed discussion of some of the problems raised, see Hirsch, JM, “Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective
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evolution. With this assumption, the question never arises o f maintaining labour in situ, 
because any alternative supply purchased on the market at a moment's notice will be 
equivalent. The role of the firm as a governance structure does not extend to creating 
incentives for investments in firm-specific skills, or to keeping specialised labour in place 
within the firm by maintaining trust among corporate participants. The political 
stakeholding and productive coalition models challenge these assumptions rather than 
those o f the property rights model.
Systems Theory
Interdisciplinary research poses complex problems for a thesis in law, and in particular 
for attempts to understand how elements o f economic and political analysis provide the 
rationale for legal rules and enter into legal discourse. I have attempted to get around 
some of the apparent conflicts between economic or political research and the provisions 
of the law by adopting a systems theoretical approach which treats the law as one o f a 
number of autopoietic systems.14
Teubner explains that we do not have to attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, and that 
we should understand inter-systemic conflicts between, for example, law and economics, 
as an inevitable by-product o f the differentiation of society, understood as a system of 
communication, into such functional and specialised subsystems. With the passage of 
time, these social subsystems evolve and become so functionally specialised that they 
gain limited autonomy from the underlying social system. This process is known as 
autopoiesis and goes beyond simple self-referentiality: their internal communications are 
self-generating and they "produce their own elements, structures, processes and 
boundaries. They construct their own environment, and define their own identity."15 
These elements are mutually reinforcing, depending on each other for their validity, and
Negotiation and Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans” (1998) 67 Fordham L Rev 957, in particular at 967-84.14 Which broadly means "self-referential", although Teubner uses the term in a technical sense to describe cognitively open but operatively closed systems: see Teubner, G, Law As an Autopoietic System (1993) at 32-3.15 ibid at 69-70
10
..............  1 ........... ..  II I Mil
feed into each other, a process explained by systems theory in terms of a "hypercycle". 
As the subsystem follows its own logic and seeks internal consistency, so the 
communications which constitute it become increasingly differentiated both from society 
and other social subsystems. While each subsystem, as part o f society, may observe other 
systems (it is "cognitively open" to "its environment"), its differentiated method of 
internal communication means that it cannot interact with those other systems directly (it 
is "operatively closed"). This means, for example, that the legal subsystem generates 
"legal reality" only indirectly, by observing the operation of the social or economic 
systems and then reconstructing them within its own internal communications and 
according to its own systemic logic.
Systems theory suggests that the conflicts between legal and economic analysis o f the 
same underlying productive relationships should be understood as arising from the 
distinctive binary functions that those sub-systems have to fulfil in relation to the 
underlying main societal system. In the case of the law, it is the legal/illegal distinction. 
In the case o f economics, it is the efficient/inefficient distinction. In the case of political 
science, it is the exit/voice distinction. This functional conflict is likely to lead to 
differences in the characterisation of corporate relationships and the normative demands 
which accompany them.
Despite these methodological difficulties, an interdisciplinary approach may generate 
considerable insight through an analysis of company law in its economic and social 
context. The collision between politics, economics and law is nowhere more evident than 
in the system of corporate governance. If, as systems theory insists, the law is cognitively 
open to its environment, then its content should reflect broader society's perceptions of its 
main subject matter, and the relationships which are embedded in it. If the model of the 
company used by the law is a richer one which draws on theoretical perspectives from a 
whole range of disciplines, its regulation of the underlying enterprise is likely to be more 
appropriate. For example, Dore has argued that the way in which intra-corporate
11
relationships are governed reflects broader social expectations of the firm.16 As one 
aspect of the corporate governance system, the law cannot ignore social expectations in 
reconstructing the corporation within its legal reality. The direction of causality may also 
be reversed, the form taken by the firm within the legal system exercising an influence 
over popular perceptions of the firm. This process of mutual reinforcement demonstrates 
not only that law is not independent from society, but also that these systems interact in a 
dynamic way. For example, where the contractual model is influential, the corporation is 
considered "popularly, as the place where for the moment, one earns one’s living, where 
one might also have an active and enjoyable social life and the satisfaction of interesting 
work; as a legal entity to which one owes obligations which are time bound by the period 
of notice specified in the employment contract." This popular perception of the firm 
appears in economic theory as "a web of contracts, the nature of which is constrained 
only by law and convention; all such contracts, even those which have legal entities as 
contractors (the firm, a trade union) being ultimately dissolvable into the contracts of 
individuals."17
The use of systems theory to by-pass difficult conflicts in this way inevitably led me to 
undertake a functionalist analysis of the law.18 Systems theory suggests that company law 
responds to changes in its environment (and in particular to changes in corporate 
governance systems) by reconstructing them in its immanent model of the firm. Changes 
in company law should therefore generally be referable to changes at the level of 
productive organisations or corporate governance.19 For example, as this thesis suggests, 
changes in the productive relationships which constitute the firm, such as the increasing 
importance of employees' firm-specific skills to the firm's competitive advantage, might 
be expected to lead to changes within the legal system, assuming, of course, that the legal 
system accepts both that its role is to encourage efficiency and the particular notion of 
efficiency at the heart of the productive coalition model.
16 Dore, R, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism - Japan and Germany Versus the Anglo-Saxons (2000) at 28”  ibid18 According to Weinrib, E, The Idea o f  Private Law (1995) at 6, the functionalist view insists that the "law provides only the authoritative form into which the conclusions of nonlegal thinking are translated."19 See Teubner, G (1993) (supra note 14) at 125.
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Systems theory is neither purely normative nor purely descriptive of the content of law: it 
simply describes a process according to which their common roots in society mean that 
aspects of economic or sociological thinking inevitably make their way indirectly into the 
law, and vice versa. This thesis takes three important theories of the company and 
considers which of them has been reconstructed within the legal system to provide the 
theoretical underpinnings for takeover regulation, and asks whether the other models 
would offer improvements if translated into law.20
The changes at the level of theory discussed in chapter three pose serious difficulties for 
traditional legal methods, in particular mandatory regulation. A theory which insists on 
the differentiation of productive systems may, of course, be criticised for indeterminacy, 
for example, where it emphasises that the importance of firm-specific investments may 
differ radically from firm to firm, or even within firms over time. However, we might 
expect the law to respond to these developments at the level of theory by refining its 
methods and assigning an increasing role to reflexive (or self-) regulation, as it 
reconstructs in legal reality the increasing differentiation of productive relationships in 
the social sphere. To some extent this is a constitutive process as increasing reliance by 
the legal system on procedural regulation and default rules simultaneously reflects and 
enhances the ability of social actors to articulate their interests within differentiated 
processes for the governance of individual corporations.
The adoption of this systems theoretical methodology required the assumptions and goals 
of the law to be judged against the insights contained in the economic and political 
science literature. When specifically applied to the position of employees within takeover 
regulation, this required description and contextual analysis before the legal position 
could be measured against the theoretical part of the thesis and the law's immanent 
assumptions identified. The outcome of this analysis inevitably raised suggestions about
20 As Teubner, G (1993) (supra note 14) says at 126, “The real business of theory is not to come up with specific proposals for regulation, but to construct legal reality in another way., .to develop a new perspective on what constitutes a corporation... And if practice accepts what theory has to offer, then there
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the ways in which legal regulation could become more responsive to the theoretical 
perspectives developed in part one, bearing in mind, o f course, that this interdisciplinary 
translation must be done indirectly.
Inter-systemic conflicts
As systems theory predicts, inter-systemic conflicts come to the surface at various stages 
of the theoretical analysis in part one. A few examples will suffice at this stage; I will 
indicate others in the main body of the text.
i) Ontology
"Whether you take a doughnut hole as a blank space or as an entity unto itself is a purely 
metaphysical question and does not affect the taste o f the doughnut one bit."21 *
First, and most perhaps most importantly as an introductory matter, I had to deal with the 
great ontological question: what is the nature of the company? Is it an entity, a moral 
person, which transcends the individuals who make it up, or no more than the sum of its 
parts? Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, an answer to this question will not be found in 
this thesis. Indeed, it may be, as Hart suggests, that seeking to define what the 
"corporation" corresponds to in social reality is an erroneous enquiry. Rather the initial 
enquiry should place the corporation in a specific context23 Then, depending on that 
context, the corporation may be "simultaneously the creature of the state, a complex of 
contracts among the associated parties, and an institution with a real life of its own, 
distinct from its members."24 Where we are analysing the rights and duties in law of the
is the possibility that these insights will lead to the development of a different and perhaps better law of corporate governance.”21 Murakami, HrA Wild Sheep Chase (London: Harvill: 1989) at 6123 Note Ripert's discussion of the long-standing idea that "La personne morale est vivante et agissante. Elle est créée par les associés, maïs la créature est plus forte que le créateur." (Ripert, G, Aspects Juridiques Du Capitalisme Moderne (1951 )at 52)2i Hart, "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" in Hart, HLA Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983), at 31; at 23 he notes that "words like 'corporation'...do not have the straightforward connection with counterparts in the world of fact which most ordinary words have and to which we appeal in our definition of ordinary words."24 Blumberg, P, "The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations" (1990) 15 D el J. Corp. L  283 at 373
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legal person, there is no alternative to indulging in a spot of reification. While peiplexing 
for non-lawyers, to do otherwise is nonsensical. When, however, we are looking at 
contractual arguments about the reasons for the allocation of decision-making power 
within the corporation (as even lawyers recognise that their "entity" must act through 
human agents), to assert simply that the corporation is a separate entity does not advance 
matters. This thesis considers the most important recent arguments about the rationale for 
the allocation of these decision-making rights.
Since ontology does not distinguish the models developed in the first part of this thesis, 
the much-debated ontological issue25 26can be set aside for the purposes of this thesis. The 
divide between the models considered here is not whether the corporation exists as a 
separate entity, but whether its internal arrangements should be considered in contractual 
or hierarchical terms. While it should be admitted at this early stage that this puzzle too 
may ultimately be incapable of a meta-solution which satisfies the demands of all 
disciplines, it remains of fundamental importance because normative arguments about 
regulation turn on this characterisation.27
iij Terminology
Translating key concepts between economic and legal analysis is problematic. To what 
extent should the law's corporate actor be equated with the "firm” of economics? Does 
the meaning of "contract” differ between legal and economic writing? If we are to 
consider corporate constituencies as linked by "contracts", what is the precise scope and 
meaning of that phrase? Does it mean that a legal obligation has been assumed? Or does
2' As Galbraith, JK, The New Industrial State (1972) says at 73: "Few subjects o f  solemn inquiry have been more unproductive than study of the modem large corporation. The reasons are clear. A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality."26 Note the comment of Eisenberg, MA, "The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm" (1999) 24 Delaware Journal o f  Corporate Law  819 at 820 that "the corporation has a dual nature: In one aspect, it consists of reciprocal arrangements; in another, it is a bureaucratic hierarchy."27 The argument between neoclassical contractarians and political stakeholders has superseded but largely retreads earlier ontological arguments between concession theorists, who considered the corporation as a creation of the state, and early contractarians, who considered it a purely private arrangement. The real concern of both debates is (and always was) less about answering a philosophical conundrum and more about grounding pro- or anti-regulatory arguments.
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it simply indicate that an exchange has taken place? Similarly, if  economists label one 
individual as the agent of another, what legal consequences does this have?
Of course, as with the ontological debate, clear answers to these questions do not exist. 
One may attempt to delineate the concepts within their respective subsystems - a difficult 
task for the lawyer faced with economic terminology and vice versa - and to suggest 
ways in which the various disciplines may attempt to take account of the insights 
provided by their differentiated rivals for the claim of most useful heuristic.
Another important point about terminology should be made here. While employees and 
shareholders appear fairly consistently across legal, economic and political analysis, the 
main corporate decision-makers tend to appear as "management" in the economic 
literature and as the board in legal literature.28 29Because of this, when I am discussing 
economic theories, I normally refer to those who take decisions about the running of the 
company as "management", understood in legal terms to include the board and those to 
whom the board has delegated authority. I assume (perhaps rather rashly given recent 
spectacular corporate governance failures such as Enron) that the board holds 
management to account in accordance with lines of command, and therefore that 
management and the board may be lumped together within the homogeneous 
"management" category. By contrast, when considering whether a theoretical argument 
from another discipline is descriptive o f the legal position or normative, a more "legal" 
terminology is appropriate and the term "board" is used, because the law does not 
recognise an intermediate category between board and employee. It is in the board that 
legal responsibility arises. This issue is particularly salient when considering the duties 
imposed on the board in the event of a takeover. Finally, where the issue concerns the
29legal role of the board, I refer to it as such.
28 And, o f course, executive members o f the board and their delegates will also be employees.29 It should also be noted that while an ever-growing number of “soft law” corporate governance codes make a functional distinction between executive directors, who are involved in management, and non­executive directors, who are not, the law does not reflect this distinction. In fact, English company law is increasingly insisting on objective minimum standards of care from all directors, regardless of whether they exercise any management function. While these minimum standards may be raised where individual directors in fact have a higher degree of experience or managerial responsibility (see Re D'Jan o f London Ltd (1994) 1 BCLC 561), all directors are obliged to supervise the management of the company. As Lord
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The reason for this conflict of terms in the literature is fairly clear. The law looks at 
corporate actors for the purpose of imposing fiduciary and common law duties, and so 
whether an actor is classified as a director or as a manager has important legal 
consequences for that individual. Economic analysis on the other hand is looking at the 
firm in terms of resource allocation (and occasionally production), and therefore does not 
need to draw a strict distinction between those who do and do not bear legal 
responsibility. Rather it draws a line between those who "manage" in the sense of 
allocating resources to uses and monitoring their performance, and those who "work" in 
the sense of performing the tasks allocated to them by contract or by command.
A Warning: The Limited Role of the Law in Corporate Governance 
Systems theory counsels that law can only have a limited effect on the underlying social 
system,30 and that its interventions may function as "irritants" to the social system and to 
various other sub-systems.31 However wfell-intentioned, piece-meal legal intervention is 
likely to have wider consequences than first anticipated. This insight is of particular 
salience as regards corporate governance systems, which are supposed to be sensitive to 
the needs of the underlying productive economy.32 They encompass not only law, but 
also economics, politics and social interactions, including, but not necessarily limited to, 
market contracting and management.
One's view' of the role which the law should play in establishing the corporate governance 
framework cannot be separated from the wray in which one defines corporate 
governance.33 The scope and aims of any corporate governance system34 will depend on
Woolf, MR, put it in Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd (1998) 2 BCLC 646 at 653, “[E]ach individual director owes duties to the company to inform himself about its affairs and to join with his co-directors in supervising and controlling them.”30 Teubner, G (1993) (supra note 14) at 125 refers to its “modest role in the dynamics of the processes of evolution of industrial organisation”.31 Teubner, G, "Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law’ Ends up in New Divergences" in Hall, PA and Soskice, D (eds), Varieties o f  Capitalism (2001), 41732 This is discussed at the end of chapter 6.33 As Romano, R, "Corporate Law and Corporate Governance" (1996) 5 Industrial and Corporate Change 277 says, "Corporate law and corporate governance are flip sides of the same coin."
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the model of the company which underlies it* The contours of various definitions of 
corporate governance may be mapped closely against the models of the firm developed in 
the first part of this thesis. For example, Shleifer and Vishny set out a definition of 
corporate governance within the neoclassical perspective:
"Corporate governance deals with the way in which suppliers o f finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment...Our perspective on corporate 
governance is a straightforward agency perspective, sometimes referred to as separation 
of ownership and control. We want to know how investors get the managers to give them 
back their money."34 5
This "agency" definition of corporate governance has come to dominate the financial 
economics literature. In contrast to this, Lipton and Rosenblum argue that
"the ultimate goal of corporate governance is the creation of a healthy economy through 
the development of business operations that operate for the long term and compete 
successfully in the world economy. Corporate governance is a means of ordering the 
relationships and interests of the corporation's constituents: stockholders, management, 
employees, customers, suppliers, other stakeholders and the public. The legal rules that 
constitute a corporate governance system provide the framework for this ordering."36
Building on this broader definition, Margaret Blair seeks to develop a fuller notion of 
corporate governance, "one that refers to the whole set o f legal, cultural, and institutional
34 As Lipton, M and Rosenblum, SA, "A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors” (1991) 58 University o f  Chicago Law Review 187 point out at 187, "Corporate governance is a means, not an end. Before we can speak intelligently about corporate govemance, we must define its goals. In much of the recent academic literature on corporate govemance, however, the goals are either ill-defined or assumed without examination." This explains the lengthy treatment o f models o f the company in the first part of the thesis.35 Shleifer, A and Vishny, RW, "A Survey of Corporate Govemance" (1997) 52 Journal o f  Finance 737 at 737-836 Lipton, M and Rosenblum, SA (1991) {supra note 28) at 189; in broader terms, Teubner, "Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their Beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to the Legal Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility" in Hopt, KJ and Teubner, G (eds), Corporate Govemance and Directors' Liabilities (1985), 149 suggests at 162 that "the social function of the economy", of which companies form an important part, should be defined in terms of "ensuring the satisfaction o f future social needs".
arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls 
them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they 
undertake are allocated."37 Within non-agency economic analyses of the firm, Zingales' 
famous definition approaches corporate governance in terms of "the complex set of 
constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm."38 
Similarly, Deakin and Hughes have argued that a "broader conception of stakeholder 
relationships addresses the economic effectiveness of the relationship between 
stakeholders and directors."39
Moving on to consider political stakeholding approaches to corporate governance, it 
might be suggested that, broadly speaking, it encompasses "the rules under which 
managers run the company and are held accountable for their stewardship."40 Streeck 
elaborates that "Good corporate governance in the Continental-European sense is one that 
ensures an equitable and socially beneficial balance between the interests of the various 
stakeholders in the corporation, protecting social peace and enabling the firm to function 
in harmony with its social environment."41 Similarly, Robert Dahl has argued that the 
"large corporation should be thought of as a political system, as an entity whose leaders 
exercise great power, influence and control over other human beings...If, however, the 
large corporation is a social enterprise and a public political system, the government of 
the corporation should be very much a public matter."42
37 Blair, MM, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance fo r  the Twenty-First Century (1995) at 338 Zingales, "Corporate Governance" in Newman, P (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary' o f Economics and the Law (1998), 49539 Deakin, S and Hughes, A (1997) {supra note 1) at 540 Plender, J, A Stake in the Future: The Stakeholding Solution (1997) at 1841 Streeck, W, "The Transformation of Corporate Organization in Europe: An Overview" (2001) MPIfG Working Paper 01/8, December 200142 Dahl, RA, "A Prelude to Corporate Reform" (1972) Business and Society Review 17 at 18; at 19-20 he refers to the "usually unexamined assumption that investors, whether individuals or firms, have some special right to govern the firms in which they invest. I can discover absolutely no moral or philosophical basis for such a right. Why investors and not consumers, workers, or, for that matter, the general public?" Of course, as Chapter I shows, the assumption of investor control has been rationalised on an economic basis. Chapters 2 and 3 set out political and economic challenges to that rationalisation.
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An appreciation that company law is only one among many influences43 on corporate 
governance means that legal prescriptions should be made with some care. With this 
limitation in mind, any discussion of the way in which company law allocates rights to 
the various corporate constituencies must begin with the various models of the company 
which provide rationales for the default terms provided by the law. Company law simply 
"serves both to facilitate and to regulate the conduct of the corporate enterprise."44 
According to the contractual approach, company law is nothing more than a standardised 
(and enabling45) framework produced as a public good with the aim of reducing 
transaction costs, and within which decisions about the allocation of corporate resources 
may be made. By facilitating contracting in this way, it arguably contributes to its 
regulatory goal o f efficiency. Models which look beyond conventional preoccupation 
with the agency relationship between management and shareholders advocate, inter alia, 
reforms of company law, since this is one of sources of norms controlling corporate 
decision-making and so has a role to play in ensuring better governance. Advocates of the 
agency perspective treat the board o f directors as a special-purpose governance 
mechanism for the exclusive benefit of shareholders. They argue that the law should 
reflect this evolution and "the background term should be the one that is either picked by 
contract expressly or is the operational assumption of successful firms."46
By contrast to the limited role which the law plays in corporate governance systems, the 
models of the company do exercise a strong pull on doctrinal understanding of law. 
While the neoclassical model o f the company may not be as pre-eminent in the UK as it 
is in the US, its "legacy can be seen in the preoccupation of many UK scholars with 
internal governance and accountability issues within the corporation to the detriment of a
43 Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 31) at 3 lists some o f the other influences: ’’aspects of corporate finance, securities and bankruptcy law, laws governing the behavior o f  financial institutions, labor relations practices, contract law and theory, property rights, compensation systems, internal information and control systems."44 Eisenberg, MA, "Corporate Law and Social Norms’’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Journal 1253 at 12534i Meaning that it can be adapted to fit the needs of a given corporation: see the discussion of Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D, The Economic Structure o f Company Law( 1991) in chapter 4.46 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note xx) at 36
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wider view of the corporate role in society."47 By contrast, countries such as Germany 
which have a less contractualist, more stakeholder-orientated corporate theory have a 
more fluid division and interaction between company and labour law.
The challenge for lawyers who advocate legal reform on the basis of the second and third 
models of the company is to find reasons why company law is both an appropriate and 
necessary tool to implement and support their model. This thesis is a small step along that 
difficult journey.
47 Wheeler, S, Corporations and the Third Way (2002) at 5. Its influence may also be seen in the normal understanding that “the interests of the company” should be equated with the interests of the shareholders, the interests of employees being instrumentalised to that end.
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Part One:
The Three Models 
of the Company

Chapter One: The Neoclassical or Agency Mode!
Introduction
In this thesis, I refer to the dominant paradigm of the firm within the economic literature 
as the "neoclassical"1 or "agency" model.2 It is of great academic and practical interest as 
it forms the basis of much economic analysis of company law and corporate governance. 
It deconstructs the corporate entity to reveal a collection o f interdependent contracts, a 
considerable departure from orthodox economic analysis, according to which the firm 
embodied a fixed production function overseen by a manager.3 The "neoclassical" label 
refers to the particular conception o f contract at the heart of this model. With the 
exception of the contract between shareholders and management, the corporation's 
constituent contracts are assumed to make detailed provision for all future contingencies, 
or to be fully "presentiated"4 and enforceable. The "agency" label refers to the normative 
conclusions drawn by advocates of this model: the law should take steps to reduce or 
minimise the "agency costs" which arise when the entrepreneurial function (consisting of 
risk-taking and decision-making) is divided between management and shareholders of the 
company.
This chapter looks at the development of the agency model, considers its normative 
implications, and critiques it from the perspective of hierarchy. In line with the focus of 
this thesis, particular attention is focused on the model's treatment of employees. 
However, since its central concern is with the relationship between shareholders and 
management, much of the theoretical literature advancing this perspective does not deal
1 This is Bratton's terminology: see Bratton, WW, "The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History" (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1471 at 1478-802 The reason for describing it in this way rather than using the more common "nexus of contracts" is because the "productive coalition" model developed in Chapter 3 also deconstructs the corporate entity and analyses the relationships and allocation of rights within corporations in contractual terms. Thus both models may be subsumed within the umbrella term "nexus of contracts".3 Chandler, AD, "Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial Enterprise" (1992) 6 Journal o f  Economic Perspectives 79-100 at 85; also Hart, 0 , "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1757. Of course, this orthodox economic view largely coincides with the legal "entity" view of the corporation.4 See Macneil, IR, "Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus"" (1980) 75 Northwestern University Law Review 1018
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directly with the position of employees. Accordingly, the analysis is carried out indirectly 
by identifying the model's underlying assumptions.
The Contractual Analysis of Corporations : ' *
The firm is often described as a "nexus of contracts".5 This modem economic ontology of 
the firm has certain analytical advantages when compared with the law's traditional 
"entity" approach to the company. One advantage is that it avoids the mystification (to 
non-lawyers) o f granting separate personality to a company. The starting point for 
contractual analysis is that the "'personhood' of a corporation is a matter o f convenience 
rather than reality."6 While the "entity" ontology continues to be useful in considering the 
corporation's external relations, e.g., with suppliers of goods, deconstruction o f the 
corporation into its constituent contracts offers analytical advantages as regards internal 
relationships. It focuses on the agreed terms of participation of each group, and the 
protection they receive from the law. This approach is very influential both in economics, 
which has come to recognise that internal relationships have a strong bearing on the 
efficiency with which the production function is carried out, and in law, which focuses on 
the rights and obligations of corporate participants. 11
i *
Whether company law should treat employees like any other "outsider" contractor, on the 
basis that they have an external, market-governed relationship with the corporate entity, 
or as affected by and forming an integral part of the corporation's internal governance 
structure is a central question for this thesis.7 The contractual approach to the firm has 
much to add to this debate. In its agency incarnation, it firmly suggests that employees 
should be located outside, while the model discussed in chapter three suggests that, in 
many cases at least, employees should be brought inside. It refuses to treat the law’s 
distribution of control rights as given or written in stone. Instead it insists that "ownership
s Originating with Jensen, MC and Meckling, WH, "Theory o f the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 Journal o f  Financial Economics 305.6 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D, The Economic Structure o f Company Law (1991) at 127 On this question generally, see Wedderbum, Lord, "Employees, Partnership and Company Law" (2002) 31 Industrial Law Journal 99-111.
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of the firm is an irrelevant concept"8 and seeks contractual explanations for the allocation 
o f control or "management rights", including "the right to make decisions not 
contractually predetermined."9
In contrast to the model developed in Chapter Two, which looks at companies and 
company law in terms of democracy and social citizenship, contractual analysis sets itself 
the task of providing guidance to company law about how its provisions might support 
economic efficiency. Neoclassical contractual!sts argue that economic efficiency requires 
that rights in corporate governance should only be granted to management and 
shareholders: this chapter traces the rationale for that proposal.10
The Meaning of "Contract”
Here we find our first inter-systemic conflict. "Contract" is a descriptive term used in 
both legal and economic subsystems. Economists, who lead the field in advancing the 
"nexus" perspective, and lawyers use the term very differently. Descriptively, lawyers 
employ the term contract to label a situation in which there has been an exchange of (at 
least two) promises, or a "present communication of a commitment to engage in a 
reciprocal measured exchange."11 By contrast, economists use the term in a looser sense 
than lawyers, referring to "relationships characterized by reciprocal expectations and 8910
8 Fama, EF, "Agency Problems and the Theory o f the Firm” (1980) 88 J  Pol Econ 288-306 at 290. He adds that "Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The finn is just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs." Similarly, Alchian, AA and Demsetz, H, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization" (1972) 62 American Economic Review 111 at 784 and 787 that shareholders should not be thought of as owners, but as optimistic investors who contract for the residual. All contractors choose the form of their return in accordance with their view of the prospects of the venture. Employees and bondholders, who contract for a fixed return, should be considered pessimistic or risk-averse investors.9 Dow and Putteiman, "Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor An Assessment of Proposed Explanations" in Blair, MM and Roe, MJ (eds), Employees & Corporate Governance (1999), at 1910 A detailed critique of the reasoning and conclusions reached by this model is offered by Chapter 3 which also uses contractual methodology but reaches rather different conclusions about the position of employees. By contrast, Chapter Two discusses the extent to which concerns other than economic efficiency might give rise to normative arguments that company law should look after the interests of employees as well as shareholders and other investors in companies.11 Macneil, I, The Relational Theory o f  Contract: Selected Works o f Ian Macneil (2001) at 131, extracted from The New Social Contract (1980)
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behavior."12 Faced with this conflict of description, Eisenberg suggests that we should 
understand the term "nexus of contracts" in the economic literature as referring to the 
wider concept of a "nexus of reciprocal arrangements" which are not necessarily legally 
enforceable.13 This differentiation o f such a central term greatly hinders discourse 
between law and economics, and o f course, causes problems where one of the parties 
seeks to rely on their legal rights under the "contract".
The normative implications of the term also differ. The economist's "contract" is a 
"reciprocal arrangement" for exchange arranged on the market, and so is accompanied by 
a normative argument that it should not be interfered with, on the basis that it is 
presumptively pareio efficient (in the absence of some evidence of market failure). Since 
both parties have voluntarily chosen to enter into the arrangement in question, they must 
be made better off by the exchange, in the sense that they value what they receive more 
highly than what they trade. Repeated exchanges lead to the progressive allocation of 
society’s resources to their most highly valued uses.14 Where the "contract" is complex 
and its continuation is projected into the future, one or both o f the parties may be granted 
considerable discretion in order to deal with change.15
By contrast, in a lawyer's mind, the term "contract" carries implies that the promises in 
question are legally binding by reference to certain tests of recognition (including that all 
terms have been settled in advance), and capable o f enforcement from the moment the
12 Hart, O (1989) (supra note 3) at 1764 fh 30; also Eisenberg, MA, "The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature o f the Firm" (1999) 24 Delaware Journal o f  Corporate Law 819 at 822-313 Eisenberg, MA (1999) (supra); the economist's broader notion of contract incorporates implicit contracts and social norms, discussed further in Chapter 3. Rock, EB and Wachter, ML, "Symposium on Norms and Corporate Law: Introduction" (2001) 149 University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 1607 at 7 argue that the economist's assumption that many corporate contracts would be "self-enforcing" or "self-governing" through the actions of the parties themselves (for example, through reputation), meant that "the economics literature did not need to differentiate between privately and judicially enforced agreements...a legal system is simply not included in the model."14 See for example, Epstein, R, "In Defense of the Contract at Will" (1984) 51 University o f  Chicago Law Review 947 at 956-7ls In the context o f a socio-legal analysis of contract's "planning and co-ordinating role", Vincent-Jones, P, "Contractual Governance: Institutional and Organizational Analysis" (2000) 20 OJLS 317 points out at 326 that "hierarchical elements built into complex contracts overcome problems associated with difficulties of specification, high uncertainty, and asset specificity." However, he emphasises that the "hierarchical dimensions of contract should not be identified or confused with legal obligations and sanctions."
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contract is concluded;16 if it arises at all, the question of whether the arrangement is 
efficient is a secondary one. The lawyer’s enforceable contract is far narrower than the 
economist's efficient contract.
Opening up the Corporate Entity: Ronald Coase and the Theory of the Firm
All contractual analysis of company law draws to some extent on Coase's seminal 1937 
article, "The Nature of the Finn".17 Coase contradicted the conventional zero transaction 
cost approach, insisting that in some cases efficient market allocations would be 
precluded by the "cost of using the price mechanism."18 Firms are a voluntary response of 
rational actors to the existence of transaction costs and "represent a more efficient method 
of organizing production"19
Before Coase, orthodox economic theory closely resembled the legal "entity" approach, 
treating the firm as a "black box" or a "monad".20 In both law and economics, the "firm" 
was a metaphysical market actor, which simply responded to market signals, and was 
assumed to have a fixed production function. The manager's role was to choose the most 
appropriate option from a fixed set of feasible production plans, and then buy and sell 
inputs and outputs on competitive markets in accordance with that plan.21 No cognitive or 
other limitations on the part of the manager were taken into account, so the success or 
failure of the firm depended upon its response to its market environment rather than its 
internal organisation.
16 Ripert, G, Aspects Juridiques Du Capitalisme Moderne (1951) at 95 discusses the logical and legal difficulties which arise if  one attempts to view the corporation as a "contract” in the narrow legal sense: under corporate law, even the most fundamental parts of the contract may be rewritten without the consent of all.17 (1937) ns 4 Economica 386; reprinted in Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" in Coase, Ronald H The Firm, the Market, and the Law (1988), 33. Generally in this thesis, the corporation is treated as one example of a firm, albeit by far the most prevalent in modem economic organisation.18 ibid at 3819 ibid at 37, fn 14. Coase claims at 14 that "in the absence of transaction costs, there is no economic basis for the existence of the firm." He rules out division of labour, risk and co-ordination of production as rationales for the firm.20 Williamson, "The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction" in Aoki, M, Gustafsson, B, and Williamson, OE (eds), The Firm As a Nexus o f  Treaties (1990), at 821 See Hart, O (1989) (supra note 3)
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Coase broke new ground by arguing that the firm has a variable production function 
which "depends on the contracting and property-rights system within which the firm 
operates."22 The "visible hand"23 of the entrepreneur supersedes the price mechanism o f  
the market as co-ordinating mechanism for the productive activity in question wherever 
internal organisation is more cost-effective than decentralised market contracting.24 Since 
both methods involve transaction costs, the choice is made on a comparative transaction 
cost basis. The entrepreneur makes decisions to allocate resources to what he considers 
their most appropriate use.25 Co-ordination through an entrepreneur replaces a series o f  
explicit contracts setting out the rights and obligations of the parties at great length. 
Under this single "contract”, the owner of the input grants the entrepreneur26 a limited 
power of direction in exchange for a fixed or floating remuneration.27 This simplification 
allows the same productive result to be achieved while economising on the costs o f  
specifying each contract in detail. It is the entrepreneur's power of direction which marks 
the firm off from the market:
12 Jensen, M and Meckling WH, "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination" (1979) 52 Journal o f Business 46923 Chandler, AD, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977)24 Coase, (1988) (supra note 17) at 7. The development o f the theory o f transaction costs may even be traced back to Kaldor, N, "The Equilibrium of the Firm" (1934) 44 Economic Journal 60-76, who noted in Part VI that "...the existing organization of the economic system, the division of the productive organization into a great number of independent units under a single control, is essentially one adapted to the existence o f dynamic change and imperfect foresight....25 Coase, (1988) (supra note 7) at 35 contrasts the operation of the price mechanism with the entrepreneur’s power of direction: "The price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result, A moves from Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and Y, except in so far as it compensates for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world we find that there are many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so." Of course, as Coase recognises, the cognitive limitations of the entrepreneur will be one of the costs which fixes limits on the firm's size.26 Or, in the case of a company, the management: see the discussion of Berle and Means below.27 While traditionally the labour input was provided for a fixed return, the providers of share capital are considered to contract for a floating or "residual" return. In both cases, management can, within certain bounds, determine the use which will be made of the input. Fama, EG and Jensen, MC, suggest in "Separation of Ownership and Control" (1983) 26 Journal o f  Law and Economics 301 at 303 that "the contracts of most agents contain the implicit or explicit provision that, in exchange for the specified payoff, the agent agrees that the resources he provides can be used to satisfy the interests of residual claimants." The fixed remuneration employment contract also contributes to efficiency by eliminating future disputes about the price and the distribution of the "co-operative surplus”. See for example, Cheffins, BR, Company Law: Theory, Structure, Operation (1997) at 33.
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1"When the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent 
on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a "firm" may be obtained."28
The economic concept of the power of direction is translated into law in the form of 
managerial prerogative and is one of the key tests for the identification of an employment 
relationship.29 For Coase, the employment relationship was the archetypal relationship for 
which the firm was particularly likely to emerge, precisely because a "very short term 
contract would be unsatisfactory."30
Splitting the Atom of Entrepreneurship: Berle and Means' The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property
The application of Coase's theory of the firm to the large public corporation requires the 
identification of the functional equivalent of the entrepreneur. In their seminal analysis of 
the modem corporation, The Modem Corporation and Private Property31 (which 
preceded Coase's theory of the firm by five years), Berle and Means argued that the risk- 
bearing and managerial (or decision-making) functions, which had previously been 
united in the person of the entrepreneur, had, during the evolution of the modem 
corporate form, been split between shareholders and management respectively. They 
referred to this as the "separation of ownership and control" or "managerialism".
Berle and Means' analysis of the corporation forms the blueprint for the agency model, 
leading its advocates to argue that systems of corporate governance, including company
28 Coase (1988) {supra note 17) at 40, although he notes that the extent to which direction is permitted by the contract may vary, which suggests a continuum between market and "firm" relationships rather than a straight dichotomy.29 In fact, Coase tested his model against the "real world" in the form of the employment relationship, noting that "The legal concept of 'employer and employee' and the economic concept of the finn are not identical, in that the firm may imply control over another person’s property as wrell as over their labour. But the identities of these two concepts are sufficiently close for an examination of the legal concept to be of value in appraising the worth of the economic concept." Coase (1988) (supra note 17) at 53-4 fh 4830 Coase (1988) (supra note 17) at 40. This may be contrasted with a commodity contract where "the mainitems can be stated in advance and the details which will be decided later will be of minor significance" (ibid). Coase does not elaborate on why short term contracts are unsatisfactory for labour supply. In Chapter 3 it will be suggested that longer term arrangements are necessary for key factors of production in order to provide both flexibility and continuity of input. While Coase concentrates on flexibility to respond to the environment, assured continuity is also essential where labour evolves with the firm and is not readily substitutable with alternatives available on the market.
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law, should focus on resolving the conflicts between management and shareholders to 
which this division of labour gives rise. Managerialism seriously weakened shareholders' 
capacity to exercise control over management, because increasing geographical 
dispersal32 and diversification of their shareholdings led to shareholders becoming 
"rationally apathetic" about monitoring management,33 which by default increased the 
degree of latitude available to management.
Berle and Means drew a parallel between the factory labourer after the industrial 
revolution and the shareholder in this type of corporation. Just as the labourer had 
surrendered his right to control over his labour to his master in return for wages, so the 
shareholder in the large corporation had ceased to be a "quasi-partner, manager and 
entrepreneur",34 becoming instead a "passive property owner".35 This "equally 
revolutionary" change in the nature of the corporation "placed the wealth of innumerable 
individuals under the same central control...The property owner who invests in a modem 
corporation so far surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has 
exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he may become merely 
recipient of the wages of capital."36 This had "destroyed the unity that we commonly call 
property... and divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined 
to it."37 Shareholders who had "exchanged control for liquidity"38 now looked to the 
market in order to realise their expectations.39 Although "the law still maintains the
31 Berle, AA and Means, G, The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1932)32 This dispersal became international with the huge demands for capital made by railway construction: see Chandler, AD (1977) {supra note 23) at 90-233 This is the famous "collective action problem" which permeates inter-shareholder relations. Where a shareholder incurs costs monitoring management, he will not receive commensurate private benefit, as less diligent shareholders "free ride" on his efforts wherever there is an improvement in the standard of management of the company: see further, for example, Parkinson, J, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory o f  Company Law  (1993) at 54-6; Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) {supra note 6) at 66-7; Cheffins, BR (1997) {supra note 27) at 62-4.34 Berle, AA and Means, G (1932) {supra note 31) at 24535 ibid at 311, emphasis in original36 ibid at 5; this development is also described by Kennedy, A A, The End o f Shareholder Value: The Real Effects o f the Shareholder Value Phenomenon and the Crisis It Is Bringing to Business (2000), who draws a distinction between "investors who had established companies to commercialize a promising technology... [and those] in the business to make a buck by delivering value to their customers" (29) and finally those who aimed to "make as much money as fast as possible" (38)37 ibid at 738 ibid at 25039 ibid at 247-250
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conception of a sharp dividing line recognizing the bondholder as a lender of capital and 
the stockholder as a quasi-partner in the enterprise", in reality the shareholder had 
become "simply a supplier of capital on terms less definite than those customarily given 
or demanded by bondholders."40 However, the law did not reflect this change and 
continued to insist on insider status for shareholders.
With the passing of the power of direction to the group Berle and Means described as 
"control", fundamental questions arose about the role of management under the new 
paradigm. Berle and Means argued that the formerly private corporation had become 
"quasi-public",41 and that "Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand 
against the paramount interests of the community."42 Accordingly, it was "conceivable - 
indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive - that the 'control' of 
the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a great 
variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of 
the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity."43
While agency theorists share Berle and Means' fear of an unconstrained "control" group 
constituting a "corporate oligarchy coupled with the probability of an era of corporate 
plundering",44 the technocratic solution favoured by Berle and Means is anathema to 
them. Agency theorists argue that "ownership" and "control" should be reunited, or at 
least have their divergent interests aligned, on the grounds that the corporation must be 
run in someone's interests. Failing this, management will be rendered unaccountable and 
free to pursue their own self interest. Accordingly, agency theory favours Berle and 
Means "possible" solution, whereby "the group in control of a corporation would be 
placed in a position of trusteeship in which it would be called on to operate or arrange for
40 ibid at 24541 ibid at 5, defining it as "a corporation in which a large measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the multiplication of owners"42 ibid at 31243 ibid at 312-3. Berle's agency theory-tinged arguments in favour of managerial accountability to shareholders in his 1932 debate with Dodd (discussed in Chapter 2) suggest that he did not consider this outcome very likely.44 ibid at 311; they considered this different from the "quasi-public" option discussed above, according to which the corporation would be run according to some (unspecified) notion of public policy.
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the operation o f the corporation for the sole benefit of the security owners despite the fact 
that the latter have ceased to have power over or to accept responsibility for the active 
property in which they have an interest."4 *5
By arguing that the law should treat the directors as fiduciaries for the shareholders 
specifically, rather than the company as a whole, the agency model seeks to implement 
the economic concept of an "agent" into the legal system, thereby turning back the clock 
to an era when shareholder partners occupied centre stage in company law.46 The widely- 
perceived failings of the conglomerate era47 transformed the economic view o f  
managerialism from a (Revolution in business form into a problem of management 
accountability. While Berle and Means considered the consequences o f splitting the atom 
of property, agency theorists consider that some semblance o f accountability can only be 
achieved by putting it back together again.
The Meaning of "Agency"
This division of entrepreneurial labour between shareholders and management lies at the 
heart of the "agency" model, which treats management as the "agents" (or "employees") 
of the shareholders. While the dangers of managerial unaccountability are very widely 
discussed, the agency relationship between management and shareholders is also praised 
for giving rise to greater efficiency, in particular by allowing a division of labour and 
specialisation o f the two groups, with one bearing risk and the other skilled in decision­
4i ibid at 311. It is notable that Berle and Means did not favour this possibility, commenting that "Were thiscourse followed, the bulk of American industry might soon be operated by trustees for the sole benefit o f  inactive and irresponsible security owners."46 While this might not make sense from a historical perspective (see for example, Ireland, P, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 32), these normative arguments from economic theory are having an increasing influence over conceptions of the scope andfunction of company law: the outcome o f  the Company Law Review in England and Wales (see theGovernment White Paper on Modernising Company Law), and in particular the reformulation of directors'duties, appears far closer to an agency conception of the corporation than to managerialism or any of the forms of stakeholding discussed in this thesis. Schedule 2 states that the directors should only take into account "the companys need to foster its business relationships, including those with its employees and suppliers and the customers for its products or services" as a means to promoting “the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.” For criticism of this, see Wedderbum (2002) (supra note 7).47 See further Chapter 4.
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making.48 Since the shareholders cannot specify in detail ex ante the precise way in 
which management will advance their interests, management must be given sufficient 
discretion to enable them to respond to changes in the firm’s environment. While 
discretion allows management to make best use of their skills, it also rules out the most 
usual means of control, namely express contract (in the legal sense), leading agency 
theorists to seek other methods for ensuring management serves the interests of 
shareholders. Accordingly, within the neoclassical perspective, this incomplete contract is 
simultaneously the defining efficiency-enhancing characteristic of the modem 
corporation and the key problem with which corporate governance and the law must deal.
The use of the term "agency" here gives rise to another systemic conflict as it has 
different meanings in law and economics. Cheffms describes the economic relationship 
of agency in terms of factual dependency.49 Jensen and Meckling define "an agency 
relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent."50 The economic notion of 
agency focuses on the problem of vulnerability to opportunism which arises where one 
economic actor is dependent on another. Like all economic actors, agents tend to put their 
own interests first, giving rise to "agency costs", which are "composed of the value of the 
output lost from the agent’s self-serving conduct together with the costs the principal 
incurs in attempting to regulate such behaviour."51 The precise cause of these costs may 
be incompetence, opportunism or "empire-building" (enlarging the business for motives 
of prestige rather than for the benefit of the shareholders) on the part of the agent. The 
agency model's prime concern is the identification and implementation of methods which 
may be used to minimise - it is recognised that they will never be eradicated completely -
48 See, e.g., Fama, EF (1980) (supra note 8) at 291 who argues that "The major loss in retaining the concept of the entrepreneur is that one is prevented from developing a perspective on management and risk bearing as separate factors of production, each faced with a market for its services that provides alternative opportunities, and, in the case of management, motivation towards performance."49 Cheffms, BR (1997) (supra note 27) at 4550 Jensen, MC and Meckling, WH (1976) (supra note 5) at 30851 Cheffins, BR (1997) (supra note 27) at 45; Cheung, SNS, "The Contractual Nature of the Firm" (1983) 26 Journal o f  Law and Economics 1 at 10 argues that agency costs should be considered as transaction costs. In this sense, the agency model follow's in the Coasean tradition, albeit that transaction costs arise beyond this central relationship (particularly as developed by Williamson, see Chapter 3).
35
these costs, such as improved incentives to the agent to serve the principal’s interests, or 
the design of (more) effective market-based monitoring mechanisms.52 Such measures 
will be put in place where they have the effect of conferring a net benefit on the principal, 
i.e., the costs o f operating the mechanism are lower than the amount which is saved in 
agency costs. Gilson describes the much sought after solution to the agency problem as 
the "organizational Holy Grail"53 which has occupied American corporate governance 
theory since Berle and Means.
In comparison, the legal notion of agency is much narrower, describing a 
"relationship...where the agent has authority to alter the principal's legal position."54 The 
law imposes obligations on those actors who are caught within a formal category. Not all 
economic agents will be categorised by the law as agents, although many will. Thus, 
when economic literature refers to management as agents of the shareholders, it does not 
purport to be descriptive of the legal position, in the sense that they are legally bound to 
serve the interests of the shareholders as such. Instead, it argues that this is what the law, 
along with the other mechanisms of corporate governance, should aim for in order to 
enhance the wealth of society.
Davies confirms that in the pre-managerialist company of the nineteenth century, the law 
in fact treated management as the agents of the shareholders, but notes the "more modem 
view o f the directors as the agents of the company but receiving their powers by virtue o f 
the company's constitution, which is controlled by the shareholders."55 If one mistakenly 
interprets the term "agency" in its technical legal sense, the model appears to be an 
attempt to return to the situation before the emergence o f the Berle and Means
52 The market for corporate control and other adaptive mechanisms are discussed in part two, in particular in Chapter 4.53 Gilson, RJ, "Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Insitutions Matter?" (1996) 74 Wash. V. L  Q. 327 at 33154 Davies, P, Introduction to Company Law (2002) at 118; the narrower concept may be explained on the basis that the law's task is to decide when to impose liability on the agent and/or the principal.si ibid; see also Ireland, P (1999) {supra note 46) who traces the evolution o f  the corporation from its roots in partnership, via a partnership with separate legal personality, to (at 42) its eventual reification and depersonification leading to the "radical economic separation" of companies and their shareholders. Ireland notes the strong pull those partnership roots have on company law, and in particular in maintaining shareholders at the centre of the model.
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corporation and separate legal personality. By contrast, the economic concept embodies 
the irreconcilable conflict between the two groups, and the argument about whether 
management should be made more accountable to shareholders, as the agency model 
suggests, or be allowed more autonomy to balance the needs of various constituencies, as 
the productive coalition model suggests.
The Agency Model and Complete Contracts
While it insists that the contract between shareholders and management is incomplete, the 
agency model assumes that the other productive inputs are provided pursuant to complete 
contracts, which are discrete and fully presentiated. Therefore, contracts of employment 
are dealt with entirely adequately by the rules of classical contract law and of no concern 
to the agency model. Employees are in no sense dependent on management (that is, they 
are not in an "economic" agency relationship with them).56
The application of the agency model to employees received its classic exposition from 
Alchian and Demsetz in 1972.57 They wrote that
"[i]t is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by flat, by 
authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the conventional market. 
This is delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power of fiat, no 
authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary 
market contracting between any two people...To speak of managing, directing, or 
assigning workers to various tasks is a deceptive way of noting that the employer is 
involved in renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both 
parties...Long-term contracts between employer and employee are not the essence of the 
organization we call a firm."58
56 This point is important because the model developed in Chapter 3 revolves around the idea that employees may be dependent on management because of the same kind of contracting problems which beset the management-shareholder relationship.57 Alchian, A A and Demsetz, H, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization" (1972) 62 American Economic Review 11158 ibid; Williamson, OE, The Economic Institutions o f Capitalism (1985) notes at 53 fh 11 that Alchian has since rejected this position. Bearing in mind the difficulties of applying economic theory directly to the law, arguments could nevertheless arise as to whether or not Alchian and Demsetz's model of the
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Although it might be argued that Alchian and Demsetz are using the term "contract" in its 
economic sense, this statement does appears to contradict Coase’s notion o f the firm to 
the extent that he saw the entrepreneur’s power of direction as its defining feature, and 
employment as the paradigmatic case where a short-term contract would be 
unsatisfactory.59 Their analysis excludes both transaction costs and guaranteeing 
continuity of factor supply as explanations for the firm.60 Contracts are assumed to 
renegotiable wherever necessary at negligible cost and replacement productive inputs to 
be freely available on the market, allowing the firm to expand and contract costlessly in 
response to changes in its environment as it pursues the shareholders’ interests. There is 
no clear distinction between allocations by the firm and allocations by the market.61 
Alchian and Demsetz even argue that no distinction should be drawn between the grocer- 
customer relationship and the grocer-employee relationship on the basis that both 
customer and employee are free to leave the grocer ("exit") and contract elsewhere
employment relationship is descriptive of the way in which the law deals with it. It might be argued that US law, with its doctrinal assumption of employment at will, which construes the employment contract as a series o f contracts lasting a moment, each fully executed before a new one is entered into, comes close to implementing this model into legal reality: see for example Summers, ’’Employment at Will in the United States: the Divine Right of Employers" in Scritti in Onore Di Gino Giugni (1999) at 1603. This is confirmed by Selznick, P, The Moral Commonwealth (1992) at 308: "The 'contract at will* is not much of a contract. No continuing relationship is established or even contemplated, and one cannot readily sue for breach o f  an agreement that may be terminated without notice. The idea o f contract is so attenuated here that, it could be said, ‘the labor contract is not a contract, it is a continuing renewal of a contract at every successive moment, implied simply from the fact that the laborer keeps at work and the employer accepts his product."’ (citing JR Commons, Legal Foundations o f Capitalism (1924), 285). See also Epstein, R (1984) (supra note 14) at 948 whose evolutionary approach suggests that the "survival of the contract at will, and the frequency of its use in private markets, might well be taken as a sign of its suitability for employment relations." Epstein argues at 951 that the contract at will is a  rule of construction which provides an efficient solution to the problem o f  filling in gaps in incomplete contracts. It allows the decision-maker to respond to unforeseeable changes in the firm's environment by altering the firm's contractual commitments.59 However, Alchian, AA and Demsetz, H (1972) (supra note 57) argue at 783 that their "view of the firm is not necessarily inconsistent with Coase’s" and that their model goes further than his in that it explains the position o f the monitors and the residual claimant. They also disagree with his interpretation of the contractual position o f employees: "...it is not true that employees are generally employed on the basis of long-term contractual relationships any more than on a series o f short-term or indefinite length contracts." (784)They consider the firm to be no more than a monitoring mechanism which reduces "shirking" in team production situations. The "agency” problem discussed in this chapter only arises when the group of functions associated with ownership is split They therefore treat the board as monitoring management on behalf o f  the shareholders, and so the task o f corporate governance systems should be to ensure that the agent acts for the benefit o f the principal.
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(assuming competitive markets).61 2 The identity of his employees or customers makes no 
difference to the grocer: he considers them fully interchangeable and generic.63
In another seminal article,64 Jensen and Meckling further developed the contractual 
approach, arguing that
"The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a 
nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence o f  
divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows o f the organization which can 
generally be sold without permission o f  the other contracting individuals. While this 
definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual 
nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial set of questions * 
why particular sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organization, what 
the consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes 
exogenous to the organization. Viewed in this way, it makes little or no sense to try to 
distinguish those things which are "inside" the firm (or any other organization) from 
those things that are "outside" of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of 
complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners 
of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output."65
This statement has been very influential and is rightly famous for its contribution to the 
ontological debate, that it is an error to personify the corporation, given that "we seldom 
fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual...."66 
Corporate personality is an "artificial construct under the law which allows certain
61 In this regard, note the comment of Jensen, MC and Meckling, WH (1976) (supra note 5) at 311: "The "behavior” of the firm is like the behavior of a market, i.e., the outcome of a complex equilibrium process."62 Alchian, AA and Demsetz, H (1972) (supra note 57) at 777.63 Hart, O (1989) (supra note 3) at 2.3 has elaborated on Alchian and Demsetz’s rather elliptical dismissal of Coase's dichotomy between the finn and market, explaining that the employment relationship does not differ from market contracting in the sense that the employee who disobeys instructions will be fired rather than sued, which is "typically the sanction that one independent contractor will impose on another whose performance he does not like."64 Jensen, MC and Meckling, WH (1976) (supra note 5)65 ibid at 31166 ibid at 311
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organizations to be treated as individuals.“67 Lawyers are (or should be) aware that their 
corporations are not real in a physical sense: rather they are simply devices of 
attribution.68 Neoclassical contractualists consider this deconstruction fatal for arguments 
that corporations should be socially responsible.69 As a collection of contracts, all 
participation in “the corporation" is voluntary and participants are protected by the terms 
of their agreement. If contracts give rise to externalities (effects on non-parties), 
compensation should be agreed by bargaining in the first place (in order to reach wealth- 
maximising solutions), or if transaction costs are too high and preclude this, by legal 
regulation.70 In the absence of externalities, the neoclassical model opposes legal 
intervention in voluntary arrangements.
Deconstructing the company in this way does give rise to difficulties when one moves 
beyond management-shareholder relationships and attempts to identify the other party to 
the employment contract, a matter of great legal importance. Presumably the "employer" 
is the shareholders, clothed in limited liability71 and negotiating through their manager 
agents. Yet, analysis in these terms is normative: it is not consistent with the law as it 
stands, since it involves equating the company with the shareholders, something that the 
law has consistently refused to do. It also begs the fundamental question of why, in 
economic terms, the employees should be considered "outsiders" in company law.72
67 ibid at 310 fn 1268 See in particular, Teubner, G, "Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the "Essence" of the Legal Person" (1988) 36 American Journal o f  Comparative Law 130.69 Jensen, MC and Meckling, WH (1976) {supra note 5) at 311. Of course, within the legal system, the corporation itself may be held liable in tort. Within a contractual model, this could be explained as imposing liability for externalities on the parties to the contract through the legal mechanism of the corporate entity. The thrust of their argument appears to be that in the wider social system there is no responsibility of the corporation as distinct from the parties to the contracts which constitute it, Jensen and Meckling, somewhat perplexingly, however, conclude at 357 that ”[t]he publicly held business corporation is an awesome social invention."70 Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", reprinted in Coase, RH The Firm, the Market, and the Law (1988) at 95. A full discussion of this lies outside die scope of this thesis.71 Wedderbum, Lord, Company Law Reform (1965)72 In another article, Jensen, M and Meckling WH (1979) {supra note 22) argue at 2 that "Suppliers of inputs (labor, raw materials, capital, etc.) along with consumers o f the product implicitly or explicitly enter into a set of contracts which delineate the rights and obligations of the respective participants in the activities of the organization.” This suggests that the reason for treating employees as outsiders lies in the terms o f  their contracts, but the precise reason is not set out. The answer must be that they do not have residual claims, and so their interest begins and ends with their contracts.
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Easterbrook and Fischel and Company Law as Contract
The most important study of the application of economic theories o f the firm to company 
law is The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law by Easterbrook and Fischel.73 They 
assess the provisions o f US company law against a model in which the "coiporation is a 
complex set of explicit and implicit contracts".74 In this section it will be demonstrated 
that their analysis rests on neoclassical model assumptions because it is primarily 
concerned with the implicit contract between management and shareholders, treating all 
other contracts as explicit and making complete provision for the future.
Translating the economist's firm into the legal system does not pose particular 
methodological difficulties for Easterbrook and Fischel: "Corporations are a subset of 
firms. The corporation is a financing device and is not otherwise distinctive."75 76Company 
law accordingly plays a rather limited role: it provides an "off the peg" corporate 
contract, eliminating the costs of producing a new one from scratch every time a business 
is incorporated. Facilitating corporate participants' exercise of their freedom of contract 
is the only logical role for the law to play: its "comparative advantage" is that it "need not 
answer questions unless they occur", allowing considerable cost savings compared with 
ex ante private bargaining.77 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that their "company law as 
contract" thesis is largely descriptive of US company law as it stands, and make the 
normative claim that where the law does not conform, it should. The almost total absence 
of provisions relating to employees in US78 and English79 company law appears to 
underpin their argument that employees are adequately protected elsewhere - otherwise
73 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) {supra note 6)74 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D, ’’Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: Articles and Comments; The Corporate Contract” (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416 at 141875 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 10; they continue that "A corporation is characterized by a statement of capital contributions as formal claims against the firm’s income that are distinct from participation in the firm's productive activities."76 ibid at 34-5; they set out the rationale for company law: "The short but not entirely satisfactory answer is that corporate law is a set of terms... that almost everyone will want to adopt. Corporate codes and existing judicial decisions supply these terms 'for free' to every corporation..."77 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 3578 With the exception of the constituency statutes (discussed in Chapter 4) adopted in around 40 states which allow management to consider the interests of constituencies other than the shareholders.79 s309 of the Companies Act 1985 is a much discussed but apparently ineffectual exception.
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they would be allocated rights80 - and that, as a consequence, company law is (and should 
remain) solely aimed at resolving the agency problems at the heart of the firm. Legal 
intervention to ensure efficiency is only necessary with regard to this incomplete 
contract, because in all other cases, it results automatically from the free interplay of 
market actors.
Determination of the Content of Company Law by Hypothetical Bargaining 
Easterbrook and Fischel use a hypothetical bargaining process to determine (or rather, 
justify) the content of company law. This methodology corresponds to their normative 
thesis that "corporate law should contain the terms people would have negotiated, were 
the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently low."81 This 
focus on transaction costs has clear parallels with the work o f Coase. A term is inserted 
into the corporate contract if the parties (assuming costless contracting) would have 
bargained and paid for it. It may then be described as "contractual", since all terms 
generated by the hypothetical bargaining process would have been negotiated, were it not 
for the desire to save costs.82
They submit that this hypothetical bargaining process yields a unique outcome: corporate 
governance rights and protections should be (and are) granted to shareholders alone, 
because they value them the most highly, and therefore, in any actual negotiation over 
allocation, would have bargained and paid for them.83 The reason shareholders value the
80 Overall, "what should be worked out and supplied by corporate law is the rule that, if  uniformly applied, will maximize the value of corporate endeavor as a whole." (Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 35)81 ibid at 1583 For criticism that the hypothetical bargaining approach simply entrenches existing distributive outcomes, see Millon, D, "Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law" (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 137383 At another point in their work, Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 36 place less emphasis on this hypothetical approach and say that the default term should be " the one that is either picked by contract expressly or is the operational assumption of successful firms." This rests on the evolutionary assumption that since most successful firms only grant rights to shareholders, so firms should continue to do so. It does not appear to take into account that available business forms may be constrained by path dependency, i.e., that based on the evolution o f the corporate form out of partnership, the law granted rights to shareholders in the first place in most businesses, and this became the norm. Selection then took place largely among firms which conformed to this pattern. For more discussion of this see Roe, MJ, "Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics" (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 641. The role of
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rights most highly lies in "the special nature of the claim held by equity investors - a 
claim to 'what is left over' rather than to a definable return such as a wage or a payment of 
interest."84 85The shareholders are considered to have contracted with management "for a 
promise to maximise long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximises the value of 
their stock." In this context, control rights are of no value to the other constituencies 
who have fixed (and enforceable) contractual claims.86 By default, therefore, the 
shareholders, as the only group that can use control to increase the value of their claim, 
value control rights more highly than anyone else, and, by allocating control rights to 
them, it is argued, the law maximises the wealth of society as a whole.
The proposed allocation of governance rights exclusively to shareholders must answer 
the objection that in practice they are seldom willing to exercise the rights they 
hypothetically value and are prepared to pay for. Easterbrook and Fischel recognise this, 
describing as a "puzzle" and "one of the oddities of markets" the fact that "when shares 
are widely traded, no one has the right incentive to gather information and make optimal 
decisions."87 This presumably means that the valuation which shareholders hypothetically
network externalities in constraining choice among possible business forms is discussed below -  see note 112 below.84 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) {supra note 6) at 2585 ibid at 36; for discussion of the status of this argument post-Enron, see Blair, MM, "Directors' Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters" (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review (forthcoming), part I. She notes the retreat from an insistence on short-term value maximisation on the part of, inter dia, Michael Jensen. Easterbrook and Fischel's insistence that the board should maximise "long-run" profits is somewhat perplexing: it must be based on the argument that lower returns to shareholders in the short term (perhaps to the benefit of the company’s employees) will be considered by efficient markets to be referable to an improved income stream in the future. Yet the authors do not explain why the market would not value more highly profit maximisation in the short term within the constraints imposed by the nexus of explicit contracts. For a discussion of the driving forces behind short-term stock price mechanism, see Millon, D, "Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?" (2002) 70 George Washington Law Review 890.86 Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) (supra note 6) at 36 identify risk bearing solely with holding a variable or residual claim: "Risk bearers get a residual claim to profit; those who do not bear risk on the margin get fixed terms of trade." The absence of a residual claim means that all other contracts are complete and risk­free, and this is confirmed by the law’s grant of control rights to shareholders. As Deakin, S and Slinger, G, "Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm" (1997) 24 Journal o f  Law and Society 124 point out at 129, "this argument is essentially circular...It is necessary to go further, and show that shareholders are inherently more exposed to risk than other owners of inputs, before the structure of the corporation can be adequately explained on economic efficiency grounds." The arguments in favour of employees' contracts being complete, such as they are, are set out below.87 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 25
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place on the rights88 should be considered separately from their willingness to exercise 
them once they have been allocated, which might be affected by the collective action 
problem.89 90Alternatively one might suggest that, although shareholders value them more 
highly than any other constituency, even they do not value them particularly highly.
The Position of Employees in Neoclassical Contractual Analysis of Company Law
Employees do not bargain hypothetically for decision-making rights because they are 
able to achieve full contractual protection against any risks they face and so place no 
value on governance rights:
"Employees... are voluntary creditors. The compensation they demand will be a function 
of the risk they face...As long as these risks are known, the firm pays for the freedom to 
engage in risky activities...risks created by a firm's activities may be understood by 
a...union if not by individual...workers. If the risk premium is correctly set, it is 
irrelevant whether each voluntary creditor is informed. Each is protected by the market
_  • _ _  »90price.
88 Hansmann, H, The Ownership o f  Enterprise (1996) suggests at 48 that allocation of rights to shareholders might be considered the best available allocation option because "by virtue of their ownership, the patrons are assured that there is no other group o f owners to which management is responsive." Were another option more efficient, this initial allocation would be contracted around.89 The question of exercise is one which has led to a large body of literature on the (potential) role of institutional investors in corporate governance (see for example, Davies, "Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom" in Prentice, DD and Holland, PRJ (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (1993), 69). Hawley, J and Williams, A, "The Emergence o f Universal Owners: Some Implications of Institutional Equity Ownership" (2000) Challenge July-August 43 suggest that institutional investors who are properly diversified should be considered "universal owners" who care about the performance of the economy as a whole, rather than narrowly defined issues of corporate governance in particular firms. Firms which externalise in order to maximise their private benefit impose costs on those investors who "own” the whole economy. They argue that this might encourage investors to take an interest in issues such as training, education and public health issues. The barrier to the emergence of more public policy orientated institutional investor activism is, o f  course, the collective action problem, which means funds will only act where they expect others to do similarly. This requires some form of (costly) co-ordination. For the time being, the market for corporate control (and associated corporate governance mechanisms) is widely considered to compensate for shareholder apathy in monitoring and is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.90 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 50-1
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Easterbrook and Fischel emphasise that, assuming costless negotiations and perfect 
information,91 the allocation o f governance rights exclusively to shareholders should not 
have distributional consequences because, as contractual terms, ’’they are fully priced in 
transactions among the interested parties."92 The shareholders pay for the governance 
rights they receive (but rarely exercise) through higher prices for the supply of labour 
where the allocation of control rights to shareholders exposes the employees to risk.93 
While stopping some way short of accepting that "bounded rationality" may prevent the 
drafting of contracts which make full provision for all contingencies, they do recognise 
that individual workers may face cognitive difficulties in assessing the degree of risk they 
face in a given contracting situation. However, they suggest that "employees work at 
terms negotiated by unions (and nonunion employees can observe the terms offered at 
other firms, which supply much information)."94 One might also suggest, although this is 
little discussed by agency theorists, that legal requirements imposed on companies to 
inform and consult employees on a regular basis about changes which affect their 
interests also assist with the assessment o f risk before contracts are concluded. Procedural 
obligations of this kind should be relatively uncontroversial because, in reducing 
information asymmetry, they may allow contracts to reflect risks more accurately, and 
therefore be more complete.95
Arguments have been made, and are considered at length in chapter 3, that employees, 
who have invested in idiosyncratic or "firm-specific" skills which are not fully 
redeployable via the labour market, bear risk like shareholders. If they change job, they 
are likely to suffer a reduction in income to reflect the lower level of skills they bring to 
their new position. Further, transaction costs (in particular, uncertainty about the future)
91 These are fairly major assumptions to make in the light of the development of transaction cost and informational economics.92 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 1793 Of course, as will be discussed below, the difficulty with this approach is that it will not be possible at the time of entering the contract to accurately estimate the likely risk borne by employees by virtue o f  not holding any control rights.94 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 24. Whatever virtues unions have in representing their members collectively, it is difficult to see how they are equipped to predict the fiiture.95 The danger from an agency perspective is that such reforms open up a Pandora's box of debate about the informational and transaction cost difficulties faced by employees in making their contracts fully explicit. This is touched on below and forms the subject o f much of the third chapter.
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prevent them from protecting themselves folly by legally binding contract. Easterbrook 
and Fischel do address these arguments in a cursory manner, but do not reconsider their 
central assumption that employees are always "protected by the market price". They 
recognise that:
"Employees may be investors in the sense that portions of their human capital are firm- 
specific - that is, are adapted to the corporation's business and are worth less in some 
other job...The question is not whether employees and other 'constituencies' of the firm 
have entitlements or expectations - they do - but what those entitlements are. If 
employees negotiate for or accept a system of severance payments to protect their firm- 
specific human capital, they ought not to grumble if they are held to their bargains when 
business goes bad. Each investor must live with the risks built into the firm. Equity 
claimants lose out to debt claimants when times are bad and are not thereby entitled to 
some additional compensation. It is all a matter of enforcing the contracts. And for any 
employee or investor other than the residual claimant, that means the explicit, negotiated 
contract."96
As we saw above, Easterbrook and Fischel assume that employees who will make firm- 
specific investment are able ex ante to accurately assess the risk they will face and to 
bargain for an appropriate "fixed payout" to reflect it.97 If employees' contracts did not 
provide adequate protection against risk, then employees would not have concluded them 
on those terms. Accordingly, employees who choose, or are forced, to exit from the firm, 
suffer no loss (apart from certain relocation costs98) as long as liquid labour markets 
operate swiftly to re-employ them elsewhere. Company law (understood as a hypothetical 
bargain) confirms that employees generally do not face risk by not allocating them any 
governance rights since to do so would serve no purpose. If the law were to provide
96 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 6) at 3797 The idea that employees bear no risk seems to contradict the idea that they make investments in fiim- specific capital: see further Chapter 3.98 Fischel, DR, "Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law" (1984) 51 University o f Chicago Law Review 1061-1077 at 1067
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rights by default to employees, the costs of negotiating them away would be wasted in 
each case."
Writing on his own, Fischel recognises that their firm-specific investments may make 
employees dependent on the firm and expose them to risk in the form of opportunism on 
the part of management.9 100 As in his writings with Easterbrook, he suggests that the 
primary rational response on the part of employees to this vulnerability is to make ex ante 
demands for increased (i.e., above-market) compensation on the basis of their putative 
future firm-specific investments and corresponding assumption of risk.101 This premium 
could be justified on the basis of the "relative inability of participants in labor markets to 
diversify risk."102 Employers should meet these demands by "such risk-shifting devices as 
long-term contracts or severance-pay provisions - in order to minimize the risk borne by 
workers."103
An insistence that employees are fully protected by their contracts is essential to 
Easterbrook and Fischers thesis because to recognise that employees face risk which 
cannot be protected by (legal) contract would be sufficient to reconstitute them as 
residual claimants and therefore change the way they act in the hypothetical bargaining 
process. However, the assumptions of contractual completeness on which their argument 
rests are highly problematic.
First, they contradict the transaction cost explanation of the firm (which is taken up in 
more detail in Chapter 3). The issue of ex ante quantification of risk is glossed over. 
Since the investment in question is firm-specific and tied to the continuation of the 
relationship, a present estimate of the likely future duration of the contract is required.
99 Leaving aside for the moment Hansmann's argument about the cost increases where there is shared governance. This is taken up in Chapter 3.ICK> See Fischel, DR (1984) (supra note 98) at 1067: "At the extreme, a firm could hire a worker and then reduce his wage to a level just above the worker’s opportunity wage minus the worker's cost of relocation."101 A preliminary objection may be raised to this suggestion of ex ante contracting: given bounded rationality, and in particular a lack of knowledge about the amount of firm-specific investment which will be made, full presentiation of the contract must be impossible, or at best, rather speculative. See further Chapter 3.102 Fischel, DR (1984) (supra note 98) at 1067103 ibid at 1068
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However, this estimate is likely to change over time in line with conditions in the firm's 
trading and technological environment. In addition, the contract requires present 
quantification o f a presently uncertain amount of investment. The way in which the future 
will evolve cannot be known with any degree of certainty. Any ex ante quantification is 
unlikely to be correct, and so produce skewed incentives either to continue with the 
contract or to breach it. If these problems mean that quantification must be deferred, then 
the contract will not be complete, and the governance structure which is in its place will 
impose a risk of opportunism on the party who does not control the decision-making 
process. ~
This leads to the second problem. Their analysis blurs the distinction between economic 
and legal conceptions of contract, which, as we saw above, are not co-extensive. The 
broader economic conception of contract as "reciprocal arrangement" does not require all 
terms to be fixed in advance for the exchange to be pareto efficient and leave both parties 
better off. Informal "understandings" between the parties reduce the transaction costs of 
complete specification of all contingencies and permit the relationship to adapt to future 
change. However, the downside of these informal and flexible elements o f the economic 
"contract" is that they are, by definition, not legally binding. Employees who rely on such 
undertakings and make firm-specific investments, which are vulnerable in the event of 
relationship breakdown, bear the risk of opportunistic breach. The flexibility which is 
their economic strength means that the law cannot enforce them: it is limited to enforcing 
the original agreement. In such a situation, the legally binding "payout" which was fixed 
in advance is unlikely hilly to cover the employee's losses where he leaves the firm. The 
assumption underpinning the economic notion o f contract that exchange leaves both 
parties better off should not be equated with an argument that their legal contracts fully 
protect them against all risks of the relationship ending, i.e., that there is no downside. 
Systems theory explicitly counsels against such direct translations of economic concepts 
into legal discourse without taking into account the different context in which the concept 
was originally used.
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Fischel implicitly recognises these formidable contracting difficulties and even suggests 
that, as an alternative to explicit contractual solutions, employees may be protected 
against risk by the creation of "governance mechanisms that reduce the probability of 
opportunistic behavior by the firm ex post." In this regard, he discusses "[o]ne possibility 
[which] is for firms to strengthen the "voice" alternative for workers: grievance resolution 
mechanisms of various kinds decrease the ability of firms to engage in opportunistic 
behavior at workers’ expense."104 This suggestion of a governance mechanism for 
employees is very interesting, coming as it does from one of the most forthright 
proponents of the agency perspective on company law. Once it is recognised that explicit 
contractual protection may present difficulties for some employees, and that a governance 
structure may be required to maintain continuity of the relationship, the agency model 
begins to shade into the productive coalition model set out in Chapter 3. For the moment 
it will suffice to note that, given Fischel’s recognition that "labor is a more heterogeneous 
good than capital"105 and that "the exit option is much more costly for workers than for 
investors",106 a governance mechanism limited to "grievance resolution" seems rather 
narrow when compared with the default governance rights provided to shareholders, 
particularly if one accepts that while both groups bear risk, it is harder for the employees 
to diversify theirs.
Finally, Fischel argues that legal intervention to protect employees who are also residual 
claimants is unnecessary because "the interest of the firm in minimizing the cost of all 
inputs in the production process will cause it to adopt the contractual mechanisms that 
best allay workers' and investors' rational concerns."107 He expects protective structures 
to evolve at the level of the individual firm on the basis of each firm's desire keep its 
labour costs to an acceptable level.108 Where such structures have not evolved at the level
1M ibid at 1067; he recognises that the problem is reciprocal and that "Firms can have specific investments in workers just as workers can have specific investments in firms. Thus there is a need to develop governance structures that minimize opportunistic behavior by workers. Pensions with long vesting periods provide an example of a contractual mechanism that does this."105 ibid at 1066106 ibid at 1066107 ibid at 1068108 Of course, this same argument might be made as regards the contract between the firm and its shareholders. It certainly underlies reliance on the efficient market hypothesis.
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of individual firms, three explanations might be considered. First, that employees are not 
prepared to pay for them, preferring to bear risk and be compensated for it. This seems 
unlikely given the difficulties of diversification they face. Second, that residual claimant 
employees are rare. This implausible argument is taken up in Chapter 3. Third, that the 
transaction costs incurred by the firm in establishing an appropriate structure outweigh its 
benefits. It can be argued that the costs o f putting in place such structures are rather high. 
The default position set by company law means that transaction costs (in the form of 
negotiation and drafting and, given that this type of arrangement is not commonly found, 
occasional litigation) will be incurred every time a governance mechanism is created to 
protect firm-specific investment by employees.
Imposing a high level of transaction costs on employees and firms who co-specialise is 
difficult to square with the supply o f standard-form corporate contracts to shareholders as 
a "public good".109 While shareholders need do nothing to gain the protection of what the 
law apparently considers an optimal governance structure, the employees receive no 
guidance from the law, must incur costs in order to put in place a governance structure 
which suits their needs, and are even under certain legal disabilities when they attempt to 
create one collectively.110 It might be suggested that company law should at least suggest 
a variety o f standard form structures to take into account the heterogeneity of firms and 
the different types of residual claims which exist. The neoclassical contractual 
explanation o f company law suggests that the law's failure to do so demonstrates that 
firm-specific investments are the exception rather than the rule, and so even a simple 
requirement to select one of a range o f legal regimes would be unnecessarily costly. The 
contractual thesis further suggests that where a firm-specific governance structure has not 
been adopted, this is either because the default structure was appropriate, or, at the limit, 
because the costs of drafting an alternative exceeded the costs occasioned by an 
inappropriate corporate contract.111
109 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1989) {supra note 74) at 1445110 The possibility o f unions playing a role in establishing governance structures is discussed in Chapter 3.
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The default provisions of company law are likely to influence the structures which are 
actually adopted. The majority of companies adopt the contract in its default form. 
Adopting the law's standard terms allows individual users to avoid the costs associated 
with the complex evolutionary process which leads to the development of alternative 
institutional designs, such as the original design, the costs of litigating, uncertainty etc. 
This effect may go beyond transaction costs for individual firms. Klausner suggests that 
network externalities significantly influence the terms which are adopted, undermining 
the basic assumption that rational parties will use the most efficient terms, leading to an 
optimal allocation of resources.112 The common use of a contract term creates value113 
and so may perpetuate a form which was efficient in the past but is no longer so.114 
Expectations that other firms will continue to adopt the path dependent contract means 
that the form will be locked in. It will be difficult to bring about change because defectors 
lose the benefits of network externalities as well as incurring the transaction costs 
associated with customising a governance structure.115
Finally, the law's provision of "voluntary" structures cannot be considered entirely neutral 
for various reasons: besides bestowing a degree o f social "approval" upon those 
structures, they embody a "pro-shareholder bias".116 In the absence of agreement, rights
1.1 Even if  this explanation is accepted, it might be argued that the high costs associated with protecting firm-specific investments undermines the willingness of employees to them in the first place, leading to a vicious circle of sub-optimal resource allocation. These arguments are taken up in more detail in chapter 3.1.2 See Klausner, M, "Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts" (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 757. See also Kahan, M and Klausner, M, "Path Dependence in Corporate Governance; Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases" (1996) 74 Washington University Law Quarterly 347.113 Klausner, M (1995) (supra) at 761: "When the use of a contract term becomes widespread, its value may rise because of several phenomena. More judicial precedents can be expected, on average, to enhance the clarity of the term. Common business practices implementing the term may become established, further reducing uncertainty. Legal advice, opinion letters and related documentation will be more readily available, more timely, less costly, and more certain. Finally, firms may find it easier to market their securities." Access to credit will also be easier where a firm has a more conventional structure.114 Alternatively, if  one does not subscribe to the contractual thesis, the form may never have been efficient but might have allowed a politically dominant corporate constituency to capture rents.115 In conclusion at 838, Klausner suggests that "the objective of corporate law...should be to promote an optima] balance of uniformity among homogeneous firms and diversity across heterogeneous firms, and to avoid obsolescence.” Accordingly, corporate law should provide menus of choices which allow homogeneous firms to form networks around their preferred terms, while allowing heterogeneous firms to customise.116 Millon, "Communitarianism in Corporate Law" in Mitchell, LE (ed), Progressive Corporate Law (1995) 1 at 24
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are granted to the shareholder constituency.117 This may be significant in various 
situations. First, the very common situation where individual bargaining by employees 
becomes infeasible because of transaction costs. Second, in the usual situation where 
employee bargaining power is not strong, "persuading management to deviate from this 
practice will likely be impossible."118 Third, it has distributional effects as employees 
must pay every time they want to deviate from the default position.119
In conclusion, if  it is accepted that employees are fully protected from risk by legally- 
binding contracts, Easterbrook and Fischel are correct to suggest that company law 
should centre on the relationship between management and shareholders, and on the 
reduction of the (agency) costs incurred by the providers o f the company's financial 
capital to an acceptable minimum. The law's provision of a standard form contract for 
incorporations which protects residual claimants is not a private benefit conferred on the 
shareholders alone, but benefits society as a whole. Chapter 3 will look at the issue of 
employee investments in firm-specific capital in more detail and suggest that this is not 
the case. !*
The Agency Model Beyond Company Law
The agency model of the firm has dominated mainstream debate about corporate 
governance in the US and the UK since the 1980s. Its normative influence as the 
intellectual underpinning of the doctrine of "shareholder value" in corporate governance 
debates should not be underestimated.120 By combining the arguments that management, 
like any other agent, always has a tendency to act in a self-serving way (the empire­
building problem), and that rational shareholders do not monitor management closely (the 
collective action problem), this model advocates the development of market-based 
solutions to the central agency problem.
117 Millón draws attention to the fact that "the default rule in question was not itself the result of a bargain between the parties.m  Millón (1995) {supra note 116) at 24. This o f  course feeds into the network externality point above, making deviation even less likely.119 ibid at 27
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The influence of the agency model may be seen in various current developments. 
Shareholder value is prioritised and generated through "the carrot of CEO pay (primarily 
stock options) and the stick of firing the CEO."120 21 12Stock options, encouraged by tax 
subsidies, have grown exponentially and the average tenure o f CEOs is now only 2.75 
years.123 Corporate metrics, in particular quarterly earnings, further concentrate the minds 
o f executives on share price as "financial markets have the power to value firms 
publicly."124 Finally, capital market actors exert political pressure for the removal of 
barriers to the establishment of a market for corporate control, which is the ultimate stick 
to encourage management to honour "the prime directive".125 Agency theorists argue that 
in matters of corporate governance the law should confine itself to taking steps which 
favour, or at least permit, the establishment and operation of these market-based solutions 
to the agency problem. The extent to which the law has contributed to the creation of a 
market for corporate control is addressed in the second part of the thesis.
However, despite the increasing diffusion of decentralised market-based solutions and 
social norms of shareholder value, the impact of agency theory on the doctrinal content of 
company law has to date been negligible. The formulation of the fiduciary duties imposed 
on management by company law (owed to "the company" rather than to the shareholders)
120 For a critical view of the effects of the shareholder value doctrine on the capacity of companies, see Kennedy, AA (2000) {supra note 36).121 Kelly, M, The Divine Right o f Capital (2003) at 54.122 Millon, D (2002) {supra note 85) notes at 906: "During the 1990s, the number of options outstanding increased from 5 to 15 percent of all outstanding shares. Options now account for 60 percent of a typical CEO’s compensation package." Kennedy, AA (2000) {supra note 36) at 45 explains that "With their pay tied to stock options, senior managers began to pay greater attention to stock price levels and began to manage their companies as though a higher and higher stock price was the only legitimate objective o f management itself." The 'financialisation' of executives and the disjunction of management from the underlying productive business has led to an overwhelming focus on accounting matters. Kennedy’s ultimate conclusion is bleak (at 47): many companies "have mortgaged their futures in return for a higher stock price now, [which] does not bode well for the economy at large.” One of the problems with share options as opposed to the grant of stock is that the board bears no risk if  the company's share price declines.123 See The Observer, 13 July 2003, citing research by the Egremont consulting group and noting that, while only 12 per cent have held their jobs for more than a decade, 15 years ago, the average chief executive stayed in his post for 15 years.124 Aglietta, M, "Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance: Some Tricky Questions" (2000) 29 Economy and Society 146 at 149125 Kelly, M (2003) {supra note 121) at 54
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Thas remained unchanged.126 The law continues to enshrine managerialism at the heart of 
the company. Yet it is also notable that the law has not intervened on the side of 
managerialism, given the extent of this “encouragement” for management to use their 
discretion exclusively in order to enhance returns to shareholders. Agency theory 
suggests that the law should continue to abstain, except as regards freeing up market 
forces. In this regard, UK takeover regulation (and the proposed European Takeover 
Directive which is modelled on it) truncates managerial discretion when a takeover bid 
has been made, and replaces managerialism with a norm of shareholder value in the 
takeover context.
A Critique of the Agency Model of the Corporation
This thesis accepts that the contractual model of the company is a useful tool for analysis 
of the provisions of company law and its treatment of the various relationships which 
make up the company. However, in its agency formulation, with its insistence that 
employment contracts provide express protection against all contingencies and its refusal 
to recognise that there are internal governance aspects of corporations which can 
potentially adversely affect employees, it is too narrow to form a complete heuristic 
model for use in legal discussion. In the particular situation where employees have made 
investments in firm-specific capital, and thus bear some degree of risk, despite the 
assertions of Easterbrook and Fischel to the contrary, ex ante attempts to provide 
protection from management opportunism through contractual mechanisms will not 
work. A more complete model which is suitable for the law would also take into account 
hierarchical aspects of corporations: in a recent paper, Eisenberg argued that the 
corporation has a dual nature, and that theories of the company should not pretend to 
exclusivity:
126 Although the UK government’s proposed company law reforms go some way in the direction of implementing an agency model: see the White Paper at 2.37: "It is crucial to effective corporate governance that the owners of the company hold the directors to account for the company’s performance." See Wedderbum, Lord (2002) (supra note 7) for criticism of this from a labour law and "partnership" angle. See also the Report o f  the High Level Group o f  Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids ("The Winter Report") at 19, which states that the directors "after all are the agents o f  shareholders... discipline of management and reallocation o f resources is in the long term in the best interests of all stakeholders, and society at large."
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"...the nexus-of-contracts conception is unsatisfactory as a positive—that is, descriptive- 
matter, in part because the corporation has a dual nature: In one aspect, it consists of 
reciprocal arrangements; in another, it is a bureaucratic hierarchy. The nexus-of-contracts 
conception captures only one of these two aspects of the corporation."127
The argument that employees are voluntary participants in the corporation has somehow 
become confused with an argument that they face no risk that decisions may be made 
which unexpectedly adversely affect their interests.128 The contractual approach ignores, 
and therefore offers no economic account of, the hierarchical aspects of corporate 
decision-making. In particular, it ignores hierarchical (or governance) arrangements as a 
potential mechanism for filling in the gaps in incomplete contracts and maintaining 
mutual trust and confidence between corporate participants in the situation where the 
market fails as a viable alternative allocation mechanism.
Treating employment contracts as explicit and discrete means that, for the most part, the 
corporation is an essentially static arrangement with no permanence, and which cannot be 
differentiated from the market: these arrangements lasts only until the next round of 
negotiations. The central agency relationship between management and shareholders is 
viewed as the only durable aspect of the relational corporation, and even there, stock 
market liquidity means that the identity of the shareholders may change. In this vein, 
Hutton builds on Eisenberg's critique:
’’But the whole narrative is shot through with intellectual and empirical inadequacies. In 
the first place this is an entirely economistic view of the organisation. If all contracts can 
be unwound at a moment's notice and reorganised around a better set of prices, this is 
only another way of saying that organisations have no history. In this conception, 
companies should be visualised as simply a peripatetic, permanently shifting network of 
deals between workers, suppliers, creditors and shareholders. Loyalty, trust, the
127 Eisenberg, MA (1999) {supra note 12) at 820128 It is suggested that this position has arisen because of this model's opposition to social arguments about the corporation, such as those discussed in the following chapter, which focus on the exercise of power within corporate hierarchies.
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organisation's social capabilities and the capacity to learn over time count for nothing. 
The truth is that they count a l o t "129
The next two chapters attempt to fill out these methodological inadequacies and to 
develop a fuller heuristic model for use in the analysis of takeover law. The final model 
should capture both individual contractual interconnections, and those hierarchical 
organisational elements which are omitted from neoclassical contractual analysis. 
Chapter Two offers an account o f the hierarchical elements o f the company in political 
terms and suggests methods o f legitimation. This account has traditionally been 
considered to be in conflict with the economic contractual model. Chapter Three attempts 
to bridge this gap and welcomes hierarchy as an effective mechanism for filling the gaps 
in (or "governing") incomplete contracts, providing protection for corporate participants 
against risk.
129 Hutton, W, The World We'Re In (2002) at 134-5. The idea of the corporation as an evolving bundle of capabilities which cannot be replicated by market exchange is discussed at length in Chapter 3. The seminal discussion of organisational memory is Nelson, R and Winter, SG, An Evolutionary Theory o f Economic Change {1982).
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Chapter Two: The Political Stakeholder Model
Introduction
"One of the marks of a truly dominant intellectual paradigm is the difficulty people have 
in even imagining any alternative view."1
The contractual approach is so dominant that "the end of history for corporate law" has 
been glimpsed.2 Chapter One suggested that the neoclassical contractual model of the 
company has come to dominate economic analysis o f company law and to set a 
normative agenda for corporate governance. The dominance of economic methodology, 
combined with structural and cultural pressures for corporate management to pursue 
shareholder value,3 may well mean that the normative influence of models based on 
political imperatives is in terminal decline. Nevertheless, in this chapter, I set out the 
political model of the company which has been a rival to the contractual model since the 
beginning of the corporate era.4
In this thesis, this model is termed the "Political Stakeholder" model to distinguish it 
from the model elaborated in Chapter 3, elements of which are sometimes referred to as 
the "Economic Stakeholder" model.5 In some of the literature, particularly that 
originating in the United States, this model is referred to as the "communitarian" model 
as opposed to the "contractarian" model discussed in the previous chapter.6 The
1 Allen, WT, "Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law" (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law  Review 1395 at 14012 Hansmann, H and Kraakman, R, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2000) Discussion Paper No 280 Harvard Law School Centre fo r Law; Economics and Business (Olin Center), who see the contractual model leading by "force of logic", "force of example" and "force of competition".3 Mitchell, LE, Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export (2001) at 434 For a detailed discussion of the historical development of these theories, see Bratton, WW, "The Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal " (1989) 74 Cornell Law Review 407. Discussing their constant evolution and dynamic interaction over time, he explains at 411 that "Corporate law doctrine...has been shifting between contracts, hierarchies, and the state for more than a century."5 While employees are treated as "stakeholders" in both models, the model in Chapter 3 justifies this on the grounds of economic efficiency rather than political imperatives.6 See for example, Millon, D, "Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law" (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1373; Millon, D, "Communitarianism in Corporate Law" in Mitchell, LE (ed), Progressive Corporate Law (1995), 1. The communitarian model incorporates elements of both economic and political stakeholding.
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development of a "political" theory of the company poses difficulties because it seeks to 
draw together divergent strands of thinking whose common ground is often only their 
opposition to analysing the company in purely contractual terms.7 The political 
stakeholding approach therefore takes a more "pluralist"8 approach to the company, 
considering a wide range of corporate constituencies, and looking beyond simple implicit 
or explicit bargained exchange to the "empirical reality of social interactions 'within' 
corporations."9
In contrast to the contractual model, political stakeholding makes normative arguments in 
favour of regulation, on the basis either o f the corporation's role in society or the 
democratic imperative. The two slightly divergent and contradictory strands of thinking 
which constitute the political stakeholding model, corporate social responsibility ("CSR") 
and industrial democracy, have been influential in discussions about company law and 
corporate governance reform, in particular as regards the position of employees.
First, CSR looks outwards and suggests that the corporation, as a social institution, has 
broader responsibilities to society than simply maximising returns to shareholders. 
Management, as the agents through whom the company acts, should seek voluntarily to 
ensure that the company complies with that "social responsibility". CSR, in its limited 
"prudential" form at least, has contributed to the widespread development o f voluntary 
codes of conduct, a practice which continues to the present day and seems to have had 
some effect on corporate governance practice.10
7 Plender, J, A Stake in the Future: The Stakeholding Solution (1997) at 16; Millon, (1995) (supra).8 Cook, J and Deakin, S, "Stakeholding and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence on Economic Performance" (1999) ESRC Centre fo r  Business Research, University o f  Cambridge Working Paper at 7: "viewing companies as social institutions broadens the recognition of their contribution to overall social welfare and allows that groups other than shareholders have a legitimate interest in, and claim against, the company; and, the interests of various stakeholder groups (including shareholders) do not necessarily always coincide, either in the short or in the long run ”9 Allen, WT (1993) (supra note 1) at 140110 Voluntary codes o f  conduct, in which firms undertake to respect, for example, labour standards, and to ensure that their suppliers also do so, are very prevalent among multinational corporations. While their critics see them as an attempt to fend off more restrictive regulation, Stone, CD, "Public Interest Representation: Economic and Social Policy Inside the Enterprise" in Hopt, KJ and Teubner, G (eds), Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities (1985), 122 suggests at 138-9 that this is unlikely to be a successful strategy, given the incentives for individual firms to defect and not co-operate in self-regulation,
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Second, industrial democracy looks inwards to intra-corporate relations and suggests that 
democracy should be extended from the public sphere to the private sphere of 
corporations. Industrial democracy therefore seeks reform of corporate decision-making 
processes to comply with the democratic imperative. Demands for industrial democracy 
led to (ultimately unsuccessful) proposals for the reform of corporate hierarchy which 
emerged at both the national and supranational levels in the 1970s.
The political stakeholding interpretation of the firm is that the contractual elements of the 
employment relationship are marginal and that one should concentrate on its hierarchical 
aspects.11 By downplaying the role of market-based contracting, political stakeholding 
shares some common ground with Coase, but diverges in its scrutiny of the corporate 
institution not in terms of economic efficiency, but as the locus of an exercise of power. 
Since it compares the company to a community,12 this model's primary concern is with 
social justice and democracy. In comparison with the inter-systemic conflicts which 
hindered attempts to pin down the precise scope of the term "contract" in the agency 
model, the political stakeholder model makes claims which are potentially more readily 
translatable across systems. Its advocates claims that its focus on the "empirical reality" 
of decision-making within the corporate hierarchy offers a more realistic model of the 
operation of corporations than the contractual paradigm, and therefore a more appropriate 
model on which the law might base regulation.13
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the historical context o f political stakeholding 
is outlined. Then corporate social responsibility and industrial democracy, the two main 
strands of thought within this model, are considered in more detail. Second, a definition
"free riding" on those companies which do put codes in place. Sectoral codes of conduct may be an emerging solution to this particular collective action problem.M This point is further developed at the beginning of Chapter 3 with the discussion of Williamson's Institutional Economics.12 See Plender, J, "A New Third Way" (1998) Prospect 33 at 34: "Large companies are more like communities than a mere corporate cloak for individual exchange."13 Compare the defence of contractualism in similar terms in Bainbridge, SM, "Community and Statismi A Conservative Contractarian Critique o f Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship" (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 856 at 22: "Contractarianism (like law & economics generally) succeeded because it offers a heuristic for exploring and predicting human behavior in response to regulation."
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of stakeholding is attempted. Third, the possible ways in which the political stakeholding 
model may be implemented in law are considered. Finally, various critiques of the model 
are discussed. As in the last chapter, and in line with the focus of this thesis, particular 
attention will be paid to the position of employees within this model. This is an easier 
task because the stakeholder model expressly sets out to include consideration o f 
employees.
Historical Context of Political Stakeholding
Concession theory argued that the corporation owed its existence and privileges to the 
state on the basis that "the corporate form was instituted by the sovereign's grant of a 
charter."14 It was not universally accepted: lawyers, who maintained that "only natural 
persons occupied the legal world",15 opposed the recognition of the corporation as an 
artificial person as opposed to the collection of individuals who constituted it. This 
"methodological individualism", which developed in opposition to the more collective 
concession theory, laid the ground for the development of the contractual model.
Concession theory could certainly claim to be a useful heuristic while the grant o f 
corporate charters was dependent upon a successful appeal to the state. It was argued that 
since the state brought the corporation into being, so the state had a right to regulate the 
corporation. It is important to note that concession theory did not argue that regulation 
should have a specific content, simply that interference in the company's affairs was 
legitimate.16 In the eyes o f its critics, however, these claims were weakened when 
incorporation became available as of right following an administrative process.17
14 Bratton, WW, "The New Economic Theory of the Finn: Critical Perspectives from History" (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1471 at 1484.15 Bratton, WW (1989) (supra) at 1484.16 For an eloquent demonstration o f the role concession theory might play in justifying regulation of the company in order to protect employees, see Wedderbum, Lord, Company Law Reform (1965).17 In their contractualist argument, Anderson, GM and Tollison, RD, "The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the State" (1983) 3 International Review o f Law and Economics 107 argue at 116 that the "legislative availability of cheap and simple incorporation was not the stimulus to the expansion of the corporate form, but merely a response to previous developments. In effect, corporate chartering was deregulated because it was no longer feasible to regulate it." On the accuracy of concession theory’s claims
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While concession theory has fallen out of favour as a theoretical basis for normative 
arguments about company law and corporate governance, it still has legal relevance. It is 
applied in many countries to decide choice of law issues. The cases discussed in Chapter 
4 demonstrate that the US Supreme Court still considers concession theory to be the 
connecting factor which identifies the state having the right to regulate matters of 
corporate governance,18 leading to the application of the law of the state of incorporation 
{lex loci incorporationis) in conflict of laws cases.19
However, in the realm of corporate theory, the state-creation model of the corporation
was gradually superseded by the "natural entity" model of the company as the main rival
to the contractual model. This model was based on the "corporate realism" o f Otto Gierke
and "drew on European ideas about the spiritual reality of group life...the management
corporation reconstituted the classical profit maximiser in collective form."20 21Corporate
realists recognised the moral identity o f the corporate person as a voluntarily created
*  «institution which embodied knowledge and was analogous to partnership. When 
combined with the notion of scientific managerialism, this model also carried an anti­
to be historically descriptive, see further, Mahoney, PG, "Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law" (1999) 34 Ga. L  Rev. 873.18 In Trustees o f  Dartmouth College v Woodward (1819) 17 US 517 at 636, the US Supreme Court gave credence to concession theory, stating that the "corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it." The Supreme Court approved this dictum in the takeover context in CTS Corp v Dynamics Corp o f  America 481 US 69 (1987) at 90, and at 91 stated "It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares." This case is discussed further in Chapter 4. The diversity of approaches to corporate governance among the US states means that this is not an insignificant matter, Lipton, M and Rosenblum, SA, "A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election o f Directors" (1991) 58 University o f Chicago Law Review 187 argue at 188 that "The Anglo-American corporate form is a creation of the state, conceived originally as a privilege to be conferred on specified entities for the public good and welfare. While the corporate form became more widely available as the economy demanded it, and is now generally available to any business, it remains a legal creation."19 This is also a live issue in the European Union, with the conflict between the liberal state of incorporation rule and the more interventionist real seat (siège réel) rule coming to the surface in cases such as Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art: see further Chapter 5.20 Millon, D, "Theories of the Corporation" (1990) 39 Duke Law Journal 201 at 202; Ripert, G, Aspects Juridiques Du Capitalisme Moderne (1951) at 52 states that "Déjà les anciens commercialistes avaient eu l'idée que, dans le contrat de société, un corpus mysticum se dégage de la volonté commune des associés. Mais cette idée était bien vague. Ils voyaient flotter ce corps mystique au-dessus du contrat comme une sorte d'ectoplasme sorti de la personne des associés. L'esprit a pris corps. La personne morale est vivante et agissante. Elle est créée par les associés, mais la créature est plus forte que le créateur."21 Millon, D (1990) (supra) at 202
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regulatory agenda: the way in which the corporation was run was a private matter, and so 
it should be left to regulate itself internally. Its anti-regulatory agenda taken away from it, 
the contractual model went into abeyance until the 1980s, when managerialism came 
under fire for allowing management to act in a self-serving way and to build empires 
rather than concentrate on objectively verifiable tasks like improving productive 
efficiency and shareholder value. The political stakeholder model must now be 
considered in the light of this re-emergence of the contractual model. As we shall see in 
Chapter 3, it was not until the 1990s that a comprehensive economic response to the 
contractual model began to be elaborated.
The Company as Social Institution: Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) embodies the notion that the corporate entity as a 
social actor should be responsible to the society in which it operates. It draws the 
attention of management who make decisions on behalf of the corporate "entity" to their 
broader social responsibilities. CSR dates back at least as far as the Great Depression, and 
perhaps even to the Industrial Revolution and Robert Owen’s New Lanark project. An 
explicit formulation of the corporate social responsibility perspective may be found in 
Berle and Means' radical conclusion that the modem corporation had become "quasi­
public". Great power to affect society was becoming concentrated in the hands of those 
holding managerial positions and decision-making power, and so the "organizations 
which they control have passed far beyond the realm of private enterprise - they have 
become more nearly social institutions." The corporation was now characterised by "the 
interrelation of a wide diversity of economic interests,- those o f the 'owners' who supply 
capital, those of the workers who 'create', those of the consumers who give value to the 
products of enterprise, and above all those of the control who wield power." This more 
pluralistic and relational conception of the company suggests that it is both embedded in, 
and functionally differentiated from, society.2 34 Since the company consists of social 
relationships, it is desirable that the "control" should act in the interests of society.
22 Berle, AA and Means, G, The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1932) at 4623 ibid at 309-1024 Where the corporation is considered as a differentiated functional subsystem of broader society, a systems theory approach to CSR is possible. CSR, whatever form it eventually takes, is a mechanism at the
62
Berle appears to have been influenced by his famous 1931-2 exchange with Dodd25 
Berle had opened the debate by asserting that "all powers granted to a corporation or to 
the management of a corporation...are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for 
the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears."26 In response, Dodd 
argued that since the company was a legal entity distinct from its shareholders,27 it should 
not be run by management directly for the shareholders without taking into account non­
shareholder constituencies, such as employees and customers. More generally, 
management should choose to run the corporation so that it behaves as a responsible 
citizen according to the society in which it does business.28 The managers of the 
corporation should be considered the trustees of an institution, which "has a social service 
as well as a profit-making function",29 and should use their discretion to take into account 
stakeholders other than shareholders when making decisions.30
level of the individual company which allows the concerns of broader society to be internalised within the corporation's decision-making process, while permitting the functional subsystem to retain its autonomy: "Functional differentiation requires a displacement of integrative mechanisms from the level of society to the level of subsystems." (Teubner, "Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their Beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to the Legal Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility" in Hopt, KJ and Teubner, G (eds), Corporate Governance and Directors* Liabilities (1985), 149 at 162. This sets the law the task of "stimulating" self- (or "reflexive") regulation rather than its more traditional direct "command” regulation or facilitation.25 See Berle, AA, "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust" (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049; Dodd, EM, " For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?" (1932) 45 Harvard Law Journal 1145; Berle, AA, "For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note" (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365.26 Berle, AA (1931) (supra) at 1049; of course, as one would expect from a reading of his seminal work which would appear later in 1932, Berle was concerned that if  management were not accountable to someone, "management and 'control' [would] become for all practical purposes absolute". Hence his reply to Dodd that "you cannot abandon emphasis on 'the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders' until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else." (Berle, AA (1932) (supra) at 1367)27 Dodd’s ontology of the corporation followed in the tradition of the corporate realists. He argued at 1160 that "...any organized group, particularly if its organization is of a permanent character, is a factual unit, 'a body which from no fiction of law but from the very nature of things differs from the individuals of whom it is constituted' ...If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual members.. .trustees for an institution rather than attorneys for the stockholders."28 According to Dodd, EM (1932) (supra note 25) at 1161, the company, "like other persons engaged in business, is affected not only by the laws which regulate business, but by the attitude of public and business opinion as to the social obligations of business."29 ibid at 114830 From a contractualist perspective, this imposes agency costs on the shareholders.
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Both Berle and Dodd’s arguments about the way in which management should run 
corporations may be accommodated within the current legal fabric of managerialism.31 
CSR, as formulated by Dodd, encompasses both "prudential"32 actions and "other- 
regarding"33 actions. Manne argues that the term "CSR" should be restricted to "elements 
of voluntarism and charitable intent."34 "Prudential" action aimed at maximising the 
firm's profits by instramentalising, for example, the employees, should simply be 
recognised as "good business because it is good public relations,"35 although "it is often 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish a purely business expenditure only 
alleged to have been made for the public's good from one actually made with real 
charitable intent,"36 Dodd also recognised that where managers "take into consideration 
the welfare of employees and consumers... [this] will in the long run increase the profits 
of stockholders."37 Yet his notion of CSR was not as attenuated and narrowly 
instrumental as the concept of "enlightened shareholder value", and he refused to limit 
management’s responsibility to developing "a more intelligent appreciation of what tends 
to the ultimate benefit of their stockholders."38 Dodd optimistically predicted the 
development of "other-regarding" CSR according to which management would occupy a 
more neutral role among the various constituencies, on the basis both that ”[p]ower over
31 Teubner (1985) (supra note 24), with his notion o f the corporation’s interest in itself, suggests at 151 that Berle and Dodd's discussion "poses the wrong question by searching for those social groups which are to be regarded as beneficiaries of fiduciary duties." Social groups may be instrumental in articulating the interests of society, but they themselves should not be considered as the beneficiaries of duties. The true goal of the corporation is to further the social function o f the economy, defined at 162 as "ensuring the satisfaction o f  future social needs...the diversion o f  as large as possible a yield from the production process to guarantee the satisfaction o f future needs, which in concrete terms is manifested by different forms of profit, taxes and wages." (emphasis in original)32 Parkinson, J, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory o f  Company Law  (1993) at 268- 9: "Prudential constraints are reflected in rules and practices that require a sacrifice of profits in the short term, but which have a long-term profit pay-off for the company."33 ibid at 269-70: "Other-regarding constraints are directly focused on protecting the interests o f parties likely to be affected by the company’s activities. They are adopted not with the ultimate aim of protecting profitability, but for the sake of the relevant interests themselves."34 Manne, HG and Wallich, HC, The Modem Corporation and Social Responsibility (1972) at 6. Manne theorised at 15-19 that the scope for "other regarding" or "charitable" CSR on the part of incumbent management is limited to the transaction costs of the takeover which would remove them from office. "If there were no transaction costs in the operation of the market for corporate control, no manager w ho did not himself own sufficient shares to control a corporation could ever use corporate funds for nonprofitable social purposes." (at 18)35 ibid at 1138 ibid at 837 Dodd, EM (1932) {supra note 25) at 115638 ibid
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the lives of others tends to create on the part of those most worthy to exercise it a sense of 
responsibility", leading to the development of a "community of interest" between 
management and employees.
However, Dodd’s idea that management might develop a broader conception of their role 
has not become either legal or market reality, and debate about CSR has been largely 
confined to arguments that corporations should voluntarily accept their social 
responsibilities as a matter o f good business practice. For example, the European 
Commission recently defined CSR as "a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily 
to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment...companies integrate social 
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis."39 Voluntary self-regulation is compatible with profit- 
maximisation where it is an "economically rational response to the preferences of the 
parties with whom the company interacts in various markets or public opinion more 
generally."40 A code of conduct which contains an undertaking to treat employees well 
will enable companies to recruit and retain better employees, leading to better 
performance over time, and consequently higher returns to shareholders.41
The limitation of the scope of CSR to voluntary action within the existing legal 
framework has been explained on the basis that "Legal solutions to the responsibility 
conundrum are not, however, easy to find."42 In particular, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, dominant norms of shareholder value and agency theory insist that profit 
maximisation within the law is a good proxy for social welfare.43 By contrast, enshrining 
a wider set of considerations into company law risks leaving management with an
39 Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2001) 366 final, 18.7.2001, pp4-640 Parkinson, J (1993) {supra note 32) at 26941 Voluntary CSR may intersect with industrial democracy and participation where, for example, the company’s employees are also involved in the development, implementation and oversight o f the company’s code of conduct. See Sobczak, A, Réseaux De Sociétés Et Codes De Conduite: Un Nouveau Modèle De Régulation Des Rélations De Travail Pour Les Entreprises Européennes (2002) at 219 et seq.42 Wedderbum, "The Legal Development of Corporate Responsibility: For Whom Will Corporate Managers Be Trustees?" in Hopt, KJ and Teubner, G (eds), Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities (1985), 3 at 15.
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unacceptable degree of autonomy to pursue their notion of the public interest whenever it 
serves their own.43 4 These arguments are discussed in some detail below.
Industrial Democracy
In contrast to these recent more outward-looking voluntary CSR initiatives, the political 
stakeholding debate historically tended to concentrate on the position of employees 
within the corporate enterprise, and in particular on the idea that corporate decision­
making should be democratised. Wedderbum notes that the "reasons why the British 
debate about corporate social responsibility became in the 1970s a debate mainly about 
'industrial democracy1 are, however, very complex and still unclear."45 Industrial 
democracy may be distinguished from CSR on the basis that it sought employee 
participation in internal corporate decision-making structures, not only at workplace or 
shop-floor levels, but also at board level,46 rather than simply to persuade or mandate 
decision-makers to take into account a broader range of interests.47 Accordingly, while 
industrial democracy may be "incapable of definition,"48 it asks in essence whether "we 
can, by law, create a new, bipartite control, out o f which to achieve a redefinition of 
corporate powers held in trust."49 Critics such as Hansmann argue that employee 
involvement in decision-making would institutionalise conflict and slow down decision­
43 Teubner, (1985) (supra note 24) at 158: "In this view, it is the political process that defines society's expectations for the scope of CSR, in terms of legal norms."44 In addition, as Stone, (1985) (supra note 10) suggests at 135, "even if  we regard the law-corrected market signal as an imperfect proxy for the social welfare, it may nonetheless, process legitimacy and so on considered, be superior to the judgment of the managers as to what's best for the whole society on the whole.”45 Wedderbum, (1985) (supra note 42) at 32. Perhaps the reason for the difference in the debate between Europe and America may be traced to the more radical orientation of European trade unions: as O’Sullivan, MA, Contests fo r  Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United States and Germany (2000) explains at 57, American unions, as part o f the broader industrial settlement, did not in general challenge the principle of managerial control.46 For example, the mandate of the Bullock Committee (below note 77) referred to "the need for a radical extension of industrial democracy in the control o f companies by means of representation on boards of directors."47 Unger, RM, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (1998) suggests at 42 that a "radical- democratic program would change the institutional forms of the regulated market economy."48 Kahn-Freund, O, "Industrial Democracy" (1977) 6 Industrial Law Journal 65 at 65. The Webbs were among early users of the term, although according to Kahn-Freund, their usage referred to the collective bargaining functions of trade unions. The Bullock Report (below note 77) at 20 includes an extensive discussion.
66
making. However, it has equally been suggested by analogy with political 
constitutionalism that a "scheme of checks and balances" requiring "consensus among the 
constituencies of the firm for every major decision"49 50 might actually improve the quality 
o f decision-making.
As a section of society, which is merely functionally differentiated, the company remains 
subject to the same democratic imperative as wider society. The corporation is treated as 
a system of government, which is used to facilitate production through the hierarchical 
division of labour. The dominant contractual view, according to which the corporation is 
a purely private arrangement in which citizens' waive their right to self-determination 
while they are at work, is rejected. Since labour cannot be separated from the person who 
supplies it, the direction of work necessarily also involves the direction of people. The 
democratic imperative insists that:
"Any company with people working in it is an institution of governance—so the question 
o f democracy arises...Democracy is a structure for the governance of people, not the 
management of property."51
In attempting to counteract the rather coercive character o f the corporate authority 
structure, "[s]takeholding offers a distinctive view on 'labour', seeing 'labour' as a 
member of an organisation rather than as a commodity, one which is sharply at variance 
with that of mainstream economics."52 In this sense, the stakeholder model aims for the
49 Wedderbum, Lord, "Trust, Corporation and the Worker" (1985) 23 Osgood Hall Law Journal 203 at 235; in this sense it seems to consider shareholders and employees as the potential controllers of the corporation: see the discussion of the Bullock report below.so Unger, RM (1998) (supra note 47) at 44. Unger compares this institutional reform to the American Constitution's restrictions on the powers of the president, which were "designed to slow politics down (for the sake of liberty and property)".51 Ellerman, D, The Democratic Firm (1997), ch2; this is not a new approach: see for example Berle, AA (1932) (supra note 25) at 1366: "the task of...administrators is, fundamentally, that of industrial government." Ellerman asks whether "a company [is] an organization for the governance of people or only for the administration of things?" and concludes that "If a company carries out any productive or service operations, then the people conducting those operations are governed by the company within the scope of those operations."52 Sachdev and Wilkinson, "Raising the Stakes: Stakeholding and the Organisation of Work" in Collins, H Davies P and Rideout, R (eds), Legal Regulation o f  the Employment Relation (2000), at 564
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decommodification of labour, insisting on a role for status53 and, like labour law, seeking 
to emancipate and redress inequalities of bargaining power, rather than to resolve the 
narrowly-defined agency problem at the heart of most discussions of company law and 
corporate governance. Its emphasis on hierarchical aspects of the corporation at the 
expense of contractual elements echoes Kahn-Freund's claim that "submission and... 
subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal mind known 
as the "contract of employment."54
Despite these parallels with the goals of labour law, advocates of industrial democracy 
demanded participatory mechanisms at the level of the individual company rather than at 
a sectoral or industrial level.55 Employees would be granted rights simply by virtue of 
their status as members of the company, rights which would affect the allocation of 
decision-making power within the corporation, and so should be considered more typical 
of company law than labour law.56 57In this sense, demands for industrial democracy put 
doctrinal distinctions under some pressure, as internal corporate decision-making and the 
concerns of employees had hitherto tended to kept in different "boxes" (at least in 
common law jurisdictions). While the concerns o f the agency model delimit, more or
53 See Streeck, "Status and Contract: Basic Categories of a Sociological Theory of Industrial Relations" in Sugarman, D and Teubner, G (eds), Regulating Corporate Croups in Europe (1990), 107-14154 Kahn-Freund, O, Labour and the Law  (1983) at 1855 If truly participatory democratic structures are introduced in the corporate decision-making process, then employees may be freed from the dual colonisation of their "life-world" by both legislative intervention and collective agreements, both of which treat them as members o f a collective only. See further Simitis, "The Rediscovery of the Individual in Labour Law" in Rogowski, R and Wilthagen, T (eds), Reflexive Labour Law (1994). Of course, whether participatory rather than representative democracy is likely to result from the reforms proposed by this model is a moot point.56 Streeck, W, "Industrial Ctizenship under Regime Competition: the Case of the European Works Councils" (1997) 4 Journal o f European Public Policy 643 at 644: "Rights based in company law ensure collective participation of workforces in a firm’s economic decision-making; as they touch upon the exercise of property rights, they represent a stronger version o f industrial citizenship that is politically more demanding to institute. Rights based in labour law are more concerned with the workplace as such, or with the plant as distinguished from the enterprise. While company-law participation rights interfere with the rights o f  owners in the firm, labour-law participation rights modify managerial prerogative in the day-to- day governance o f the employment relationship. The two kinds of participation rights are not always entirely separable, and some issues can in principle be addressed under either company or labour law."57 The controversy generated by these proposals may be seen, for example, in Kahn-Freund, O (1977) {supra note 48) at 75-7. He insisted that pluralistic regulation through collective bargaining at the enterprise level was preferable to company law reform. Measures falling short o f representation, like "mere consultation, though well meant, may have the psychological effect of a charade." Further, the employees' representatives would be afflicted with a conflict of interest as they would owe duties both to the employees and to the company. An additional supporting substructure is required where a two-tier board
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less comprehensively, the scope to date of Anglo-American company law, the concerns 
of the political stakeholding model have traditionally been met in those legal systems 
through the provisions of collective labour law. Some political stakeholding measures 
have traditionally been included in continental systems of company law. The clash 
between these two different conceptions of the scope of company law is visible in the 
"industrial restructuring" directives, and should become apparent in the final chapter’s 
analysis of the proposed EC takeover directive.
Instrumental Rationales for Industrial Democracy
Looked at through the lens of the democratic imperative, the introduction of employee
f Oparticipation in corporate decision-making has a value per se. As part of society, the 
corporation may only be legitimised through the démocratisation of its governance 
procedures. This primary rationale is often supported by secondary arguments to the 
effect that reform of corporate decision-making might also be instrumentalised in order to 
achieve other goals. For example, some discussions suggest that economic efficiency 
may be a favourable by-product of more democratic firms.58 9 Similarly, the introduction
structure is created so that the supervisory board is not marginalised, and a one-tier board structure requires extensive delegation if  it is to avoid "management by negotiation". The end result is that the likely "ineffective representation...may, in this respect, be the equivalent of mere consultation." For a more positive assessment of consultation and its historical role as part of a "double helix" with collective bargaining, see Weddeitmm, Lord, "Consultation and Collective Bargaining in Europe: Success or Ideology?" (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 1 at 30-32, although he also insists it is not a suitable replacement for collective bargaining. Armour, J and Dealdn, S, "Insolvency and Employment Protection: the Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights Directive" (ESRC Working Paper 2002) suggest that the legislative provision o f rights to consultation create sequential process rights in corporate governance which are only triggered by events that threaten a certain constituency's interests. For example, the board’s right to sell part of the enterprise may be de facto limited by the requirement of the Acquired Rights Directive (2001/23/EC) that employees be consulted, and the CRD (98/59/EC) may similarly limit their right to make large scale redundancies. Although these are measures o f employment protection, they impinge on the board's company law right to manage because failure to comply may give rise to an obligation to pay compensation. These directives played an important role in the outcome of the Rover/BMW affair by penalising bids which sought to break up the company: see Armour, J, Deakin, S, and Konzelmann, S, "Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance" (2003) ESRC Centre fo r  Business Research, University o f  Cambridge, Working Paper No. 266 at 14-16.58 For example, Stone, (1985) (supra note 10) at 136 (footnote added) refers to "a moral good that deserves an accounting independent of its social welfare consequences... democratic process can be defended on grounds other than that it provides more beneficial results."59 See for example, Hurst, "From the Economic to the Political" in Kelly, D, Kelly, G, and Gamble, A (eds), Stakeholder Capitalism (1997), 63 who argues that "uncontrolled power is not the most efficient route to wealth creation if it ignores the knowledge and experience of employees, and if it fails to motivate employees by not actively involving them." See also generally Kelly, G, Kelly, D, and Gamble, A eds, Stakeholder Capitalism (1997). In more interventionist terms, Hutton, W, The State We'Re In (1996) argues
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of democracy might also be justified politically on the grounds of redistribution of 
wealth. Cheffins suggests that "a legal regime which provides workers with rights and 
bargaining leverage unavailable in an unregulated market may well help to yield a more 
equal allocation of wealth in society. Hence, it is possible to develop a plausible 
redistribution argument to support corporate law rules which will improve the position of 
the workforce."60
Advocates of an instrumental approach to industrial democracy advance three main inter­
related arguments for improving "participation"61: humanistic, power-sharing and 
economic efficiency.62
The humanistic case for participation is that one should aim to "satisfy employees' non- 
pecuniary needs including those for creativity, achievement and social approval. For 
employees, having a voice in how they do their work may be as important as how much 
they are paid for it."63 It is argued that participation enables individuals to leam about 
socially responsible action since this is the only type of action to which others will agree, 
and that this in turn might be instrumental in bringing about change at the societal level.64
The power-sharing case raises a moral and political argument based on the inalienable 
right of human beings to self-government:65 "traditional autocratic relationships are 
inherently unjust and inconsistent with the values of a democratic society."66 Going 
further, one might say that "if democracy is justified in the government of our state, then
at 285 that "Free markets do not necessarily produce the "best" institutions and outcomes; they must be carefully sustained by social and public action."60 Cheffins, BR, Company Law: Theory, Structure, Operation (1997) at 15161 Defined as "how people interact with each other in an organizational context" by Heller, F, Pusiæ, E, Strauss, G, and Wilpert, B, Organizational Participation: Myth and Reality (1998) at 662 ibid at 8-1063 ibid at 8. The authors argue at 68 that it is often impossible to separate satisfaction derived from taking part from sharing in the results.the outcomes to which that participation leads.M Pateman, C, Participation and Democratic Theory (1970). Similarly Dahl, RA, A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985) argues at 94 that "democracy within firms would improve the quality of democracy in the government o f  the state by transforming us into better citizens and by facilitating greater political equality among us."65 See for example, Dahl, RA (1985) (supra)zX 6166 Heller, F, Pusiæ, E, Strauss, G, and Wilpert, B (1998) (supra note 61) at 8-9
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it is also justified in the governments that make decisions within firms."67 The actual 
measures needed to achieve industrial democracy will depend on existing institutional 
arrangements in the jurisdiction and industrial sector in question. The democratic goal is 
more important than the precise way in which it is achieved. For example, there may be 
no need for second channel representation if there is a strong workplace union.68 
Alternatively, firm level participation mechanisms may compensate for the lack o f a 
union. As Streeck and Rogers point out, a whole spectrum of combinations between 
collective bargaining and other participation methods is possible:
"The purpose of second channel institutions is to give workers a voice in the governance 
o f the shop floor and the firm, and to facilitate communication and cooperation between 
management and labor on production-related matters, more or less free of direct 
distributive conflicts over wages...Where unions and collective bargaining are 
centralized at the national or sectoral level, outside the firm - as in the Netherlands and 
Germany - or where unions are weak and not widely present at the workplace - as in 
France and Spain - second channel functions are usually performed by what are known as 
works councils. . . . " 69 70
They argue that the continuing decline of union membership in the UK raises fears o f a 
US-style "representation gap" in which "basic democratic ideals are compromised." 
These representational concerns demonstrate the importance of recent EC directives 
concerning works councils and information and consultation procedures from a 
democratic perspective.
67 Dahl, RA (1985) (supra note 64) at 9468 See Gospel, H and Willman, P, "High Performance Workplaces: the Role o f Employee Involvement in a Modem Economy" (Centre fo r Economic Performance Working Paper February 2003 at 8-1169 Rogers and Streeck, "Workplace Representation Overseas: The Works Councils Story" in Freeman, RB (ed), Working Under Different Rules (1994), 97-156 at 97-8. In Germany, works councils and board level representation together constitute the system of co-determination - see further chapter 6. On the other hand, the EC Works Council Directive appears to treat works councils as qualitatively different from co­determination.70 ibid at 98
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The economic efficiency argument for political stakeholding is that participation will lead 
to improvements in decision-making through the circulation of information, easier 
implementation o f decisions, enhanced motivation of the workforce through goal-setting, 
and may improve cooperation and coordination as well as organizational learning.71 723This
*7*7uses a dynamic as opposed to static notion of efficiency, i.e., efficiency which increases 
over time with repeated interactions, and which may offer the following benefits: less 
supervision required as self-supervision becomes possible; resultant non-adversarial 
relations; employees leam new skills and leadership potential is developed and 
identified. It should also provide the company with "the economic benefits of a stable 
workforce with low turnover and correspondingly high social integration."74
The Fate of Industrial Democracy
Demands for industrial democracy during the 1970s were reflected in a number of high 
level reports. The European Commission issued a Green Paper in 1975 entitled 
"Employee Participation and Company Structure",75 in which it referred to the 
"democratic imperative" that "those who will be substantially affected by decisions made 
by social and political institutions must be involved in the making of those decisions."76 
Similarly, the Bullock Report in Britain referred to "the principle that a socially 
responsible company in a democratic society cannot operate without taking account of 
the interests of its employees."77 The report explained that these “[n]ew conceptions of
71 Heller, F, Pusiae, E, Strauss, G, and Wilpert, B (1998) (supra note 61)at 10; Bowles and Gintis, "Is the Demand for Workplace Democracy Redundant in a Liberal Economy?" in Pagano, U and Rowthom, R (eds), Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic Enterprise (1996), 64-81 at 75; in a similar vein, Kelly, G, Kelly, D, and Gamble, A eds (1997) (supra note 59) at 244 argue that "companies which draw on the experience of all their stakeholders will be more efficient." O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 45) at 53 describes this as a "rather hopeful" statement. Economic arguments in favour o f  participation are taken up in more detail in Chapter 3.72 Aoki, M, "Towards an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm" (1990) 28 Journal o f Economic Literature
173 Heller, F, Pusiae, E, Strauss, G, and Wilpert, B (1998) (supra note 61) note at 10 and in Chapter 6 that participation cannot be introduced in isolation from other policies such as training, performance-based pay and job security.74 Streeck, W, "The Transformation o f  Corporate Organization in Europe: An Overview" (2001) MPlfG Working Paper 01/8. December 200175 Bull Supp 8/7576 ibid at 977 Report o f  the Committee o f  Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Cmnd. 6706,1977) ("the Bullock Report") at 21. Coming when it did, the Bullock Report also generated a great deal of interest in Europe: see for
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the role of employees in decision-making at company level are not just reactions to 
economic trends. They also derive from social changes which have taken place since the 
war, especially rising standards o f education and higher standards o f living.”78
These reports and accompanying reform proposals were not well received by those 
already involved in the governance o f the employment relationship. Proposals to 
introduce industrial democracy in its co-determination form were opposed not only, as 
might be expected, by industrialists79 but also by trade unions that favoured "pluralist" 
collective bargaining over a "unitary" conception of industrial relations.80 812In response to 
these objections, others questioned whether weaker forms of worker involvement would 
be sufficient to achieve the democratization goal, noting that "participation in decision­
making is a very different animal in the labour relations zoo from consultation of workers
A |by a management which retains full discretion to make the cntical decisions."
These objections meant that, in contrast to CSR, which basically left the existing 
structure of corporate decision-making intact, the industrial democracy debate was 
inextricably caught up with discussions about company law reform. As Wedderbum 
said of the Bullock Committee, o f which he was a member, "the view was widespread 
that if  workers' influence was to be felt in the taking o f critical decisions about the 
enterprise, new institutions should at least be considered.... It seemed quite absurd to say 
that directors in the modem company were subjected to fiduciary duties which involved
example, Sciana, S (ed), Democrazia Politica e Democrazia Industriale (1978); Montalenti, P (ed), Operai Ed Europa: La Partecipazione Dei Lavoratori Alla Gestione Dell'Impresa (1981).78 ibid at 2279 Among many others, Wedderbum, (1985) (supra note 42) at 37 cites the CBI’s "Replies to Bullock" and the Institute of Directors' "The EEC Vth Directive - A Trojan Bullock". Wedderbum notes that while there was an "overwhelming" interest in participatory management, only a minority realised that this would have an effect on the managerial prerogative.80 See, for an example o f this logic, Kahn-Freund, O (1977) (supra note 48 ), who argued that there was a straight dichotomy between "unitary" and "pluralistic" forms of employee representation. For criticism that these "old maps...are inadequate", see Davies, P and Wedderbum, Lord, "The Land of Industrial Democracy" (1977) 6 Industrial Law Journal 197-211 at 211. They saw the Bullock report as seeking "conflictual partnership", and argued that collective bargaining was merely one form of joint regulation of the employment relationship.81 Wedderbum, Lord (1985) (supra note 49) at 248; however in Wedderbum, Lord (1997) (supra note 57) at 28 he recognises that consultation and collective bargaining may be complementary and that the distinction may even become blurred.82 Wedderbum, Lord (1985) (supra note 49) at 249
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shareholders and employees equally and then to omit the employees altogether from the 
constitution of the incorporated enterprise. Such an offer to the workers would be little 
better than a fraudulent prospectus."83
A Definition of Political Stakeholding
The stakeholding model of the company draws heavily on these varied and rich 
intellectual traditions. Although mainly developed and applied to companies,84 as a 
political theory it demands increased participation in other institutions, such as local 
government and universities.
As recently as 1984, stakeholders were broadly defined as "any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of a corporation's objectives."85 86Ellerman 
gave this definition a more precise texture, uniting the industrial democracy and CSR 
constituencies into a single formulation, insisting that the "stakeholders in an enterprise 
[are] all those people who are either governed by the enterprise management or whose 
interests are affected by the enterprise...." Some communitarians even claim that the 
"stakeholders in this corporate entity include...the immediate community, and indeed, the 
general society."87
Such sweeping definitions have been heavily criticised both within economics and law 
for indeterminacy, and for being of little use in assessing management performance or 
giving concrete form to the law.88 However, the difficult question of whether "the general
83 ibid at 240; of course, this was to some extent the outcome, in the form of the unenforceable "window dressing" (per Birds, J, "Making Directors do their Duties” (1980) Co Law 67 at 73) o f  section 309, introduced in the Companies Act 1980, mandating the board to "have regard" to the interests o f employees.84 Plender, J (1997) (supra note 7) at 168J Freeman, RE, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984, Pitman, Boston)86 Ellerman, D (1997) {supra note 51), ch287 Dinh, VD, "Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business Enterprise" (1999) 24 Iowa Journal o f  Corporation Law 975 at 98588 For example, Jensen, MC, "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function" (2001) Harvard Business School Working Paper 00-058 at 2-3 argues, with some exaggeration, that under this model the stakeholder category may be considered to "include all individuals or groups who can substantially affect the welfare o f the firm: not only the financial claimants but also employees, customers, communities, and government officials - and under some interpretations, the environment, terrorists, blackmailers, and thieves." See also Johnston, JF, "No Man Can Serve Two Masters" (1998) Social Affairs Unit Research Report 25 .
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society" may in any meaningful legal as opposed to political sense be considered a 
stakeholder of a corporation may be left aside because the focus of this thesis is on the 
position of employees. In any account of political stakeholding, employees are 
considered "internal" to the company89 because they are "governed" while other 
constituencies are merely "affected". Employees fall within the "governed" category 
because they "(within certain limits) take orders from the enterprise management, i.e .,... 
are under the authority of the managers."90 Accordingly, their interests should be dealt 
with within the corporation's internal structure, while the affected should be protected 
through legislation.91 92
Implementation into Law
As a general project, political stakeholding offers several suggestions for reform of 
company law:
i) Board as trustees
"Stakeholder theory proposed instead a view of the managerial role which came closer to 
trusteeship, where the trustees' role was to balance the interests of the various 
constituencies in the business and to recognize a wider responsibility to society."
Establishing the board as mediating figures is a paradigmatic example of the 
implementation of other-regarding CSR, and is arguably what company law already does 
with its insistence that management owe their duties to the corporate entity rather than to 
the shareholders collectively. While the precise extent to which the law (as opposed to 
capital market pressure) obliges management to advance the interests of shareholders, 
management is certainly entitled, in the exercise of its discretion, to make long-term 
plans in which the pay-off to shareholders will be considerably deferred. This allows the 
board to take employees' interests into account in running the business, and the link 
between the treatment o f employees and the return to shareholders does not have to be
89 See Kelly, M, The Divine Right o f Capital (2003) at 145-690 Ellerman, D (1997) {supra note 51)91 Kelly, M (2003) {supra note 89) at 145-692 Plender, J (1997) {supra note 7) at 17
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too specific. As long as the company is a going concern, any actions taken by the board 
to favour employees may be considered in terms of developing good industrial relations. 
In any review o f management’s actions, the courts will simply look at whether the action 
in question was capable of benefiting the shareholders. The business judgement rule 
mandates a fairly hands-off approach by the courts on the basis that the task of 
formulating business policy belongs to the directors and not to the courts. The courts 
therefore will not intervene unless it is clear that an action could not benefit the 
shareholders.93 The proper response for dissatisfied shareholders is to use their power to 
remove the board rather than to attempt to litigate the matter before the courts. This 
"prudential" interpretation of the board's duties is consistent with both the agency and 
stakeholder models, and is widely disseminated through voluntary CSR measures, such 
as codes of conduct.
In England and Wales,94 management is also required to take into account the interests of 
employees, although this duty is unenforceable by the employees.95 A broad reading of 
the obligation suggests that they are entitled to do so even where there is no conceivable 
benefit for the shareholders, and suggests that further reform to give management greater 
autonomy from the various corporate constituencies would be appropriate.96 The problem 
with attempting to implement a political stakeholder model through legal reform of 
directors’ duties in isolation is that "the mechanisms of corporate governance are now 
largely aligned to ensure that shareholders' interests actually do get primacy."97 The 
market mechanisms discussed in chapter one, and the hostile takeover, discussed in part 
two, which all encourage management to pursue the interests of shareholders, clearly 
undermine management’s capacity to act as neutral trustees. Changes to the legal regime
9' The facts o f Hutton v West Cork Railway ((1883) 23 Ch 654), the main authority on this point, were exceptional because the company had no future as a going concern.M Under s309 o f the Companies Act 1985. This is also true of many US jurisdictions: see Chapter 4 for a discussion of corporate constituency statutes, albeit in the narrower context o f  takeovers.95 Although Parkinson, J (1993) (supra note 32) argues at 84 that the unenforceability of the duty reduces it to a discretion to take into account the interests o f employees.96 See for example, Xuereb, PG, "The Juridification o f Industrial Relations through Company Law Reform" (1988) 51 Modem Law Review 156-172, Teubner, G, "Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the "Essence” of the Legal Person" (1988) 36 American Journal o f Comparative Law 130, Ireland, P, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62 Modem Law Review 32
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aimed at increasing managerial autonomy would have to be coupled with a reassessment 
o f the compatibility o f such market mechanisms with fiduciary duties, as well as reform 
o f the system by which the board is appointed along more pluralistic lines. Such reforms 
clearly conflict with the dominant agency model, and are at present politically unlikely.
ii) Voluntary Solutions
However, there is more normative variety to the political stakeholding model than the 
simple categorisation o f the directors as trustees. The CSR limb of political stakeholding 
emphasises voluntary action by the board within the current legal framework. Some
AOcommentators consider it no more than a guide to management decision-making which 
might assist them either to indirectly enhance shareholder value through taking 
stakeholders into account or, more controversially, to act for other purposes. Such a guide 
is useful given the effects of "bounded rationality"97 89 in creating "profit-undifferentiable 
situations": in many situations it is difficult for management to clearly identify the ideal 
course of action in terms of generating profits.100 10A code of conduct may provide useful 
pointers in terms of value-creation strategy.
Voluntary CSR is currently very influential, at least in terms of stimulating production of 
codes of conduct and other methods of highlighting corporations' socially responsible 
behaviour, such as social accounting. The European Commission is trying to stimulate 
more action in this direction, issuing a Green Paper, Promoting a European Framework 
fo r  Corporate Social Responsibility In that Green Paper, the Commission attempts, but 
ultimately fails, to bridge the gap between CSR and industrial democracy. It refers to 
CSR's "internai" and "external" dimensions, while emphasising the importance of 
voluntary solutions. "Socially responsible practices" along the "internal" dimensions
97 Roberts, J and Van den Steen, E, "Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Investment and Corporate Governance" ( Working Paper Stanford Graduate School o f Business April 2000) at 298 See for example the "balanced scorecard" approach of Kaplan, RS and Norton, DP, The Balanced Scorecard (1996, Harvard University Press). Jensen, MC (2001) (supra note 88) suggests that it should operate as "a specification tool to help managers understand what creates value in their business" rather than a legal obligation.99 Discussed in Chapter 3.100 Stone, (1985) (supra note 10) at 137101 COM (2001) 366 final, 18.7.2001
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appear to replace industrial democracy concerns, and "primarily involve employees and 
relate to issues such as investing in human capital, health and safety, and managing 
change..."102
Hi) Introduction o f  Participation
Despite these recent attempts at synthesis by the Commission, the industrial democracy 
strand of stakeholding is generally considered to be more normatively demanding, calling 
for the introduction of democratic principles into companies. Participation is a broad 
concept, and need not necessarily extend as far as co-determination on the German model 
and the right for employees to appoint representatives to the board. Lower-order 
procedural rights, such as informational and consultational participation can also 
contribute to the achievement of industrial democracy, and in particular may be 
combined with adversarial participation through collective bargaining. The essence of 
these procedures from an industrial democracy perspective is that, regardless of the 
identity of the final decision-maker, employees have the right to exercise some "voice" in 
the corporate decision-making process, whether directly or indirectly through 
representatives. This category may intersect with the idea o f management as trustees 
where industrial democracy takes the form of deliberative procedures, in which 
employees put forward their point o f view on a given issue to the decision-making 
trustees.
A Critique of Political Stakeholding
i) The ”Multiple Goals”Argument
The main critique made o f political stakeholding in the corporate context is that the 
concept is too broad. Critics argue that, despite its descriptive weaknesses, the agency 
model of the company does at least provide a useful guide to inform board decision­
making, and therefore a standard against which the performance of the board may be 
judged. To broaden the guide to include so many other constituencies raises the old fear 
that management will be left accountable to no-one if  they are given a completely free
102 ibid at 8; the potential impact o f  the Commission's Green Paper on takeovers is discussed in Chapter 6.
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rein to identify which possibly conflicting goals they are to pursue. Managers will be able 
to defend self-serving actions on the basis that they were pursuing whichever goal 
coincides most closely with their own self-interest.103 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that:
"...a  manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the 
community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither. Faced with a demand 
from either group, the manager can appeal to the interests of the other. Agency costs rise 
and social wealth falls."104
Many other commentators have raised this "classic argument".105 Even Wedderbum 
agrees that "no markers of parallel clarity to that of the profit test have yet been offered to 
modem management by government or society."106
As suggested above, stakeholders might be narrowed down to the "governed" employees. 
Alternatively, stakeholding could be limited to those whose interests are not adequately 
protected by the law, and who therefore require some kind of protection at the level of the 
corporate constitution.107 However, even confining political stakeholding to the interests 
o f employees is not a complete response to the "classic argument". If the board is 
mandated to take into account the interests of employees alongside those of the 
shareholders, either in a prudential or other-regarding sense, they are still faced with
103 Alternatively, Johnston, JF (1998) (supra note 88) argues at 15 that if managers act in good faith, "either they will not be able to make a decision at all, or any decision will be a watered-down compromise."104 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D, The Economic Structure of Company Law (1991) at 3 8.105 Slinger, G, "Spanning the Gap: The Theoretical Principles that connect Stakeholder Policies to Business Performance" (ESRC Working Paper ¡11, Dec 1998 ) at 4; see for example, Bainbridge, SM, "In Defense o f the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm" (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1423. For a detailed exposition of the "classic argument" see Johnston, JF (1998) {supra note 88) who traces its origin in the corporate context to Berle, AA (1932) {supra note 25), and its wider societal application to 2000BC!106 Wedderbum, (1985) {supra note 42) at 9107 Leader, S, "Participation and Property Rights" (1999) 21 Journal o f Business Ethics 97-109 at 106. Similarly, Kochan, TA and Rubinstein, SA, "Toward a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: The Saturn Partnership" (2000) 11 Organization Science 367 suggest at 369 that stakeholders should be identified by reference to their "saliency" which is "a function of ( I ) the extent to which potential stakeholders contribute valued resources to the firm, (2) the extent to which they put these resources at risk and would experience costs if  the firm fails or their relationship with the firm terminates, and (3) the power they have in or over an organization. Contributing valued resources creates incentives for others to recognize a potential stakeholder, while putting resources at risk gives one a moral claim to stakeholder status...however, without the other two features, a powerful group may not be perceived as legitimate by other stakeholders." This definition begins to shade into the model developed in Ch3.
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multiple goals and will take whichever course of action most closely coincides with their 
own interests. The risk of this, as we shall see in the second part, is particularly acute in 
the hostile takeover situation where the incumbents' positions are under threat. Since the 
business judgement rule renders management's decisions broadly unreviewable, this leads 
to capital market pressure for deviations from the general company law rule of 
managerialism in the takeover situation.
ii) The “InstitutionalParalysis” Argument
In terms o f participation mechanisms, the representation of employees on the board 
alongside the shareholders’ "agents" is, of course, very controversial. Calls for 
démocratisation and employee board-level representation contradict the agency model’s 
normative argument that the board is a specialised governance device to resolve 
incompleteness in shareholders' contracts. Even if  one accepts, as do new institutional 
economists, that employees' contracts may be incomplete, the rational solution is for 
them to set up an appropriate governance structure to fill out the details.108 To suggest 
that they share the shareholders' device runs the risk that the single-purpose character o f 
the board might be subverted and will fulfil neither of its goals.
Placing employee representatives on the board runs the risk not only of rendering 
management unaccountable, but also of paralysing the company's decision-making organ, 
or simply forcing decision-making out o f its formal environment to be taken elsewhere:
"Participation is not free...It brings with it all the costs of collective decision making."109
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that the "growing view today is that meaningful direct 
worker voting participation in corporate affairs tends to produce inefficient decisions, 
paralysis, or weak boards, and that these costs are likely to exceed any potential benefits
I0S For this argument, see Williamson, OE, "Corporate Governance" (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1197, discussed in Chapter 3.109 Hansmann, H, The Ownership o f  Enterprise (1996) at 89; this argument was also made by Kahn-Freund, O (1977) (supra note 48) , who at 79-80 referred to "management by negotiation" and the problem o f  deciding how much delegation the board would be allowed to make.
J
that worker participation might bring.*'110 While employees do bring certain strengths to 
the governance process, such as better incentives and ability to monitor management than 
shareholders, they are also afflicted by significant weaknesses. While shareholders are 
likely to be passive and give management free rein, employees are more likely to 
disagree among themselves about wages and other distributional issues such as which 
plants to keep open. The "extent to which employee’s interests diverge in these respects is 
likely to increase as the division of labor within the firm increases."111 The costs of 
collective decision-making make governance by employees feasible only where they are 
particularly homogeneous.112
Despite the difficulties associated with involving employees in governance for 
democratic reasons, Hansmann considers that "forms of employee participation that fall 
short of true ownership may offer better prospects for improving on the efficiency of the 
classical model...quality circles, shop floor committees, works councils, labor- 
management committees, and informational seats for labor on the board of directors may 
be more workable means of improving the flow of information between management and 
employees."113 Information and consultation participation fits better with an efficiency 
rationale than a democratic one as it may be considered to reduce transaction costs. This 
point is taken up in chapter 3.
Hi) The “Unnecessary Duplication o f Protection” Argument
Finally, Paul Davies asks whether the political stakeholding model in fact necessitates 
any changes to the existing system of legal protection of stakeholder interests. He 
suggests that the interests of non-shareholder constituencies might be considered to be
110 Hansmann, H and Kraakman, R (2000) {supra note 2) at 6; the root cause of the problem is that "the workforce in typical firms is too heterogeneous in its interests to make an effective governing body and the problems are magnified greatly when employees must share governance with investors, as in codetermined firms."1,1 Hansmann, H (1996) (supra note 109) at 90. A similar distributional conflict afflicts joint governance by shareholders and labour.112 ibid at 119. He argues that where worker representation on boards has succeeded in the US, there has tended to be little hierarchy, workers doing similar jobs, and broad equality of earnings to prevent dissension and reduce costs of collective decision-making. By contrast, co-determination was "imposed on German firms by force of law; no similar system seems to have been adopted by any significant number of firms either inside or outside of Germany in the absence of compulsion." (at 111)
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fully protected by the provisions of labour» environmental and tax law.13 14 As regards 
employees specifically, Davies argues that employees are not employed exclusively by 
corporations but also by partnerships and sole traders. Regulation of the employment 
relationship should not depend on the form of the legal vehicle adopted by the 
employer.115 The provisions of labour law apply whenever a worker is considered to be 
an "employee", and do not depend in any way on the legal form o f the employer.116
Similarly Bowles and Gintis point out that critics "have claimed that the project of 
democratizing the workplace is redundant given that worker autonomy is already secured 
by the competitive structure of labour markets and the liberal democratic structure o f the 
state."117 The first aspect o f this claim, of course, assumes that competitive markets will 
allow the worker in question to exit the firm without suffering any loss. This issue is 
addressed in the next chapter. The second aspect of the critique was one of the main 
tenets o f industrial democracy, namely that democracy should be extended to the firm. In 
its legislative form, industrial democracy was to have been imposed by the democratic 
state as an extension of itself.
Davies backs up his argument by reference to the inefficiencies identified by Hansmann 
whenever heterogeneous employees become involved in corporate decision-making. 
Company law cannot be considered "the most efficient mechanism for providing that 
governance"118 if one assumes that
"the core function of company law is to regulate the input of risk capital (primarily 
ordinary share capital) and to some extent o f loan finance (because shareholders' desire in 
large companies for limited liability creates extra risks for creditors) and of senior 
managerial exercise (because of shareholders' reliance in large companies on centralized
113 ibid114 This argument is echoed in the Winter Report: see Chapter 6.11 s Davies, P, Introduction to Company Law  (2002) at 272.116 This argument does gloss over the fact that non-corporate employers tend to be smaller and less bureaucratic, making it easier for employees to gain access to the decision-makers, even if they do not have the right to actually make the decision.117 Bowles and Gintis, (1996) (supra note 71 ) at 64118 Davies, P (2002) (supra note 115) at 272
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management). The law needs to provide a framework for the co-ordination of the other 
inputs upon which business success depends, but the process o f contracting for labour or 
supplies, for example, does not have to be seen as part of company law."119
O f course, this understanding of company law is grounded in the agency model. If 
company law is about ensuring economic efficiency, then it appears that arguments based 
on the democratic rationale or the company as a social institution are not sufficient to 
justify the representation of employees in corporate governance processes. Industrial 
democracy may be achieved through the system of adversarial collective bargaining 
between unions and employers, and companies may act rationally and fulfil their social 
responsibilities voluntarily without any need for legal intervention. Nevertheless, Davies' 
broad formulation of the task of company law, namely the provision o f "a framework for 
the co-ordination of the other inputs upon which business success depends", does open 
the door to the main argument of the next chapter, that the position of employees is 
analogous to that of shareholders rather than suppliers because they bear residual risk. If 
an economic rationale can be advanced for employee participation, then the fact that the 
measures also enhance democracy is another factor in favour of their adoption.
119 ibid at 272
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Chapter Three: The Productive Coalition Model
Introduction
The two models already considered either assume that employment contracts may be 
made explicit and thus fully protect employees from risk, or downplay the contractual 
aspects of the employment relationship in order to concentrate on the political detriment 
o f corporate hierarchy to the individual. The more complete model developed in this 
chapter treats corporations as mechanisms for developing, and maintaining the integrity 
of, systems of production of which the constituent elements become co-specialised and 
therefore interdependent. In this model, transaction costs frequently prevent employment 
contracts (the employees’ gateway to the productive coalition or "pactum subjectionis"1) 
from being fully "presentiated" at the time of their conclusion. The firm is a governance 
mechanism capable of resolving this contracting problem by filling in the gaps in 
incomplete contracts.2 Applying Easterbrook and Fischel's methodology to this 
contracting problem means that company law may then be explained normatively as 
providing a standard-form governance structure for voluntary adoption by the members 
of a productive coalition where it leads to lower transaction costs than market-based 
explicit contracting.
Despite sharing the neoclassical model’s methodology, this model’s normative agenda for 
company law differs considerably because it recognises that contracting failures may 
occur in respect of a wider range of key productive inputs than simply share capital. The 
corporate constituencies which need the benefit of a governance structure are identified 
by reference to the contracting problems they experience. This process suggests that 
many, if  not all, of the corporation's employees should be considered residual claimants 
on the basis that
1 Blair, MM and Stout, LA, "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law" (1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 247 at 2782 O f course, this model of the employment contract has strong parallels with the agency model’s assumptions about the management-shareholder contract.
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"when investments in highly specialized human capital are important to the way the firm 
creates wealth, employees, as well as shareholders, are likely to be residual claimants 
and, therefore, residual risk-bearers...."3
Accordingly, in "many kinds o f corporations, employees (and sometimes other major 
stakeholders) have as much of a claim to being owners of the corporation as do 
shareholders, and perhaps more so."4 Many employees may even bear more risk than 
shareholders because they are unable to minimise their risk through diversification of 
their investments.5 In addition, the job market is less liquid than the stock market, and so 
exit from the firm is likely to impose additional costs on employees in terms of the time it 
takes to find another (lower paying) job.6
The basic premise of this model is that when employees acquire skills which are "sunk" 
into the business, these should be treated as capital investments because they generate 
value. This "human capital" is, in the context of many modem public corporations not 
only scarcer and more important in creating value than financial capital, but also more 
difficult to attract and maintain. This change in the nature o f capital complicates the role 
of company law: while it continues to bear responsibility for facilitating the gathering of 
capital, it must now ensure that the corporation's governance structure reflects and 
supports the changing dynamics o f the productive coalition. The economic rationale for 
company law remains that o f maximising the wealth of society by supporting the firm's
3 Blair, MM, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance fo r  the Twenty-First Century (1995) at 238-9: this has important normative implications: “If  other stakeholders could be shown to share in the residual gains and risks, their interest in being able to exercize some control over corporations would be significantly legitimized.” (ibid at 231)4 ibid at 238-95 The dominance of shareholder value as a mission statement for management, combined with full portfolio diversification, makes shares even less risky. O'Sullivan, MA, Contests fo r  Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United States and Germany (2000) at 50 refers to empirical evidence which suggests that the "equity risk premium”, that is the difference between the return to equity holders and the return to holders o f  risk-free assets like t-bills, is "a 'puzzle' because the measured risk of equity returns is not high enough to justify premia of the order o f  6 per cent without resorting to unreasonable assumptions about risk aversion among investors." For statistical evidence of the extent of the premium, see Mehra, R, "The Equity Premium: Why is it a Puzzle?" (NBER Working Paper 9512, February 2003) at 2-4.6 See O’Connor, M, "Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus o f Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers" (1990) 69 N.C.L.Rev. 1189 at 1197 who notes that "Workers who lose their jobs to layoffs and plant closings spend an average of eight weeks trying to find other jobs."
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transaction cost reduction function. However, company law and corporate governance 
should reflect the fact that almost all employees provide capital and bear risk, and that 
governance of the employment relationship is required at the level of the individual 
company because of increasing differentiation.
The traditional legal view of the company as a separate entity is perfectly adequate w here 
we are dealing with explicit contracts. However, where contracts remain implicit and not 
legally enforceable, a systems theory perspective becomes useful. It allow’s a recognition 
that ontologically, the "corporation, in principle, is just an empty shell"7 which may 
become valuable because of "the claims the legal shell has on an underlying economic 
entity...the firm."8 The legal shell establishes a structure which governs decision-making 
processes and claims over the underlying firm. Accordingly, the shell should reflect the 
needs of that underlying productive entity for continuity and trust.
The rationale for reinforcing the modem company as a multi-party governance structure 
may be seen through an analogy with communitarianism. Specialisation makes all 
productive inputs dependent on each other and the continued existence of their 
"community" to sustain current levels of productivity and the generation of rents. This is 
a narrower notion of communitarianism than the one considered in the previous chapter. 
It fixes the limits of community by reference to a factual test of interdependence, which 
turns on the availability of a viable exit option or the ready availability of replacements, 
rather than simple status arising by virtue of being, for example, an employee or a 
supplier. The continued existence of the community depends on the maintenance of 
mutual confidence, so that the various factors will be prepared to "sink" the necessary 
investments for the enterprise to flourish in its competitive environment. The increased 
permanence anticipated for the productive coalition may allow' a reconciliation of the 
contractual model of the firm with the sociological model espoused by Teubner, w hich
7 Zingales, "Corporate Governance" in Newman, P (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary- o f Economics and Me ¿aw (1998), 495 at 4988 ibid.
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treats the interest of the company as being in itself, unitas multiplex, rather than giving 
priority to the interests of any single constituency.9
"...stakeholding amounts to precious little i f  it is deprived o f its economic dimension."10
In recognising that many employees have a stake or interest in the way the corporation is 
governed, this model's normative conclusions are closer to those reached by the political 
stakeholder model than the agency model, albeit that it is concerned with economic 
efficiency rather than political emancipation. This synthesis o f theories complements the 
normative arguments made by political stakeholding with a more durable economic 
methodology than the one typically used by political stakeholder theorists.11 As Deakin 
and Slinger put it, the "stakeholder approach, whatever its moral justification, has always 
required an economic justification consisting of net benefits to the group, or society that 
adopted it."12
The Historical Evolution of the Productive Coalition Model
Company law should reflect the fact that productive relations, and the nature of "capital", 
have evolved considerably since the corporation was first reified and treated as a legal 
entity separate from its owners, the shareholders.13 The discovery of the corporate 
"entity" was a product of its times, coinciding with the demands of large-scale projects 
for financial capital which far exceeded the credit and scope for risk-taking of any 
individual entrepreneur or entrepreneurial family. The corporation emerged as an 
ingenious juridical invention which offered several distinct advantages. It facilitated the 
collection and co-ordination o f the large amounts of financial capital from dispersed
9 See Teubner, "Company Interest: The Public Interest of the Enterprise ‘in Itself" in Rogowksi, R and Wilthagen, T (eds), Reflexive Labour Law ( 1994),10 Plender, J, A Stake in the Future: The Stakeholding Solution (1997) at 1611 Who tend to "rely on sweeping and unsubstantiated assumptions about the foundations of economic success" (O’Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 5) at 52) to sustain their "hopeful" arguments that the participatory company will be more efficient.12 Slinger, G and Deakin, S, "Company Law as an Instrument of Inclusion: Re-Regulating Stakeholder Relations in the Context of Takeovers" (1999) ESRC Centre for Business Research, University o f Cambridge Working Paper No 145 at 3-4
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investors, limiting their liability and rendering the identity of their co-investors irrelevant. 
It also allowed ex ante unpredictable returns to be allocated ex post in a systematic way 
which respected all investors.13 4 The corporation’s utility was further broadened by the 
development of stock markets, which provided investors with liquidity and the 
opportunity to diversify their investments, while the company's management had a supply 
of committed capital.15 The larger the undertaking’s requirement for finance, the more 
useful the corporation proved: this was particularly significant given the demands for 
financial capital involved in the construction of the railways.16
Through its provision o f the corporate vehicle, the law supported the needs of underlying 
productive industry for scarce financial capital. Yet, while the law continued to provide 
essentially the same "off the peg" contract for productive organisations throughout the 
twentieth century, the capital requirements of firms did not remain static. It has been 
suggested that Western society moved during that period from the Industrial Age to the 
Information Age, and correspondingly from corporations based on physical assets to the 
"knowledge company.”17 Previously, financial capital, which was required for investment 
in "highly specialized inanimate assets, ranging from plant and machinery to world- 
famous brand names”18 had been scarce,19 while the unskilled labour which would
13 On the emergence of the corporation from partnership, and its ongoing influence on corporate law doctrine, see Ireland, P, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62 Modem Law Review 32.14 Rjpert, G, Aspects Juridigues Du Capitalisme Moderne (1951) at 111 sees the company as "la machine juridique...pour la simple gestion des capitaux"; Easterbrook and Fischel also define the corporation in terms of capital claims against income. As we shall see in this chapter, defining the corporation in terms of being a device for managing capital only conflicts with the agency model if  one broadens the notion o f capital to include human capital.15 Although, as we saw in Chapter 1, this did undermine the willingness of shareholders to monitor management.16 Chandler, AD, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977) at 90-2; Bratton, WW, "The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History" (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1471 at 148817 Stewart, TA, Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth o f Organizations (1997)18 Rajan and Zingales, "The Governance of the New Enterprise" in Vives, X (ed), Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives (2000), 201 at 20119 Rajan, RG and Zingales, L, Saving Capitalism From the Capitalists (2003) point out at 37 that between 1869 and 1899, capital invested per worker in the United States nearly tripled.
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operate those machines was plentiful and interchangeable.20 This was reflected in 
Taylorist forms o f work organisation and collective representation of employees. Now, 
however, technological change and increased competition means that the modem 
knowledge corporation depends less on specialised machines and more on the skills of its 
workforce for its competitive advantage.21 Financial capital has become more readily 
available, whether in the form of retained earnings in the case o f mature enterprises, or 
more generally as a result of deregulation and the globalisation o f capital markets. By 
contrast, it is increasingly difficult to guarantee continuity of labour supply, since firm- 
specific skills, embodied in employees, cannot be vertically integrated.
This change in the balance of productive relations creates a new but analogous function 
for company law and corporate governance. With a view to ensuring continued co­
operation, human capital from many sources must be combined with financial capital, co­
ordinated, and the ex ante unpredictable returns allocated to all concerned in proportion 
to their productive contribution 22 The "sunk" investments made by these investors are of
20 Rajan and Zingales (ibid at 41) argue that while unskilled workers could obtain employment in other firms, managers or skilled employees who were specialised to a particular firm were disadvantaged from a power perspective because they would leave behind their firm-specific human capital.21 Stewart, TA (1997) (supra note 17) at 30 argues that in the previous age, "machines embodied all the knowledge necessary for them to do their jobs" whereas in the information age it is embodied in humans.22 Kelly, M, The Divine Right o f Capital (2003) argues at 35 that in fact shareholders, with their net negative equity contributions are "an immense cash drain on corporations" rather than a contributor to corporate productivity. It might be suggested, as Hansmann does in The Ownership o f Enterprise, that, during the period when large companies were being formed, shareholders who supplied risk capital demanded control rights on the basis that they were contracting with the company for a return which could not be guaranteed ex ante. The productive coalition model concedes that this argument is historically accurate, but argues that it no longer reflects the reality of intra-corporate relations in established publicly- held companies, where dispersed shareholders no longer rely on control rights but market mechanisms to ensure their returns. Accordingly, from the perspective of the productive coalition model, path dependency may have locked the law into a sub-optimal distribution of control rights. Empirical support for this argument may be found in Singh, A, “Corporate Governance, Corporate Finance and Stock Markets in Emerging Countries” (2003) JCLS 41. Singh provides empirical evidence at 48-50 that companies in developing countries rely quite heavily on equity finance to fund their growth, while in developed countries such as the US and UK, new equity finance actually makes a net negative contribution to the financing of corporate growth. This is particularly notable given the imperfections in developing country stock markets (iibid at 50), In response to these arguments, advocates of the status quo make two points. First, they claim that the allocation o f  rights is still efficient because shareholders, although lacking the best incentives, are still better at monitoring than other constituencies: see text accompanying notes 109-113 in Chapter Two. Second, they claim that “impatient” shareholders are the best means available to “recycle” capital from declining industries to those new industries which need new risk capital to fund their growth. The argument that these reallocations are efficient of course depends upon the efficient markets hypothesis (which is critiqued in Chapter Four). However, the collapse o f the technology bubble suggests that much of the recycled investment in the “new economy” was wasted rather than efficiently allocated: see, for example,
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less value elsewhere and so generate quasi-rents,23 so, although their interests in the 
distribution of rents normally conflict, continued co-operation in the framework of the 
corporation will be more beneficial overall to them than defection. From a macro- 
economic perspective, maintaining resources in the use to which they are specialised is a 
pareto efficient allocation. By maintaining the integrity of the coalition, company law 
helps maximise the wealth of society.24
Company law has not kept pace with these changes. Margaret Blair terms the "primitive 
model of corporations in which shareholders are seen as earning all the returns and 
bearing all the risk... a throwback to an earlier time”25 when entrepreneurial function and 
labour input were strictly separated. There the source o f wealth generation could be 
traced back to those who bore risk and engaged in entrepreneurial endeavour, i.e., the 
shareholders and their agents, the managers, and before their separation, the entrepreneur. 
Taylorist models of production required the shop-floor to be de-skilled and management 
to take all decisions. Employees took no decisions and no (financial) risk. Company law 
does not reflect the fact that "in the 1990s, fewer and fewer publicly traded corporations 
actually look like the factory model. Much of the wealth-generating capacity o f most 
modem firms is based on the skills and knowledge of the employees and the ability of the 
organization as a whole to put those skills to work for customers and clients.”26 The 
"downsizing" o f layers of middle management, and the growth o f "high-performance 
work practices" such as "direct workforce meetings, briefing groups, and problem solving
Stiglitz, JE, The Roaring Nineties: Seeds o f  Destruction (2003) at 62-3. For a detailed discussion of the causes behind the divergence of market prices from “fundamental value”, see Shi Her, RJ, Irrational Exuberance (2000).23 A rent is the surplus produced by co-operation. According to Zingales, (1998) {supra note 7) at 497, "The difference between what the two parties generate together and what they can obtain in the marketplace represents a quasi-rent, which needs to be divided ex post.” In other words, the quasi-rent is the increased profit which a particular relationship generates over and above what could be achieved by the deployment o f the same assets in their next best use.24 For the purposes of this chapter, it is assumed that this is a valid aim for company law; for a contrary view see Dworkin, RM, "Is Wealth a Value?" (1980) Journal o f Legal Studies 191.25 Blair, MM (1995) {supra note 3) at 23326 ibid at 233-4: similarly, at 238: “Investments in human capital are most likely to be important in technology-intensive or service-oriented enterprises, where most of the value added comes from innovation, product customization, or specialized services.” Stewart, TA (1997) (supra note 17) says at 49 that when "work is about knowledge, the professional model of organizational design inevitably begins to supersede the bureaucratic... When those in authority no longer comprehend the work of their subordinates, chains of command should cease to be viable for coordination."
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circles" are testimony to the new flatter hierarchy within the modem knowledge 
corporation and the entrepreneurial functions being exercised by individual "employees".
It is possible to go further and argue that in the modem public corporation, shareholders 
do not contribute to productivity and in fact "for decades have been an immense cash 
drain on corporations."21 *8 People who purchase stock in established publicly-traded 
companies rarely contribute new capital, and are more akin to speculators "buying the 
right to extract wealth."29 The argument is that issues of new stock in a given year 
amount to a very small percentage o f market capitalisation30; when stock buy-backs, 
which have reached extraordinary levels, are included, the net contribution of 
shareholders becomes negative.31 The reasons companies repurchase their shares are as 
follows. First, while the tax treatment may differ, buybacks are functionally equivalent to 
paying dividends to shareholders and allow firms to divest themselves of cash flow for 
which they have no better use.32 Second, reducing the supply o f a given stock has the 
effect o f increasing that stock's price, benefiting those who hold stock options, increasing 
"shareholder value", deterring hostile takeover bids and reducing the company’s cost of 
borrowing or taking over other enterprises. Company law continues to recognise the 
rights of these "most unproductive stakeholders", while denying a governance role to 
employees who make firm-specific investments in human capital.
27
21 Gospel, H and Willman, P, "High Performance Workplaces: the Role o f Employee Involvement in aModem Economy" (Centre for Economic Performance Working Paper February 2003 at 7; Osterman, P,Kochan, T, Locke, RM, and Piore, MJ, Working in America: A Blueprint fo r  the New Labor Market (2001)at 81 refer to 1997 data which demonstrates the growing importance of "high-performance work practices".However, despite rapid diffusion, self-managed work teams still present problems because they "areprobably the category most affected by layoffs and other radical organizational changes, since they are hardto manage successfully if the personnel keep shifting."28 Kelly, M (2003) {supra note 22) at 3529 ibid30 In 1999, around 1 percent. For precise figures see Kelly, M (2003) (supra note 22) at 33. "Stockholders make a onetime investment when a new share o f  stock is purchased, and beyond that contribute nothing. Yet the company aims to create maximum income for them forever,. (ibid at 39)31 Latest figures from www.FederalReserve.gov (Z.l, June 5, 2003, Flow o f  Funds Accounts o f the United States, Federal Reserve statistical release, first quarter 2003, F.102 Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business at 18) indicate that net new equity issues in the US for 2002 were -$40.5 bn. In 1998 they were as high as -$2I5.5bn.32 Rajan, RG and Zingales, L (2003) (supra note 19) at 60-1. This is an aspect of "marketisation" of corporations: eamings should only be retained if  they can produce a return higher than the market.
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Transaction Cost Theory and the Development of Institutional Economics 
This section looks at the nature of the transaction costs which prevent presentation of 
contracts and mean that employees often bear risk. It builds on Coase's insight that the 
firm may reduce the costs o f contracting, in particular with regard to long-term 
arrangements. In The Economic Institutions o f  Capitalism, Williamson defines a firm 
transaction as co-operation within a governance framework,33 whereas a market 
transaction is competition regulated by contract. The transaction cost approach compares 
the costs of establishing "institutional arrangements, normally referred to as governance 
structures"34 35and market contracting against their benefits in terms of maintaining the
■jcintegrity of transactions. Transaction costs arise both ex ante (in the form of "drafting, 
negotiating and safeguarding an agreement"36) and ex post (in the form of "haggling costs 
incurred if  bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments...the setup and 
running costs associated with the governance structures (often not the courts to which 
disputes are referred), and...the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments").37 
However, these costs are "interdependent" and "must be addressed simultaneously rather 
than sequentially."38
Williamson insists that his analysis is "complementary to, rather than a substitute for, 
conventional analysis"39 as embodied in the neoclassical model o f the firm. His model 
simply fills in the gaps where the neoclassical model "operates at too high a level of 
abstraction".40 It concentrates, in particular, on the difficulties (or transaction costs)
33 Williamson, OE, The Economic Institutions o f  Capitalism (1985) at 18. His approach is contractual because it treats the business firm as a governance structure rather than a production function.34 Williamson, "The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction" in Aold, M, Gustafsson, B, and Williamson, OE (eds), The Firm As a Nexus o f Treaties (1990), at 9; Ripert, G (1951) (supra note 14) asks at 96 whether the concept of "institution" is really new: "Depuis fort longtemps les juristes remarquaient que le mot société a un double sens et désigne à la fois le contrat créateur et la personne morale créée. L'institution est à la mode. L'expression est pourtant bien vague. En droit privé, elle ne prend guère de sens que par opposition au contrat."35 Williamson, OE, "Transaction-Cost Economies: The Governance of Contractual Relations" (1979) 2 Journal o f Law and Economics 233 at 23436 Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 2037 ibid at 2138 ibid at 2139 Williamson, OE, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975) at 140 ibid
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associated with the ex ante production of contracts which accurately reflect the agreement 
between the parties and their anticipation o f future contingencies.41 By contrast, Macneil 
argues that the institutional model o f the firm conflicts with the neoclassical model 
because it does not consider the parties to the transaction as individual maximisers, but as 
a "single maximizing unit” with a governance structure to prevent them from reverting to 
individual maximisers.42 Macneil considers the institutional model to be more realistic 
because "it is impossible to conduct exchange without transaction costs, and since they 
are variable, they are as much a factor o f production as are capital and labor. Any 
sensible application of the neoclassical model requires the inclusion of these costs 
whenever they are variable, affect other factors and are significant. This usually will be 
the case."43
Williamson treats the transaction as the "basic unit of analysis,"44 and transaction costs 
are defined as "the economic equivalent o f friction in physical systems."45 Kreps explains 
that "to consummate a transaction or an exchange [the parties] must expend resources 
other than those contained in the terms of the transaction."46 A rational choice between 
market contracting and a "firm" reduces transaction costs, but institutional economists 
recognise that, like friction, these costs can never be eliminated entirely and so should be 
taken into account in system design. Williamson explains that, in conditions of 
uncertainty, transaction costs are caused by three interconnected factors: "bounded 
rationality", "opportunism" and "asset-specificity".
41 Williamson’s conception of contract is closer to the "legal” contract because it recognises that the difficulties involved in making full provision for the future may be so great as to render legally binding contracts unviable.42 Macneil, I, The Relational Theory o f  Contract: Selected Works o f  Ian Macneil (2001) at 25543 Macneil, I, "Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus" in Macneil, I (2001) (supra) at 255; originally published at 75 Northwestern University Law Review 1018 at 102244 Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 41.45 ibid at 1946 Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory" in Alt, JE and Shepsle, KA (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (1990), reprinted in Buckley, PJ and Michie, J eds, Firms, Organizations and Contracts (1996) at 224
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First, human agents suffer from "bounded rationality”, which means that their behaviour 
is "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so."47 48When coupled with uncertainty about the 
future, bounded rationality makes it either impossible, or very costly, to identify in 
advance all, or even most, of the eventualities which might arise during a long-term 
contract. This means that many issues which the parties would address in advance if  they
JAhad unlimited resources are in reality only addressed as and when they arise. Man's 
inherently limited cognitive competence therefore imposes limits on the use of ex ante 
legally-binding long-term contracts. Bounded rationality, to use Macneil's term, 
frequently rules out full presentiation o f the contract. This consideration is missing from 
the neoclassical approach, which views all contracts for productive inputs as discrete and 
with full risk allocation. Institutional economists ask how the parties to the exchange can 
arrange their affairs so as to make the best use of their limited competence. In particular, 
where the exchange is a long-term one, "contracts may be supplanted by internal 
organization...[which] permits adaptations to uncertainty to be accomplished by 
administrative processes."49
Second, human beings have a tendency for "opportunism", or "self-interest seeking with 
guile."50 Where there is no information asymmetry and the parties' obligations are 
comprehensively expressed in a legally binding contract, this is not a factor. In the 
neoclassical model of the firm, opportunism takes the form of shirking, as employees 
take advantage of the information asymmetry between management and labour in a team 
production situation by putting in as little effort as possible while still obtaining the 
remuneration which has been contracted for. Williamson's analysis goes far beyond 
shirking, because his model views the employment relationship in dynamic, constitutive
47 Williamson, OE (1985) {supra note 33) at 30, citing Simon, HA, Administrative Behaviour (2nd Ed: 1961: Macmillan) at xxiv. Simon argues elsewhere that "The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world” {Models o f Man (New York: John Wiley & Sons: 1957) at 198, cited in Williamson, OE (1975) {supra note 39) at 9).48 As Eric Posner (Posner, EA, "Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?” (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 829) says at 865, "If individuals were rational, with no cognitive limits, and if transaction costs were zero, the role of contract law would be simple and uninteresting. Parties would foresee every possible future state of the world, and - the story goes - their contract would describe each parties' obligation in each of these possible states."49 Williamson, OE (1975) {supra note 39) at 9
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terms. During the course of the relationship, one party may become more valuable to the 
other than alternatives available on the market. The resulting dependency gives the more 
valuable party an opportunity, by "rent-seeking" or "hold up",50 1 to increase their share o f 
the surplus by threatening to defect. The risk of opportunism in the event of a change in 
the dependency balance is exacerbated where the combination o f  bounded rationality and 
uncertainty has prevented the parties from making fully explicit contractual provision. 
Williamson’s third factor, asset specificity, explains the reason that changes in the 
dependency balance might occur.
<
"Asset specificity" is the "most critical dimension,"52 and refers to the "idiosyncratic 
attributes of transactions". The absence o f asset specificity "describes the world where 
discrete market contracting is efficacious,"53 i.e., the world of neoclassical contract. Once 
the identity of buyer and seller begins to matter (because they have made "non-trivial 
investments in transaction-specific assets"), the transaction ceases to be "faceless" and 
"instantaneous" and the parties are "effectively operating in a bilateral trading relation 
with one another."54 Asset specificity makes a contract relational, in the sense that the 
other party is not readily replaceable on the market. Where this is the case, "Harmonizing 
the contractual interface that joins the parties, thereby to effect adaptability and promote 
continuity, becomes the source of real economic value."55 s
When all three of these factors are present, explicit contracting devices break down: 
"Planning is necessarily incomplete (because of bounded rationality), promise predictably 
breaks down (because of opportunism), and the pairwise identity of the parties now 
matters (because of asset specificity)."56 This combination o f factors causes a 
"fundamental transformation", in which the simple exchange transaction becomes highly 
specific in the sense that "the identity o f the parties will begin to matter" and "continuity
50 Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 3031 This expression originates in Klein, B, Crawford, R and Alchian, A, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process" (1978) Journal o f  Law and Economics 2152 Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 3053 ibid at 3154 ibid at 3035 ibid56 ibid at 32
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of the trading relation is thus valued."57 The parties know that if the relationship ends, 
they cannot readily and costlessly find replacement trading partners on the market. 
Williamson terms this situation "bilateral monopoly" and describes the difficulties which 
may arise:
"both buyer and seller are strategically situated to bargain over the disposition of any 
incremental gain whenever a proposal to adapt is made by the other party. Although both 
have a long-term interest in effecting adaptations of a joint profit-maximising kind, each 
also has an interest in appropriating as much of the gain as he can on each occasion to 
adapt. Efficient adaptations that would otherwise be made thus result in costly haggling 
or even go unmentioned, lest the gains be dissipated by costly subgoal pursuit. 
Governance structures that attenuate opportunism and otherwise infuse confidence are 
evidently needed."58
The role of the governance structure is to maintain the integrity of a relationship which is 
not suitable for contractual market governance because transaction costs are either too 
high, or cause the market to fail altogether. Governance structures generate and maintain 
trust and confidence between the parties, reducing the risk of defection. They impose "a 
complex set of constraints"59 on the bargaining processes that may be used to "work 
things out"60 concerning the distribution of quasi-rents generated in the course of the 
relationship. At the macro-level, governance structures raise the level of asset-specificity 
in the economy as whole, and allow assets to be deployed and maintained in their most 
highly valued contexts.
57 ibid at 75: while at the initial bidding stage there are many potential contractors, their number is reduced by the acquisition of firm specific skills by the providers of factors of production, meaning that costs will be incurred if it becomes necessary to replace a contractor. It should be noted that for Macneil, the relationship would become relational long before this: his definition is much broader and includes social and cultural, as well as economic, factors.58 ibid at 6359 Zingales, (1998) (supra note 7) at 497; at 498 he defines corporate governance as "the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm."60 Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 79
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Given that the first and second factors are always likely to be present and to impose costs 
on all ex ante contracting, "asset specificity" is likely to determine whether a specialised 
governance structure or market contracting will be more cost-effective. If there is no 
"asset specificity", no quasi-rents will be generated, and ex ante (or neoclassical) 
contracting, supported by its associated legal remedies, will be sufficient to allocate 
returns. Where there is some asset specificity, the weight to be attached to it will depend 
on the frequency or volume of transactions, which will in turn determine whether the 
quasi-rents generated are sufficient to justify the additional costs of setting up and 
operating a governance structure. '
Transaction Costs Applied to the Employment Relationship
Asset specificity presents acute contracting problems in the context of the employment 
relationship. It has even been said that "the whole rationale for the employer-employee 
status, and even for the existence of firms, rests on [asset specificity]; without it there is 
no known reason for firms to exist."61 62Vertical integration, which is the normal solution 
advocated for "harmonizing the contractual interface" in the presence o f asset 
specificity, is of course impossible in the case o f "asset-specific" employees because 
this would amount to slavery. Employer and employee therefore remain mutually 
vulnerable: the employer because specialised factors o f production which are 
fundamental to the business may leave at any time, the employee because if he loses his 
job is likely to suffer a drastic decline in income.63
When applied to the employment relationship, "asset specificity" is now usually referred 
to as "firm-specific human capital". An analogy is drawn between the provision of
61 In a dramatic apparent U-tum by Alchian, "First National Maintenance vs National Labor Relations Board", unpublished manuscript, 1982 at 6-7 cited in Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 53.62 See for example, the property rights theory of Grossman, S and Hart, O, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" (1986) 94 Journal o f  Political Economy 691.63 The reason for the likely loss o f income is discussed in more detail below. Williamson traces the economic recognition of asset-specificity back as far as Marshall's 1948 Principles o f Economics, Marshall (at 626) referred to the situation where "the head clerk in a business has an acquaintance with men and things, the use of which he could in some cases sell at a high price to rival firms. But in other cases it is of a kind to be of no value save to the business in which he already is; and then his departure would perhaps injure it by several times the value of his salary, while probably he could not get half that salary elsewhere."
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financial capital by shareholders and the provision of human capital by employees. 
"Knowledge and skills that are specialized to a given enterprise, as well as effort that has 
been put forth towards the goals o f the enterprise, are 'assets* at risk in much the same 
way that equity capital is at risk once it has been committed to a given enterprise."64 Just 
as transaction costs prevent investments in share capital from being supported by 
complete contracts, because the use to which the capital will be put, and the returns it will 
generate, cannot be known in advance, so investments in firm-specific human capital 
must also be protected by implicit contracts. Investments in human capital cannot be 
quantified ex ante, nor the returns that they generate correctly anticipated. In fact, 
investments in human capital have a more dynamic sui generis character which make 
them even harder to protect ex ante than investments in share capital: "human capital may 
not depreciate with use, but may, instead, appreciate. Knowledge and skills that are used 
may build on themselves and become more valuable.”65
The making of investments in firm-specific human capital presents formidable obstacles. 
The development of trust between the parties is hindered because they have difficulty 
making credible commitments to each other. Uncertainty about the future success of the 
enterprise means that the company cannot make a long-term legally binding commitment 
ex ante. Yet, as Shleifer and Summers put it, an "employee will spend time and effort to 
leam how to do his job well only if he knows that his increased productivity will be 
subsequently rewarded."66 The unavailability of legally binding contracts obviously 
makes potential investors in firm-specific skills vulnerable to opportunism and other 
breakdowns in the employment relationship, and renders them less willing to risk 
"sinking" such investments. Yet such investments are desirable from an overall efficiency 
standpoint because "continuity of association between firm and employees directly or 
indirectly generates a substantial productivity premium."67 Investments in firm-specific 
human capital are one of the key assets on which firms can build competitive
64 Blair, "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm" in Blair, MM and Roe, MJ (eds), Employees & Corporate Governance (1999), 58 at 6265 ibid at 7466 Shleifer and Summers, "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers" in Auerbach, AJ ed, Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (1988), 33-56 at 37
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/ eadvantage. It is the ability to rely on such investments which differentiates firms from 
each other (and from the market) and allows them to "possess distinctive assets...referred 
to as 'competencies' or 'capabilities'...The essential feature o f a 'capability' is that its 
value as a resource depends upon its being put to use over time within the organizational 
setting of the firm."67 89 These investments may be seen as absolutely crucial in the move 
by firms to focus on their 'core competencies' and to outsource more generic work.70 7123
The notion of the firm as a unique collection of "competencies" originated with Edith 
Penrose, whose theory of the growth o f the firm was based on organisational learning. 
An extension of that theory to embrace employees at lower levels of the corporate 
hierarchy is arguably appropriate at the current stage o f industrial development, and 
requires a focus on "firm-specific skills which depend on tacit or non-codifiable 
knowledge, transmitted through learning by doing and enterprise training."74 
Evolutionary theory goes further and argues that "’competencies within the firm are both 
context-dependent and organically related to each other.’ The firm's resources, in other 
words, amount to more than the sum total of the resources which are owned by or at the 
disposal of its individual members (whether they be shareholders, employees or third- 
party contractors)."75 The apparent conflict between the exchange focus o f the transaction
67 Schultze, C, Wealth Creation and Wealth Sharing: A Colloqium on Corporate Governance and Investments in Human Capital ( \ 996) at 1868 Slinger, G and Deakin, S (1999) (supra note 12) at 16S> Deakin, S and Slinger, G, "Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm" (1997) 24Journal o f  Law and Society 124 at 13070 Osterman, P, Kochan, T, Locke, RM, and Piore, MI (2001) (supra note 27) at 57. Accordingly, there is "fierce competition for scarce Toiowledge workers', often entailing incentive-based wages and various stock options, at the expense of more traditional semi-skilled manufacturing and clerical workers."71 Edith Penrose, "The Theory of the Growth o f the Firm" (1959)72 Although her application of that theory has been criticised for being focused solely on managerial learning and so failing to consider "the possibility o f  integrating the capabilities of other employees of the enterprise with a process of collective learning": see O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 5) at 17. For a theory in the context of takeover regulation which also limits its consideration of investments in firm- specific capital to management, see Coffee, JC, "The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups" (1988) Wisconsin Law Review 435.73 See the analysis of the Saturn project in O’Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 5) at 211-19 or in Kochan, TA and Rubinstein, SA, "Toward a Stakeholder Theory o f the Firm: The Saturn Partnership" (2000) 11 Organization Science 367-8674 Deakin, S and Slinger, G (1997) (supra note 69) at 13075 ibid at 130, citing Hodgson, G, "Evolutionary and Competence-Based Theories of the Firm" in Pitelis, C (ed), The Economics o f  Industrial and Business Strategy (1997). Whitley, R, Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change o f  Business Systems (1999) suggests at 73 that "through employment
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cost model and the production-orientated perspective of evolutionary theory76 78 is 
discussed at the end of the chapter.
The Mechanisms of Implicit Contracting
Given the mutual benefits which firm-specific investment brings, it is in the best interests 
of both parties to co-operate in the long-term. However, transaction costs rule out ex ante 
explicit contracting: bounded rationality prevents the precise extent of the employee's 
asset-specificity, and the returns it will generate, from being known in advance, so the 
governance structure must take the form of "tacit or implicit understandings, or implicit 
contracts'* These include social norms and conventions (such as lifetime employment) 
and other expectations (for example, career ladders and internal labour markets). Since 
they are not legally binding, these arrangements should be supported by additional 
governance structures which encourage and support investments in firm-specific skills 
from the beginning of the relationship by assuring both parties that their relationship will 
continue by adapting to unanticipated events in the future and preventing damaging 
haggling once bilateral monopoly arises. Governed in this way, the resulting increased 
productive capacity may be enjoyed for as long as possible.
Although the details vary, companies often promise their employees supra-competitive 
remuneration to reflect their firm-specific skills. This is a way of sharing the co-operative 
surplus which arises because the employees’ firm-specific skills "make it possible for 
employees to be more productive than they would be in alternative employment and thus
contracts firms are able to develop idiosyncratic and flexible collective competences by organizing people in a variety o f ways to undertake a range of tasks"; therefore we should focus on the "contribution of employees to the development and improvement o f  organizational capabilities", which are contrasted with "loosely coupled collections of individuals or small groups co-ordinated in quasi-contractual ways." See also Kay, J and Silberston, A, "Corporate Governance" (1995) National Institute Economic Review 84, discussed below.76 See for example Chandler, AD, "Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial Enterprise" (1992) 6 Journal o f Economic Perspectives 79-100 at 86.77 Deakin, S and Slinger, G (1997) (supra note 69) at 131; also Slinger, G and Deakin, S (1999) (supra note 12)78 In the context of a discussion about radical democratic reform, Unger, RM, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (1998) suggests at 49 that "workers can best be defended by arrangements that enhance their capabilities rather than entrench their positions."
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to generate rents."79 However, the agreement must remain implicit because "...it is 
difficult for a corporation to accurately detect, measure, and reward human capital 
investments as they are made. Instead, the firm must wait to observe and reward the 
ultimate increase in employee performance that results."80 The implicit agreement by the 
company to share with the employee the "quasi-rents"81 generated by the relationship, it 
is argued, is sufficient to constitute the employees as residual claimants since, like the 
shareholders, they will suffer loss in the event of the company failing.82
The failure o f ex ante legally-binding contract complicates the process by which 
investments are made in firm-specific skills. The parties find it difficult to make "credible 
commitments" to each other before and during the investment process. If the company 
funds the employees' acquisition of skills, in the sense of meeting all the training costs up 
front, it will have to agree to pay them wages which are higher than their opportunity cost 
(i.e., than they could earn elsewhere) once those skills begin to generate returns for the 
business. This is because employees who are only paid market wages have nothing to 
lose by walking away, and therefore must be given an incentive to remain in their 
employment. The payment of supra-competitive wages often forms part of a larger 
implicit contract which reflects investments in firm-specific capital and the employee's 
corresponding value to the firm, including, for example, a "tacit or open commitment of 
the firm to guarantee its personnel that their wage rates, hours worked, employment 
status, or a combination of all such factors, will be in some degree independent of 
vicissitudes o f the business cycle... [these] assurances... will not be handed out evenly to 
all personnel. In breadth and firmness of commitment, employers will discriminate in
79 Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3) at 26780 Stout, LA, "Stock Prices and Social Wealth" (Harvard Law School Center for Law and Economics Discussion Paper No 30J (November 2000)) at 2981 Supra note 2382 It might even be suggested that such employees bear considerably more risk than shareholders. While shareholders can (and should) diversify their investments and minimise the risk associated with any one firm, employees are unable to diversify and so risk the entirety o f their remuneration which is referable to their firm-specific skills.
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favor of persons in whose training substantial investment has been or is about to be 
made."83
The vulnerability o f the employer to threats to defect from employees who are 
fundamental to the enterprise and have strong bargaining power means that employers 
often structure remuneration at the beginning of the relationship to encourage employees 
to remain with the enterprise in the longer term. Employees often "pay" for the 
acquisition o f firm-specific skills by accepting a below-market wage during the period of 
training, on the (once again, non-contractual) understanding that they will be paid more 
than their "short-run opportunity cost once they are fully trained and the business is up 
and running."84 85In the early days of the contract, this arrangement allows the employer to 
appropriate the rents which are attributable to the employee's firm-specific skills and 
offset them against the costs of training. The reduced pay accepted by the employee in
Ofthe early days of the employment relationship constitutes a form of "bond" laid down 
by the employee to underwrite his long-term commitment to the enterprise. In return, the 
employer sets out a detailed implicit contract containing career ladders, promotions and 
pay rises etc., although these remain "informal, unwritten understandings...social 
conventions governing relationships and determining what is considered fair and 
appropriate and expected treatment."86 As long as he believes it will be honoured, it is 
rational for the employee to accept this payment structure because the total remuneration 
he expects under it exceeds what he could earn from a series of market-based spot 
contracts.
The increased efficiency arising from firm-specific investment in skills, in the form of the 
larger rents which are generated, means that companies agree to share the corporate 
surplus with employees eventually, irrespective of the identity o f the party who initially 
financed the firm-specific investment.
83 Azariadis, C, "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria” (1975) 83 Journal o f  Political Economy 1183 at 1184. Azariadis is credited with coining the term "implicit labor contract" to describe this "implicit set of commitments" which differs from an auction for fresh fruit.84 Blair, MM, "Rethinking Assumptions Behind Corporate Governance" (1995) Challenge 12 at 1485 Daniels, R, "Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate?” (1993) 43 University o f  Toronto Law Journal 315 at 318-9.
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Where the employee "bonds" his future performance, the company is able to eliminate 
the risk of the employee defecting, even where it funds the employees' acquisition of 
skills up front. On the other hand, the employee bears considerable risk, both of changes 
in the firm's environment (such as changes in competition and technology) and of 
opportunism on the part of management (because the return on his investment is only 
protected by non-legally binding "understandings"86 7 8). An employee who loses his job 
while his remuneration is at below market levels will never recover the deferred 
compensation, while one who loses his job when in receipt of deferred compensation is
A Ostatistically likely to suffer a significant decline in income in his next job. Little can be 
done about changes in the company's environment, and accordingly it is unlikely to have 
a strong impact on the degree of firm-specific investment across the economy as a whole. 
On the other hand, opportunistic breaches o f implicit contract are far more damaging. 
Such breaches are not only wasteful in terms o f destroying productive capacities by 
moving resources out of their most highly-valued uses, but also undermine the ability of 
other actors to rely on implicit contracts, by reducing trust and therefore raising 
transaction costs across the economy as a whole. This is discussed below in the section 
on reputation. Opportunistic breaches are particularly likely to occur where incumbent 
management is removed following a hostile takeover bid, and replaced by new 
management who do not feel bound by their predecessors’ undertakings. New 
management may decide to pay employees at a level below their productivity but above 
their opportunity cost, expropriating employees' share of the quasi-rents to service the 
debt which funded the takeover.
Before considering whether there is a role for the law to play in sustaining productive 
coalitions, the question of the prevalence of firm-specific investment by employees in
86 Schultze, C (1996) {supra note 67) at 1987 Franks and Mayer, "European Capital Markets and Corporate Control" in Bishop, M and Kay, J (eds), European Mergers and Merger Policy (1993), 162 at 188. Shleifer and Summers, (1988) {supra note 66) at 38: "Although both shareholders and stakeholders benefit ex ante from implicit long-term contracts, ex post it might pay shareholders to renege. For example, it will pay shareholders to fire old workers whose wage exceeds their marginal product in a contract that, for incentive reasons, underpaid them when they were, young."88T hé exterfsof this decline in wages is discussed below.
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advanced industrial economies must be addressed. If investments in firm-specific capital 
are important to the way in which a society's wealth is generated, then it becomes 
arguable that company law should reflect this in its provisions.
How Prevalent is Employee Investment in Firm-Specific Capital?
Margaret Blair accepts that it is very difficult to measure investments in firm-specific 
human capital "because the process of developing firm-specific skills and organizational 
capabilities and routines is not distinguishable from the process of developing generic 
skills." Theoretically, the distinction between generic and firm-specific skills is clear 
enough, but empirical proof gives rise to difficulties.
Proponents of shareholder value frequently argue that employee investments in firm- 
specific skills cannot be proved.89 0 Yet it should be noted that it has not been proven that 
shareholders make firm-specific investments either. Williamson argues that while 
individual shareholders may exit and recover the market price for their shares, it is a 
"fallacy of composition" to argue that this is available to "stockholders in the 
aggregate".91 In contrast to employees (some of whose investment is generic and 
transferrable), the whole of the shareholders' investments are firm-specific and at risk 
because they "invest for the life of the firm". While this is true if  one focuses on a single 
firm, it is misleading with regard to the position of investors in the modem capital 
market. Acting rationally and carefully, and assisted by technology and mutual funds 
which track overall market movements, shareholders diversify their investments in liquid 
assets to the level at which they do not risk much on the survival of a single company. 
Their interest is in the performance of the stock market as a whole.92 Where a particular
89 See for example Blair, MM, Wealth Creation and Wealth Sharing: A Colloqium on Corporate Governance and Investments in Human Capital (1996) at 890 See, for example, Romano, "A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation" in Hopt, K and Wymeersch E (eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (1992). She argues at 17 that Shleifer and Summers (1988) (supra note 66) “never identify what is firm-specific about unionized TWA workers’ skills” .91 Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 30492 This argument seems to undermine Easterbrook and Fischel's assumption that shareholders bear risk because they are residual claimants; it suggests that in fact they bear minimal risk unless they are careless. One crucial exception to this rational diversification is the employee whose savings are invested heavily in his employer’s shares through their company pension plan.
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company is underperforming, anonymous shareholders who are diversified across the 
market as a whole may exit without great cost to themselves. This will o f course drive 
down the price of shares and open an opportunity for a hostile takeover. The exception to 
this argument are the holders of large blocks of shares, who face much larger losses if 
they exit via the market. Institutional investors are not anonymous, and may be “locked 
in” to a particular company or to the market as a whole through a series of blockholdings 
which cannot be liquidated without incurring considerable loss. Agency theorists argue 
that systems of takeover regulation such as the UK City Code, which underpin a market 
for corporate control, are essential to solve this market failure and allow large 
shareholders to exit from their “locked in” position without loss.93
i) What Kinds o f  Skills Might be Termed Firm-Specific?
The umbrella category of firm-specific investment may be broken down into various sub­
categories. "Specific investment can be with respect to the firm's assets (the employee 
learns to use a specialized lathe or write in a specialized software language). 
Alternatively, it can be with respect to other employees (the secretary learns to work with 
his boss)." 94 Equally, the investment could also take the form of a relationship with the 
firm's clients.95 Finally, "even if skills are to some degree transferable, the effect of 
working in a single organisation for a prolonged period of time can give rise to a wage- 
specific premium which is lost when the worker is made redundant. This may derive 
from a worker's tacit knowledge o f organisational practices, and also through the 
opportunities for mutual learning between employer and employee in the matching of 
skills and job requirements over time."96 It has been suggested that almost all jobs have 
some firm-specific element. For example, in 1990, Weiler wrote that
"Very few jobs have demands which are so rudimentary or necessary skills which are so 
adequately taught elsewhere that a newcomer can step in and do a satisfactory job
93 See, for example, Yarrow, GK, "Shareholder Protection, Compulsory Acquisition and the Efficiency of the Takeover Process" (1985) 34 Journal o f  Industrial Economics 3; Grossman, S and Hart, O, “Takeover bids, the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory o f  the Corporation” (1980) 11 Bell J  o f Economics 42.94 Raj an and Zingales, (2000) (supra note 18) at 206 fh 995 This would involve learning about how the client's needs intersect with the firm's competencies.
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immediately. At a minimum, the new employee will have to leam the location and 
idiosyncracies of the physical equipment and the routines and expectations of fellow' 
workers. Typically, much of the necessary basic knowledge and skills for the position 
will have to be learned on the job rather than at school; either because learning by doing 
is the soundest pedagogical technique for teaching certain skills, or because the relevant 
aptitudes are peculiar to a particular firm's operations, so that only that firm has the 
means and the economic incentive to provide such training."96 7
a) Firm-specific investment within the manufacturing sector
Many factory workers are still involved in Fordist methods of production which require 
few, if any, non-transferrable skills. In those workplaces, only limited numbers of 
employees will be operating, and becoming "co-specialised" with, machinery and other 
assets which are not used in other firms, most discretion and decision-making power 
being vested in management. However, the number of employees gaining industry- or 
firm-specific skills appears to be increasing: competitive pressures mean that 
manufacturing firms must either compete in terms of cost or quality. Competing with 
firms located in developing countries is unlikely to be successful in terms of labour cost; 
competition in terms o f quality is more likely, requiring a greater emphasis on skills and 
specialisation as the source of firms' and nations' comparative advantage. Recent research 
within the "varieties of capitalism" literature has indicated that comparative advantage 
may be acquired through diversified mass production (which requires industry-specific 
skills) and diversified quality production (which requires firm-specific skills).98 It is often 
suggested that these routes to advantage are not likely to emerge spontaneously through 
market contracting and depend on the support or "beneficial constraints" of institutional
96 Armour, J and Deakin, S, "Insolvency and Employment Protection: the Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights Directive" (ESRC Working Paper 2002) at 597 Weiler, PC, Governing the Workplace: The Future o f Labor and Employment Law (1990) at 147; also Smith, SC, "On the Economic Rationale for Codetermination Law" (1991) 16 Journal o f Economic Behavior and Organization 261 at 264: "Most employees make investments in the organization that employs them. Some will buy shares of stock but most such investments are in the form of specific human capital, or in acquiring knowledge, skills, and even "corporate culture" which increases their productive value to that organization (but not to other organizations)."98 Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State" in Hall, PA and Soskice, D (eds), Varieties o f Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations o f  Comparative Advantage (2001) at 149.
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structures." In addition, one should arguably take into account the relational aspects of 
employees' work, particularly in complex DQP manufacturing, where the stages of the 
process are interdependent and require a degree of co-operation in team production as 
evidenced by the prevalence o f team working and discussion groups. If these learning 
aspects of co-operative production are taken into account, then almost all employees 
involved in manufacturing make some firm-specific investment.
b) Firm-specific investment within the service sector
In the service sector, co-specialisation to firm-specific assets is less dominant, although 
there may be firm-specific computer software etc. However, the relational aspects of 
employees' work take on more importance. They must gain familiarity with chains of 
command and different styles o f working. They must build up relationships with clients, 
and learn to work in the way in which work is structured within that particular 
organisation.9 100 If one also includes gaining "familiarity with the firm's business 
culture,"101 then it might plausibly be argued that most, if  not all, employees in the 
service sector make at least some non-redeployable investment. These relational aspects 
of employment are becoming more important with the growing dominance of the service 
sector in advanced economies.102
At its extreme, the service sector corporation may be simply a set of highly-developed 
relationships. For example, Kay and Silberston suggest that the corporation is "a set of 
systems and routines and a structure o f organisation... The essence of the company is a
99 Streeck, "Productive Constraints: on the Institutional Conditions o f Diversified Quality Production" m Streeck, W (ed), Social Institutions and Economic Performance (1992), at 26: "...diversified quality production presupposes an affirmative polity in which major conditions of competitive performance are, and have to be, collectively created and maintained." While the relationship between neoclassical and new institutional economics is complex and opaque, both schools only consider institutional arrangements as remedies for contracting failure. By contrast, Streeck conceives of institutions as allowing a type of production which would never be possible under a "a regime o f free markets and private hierarchies" (ibid at 10).100 Rajan, RG and Zingales, L (2003) (supra note 19) at 86 discuss the growing importance o f  customising the firm's services for customers in die banking sector, something which clearly requires firm-specific skills.101 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (1999) (supra note I) at 276 fri 61; Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) suggests at 242 "knowledge of a particular firm's filing system" as a highly specific skill. This would tend to suggest that investment in firm-specific skills is rather ubiquitous in the service sector.102 See Turner, A, Just Capital (2001) at 53-9
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structure of internal relationships among the staff, and a collection of external 
relationships with suppliers...."103 This context allows "what are, in the main, 
individually rather unexceptional people to perform, in aggregate, in very exceptional 
ways." They suggest that looking at the modem corporation in this way demonstrates that 
it is meaningless to consider "ownership of a set of routines, or a structure of 
relationships...You can benefit from the returns they generate, but that is not at all the 
same as owning them. If anyone did own these things, it is more likely to be the 
employees than the shareholders. But they do not really own them either."104
ii) How Can the Existence o f Firm-Specific Investments be Proved Empirically?
Empirical proof o f the existence of firm-specific investment is more difficult. The 
relative importance of firm-specific investment will, of course, differ from firm to firm, 
from industry to industry, and even from state to state, depending on their strategy for 
competitiveness. In addition, outsiders are not normally able to identify the portion of an 
employee's human capital which is firm-specific. This of course is one reason why 
implicit contracts are used. It is often suggested that the constraints imposed by the more 
pluralistic systems of corporate governance found in Germany and Japan have led to a 
competition strategy based on higher degrees of firm-specific investment. The dominance 
of the agency model of the company in Anglo-American corporate governance does not 
necessarily mean that firm-specific investments are not important to wealth creation; it 
may mean that the Anglo-American system does not encourage them, and so there may 
be a sub-optimal level of such investments.
In the (likely continued) absence of conclusive empirical evidence one way or another, 
Margaret Blair says, "the most compelling evidence that firm-specific human capital is 
important is the simple fact that much economic activity is organized in ways that involve 
long-term stable employment relationships rather than a series of spot contracts and 
subcontracts."105 If paying market wages to strangers on the basis of "spot" contracts
103 Kay, J and Silberston, A (1995) (supra note 75)104 ibid.tos Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3) at 16; of course not all long term employment relations involve firm- specific capital or supra-competitive wages: see Armour, J and Deakin, S (supra note 96) at 5 fh 9
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were an adequate way of arranging production, then rational managers would carry on 
their business in this way.106 In other words, the existence (although not necessarily an 
optimal level) o f investments in firm-specific human capital can be inferred from the very 
use o f the implicit contracts and bonding mechanisms discussed above, the extra value 
generated being more than sufficient to offset the additional costs incurred.
Using such arrangements as a proxy, the existence of firm-specific human capital within 
the economy as a whole is usually demonstrated indirectly by reference to three factors.
"First, wages typically rise with job tenure by more than they would be expected to rise
solely as a result of the employee's increased general experience. These higher wages are
generally taken as evidence that the employee becomes more productive as he
accumulates firm-specific human capital."107 108If the identity o f the employee did not
matter, the company could seek to engage replacement employees on the market at the
lower market rate. Advocates of the market for corporate control do not accept this,
arguing that rising wages could equally indicate that managers who have been with the
108firm for a long time do not bargain as hard with employees as new managers do. 
Further, the "efficiency wage theory" suggests that the increased remuneration does not 
reflect firm-specific skills but that "higher wages improve worker morale, motivation and 
stability and reduce recruiting costs, thereby increasing the productivity and reducing the 
costs of having a permanent workforce."109
106 Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3) at 14.107 ibid at 263; see Topel, R, "Specific Capital, Mobility and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Security" (1991) 99 Journal o f Political Economy 145-76 at 147: "estimates imply that 10 years of job seniority raise the wage of the typical male worker in the United States by over 25 per cent relative to what he could earn elsewhere." However, O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 5) suggests at 57 that the increase of wages with seniority may rather be attributable to the settlement between management and labour, according to which managerial prerogative was established in the US in return for seniority ladders.108 See for example, Romano, (1992) (supra note 90) at 17-18: "managers may be burdened with a reputation for weakness from past practices o f  capitulating to labor demands in order to make their jobs as managers more comfortable, and this reputation affects their credibility as bargainers." Such non- ad versarial bargaining with employees is considered an aspect of empire-building on the part o f incumbent management (see Bebchuk, LA, "The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers" (2002) 69 University o f  Chicago Law Review 973 at 994) and an agency cost for shareholders (see Jensen, MC, "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences" (1988) 2 Journal o f Economic Perspectives 21-4S at 28). Their prescription is the réintroduction of elements of market contracting into firms.
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’’Second, job turnover rates (both layoffs and quits) typically fall with tenure. This is also 
construed as evidence that employees accumulate firm-specific human capital that makes 
them more valuable to the firm and the jobs more valuable to the workers."109 10 Again, if 
those employees who have served the firm long-term did not bring benefits to the firm in 
terms of productivity, the firm would instead make a series of spot contracts on the 
relevant market.111
"Third...that the costs of being laid off are typically larger for workers with more 
tenure."112 As Topel points out, "human capital investments are mainly general rather 
than firm-specific, so that the main component of workers' embodied skills is portable 
among firms."113 However, evidence suggests that "'displaced' workers have a subsequent 
'wage path' significantly below those of workers who are not made redundant."114 This 
constitutes circumstantial evidence for an argument that employees who move to new 
jobs are unable to use the firm-specific skills to which their earlier higher remuneration 
was attributable.115 Schultze suggests that alternatively the payment of higher wages may 
be evidence of a "process of learning by which the existence of a good match is
109 Blair, MM (1995) {supra note 3) at 254110 ibid at 263111 Schultze, C (1996) {supra note 67) and O'Connor, M, "The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation" (1993) 78 Cornell Law Review 899-965 at 905 both refer to research by Robert Hall, "The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the US Economy" (1982) Am Econ Rev 716. This demonstrates the prevalence of continuity of association within US firms: a quarter o f  the total workforce remain at the same firm for at least twenty years. It should be noted that this research is 20 years old and that these figures may have decreased. But even if turnover rates have increased, this is not fatal to the argument as one could simply argue that the economy as a whole is underperforming because of sub-optimal levels of investment in firm-specific skills.112 Blair, MM (1995) {supra note 3) at 265; again see Topel, R (1991) (supra note 107) for evidence of this. See also O ’Connor, M (1990) {supra note 6) at 1198. Armour, J and Deakin, S {supra note 96) at 5 fh 9 note that supra-competitive earnings by employees could be explained as "the result of rent-seeking by 'insider' worker groups who hold up* other stakeholders, such as shareholders and creditors." This point may not be so important if  a broader evolutionary perspective on the firm is used, which suggests that almost all employees have invested in firm-specific capital. As Stewart, TA (1997) {supra note 17) notes at 92, companies are able to outsource work which does not require proprietary (that is firm-specific) knowledge.1,3 Topel, R (1991) {supra note 107) at 147; Schultze, "Has Job Security Eroded for American Workers?” in Blair, MM and Kochan, TA (eds), The New Relationship: Human Capital in the American Corporation (2000), 28 at 49 confirms that "wage premiums attributable to generally applicable skills are not 'at risk* from layoffs."114 Armour, J and Deakin, S {supra note 96) at 5, referring to Schultze, (2000).115 O f course, as Williamson, OE (1985) {supra note 33) points out at 259, the employee who has only acquired generic skills has a wide choice of employers and only bears the risk of incurring costs while using the market to find another job.
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confirmed, tested with promotion, and reconfirmed.”116 Accordingly, lower wages in new 
employment either reflect the employee's reduced productivity in a job requiring only 
generic skills, or the start of a new period of mutual observation, or a fresh "bonding" 
process which has begun as the employees fund the acquisition of a new set of firm- 
specific skills.
iii) What Proportion o f the Corporate Surplus is Allocated as a Return to Firm-Specific Human Capital rather than Finance Capital?
In attempting to discern the relative importance of this phenomenon, Margaret Blair has 
estimated that "as much as 14 per cent o f total wages and benefits paid to employees of 
corporations in the United States may represent a return to firm-specific human 
capital."117 This appears to be o f a similar order to accounting profits, suggesting that the 
true rents and quasi-rents generated within US corporations may be seriously 
underestimated. As to the size of these rents, Blair estimates that "the value of the rents 
that employees have at risk in the typical large corporation is, in the aggregate, roughly 
the same order of magnitude as the value o f the stake that shareholders have."118
However, more accurate estimations are hampered by accounting practice. Margaret Blair 
notes a systemic bias against human capital because the "accounting system that US 
corporations use...provides no information about the return a company can earn on other 
kinds of investments, such as investments in the skills o f its employees or in 
organizational capabilities."119 Profits for distribution are calculated net o f payments to 
the workforce, so where premium wages are paid to employees, these are considered as a 
cost of the business rather than as a prior distribution of surplus.120 Accordingly, capital 
markets insist that reduction of these costs forms part of good management and bring all
116 Schultze, (2000) (supra note 113) at 50. This is because of "the inherent inability of firms and workers, but especially the former, to make a full evaluation o f each other except over time, through observing actual performance." He also suggests that the premia may be considered anti-shirking bonuses.117 Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3) at 266118 Blair, MM (1996) (supra note 89) at 11Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3) at 327120 It may be noted that while supra-competitive payments to employees are treated as an expense rather than a distribution o f profits, managerial stock options are controversially still not treated as an expense until they are exercised. See Millon, D, "Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?" (2002) 70 George Washington Law Review 890 at 909 fti 87 who
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their influence to bear: "many firms with strong performance will nonetheless lay off 
employees to send signals to the capital markets and to improve their stocks’ trading 
prices." Viewing employees supra-competitive wages in this way creates a danger that 
firms "will have an incentive to shut down operations that are not generating profits for 
shareholders even though those operations may still be generating substantial real 
economic rents. From the point of view of society at large, this is, obviously, 
inefficient."12 22
Some commentators have recommended changes to the accounting treatment of 
employee remuneration on the basis that investments in human capital play an important 
role in increasing the wealth of society. Lawrence Mitchell makes detailed proposals for 
the capitalisation of that portion o f employees' pay which is referable to their investments 
in firm-specific human capital.123 Remuneration above a certain level, as well as the costs 
o f training workers, should be capitalised, and then depreciated in line with the average 
tenure of employees. Where an employee is dismissed, the investment should be written 
off immediately to prevent transfers from employees to shareholders. This would also 
have the benefit that wage premia do not impact on the bottom line and therefore the 
price of the company's shares. Provision would also have to be made for the situation 
where the employee "bonds" the investment by accepting deferred compensation. The 
deferred portion of the remuneration could also be capitalised. If these changes were 
adopted, then figures could be provided as to the employees' share in the quasi-rents. 
Similarly, Blair suggests both corporate governance and financial market reform.124 
However, such reform proposals face the same difficulty as other attempts to formally 
recognise investments in firm-specific capital, namely that only corporate insiders can 
verify their existence and extent. There is accordingly a risk of collusion, given that only 
employer and employee may observe the extent of the investment. From an agency 
perspective, this is clearly unacceptable.
notes that "A decision by the Financial Standards Accounting Board in 1993 to change this rule to require expensing when issued was met with massive political opposition and was withdrawn by the end of 1994."121 Osterman, P, Kochan, T, Locke, RM, and Piore, MJ (2001) (supra note 27) at 67.122 Blair, MM (1996) (supra note 89) at 12123 Mitchell, LE, Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export (2001) at 246124 Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3), ch9
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Should the Law Play a Role in Maintaining the Integrity of the Productive Coalition?
Mainstream economic debate has given little consideration to the legal implications o f the 
fact that employees who make investments in firm-specific skills bear risk, with the result 
that the discussion in most o f the literature is underdeveloped about the way in which 
such investments might be encouraged and protected, and about whether the law has a 
role to play in this process.
The typical implicit contracting process discussed above presents several problems. First, 
putting in place appropriate undertakings from scratch each time a firm desires to rely on 
firm-specific investment necessarily involves costs, whether this done by collective or 
individual bargaining, or imposed unilaterally by management.
Second, informational asymmetry will affect the process o f dividing up rents ex post. 
Since third party arbitration devices are unsuitable, the division must be performed 
internally. The problem is that management has access to far more information than the 
employees do, for example, because o f their monitoring role, which means that 
management is more likely than the employees to know the extent of each employee's 
contribution to rent generation. This may lead to under- or over-estimation by the 
employee of his contribution and subsequent conflict, and so to rents being wasted 
through haggling, which, when combined with "bilateral monopoly" risks becoming 
intractable because of the "difficulty o f computing and assigning residuals".125
Third, and most importantly, the employees' bargaining position is weakened because, 
while they remain in receipt o f above-market wages, they are vulnerable to threats to 
close down the business in an attempt to "expropriate some of the rents promised to 
workers...unless workers agree to work at a wage that is lower than what they had been 
promised."126 The risk of opportunism becomes particularly acute immediately before the 
expiry of their "bond" when their above-market remuneration is due to kick in. The 
reverse situation may also hold true: the employee may "hold up" the employer for higher
125 Blair, (1999) (supra note 64) at 74
114
wages by threatening seriously to disrupt the business by withdrawing his firm-specific 
skills. While this type of confrontation is unlikely on its own to lead to the termination of 
the productive relationship, the credibility gap that emerges is costly both in terms of 
resources wasted and in undermining trust. Reduction of trust across the economy as a 
whole leads to increased contracting costs and sub-optimal resource allocation.
We saw in Chapter one that Easterbrook and Fischel argue that company law ought to 
perform a cost-saving function and provide default terms which most corporate 
constituencies would want. A hypothetical bargaining process would determine the law's 
initial allocation of decision-making rights, they suggested, and at the same time, 
maximise the wealth of society by providing them to those who valued them most highly. 
It may be argued by analogy that where firm-specific investments by employees are 
important to the way in which a given economy generates wealth, the law should 
similarly anticipate the demand for structures to encourage and sustain those investments. 
Since their claim is partly residual, employees, like shareholders, hypothetically place 
value on obtaining some rights over the decision-making process because they can use 
those rights to maximise the value of their claim. Moreover, the fact that employees, 
unlike shareholders, are not (and cannot be) diversified, means that it is rational for them 
not to be apathetic and to take an active role in monitoring management. The law could 
therefore be given the task of providing default rules which establish a protective multi­
party governance structure. Where firm-specific investments are prevalent, the law w-ould 
contribute to reducing the costs of producing individually-tailored governance structures. 
Only companies that do not rely on firm-specific investments to create w-ealth would then 
incur the costs of contracting around the default rules. These costs might encourage 
companies to adopt a business strategy which relies on firm-specific skills, and therefore 
a more efficient use of resources.126 728 A governance structure which is imposed from the 
beginning of the relationship would also help solve the credibility problems associated
126 Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3) at 14127 They also lack market-based mechanisms with which to align the interests of management with theirs.128 Compare the argument of Deakin, S and Wilkinson, F, "Rights vs Efficiency? The Economic Case for Transnational Labour Standards” (1994) 23 Industrial Law Journal 289 that labour standards can encourage efficiency.
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with implicit contracts, which lead to sub-optimal levels o f firm-specific investment in 
the economy as a whole, and so increase the overall wealth o f society.
However, Easterbrook and Fischel’s hypothetical bargaining methodology has been 
applied remarkably rarely to the employment relationship. An important exception is 
found in the work of Oliver Williamson. Although he recognises that transaction costs 
may make non-contractual governance structures appropriate in order to safeguard the 
economic value of idiosyncratic relations, he anticipates that, outside the shareholder- 
management relationship, such structures will normally be put in place voluntarily by 
bargaining between the parties.129
Rational actors, who are, or will be, in a situation of "bilateral monopoly" will demand 
and put in place governance structures which are appropriate from a cost-benefit 
perspective to maintain the integrity of their relationship, and therefore the value of their 
idiosyncratic investments.130 These structures will tend to be bilateral because it is very 
difficult for third parties to observe the extent o f firm-specific investment.131 The rational 
employer will provide appropriate governance mechanisms so that the employee investor 
does not charge a risk premium, keeping wage costs down.132 In most cases, therefore, 
Williamson argues, suitable governance structures will be put in place by agreement 
between the parties without any need for external intervention.133
However, Williamson’s expectation of bargained solutions makes certain assumptions 
which are problematic from the perspective of transaction cost economics. First, it fails to 
take into account that informational failures may preclude appropriate arrangements. It is
129 In this Tespect, Williamson shares common ground with Fischel - see Fischel, DR, "Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law" (1984) 51 University o f  Chicago Law Review 1061-1077 at 1068, discussed in Chapter one.130 Williamson at 259 (emphasis added): "workers who accept employment of a firm-specific kind will presumably recognize the risks and insist on surrounding such jobs with protective governance structures."131 This makes trilateral dispute resolution processes like mediation and arbitration less likely.132 Williamson, OE, "Corporate Governance" (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1197 at 1204133 The implication is that the absence of a tailored governance mechanism should be equated either with a lack o f firm-specific investment (or rather, that the costs o f putting in place such a structure were greater than the benefits to be drawn from maintenance of the relationship) or with the employees preferring to take a risk premium as part of their remuneration.
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assumed that the parties will have full information about the extent to which their skills 
are (or will be) firm-specific, and therefore how much risk they will be bearing. This may 
not be the case where management has strong control over information flow. This 
objection is dealt with below; it will be noted that Williamson proposes liberal 
information disclosure rules. Second, it does not take into account the cognitive 
limitations and bounded rationality of the parties. It is assumed that they will be able to 
match an appropriate governance structure to their needs. In order to do this, "the relation 
between each constituency and the firm needs to be evaluated in contractual terms."134 
This is important because "To use a simple structure to govern a complex transaction will 
predictably have disruptive consequences - and possibly fracture the relationship - while 
to use a complex structure to govern a simple transaction is to incur excessive costs."135 
Yet there is an assumption not only that the parties will be able to anticipate the extent to 
which they will make firm-specific investment and conceive o f the best way to protect 
their interests and maintain the relationship, but also that the measure they put in place 
will be successful in dealing with future contingencies. This is particularly problematic 
where employees are not organised collectively. Third, it is assumed that the costs 
involved in the ad hoc creation of governance structures (including but not limited to 
negotiation and conflict costs) will not eat up a substantial portion of the quasi-rents 
generated by the relationship. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, it must rest on an 
assumption that firm-specific investment is not particularly common.136 A governance 
structure for employees must not be something that "almost everyone will want to 
adopt."137 Otherwise it would, if the transaction cost approach to company law were 
descriptive, already be included in company law. The content of the law must be based 
on an assumption that the costs of creating an ad hoc governance structure in every firm 
where it will be beneficial will be lower than the costs of either making choices among a 
menu of different governance choices or bargaining away from a default structure 
imposed by the law.
134 Williamson, OE (1984) (supra note 132) at 1198135 Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 241136 Although Williamson, (1990) {supra note 34) at 12 describes asset specificity as a "common" condition.137 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D, The Economic Structure o f Company Law (1991) at 34-5
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The bargaining process itself also potentially gives rise to difficulty. While society as a 
whole may benefit from the use of a governance structure (on the basis that co­
specialised assets will be maintained in their most highly valued usage, and that the 
residual claims of the employees and the shareholders will be maximised), there is no 
guarantee that this will be the outcome o f a bargaining process between individual 
maximisers. Sadowski et al suggest that where the parties pursue self-interest, they are 
unlikely to realise that their best interests are served by co-operation, and therefore are 
unlikely to put in place ex ante structures which maximise the wealth of society:
"In distributional conflicts about contractually unprotected quasi-rents, it is at least 
optimistic, if not naïve, to expect an efficient voluntary agreement about the firm's 
constitution. A selfish rational agent will prefer a constitution that strengthens his 
absolute position in ex post bargaining, even if  this is detrimental to the firm value. One 
cannot then expect an efficient constitution o f the coiporation as a result of a bargaining 
process between co-specialised investors. Investors will find themselves locked in a sub- 
optimal position. Are legal interventions an efficient way out?"138
Similarly, the argument that the parties might, of their own accord, bargain to produce a 
governance structure to regulate their relationship after its inception faces certain 
difficulties. First, if  no governance structure is in place ex ante, employees (who are in 
possession of full information and are rational) are going to be reluctant to make non- 
transferrable investments as these would not be protected. In this case, no governance 
structure would be needed. Second, if such investments are made, despite the absence of 
a governance structure, management will be able to opportunistically appropriate (on 
behalf of either themselves or the shareholders) the quasi-rents attributable to those 
investments (by paying the employees above their opportunity cost but below their 
productivity), even if this has the consequence o f reducing the overall level o f rents 
generated by the enterprise. There is no incentive for management or shareholders to
118 Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthai, S, "Labour Co-Determination and Coiporate Governance in Germany: The Economic Impact o f  Marginal and Symbolic Rights" (Quint-Essenzen Nr 65, August 2001,IAAEG at 3.1.3
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create a governance structure in this situation, although to do so would maximise 
society's wealth.
Further difficulties may arise. Managers may resist the establishment of governance 
mechanisms, not because they are serving the interests the shareholders, but because 
politically they do not want to share their authority with employees (or some other 
constituency), or to open themselves up to potential monitoring by employees. The 
employees collectively may not hold or express strong preferences. Given that they have 
different amounts o f investment at risk (and that it will be difficult to anticipate in 
advance the extent to which they will bear risk), they too may be affected by a collective 
action problem and be rationally apathetic towards the creation o f a governance structure 
to protect their interests.139 40 By comparison, management is likely to have a strong and 
clear preference for no such structure.141 Finally, the shareholders, if  they can overcome 
their apathy and have any effect on the bargaining process, might prefer to appropriate a 
larger proportion of a smaller pool o f rents.
Legal intervention, while by no means a simple project, could arguably help circumvent 
some of these difficulties, while still fitting with a contractual methodology. The 
imposition by law of a governance structure ex ante would enhance the parties' ability to 
make credible commitments to each other before the investments are made, thus 
increasing the level of such investments in, and the overall productivity of, the economy. 
Further by ensuring that at least minimal standards of protection are available, the law 
would contribute to keeping those investments in their more productive, highly valued 
uses. Finally, an appropriate governance structure should contribute to the flow of 
information within the corporation. This would allow management to communicate
139 See for example, Smith, SC (1991) {supra note 97) at 269-271140 It may be rational for individual employees not to organise collectively, and not to incur costs lobbying for the establishment of a governance structure, because free riders may take advantage of the resulting governance structure without incurring the costs of organisation or lobbying.141 Per Smith, SC (1991) {supra note 97) at 273: "private external benefits o f unchecked hierarchy are concentrated in a few managers, while the private external costs are widely scattered among many employees. Each employee has relatively little to gain. ..and each manager has relatively much to lose."
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credibly about the firm's state of finances, and therefore to seek compromises with 
employees in a time of crisis.142
More institutional imagination would be required from lawmakers. Many options are 
available and some have even been tested: formal co-determination at supervisory board 
level on the German model;143 informational participation at board level; indirect 
influence over the board through voting rights in management elections; decision-making 
bodies below board level, such as works councils, working groups, consultative 
committees etc; consultation on any number of models, allowing greater elaboration of 
employee interests in dialogue internal to the corporation; and information obligations on 
management, which may be seen as maintaining trust that management are taking the 
interests of employees into account.144
Alternatively, the law could aim for reflexive regulation by granting basic procedural 
rights with the aim of facilitating the bargaining process over the establishment of a 
governance structure. These procedural rights would not be aimed at achieving 
contractual completeness but rather at encouraging "a flow of information and 
cooperation which goes beyond the terms of any express or implied contract."145 The 
continual dialogue established by such rights would itself constitute the appropriate 
governance structure for the parties. It is more flexible than an approach based on the 
grant o f specific governance rights to employees, and would be able to take into account
142 On this point see Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S, "The German Model of Corporate and Labor Governance" (2000) 22 Comp. Labor Law & Policy Journal 33 at 47; also Williamson, note 170 below.143 Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S (supra note 138) at 4 have suggested that this is a way to "securitise" non-liquid employee investments, although they recognise that there may be difficulties with ensuring that this governance structure works in the interests o f the company as a whole rather than in a partisan manner. The incentives for board members to act in a fiduciary capacity (i.e., comply with the German obligation to act in the interests of the company as a whole), rather than favour the constituency which elected them by ballot, are weak, especially in terms o f monetary incentives and legal sanctions. They suggest that board members may be constrained by reputational mechanisms, or that the requirement of voice by employees, even if  rendered "ceremonial and symbolic" because they can always be outvoted, "may help to keep in mind the common interests of the conflicting parties, i.e., the norms and duties required for or at least conducive to the common endeavour. State constitutions as well as guidelines for corporate behaviour often have such programmatic, educational functions."144 Many of these proposals would also be justifiable under a political stakeholder model.|4S Slinger, G and Deakin, S (1999) {supra note 12) at 5
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the idea that the extent of employee investment may change over time. The provision of 
fundamental procedural rights may be seen in this way.
If it is accepted that investments by employees in firm-specific human capital are not 
exceptional, two possible courses are open to the law. First, in order to save as much of 
the costs of negotiation as possible, the law could offer a variety of "off-the-peg" 
business formats which may be varied freely according to the needs of the business in 
question.146 The variety should be broad enough to capture the full range of possible 
employee investments, from entirely generic to entirely firm-specific, and to provide 
appropriate governance for that degree of investment. The default position taken by the 
law would be determined by a process of hypothetical bargaining, which would reflect 
the average level of firm-specific investment across the economy as a whole, so that the 
costs of negotiating away from the law's default position would be minimised. The 
conduct of any subsequent bargaining process would send reliable signals to the 
employees about the firm's commitment to protecting their investments. If, through hard 
bargaining, a new firm disallowed all employee involvement provisions, it would send a 
clear signal to its employees that they should not make substantial non-redeployable 
investment in that firm. The use of default rules in this way would invert the current 
position (where no employee involvement exists except that for which they bargain) with 
the aim of encouraging more firm-specific investment by employees.
Alternatively, the law could impose a mandatory governance structure.147 The effect of 
this would be that firms which do not rely on firm-specific human capital would be 
saddled with an excessively expensive governance procedure. For those firms, market 
governance of labour relationships would be more suitable. However, given the empirical
146 See, for example, Klausner, M, "Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts" (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 757 at 838; discussed in more detail in Chapter one.147 Smith, SC (1991) (supra note 97) at 271 draws an analogy with the protection given to financial capital investors by law and regulation, which results in an increased supply of such capital, and argues that "If human capital investment were subject to "disclosure" requirements...its supply might also be expanded." He justifies the imposition by law of internal procedural rules on the basis that "The transaction costs for an individual company to set up credible guarantees without an overall legal framework may simply be too high; by analogy consider the lower value of voluntary disclosure of financial information without government auditing and sanction authority."
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difficulties o f ascertaining which firms rely on firm-specific investments, a simple opt- 
out o f the governance structure is inappropriate.148 As discussed above, the outcome of 
bargaining between individual maximisers is likely to lead to optimal allocations for the 
economy as a whole. The decision to impose a mandatory governance structure on all 
firms would ideally be made on the basis of an overall cost-benefit analysis; a macro- 
economic decision about whether or not more wealth would be generated one way or the 
other. However since this would not be possible on the basis of currently available 
empirical data,149 the decision would have to be taken on the basis of macro-economic 
policy: whether it is considered desirable for firms to rely on firm-specific investment for 
the generation o f wealth and the creation of comparative advantage, or to compete in 
terms of reducing costs.
Objections to legal intervention
Leaving aside the argument from the agency model that company law should have a 
single objective in order to ensure managerial accountability, arguments in favour of 
legal intervention to protect employees from risk have been opposed on two main 
grounds. First, that employees are already adequately protected through reputational 
mechanisms. Second, that mechanisms outside company law, such as trade unions, 
already protect employees against risk.
i) Protection Through Reputation
It is frequently suggested that intervention is unnecessary because the "implicit 
understandings between employees, employers, and investors... are sustained by the 
desire of different parties to maintain reputations."150 If  management reneges on an 
implicit contract to reward employees in line with their investment and the returns it
148 In seeking the rationale for the mandatory nature of Geiman co-determination laws, Sadowski, D, Junkes, 3, and LindenthaJ, S (2000) (supra note 142) at 64-5 consider, as a possible alternative, the imposition o f sector-specific co-determination arrangements to deal with different levels of firm-specific investment, but rule them out on the basis that "even if  they were theoretically advisable, [they! appear very difficult to implement."149 One possibly adequate proxy would be an operating assumption that firms rationally contract out all work which does not depend on firm-specific skills.150 Franks and Mayer, (1993) (supra note 87) at 188; similarly O’Connor, M (1990) (supra note 6) at 1204- 5 suggests that "implicit contracts are...social arrangements typically enforced through the operation of market forces."
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generates, so the argument goes, they will find it harder both to recruit good employees, 
and to persuade those that they do employ to make such investments.151 Advocates of this 
perspective suggest that "Private pressures effectively limit [the] scope [of arbitrary 
behavior]. The lack o f legal protection to the employees is therefore in part explained by 
the increased informal protections that they obtain by working in large concerns".152
Voluntary CSR measures, such as codes of conduct and social accounting, might be seen 
not as political stakeholding measures but rather as an instrument for formalising and 
disseminating a corporate reputation for fair dealing (or lack of opportunism) inter alia in 
interactions with employees. Such statements are accordingly not attempts to head off 
more formal regulation, but a solution to the firm's contracting problem. The costs of 
sustaining a reputation are met by the increased efficiency of firms’ operations. These 
measures are designed to give employees more credible indications about the standard of 
treatment they can expect and the anticipated division of rents where firm-specific 
investments are made. Accordingly, they should be seen as voluntary limitations on the 
exercise of managerial prerogative (gap-filling). The considerable costs of building up 
and publicising a reputation, which becomes a valuable asset of the firm since it reduces 
the firm’s transaction costs, makes breaches of implicit contract less likely because they 
dissipate the asset,153 While defection may bring short-term benefits, in the longer term it 
will be more costly since reputations are quickly destroyed and difficult to rebuild.
151 Per O’Connor, M (1990) {supra note 6) at 1209: "The firm has a strong incentive to abide by an ethical code to treat workers fairly because they want to attract and retain the most qualified employees," Similarly, Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 261 puts some faith in the reputational mechanism, arguing that the reputational mechanism effectively restricts "the strategy of exploiting the specific investments of incumbent employees...to circumstances where (1) firms are of a fly-by-night kind, (2) firms are playing end games, and (3) intergenerational learning is negligible." Epstein, R, "In Defense of the Contract at Will" (1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 947 at 967-8 describes the adverse consequences which follow destruction of an employer's reputation for fair dealing with employees, which he describes as "functionally indistinguishable from a reduction in wages unilterally imposed by an employer. At the margin, some workers will look elsewhere, and typically the best workers will have the greatest opportunities."152 Epstein, R (1984) (supra note 151) at 968153 Social norms, such as the long-standing tradition of lifetime employment in Japan, may also push companies to honour their commitments, at least during periods of growth: see Dore, R, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism - Japan and Germany Versus the Anglo-Saxons (2000) at 102-4.
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David Kreps models the role played by corporate culture in sustaining reputation and 
reducing transaction costs at the level o f individual corporations. Reputations provide an 
incentive to individual companies to abide by their implicit contracts as long as they 
desire to undertake "future beneficial transactions".154 Once this is no longer the case, a 
return to "self-interest seeking with guile" is to be expected. Kreps argues that "for a 
reputation to have an effect, both sides involved in a transaction must ex ante have some 
idea of the meaning of appropriate or equitable fulfilment of the contract."155 The "focal 
point" will be a "principle or rule that has wide (preferably universal) applicability", 
which is then disseminated by means of corporate culture which is "partly the principle 
itself...and partly the means by which the principle is communicated to hierarchical 
inferiors (so they can monitor its application) and hierarchical superiors (so they can 
apply it faithfully)."156
It might be suggested that reputation is a rather fragile mechanism to rely on to establish 
and maintain a productive coalition for the following reasons. At a general level, "the 
waves of takeovers, buy-outs, spinoffs, corporate reorganizations, restructurings, and 
downsizings"157 may have undermined employees' confidence in the idea that reputation 
matters to firms across the economy as a whole, and made implicit undertakings by firms 
generally less credible. This could lead to a generalised reluctance on the part of 
employees across the economy as a whole to make firm-specific investment. This may be 
exacerbated by the diffusion of cultural and economic norms of shareholder value, 
according to which the capital market rewards breaches o f implicit contracts with an 
increase in stock prices. Similarly, social norms take a long time to build up yet are easily 
broken. Where one or two "bad apples" renege on implicit contracts, this creates an 
externality by increasing transaction costs across the economy as a whole as implicit 
commitments become less credible.
154 Kreps, (1990) (supra note 46) at 224155 ibid156 ibid157 Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3) at 259
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Employees who have already invested are not well protected by reputations in two 
situations. Firms operating in a declining industry have less incentive to play fair and 
maintain their reputation. Employees with skills specific to that sector, and even more so 
with firm-specific skills, are unlikely to have many exit options and so will be forced to 
accept pay cuts. The "endgame" problem may also be significant. Where a firm decides 
to leave the jurisdiction and relocate production abroad, its reputation is unlikely to 
precede it, and it has little incentive to pay regard to its reputation in the state from which 
it is exiting. Indeed, a firm need only locate outside the area where its reputation is 
operational. Similarly, where a firm is winding down its operations, it is less likely to 
care about its reputation. Further, reputation need not constrain a firm which no longer 
intends to rely on employees' firm-specific skills for its competitive advantage.158 59 Finally, 
replacement management installed after a hostile takeover are unlikely to feel bound by 
the reputation of their predecessors.160
Employees who have not yet made such investments face a different, but related, set of 
problems. First, reputations of individual firms can only be effective where monitoring 
takes place. Most employees do not have the resources to individually monitor the 
reputations o f all possible corporate employers. The task of monitoring a reputation is 
complicated by continual merger, takeover, spinoffs and other forms of corporate 
engineering which may make it difficult to identify successor companies. In this regard, it 
might be suggested that one of the "agency" functions trade unions might perform on 
behalf of their members is to act as monitors of firms' reputations.161 Unions certainly 
appear able to fulfil informational functions on behalf of their members with regard to 
pay structures and other terms and conditions. But the suggestion that they might monitor
158 O’Connor, M (1990) (supra note 6) at 1209: “labor economists note that the risk of opportunistic behavior is very high when the employer leaves a regional labor market and relocates to another part of the country or world.”159 This may be because the sector is in terminal decline. Alternatively, the firm may have decided to take the low-cost, low skill route to production. Finally, there may have been technological change.160 This point is taken up in chapter 4.161 Alchian, AA and Demsetz, H, ’’Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization” (1972) 62 American Economic Review 111 at 790: "unions, whatever else they do, perform as monitors for employees”. It is notable that Easterbrook and Fischel go further and argue at 24 that unions may make complete contracting possible: "Participation in companies is uniquely amenable to contracting because
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films' compliance with implicit contracts is more problematic. There will be much 
duplication of effort as unions tend not to be connected to specific firms: several unions 
may end up monitoring the same firm, and each union will have many firms to monitor. 
They may also reach different conclusions about compliance, as precise tests for 
monitoring conformity with reputation are not feasible. There may also be problems of 
observability. More significantly, the degree of non-transferrable investment will vary 
across members of the same union, and even more so across members of different unions. 
Opportunistic management will not necessarily break all implicit contracts at once. A 
corporate reputation is likely to be more complicated than a simple statement that "such 
and such corporation observes its informal undertakings to employees." Instead it should 
contain information about the treatment of different categories of employees by reference 
to their level o f investment, tenure, level o f seniority within the organisation etc. One 
might also question whether unions are equipped to take on this role, given that 
differences in level of firm-specific investment between members may create conflicts of 
interest within the union. Finally, and perhaps most problematically, given the low 
density of union membership, this appears a rather marginal and tenuous mechanism for 
protecting employees from expropriation o f their investments.
ii) Protection Outside Company Law
Williamson expects that employees' collective organisations will normally play a key role 
in establishing appropriate governance structures, rendering legal intervention 
unnecessary and inappropriate. However, he does recognise that this will present 
difficulties where employees are particularly heterogeneous:
"More complex labor governance structures are needed as investments in firm-specific 
human capital deepen, ceteris paribus. In consideration of that, and given heterogeneity 
in the typical work force, it may be that a series of bargains rather than a single bargain 
applicable to the entire labor force should be struck. Among other things, a single union 
operating under a uniform agreement will have difficulty aggregating the preferences of a
even the ignorant have an army of helpers... Employees work at terms negotiated by unions (and nonunion employees can observe the terms offered at other firms, which supply much information)."
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disparate membership. To negotiate discriminating terms is at variance, however, with 
the egalitarian purposes of unions.”162
Another problem is that trade union membership is in serious, perhaps terminal, decline. 
It might even be suggested that this decline is in part driven by changes in productive 
organisation: collective representation is becoming more costly as contracting out and the 
fragmentation of large establishments increases,163 employees become increasingly 
differentiated in terms of skills, and more precisely-tailored (firm- or even individual 
employee-specific) governance structures are needed. The collective agreement as 
governance structure, protecting the interests of employees ex ante by fixing the terms on 
which employees enter (including grievance procedures), and ex post by the co­
administration with the employer of the agreed grievance procedures, becomes less 
appropriate with increasing heterogeneity of employees. Employees face a collective 
action problem and are less likely to organise themselves into a union, which means that 
the transaction costs for both parties of establishing a governance mechanism will be 
much higher since there is no common agent acting on behalf of the employees. Further, 
the extent of employee differentiation may mean that the costs of producing governance 
mechanisms with a small scope of application may be higher than the benefits they 
provide in terms of allowing continuity of high productivity relationships. These 
difficulties arguably support a transaction-cost reducing role for the law in offering a 
selection of ”off the peg" governance structures which can accommodate the increasing 
idiosyncracy of firms.
Williamson suggests that these difficulties of employee "aggregation" mean that jobs 
with a high degree of firm-specificity will tend to be "unstable" and to evolve either by 
"sacrificing" their idiosyncratic attributes (and reverting to market governance) or by 
"devising" protective governance mechanisms ("collective organization (often in the form 
of union)").164 Where this occurs, he suggests, appropriate governance mechanisms might 
be put in place by agreement between the union and the employer. These might include
162 Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 265163 See "Déjà vu?", The Economist, 5* June 2003.
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severance payments which reflect firm-specific investments164 65 and “Machinery for 
settling disputes and for adapting to changed circumstances...The grievance machinery 
and associated job structures -- ports o f entry, promotion ladders, bumping, and so forth - 
- are thus important parts of efficient governance."166
The argument for legal intervention is that economic efficiency requires firm-specific 
investments to be maintained in their highest value locations. It seems counter-intuitive 
that shareholders should be provided with protective default mechanisms as a public good 
by company law on economic efficiency grounds, while employees either have to 
organise and incur the costs of creating ad hoc mechanisms, or rely on the vagaries of 
corporate reputation to protect their non-redeployable investments.
Acceptable Legal Interventions in Company Decision-Making
Where a role for the law is contemplated, it normally takes one of the following forms: 
information provision, board representation or the strengthening of managerialism.
i) Provision o f  Information
The provision of information (or consultation) to employees fits with any of the three 
models of the company discussed in this thesis. Looked at in terms of the agency model, 
it may help make contracts more complete and therefore sustain that model's central 
argument that additional governance structures are unnecessary. In addition, the provision 
of information to employees may lead to better monitoring of management, leading to a 
reduction in agency costs (to the extent that the interests o f employees and shareholders 
overlap).167 In terms of the political stakeholder model, the provision of information may
164 Williamson, OE (1985) {supra note 33) at 27216i Which are the reverse of the "bond“ posted by employees at the beginning of their employment; severance payments allow firms to bond their performance to employees: see O’Connor, M (1990) {supra note 6) at 1210. Like bonding, this also suffers from the weakness that neither the extent of firm-specific capital investment nor the quasi-rents it generates are ex ante knowable, so any bond will be at best an estimate of these figures.166 Williamson, OE (1984) {supra note 132) at 1208167 Note that Williamson, OE (1985) {supra note 33) argues at 302 that "where neither party values continuity in its relationship with the other, a costly effort to reduce informational asymmetries serves no useful veracity purposes either.” However, it must be doubted whether many (or indeed, any) employment relationships fall into this category.
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be seen as a weak form of participation and moderation of hierarchy, which may sustain 
more adversarial labour law mechanisms. Finally, it may support a productive coalition. 
Where there is no collective organisation, the provision of information should allow 
individual employees to gauge more accurately the risk they face, and therefore the risk 
premium they should demand. In terms of collective governance, it may assist with the 
reflexive establishment and operation of an appropriate bilateral structure, where it 
anticipates future change and threats to firm-specific investment. It may also, according 
to Williamson, supplement the structure by facilitating adjustments and avoiding 
misallocation during a long-term agreement; its absence may cause "the less informed 
party to disbelieve the representations of the more informed and lead to a costly 
contractual impasse."168
Williamson proposes that information should be supplied to the labour constituency via 
representatives who are placed on the board for informational purposes only.169 170This is 
useful "during periods of actual or alleged adversity, especially when firms are asking 
workers for give-backs. Labor's board membership might mitigate worker skepticism by 
promoting the exchange of credible information...." These arrangements would only 
be put in place where contracting difficulties justify it; they w'ould "sometimes" be 
justified to supplement an already established bilateral governance structure, but the role 
o f employee representatives should "normally" be limited to informational 
participation.171 The reason for the caution about extending to informational participation 
to all companies is that unwarranted decision-making participation (for example, on the 
basis of democratic imperatives rather than in support of idiosyncratic investment) 
imposes unnecessary transaction costs on the business without any corresponding 
increases in productive efficiency. These costs include the costs of "supplying
168 ibid at 302169 ibid. Williamson defines informational participation in terms of "allowing] a constituency to observe strategic planning and to be apprised of the information on w hich decisions are based, but allows no vote on investments or management." He adds at fit 3 that "Allowing only informational participation to a constituency could be implemented through two-tier boards, but more often it takes the form of implicit understandings among the members of the board. In principle, members are equals, but a subset understands that its useful participation is limited to supplying and receiving information."170 Williamson, OE (1984) (supra note 132) at 1209171 ibid at 1206. He does not give any examples of abnormal circumstances
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information. Huge educational needs arise if specialized constituencies are to be informed 
participants on the board”; "deflecting strategic decisionmakers from their main purposes 
by forcing them to redress operating-level complaints. This squanders a valuable 
resource”; and finally opportunistic use of leverage to extract extra concessions during 
the execution of the contract.172 *It may also cause an adverse adjustment of the terms on 
which corporate finance is available because the governance structure becomes more 
diffuse and less adept at resolving agency problems between management and 
shareholders. Accordingly, as a general rule, the parties' "specialized structures will 
normally be better attuned to the adaptive needs and dispute settlement requirements of a 
constituency than will access to a generalized instrument."174
Despite these arguments in favour of informational participation, Williamson notes that
"This practice does not, however, enjoy widespread support. Some opponents fear that it 
will be difficult to resist the transformation of informational roles into decision-making 
participation. It is also possible, however, that the informational benefits o f labor 
membership are not adequately appreciated."175
ii) Board Representation
Despite the difficulties with the bargaining process discussed above, Williamson insists 
that only shareholders merit exemption from the requirement of explicit bargaining. They 
are the only constituency which needs a "generalized safeguard" because they "cannot 
devise effective bilateral safeguards."176 The reason for their difficulty is two-fold: the 
unique nature of their contract with the "company" means that, unlike those of other 
constituencies, their position does not come up for periodic contractual renewal. They
172 ibid at 1206-7; Hansmann, H, The Ownership o f Enterprise (1996) considers in detail the costs where employees are involved in corporate decision-making.,73 O f course, employees do have limited cognitive resources which they may allocate to consideration of the information supplied by management. This may suggest that the information supplied should take a form and have a content which is likely to be useful for such rent-dividing negotiations, for example by including information about firm-specific capital.174 Williamson, OE (1984) (supra note 132) at 1206,7S ibid at 1209176 ibid at 1206
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"are also unique in that their investments are not associated with particular assets. The 
diffuse character of their investments puts shareholders at an enormous disadvantage in 
crafting...bilateral safeguards..."177 *and so they contract for "a governance structure of 
broad scope" in view of the risk of expropriation of their investment. Williamson 
accordingly explains "the board o f directors to be a governance structure whose principal 
purpose is to safeguard those who face a diffuse but significant risk of expropriation 
because the assets in question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a 
well-focused, transaction-specific way. Thus regarded, the board of directors should be 
seen as a governance instrument of the stockholders."179 1802
Williamson’s reluctance to extend the protection offered by the board to the employees 
(or other constituencies) is explained on the basis that "...special-purpose governance 
structures (of which the board of directors is one) arise in response to the needs of an 
exchange relation for contractual integrity. And...lest the design benefits be dissipated, 
the special purpose character of each governance structure must be respected." It is 
only if  "parties cannot devise effective bilateral safeguards, [that] generalized safeguards 
through voting board membership may be warranted." Williamson does not rule out 
the use of the board to protect the investments of employees in principle. A decision must 
be based on "their contracting relation with the firm." The grant of voting participation 
on the board may be permissible, but the question of why a constituency with 
idiosyncratic investments "has not successfully forged a bilateral governance 
structure...is germane".183 As discussed above, the absence of bilateral safeguards is 
generally construed as an indication that there are no firm-specific investments, or that 
the employees in question prefer to take a risk premium, rather than an indication of high 
transaction costs. It appears from Williamson's willingness to ”[s]uppose, arguendo, that
177 ibid at 1210
179 ibid; in Williamson, OE (1985) (supra note 33) at 316 he suggests that given its monitoring role, managerial participation on the board, while useful in terms of stimulating information flow, should not beso extensive as to lead management to dominate and prevent the board operating as a governance structure for the benefit of shareholders.180 Williamson, OE (1984) (supra note 132) at 1198181 ibid at 1206182 ibid at 1210183 ibid at 1206
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voting membership for [some] constituencies is granted"184 that he anticipates the 
existence of situations in which bilateral safeguards are not possible, but unfortunately he 
does not elaborate further.
The German experience with employee representation on supervisory boards (which has 
its origins in social rather than corporate governance) certainly suggests that it affects the 
costs and the dynamics o f the corporate governance process. Pistor notes that, as 
Hansmann argues, codetermination raises the costs of the governance process as the 
greater heterogeneity of interests on the supervisory board185 leads to more autonomy for 
the management board, and accordingly to an increase in agency costs.186 187
Codetermination also changes the dynamics o f the corporate governance process. While1 ft?there may be a tendency for a division o f supervisory labour along functional lines, 
corporate governance essentially becomes a game of coalition-building as each 
constituency seeks to protect their fundamental interests. Unlike coalitions in the US and 
UK, which tend to emerge spontaneously in response to specific threats like hostile 
takeovers, German supervisory board coalitions tend to stabilise as a result of repeated 
interactions. From a productive coalition perspective, therefore, the German system 
offers a degree of protection for employee investment in firm-specific human capital 
through a combination of institutional and legal arrangements: employee involvement in 
board level governance, combined with a collective labour contract system, means that 
firms do not need to rely on unenforceable implicit contracts in order to encourage firm- 
specific investment.188
184 ibid185 Including differences in interest among various groups of employees, including time horizons and risk- aversion. Union representatives may also have more sectoral interests which extend beyond the future of the individual company.186 See Pistor, K, “Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities” in Blair, MM and Roe, MJ (eds), Employees & Corporate Governance (Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 1999) at 177-9187 Pistor (supra) suggests at 170 that “the shareholder bench focused on investment decisions and financial returns, while the employee bench concentrated on the working conditions for the company’s work force.”188 ibid at 180. The role of co-determination is underpinning a productive coalition model is taken up in Chapter Five.
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The Rebirth of Managerialism: Management as Mediating Hierarchs
In her seminal work, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the
Twenty-First Century, Margaret Blair concludes that major reform of the US corporate
governance system is unnecessary, principally because "US corporation law, contract
law, and securities law readily accommodate most experiments in new organizational
forms, many new governance structures are emerging on their own."189 In a series of
articles jointly written with Lynn Stout,190 flesh is put on the bones of this argument.
They argue that the law grants management discretion to allocate returns to the various
constituencies in accordance with the extent of their firm-specific investment and
contribution to production, thus avoiding costly rent-seeking among constituencies and
helping to maintain trust and cooperation. The role of the board and its delegates in team
production situations is to act as mediating hierarchs between the claims of all corporate
constituencies, and in particular "to coordinate the activities of the team members,
allocate the resulting production, and mediate disputes among team members over that
allocation."191 192As insiders they are uniquely well placed to observe the contributions of
each constituency to the output of the productive coalition. Blair and Stout insist that
their model is descriptive because company law as it currently stands revolves around a
10 ')managerial conception of the corporation.
Managerial discretion becomes a gap-filling governance structure for incomplete 
contracts. The corporate form is a useful legal framework which guarantees the continued 
independence of this governance mechanism from interference by any corporate
589 Blair, MM (1995) (supra note 3) at 277190 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (1999) (supra note 1), Blair, MM and Stout, LA, "Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law" (2000) Georgetown University Law Center 2000 Working Paper Series in Business, Economics, and Regulatory Law Working Paper No. 241403 and Blair, MM and Stout, LA, "Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board" (2001) Georgetown University Law Center Working Paper Series in Business, Economics, and Regulatory Law191 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (1999) (supra note 1) at 251192 ibid at 290-320. At 320 they argue that "The mediating hierarchy model we propose explains many important aspects of corporate law much more robustly than its alternatives, especially principal-agent theories premised on the notion that shareholders 'own' corporations." In addition, it "departs from those of the progressives because the[y] commonly argue that corporate directors do not take sufficient account of nonshareholders' interests and that changes in the law are required to make this happen...e g. ...arguing that directors should operate as "neutral referees" and proposing legal requirements that employees be represented in the boardroom." (ibid at 286 fn 83)
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constituency, allowing the participants to make credible commitments to each other, 
thereby creating the stability to develop organisational capabilities.193
Blair and Stout’s model treats the public corporation as a ’’nexus of firm-specific 
investments... in which several different groups contribute unique and essential resources 
to the corporate enterprise’’ rather than a '"nexus o f contracts' (explicit or implicit)".194 
The vulnerability to opportunism of fellow investors, which arises from the lack of 
explicit contractual protection, is obviated by the grant of governance rights to 
management. Giving this role to management clearly contradicts the agency model of the 
firm, and implies that "no one team member is a 'principar who enjoys a right of control 
over the team".195 Rather, each team member has yielded control over their investment to 
management in the expectation that others will do likewise. In this remodelled 
managerialism, each corporate participant ”agree[s] not to specific terms or outcomes (as 
in a traditional "contract’’), but to participation in a process of internal goal setting and 
dispute resolution."196 This incomplete contract reformulation contains no novelty as far 
as the shareholders are concerned: their residual claimant status is of course familiar from 
Chapter 1. The key differences lies in the recognition that employees are also dependent 
on management. Corporate residuals are then allocated according to the outcome of a 
"political game” in which the participants lobby management to grant them a larger share 
of the residuals on the basis of the value created by their inputs in the production process.
Blair and Stout recognise that the delegation o f decision-making powers to this 
managerial hierarchy may lead to an increase in agency costs, but suggest that the 
facilitation o f credible commitments between members of the team production system, 
lower levels of shirking, and a streamlined rent-seeking process should be sufficient to
193 See Blair, MM, "Corporate Law and the Accumulation o f Organizational Assets: Lessons from the 19th Century" (2003) Georgetown University Law Center 2003 Working Paper Series in Business, Economics, and Regulatory Policy Working Paper No. 368100. Blair claims at 50 that "the “separation o f ownership from control”, far from being an infirmity o f  the corporate form, was one of the most important benefits of the corporate form."194 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (1999) (supra note 1) at 275195 ibid at 277, emphasis in original196 ibid at 278; this method of dispute resolution is both cheaper and more conducive to continued cooperation than more adversarial methods such as arbitration and litigation
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outweigh these costs. While, at least in the short term, returns to shareholders will be 
likely to be lower, in the longer term, increased returns may accrue to shareholders as the 
company exploits the competitive advantage it derives from maintaining a network of 
firm-specific investments. In response to the inevitable arguments that management will 
tend to act in a self-serving way, Blair and Stout assert that developments in behavioural 
psychology suggest that there may be grounds for believing that, as a general rule, 
management tends to act in an intrinsically trustworthy manner, constrained by social 
signals and other variables.197 198
The Impact of Adaptive Mechanisms on the Prospects of Mediating Hierarchy 
We have seen that the law presently plays only a minor, facilitating role in systems of 
corporate governance. It pushes management to fulfil a mediating role, at least 
rhetorically, by imposing both fiduciary duties and a duty of care on management to act 
in the best interests of the legal person. However, these liability rules play only a minor 
role in making directors accountable, serving as a ’'backstop” for egregious wrongdoing 
and have limited enforceability, the capital markets play the most important role in 
controlling managerial discretion, and of course focus on the interests of shareholders 
rather than employees.199
One might ask whether the tools of shareholder value,200 stock options, the market for 
corporate control, short tenure for executives and earnings metrics, which push 
management to exercise their discretion to advance the interests of shareholders,
197 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (2001) (supra note 190) especially at 44 et seq; see also Stout LA, "On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board)" (UCLA School o f  Law Law and Economics Research Paper 03-08 . While this argument may have been fatally undermined by subsequent revelations from, inter alia, Enron and Worldcom, it is possible to argue that "stock-based compensation... can encourage directors to take actions that can raise share price in the short run rather effectively, while harming the firm's long-run prospects. Accounting fraud provides an extreme example of this phenomenon." (ibid at 4 fh 9.) While stock-based compensation was originally intended to align management's interests with those of the shareholders, in the end, when combined with their inside information, it only served further to differentiate their interests from those of their "principals".198 See Mitchell’s critique below.199 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (2001) (supra note 190) at 45 suggest that capital markets are not the only constraint on management: "even while directors enjoy enormous legal discretion in how they choose to manage and allocate corporate resources, as a practical matter this discretion is limited somewhat by economic pressures (the cost of capital, the availability of skilled workers, the demand for the firm’s products)."
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whatever the claims of other constituencies, undermine the operation in practice of Blair 
and Stout's model. They suggest that these mechanisms should be seen simply as 
"disparities...driven more by political power than by economic factors."20 01 In making 
allocation decisions, the board simply has to meet the minimum demands of each team 
member (for a return at least equal to their opportunity cost) and to maintain sufficient 
reputation to continue recruitment to the team;202 beyond that, they have an array of 
choices as to how to distribute surplus rents, and will make decisions according to the 
political pressure which a given group can impose on them. Two interpretations of the 
rationale for the more pro-shareholder allocation o f surplus witnessed recently are 
advanced. First, that "the rise in the 1980s of institutional shareholders ...(which control 
sizeable blocks of shares in many firms) has tipped the balance of political power toward 
shareholders by reducing obstacles to collective investor action" at the expense of 
labour.203 Alternatively, the imperatives o f capital market globalisation have led 
management to realise that "they must redirect some of the surplus produced by corporate 
team production from employees to shareholders in order to prevent the flight of capital 
and keep the coalition together."204
By treating the market's "adaptive responses"205 to managerialism as mere "political 
pressures" on management, Blair and Stout are able to continue to treat managerial 
responses to changes in market conditions as ultimately rational rather than sectional. 
They therefore remain opposed to "reform proposals designed to give stakeholders 
greater power over directors [which] are misguided if they are driven by efficiency 
concerns about the supposed inability of current law to protect nonshareholders' firm-
200 See Chapter One, "The Agency Model Beyond Company Law"201 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (1999) {supra note l)a t2 8 3202 Millon, D, "New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law " (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 1001 at 1024203 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (1999) (supra note 1) at 325; one might add the decline in collective organisation as a further reason behind the reduction of employees' political weight in the coalition.2W ibid at 326; it might be suggested that the reason for this change in allocation was that during the boom of the "new economy", management thought that technological change was reducing the importance of firm-specific investment by labour, and that more capital was needed for investment in information technology; this drove management to make an "appropriate and economically efficient response to changes in the underlying markets for capital and labor."205 See Kahan, M and Rock, EB, "How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law" (2002) 69 Uni Chi L Rev 871
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specific investments".206 Yet the assertion of managerial rationality may be questioned on 
the basis that the capital market's "high-powered incentives" force management into a 
coalition with the shareholders which marginalises the employees, encouraging them to 
exercise their discretion in a particular way regardless of the underlying economics of the 
situation. The focus on short term stock price brought about, inter alia,207 by the market's 
combination of "carrots" and "sticks" is likely to make management reluctant to allocate 
resources on the basis o f employee investments.
Communitarian Critiques
Blair and Stout's interpretation of the doctrinal content of company law, which sees the 
board as a neutral constituency making trade-offs where the interests of the shareholders 
and the employees are in conflict, clearly contradicts the normative claims of the 
contractualists. However, from a communitarian perspective, Mitchell argues that this 
characterisation of the board cannot be sustained by reference to the doctrinal content of 
the law either: the basic structure of American corporate law "create[s] almost 
insurmountable incentives for corporate actors to look primarily, if not exclusively, to 
maximizing stockholder wealth in performing their functions, and to make any more 
balanced concept of their roles extremely difficult to pursue."208 In support of his 
contention he refers to various structural issues: only shareholders have the power to 
vote, an "inchoate power" which encourages directors to focus on shareholder wealth 
because "stockholders have the right to sell the corporation out from under the 
management to the highest bidder";209 only shareholders have standing to bring a 
derivative action on behalf of the company in respect of directors’ breaches of duty, 
meaning that directors will tend to "behave" as regards the shareholders;210 and although 
management is permitted by constituency statutes to take into account non-shareholder 
interests, these are not enforceable because of the limitations on derivative actions.211
206 Blair, MM and Stout, LA (1999) (supra note 1) 327 fh 206207 See Millon, D (2002) (supra note 202)208 Mitchell, LE (2001) (supra note 123) at 992W ibid at 107210 Of course, the use of derivative actions in more restricted in English law.211 US constituency statutes are discussed in Chapter 4.
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Millon also suggests that the mediating hierarch theory "implicitly assumes that the 
board's role is to validate existing, exogenously determined power relationships among 
employees, shareholders, and other stakeholders." Even worse, it "tacitly accepts the 
possibility that extralegal pressures might lead the board to behave no differently than it 
would if operating under the constraints of a shareholder primacy legal regime."21 13 While 
the risk that management may only act in the interests of a given constituency where it 
also serves their own interests is a repeated concern whenever managerialism is 
discussed,214 that risk becomes a near certainty where the incentives provided to 
management tilt the balance of likely decision-making firmly in favour of one 
constituency. Existing power structures, and the distribution of wealth, are reflected in 
the imposition o f extralegal constraints.
Perhaps more importantly, the incentives and social norms, which drive management to 
concentrate on the share price, undermine the board's position of neutrality, and therefore 
the possibility of maintaining a productive coalition. Employees who have made firm- 
specific investment, Millon adds, will be in a weaker bargaining position than 
shareholders because of the cost of their exit option.215 *Diversified shareholders may
^ 1/more credibly threaten to exit because "no portion of their investment is firm-specific". 
Millon also suggests that rent-seeking might reach such high levels that "aggregate net 
benefits to team members... could be less than they would be under a legal regime of 
shareholder primacy because the value of each person’s share of the pie would be 
reduced by the costs required to obtain it.”217 He argues that the only way to avoid this 
rent-seeking fiasco is to provide management with insulation from political pressure, but 
doubts whether it is possible to "conceive of a set of legal rules capable of establishing 
this state of ivory tower autonomy".218 Certainly, such rules would need to include some 
degree of protection against hostile takeover, or taming of the market for corporate
212 Millon, D (2000) (supra note 202) at 1027213 ibid at 1027214 The "classic” argument discussed in Chapter 2.215 Millon, D (2000) (supra note 202) at 1027-8: they are unable to make a credible threat of defection because it would imply forfeiture of their investment2.6 ibid at 1028.2.7 ibid at 10312.8 ibid at 1032
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control, as well as restrictions on remuneration based solely on share price. Millon 
ultimately falls back on the "classic argument", concluding that fiduciary duties are "ill- 
suited to situations in which a steward must figure out how to serve two masters at the 
same time.”219
Information and Consultation as Rights Guaranteeing Dialogue
Leaving these important critiques aside, Blair and Stout's mediating role for the board 
suggests a new economic rationale for information and consultation processes, located 
squarely between a contractual rationale, which posits that information and consultation 
are aimed at achieving contractual completeness, and a governance rationale, which 
posits that the process facilitates the establishment and operation of appropriate decision­
making structures which allow adaptation to changed circumstances. Information and 
consultation might instead be seen as formalised processes guaranteeing employees 
access to management on a regular basis; this repeated interaction then becomes one of 
the political methods by which employees press their claims before the mediating 
hierarchs, allowing them to emphasise the importance of their firm-specific investment. 
The question that remains is whether information and consultation create a sufficiently 
powerful "political lobbying" mechanism, compared with the "high-powered incentives" 
provided to management to serve the interests of capital markets.
A Critique of the Productive Coalition Model
As we have seen, investments in human capital are difficult to quantify, and so they are 
either resisted by neoclassical contractualists on the basis that they cannot be proved to 
exist, or ignored altogether. They do not consider the potential role of employees in 
reducing agency costs by monitoring management for self-serving behaviour.220 The 
argument that employees should also be considered residual claimants because of the 
contracting problems they face must be answered systematically before the agency model 
can truly claim exclusive heuristic force.
2,9 ibid at 1041220 Mitchell, LE (2001) {supra note 123) at 131 argues that, in contrast to shareholders, employees have good knowledge about the business, the incentive to monitor management, and would tend to take a longer term view.
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Moving beyond the empirical difficulties associated with demonstrating that employees 
make investments in firm-specific capital, economists like Lazonick and O'Sullivan have 
been somewhat critical of the productive coalition approach, although their analysis of 
corporate governance in terms of productive efficiency and generation of innovation also 
shares much common ground. O'Sullivan is very critical of the neoclassical contractual 
approach on the grounds that it is premised on exchange (static resource allocation) at the 
expense of organisational and production issues.221 Its emphasis on exchange does not 
allow it to have any theory of production222 or of organisational capability: since the 
market is the only form of governance considered, emphasis is placed on the ease with 
which assets may be redeployed to other uses. O f course, this takes no account of 
investments which cannot be redeployed easily or at all, irreversible commitment of 
investments being one of the key aspects of the innovative enterprise in the opinion of 
Lazonick and O'Sullivan.223 This is the defect in the neoclassical model which the 
concept of firm-specific capital is supposed to remedy. But this approach does not escape 
their critique either:
"to an extraordinary degree, given its centrality to their work, labour economists have 
failed to open the black box of firm-specificity to analyze where it comes from and, 
relatedly, why it makes sense to assume that it might be an important phenomenon in the 
economy."224
221 O’Sullivan, MA (2000) {supra note 5) in particular at 43-52222 Pitelis, C, Market and Non-Market Hierarchies - Theory o f  Institutional Failure (1991) at 18-19 explains why neoclassical analysis can have no theory of production: if  one does not follow Coase and Williamson's view o f the market pre-existing the firm and being the "natural (or original) means of resource allocation, so that non-market institutions need to be explained", then one can see that "market exchanges are nothing but exchanges between existing firms, or between such firms and their customers. The reason for this is that exchange presupposes production. Markets do not produce. Firms (including single-person ones) do. It follows that conceptually the firm precedes the market and not vice versa."223 O'Sullivan, MA (2000) {supra note 5) at 11; the other two are the organizational integration o f  human and physical resources and the strategic allocation o f resources to alter market and technological conditions.224 Lazonick, W and O’Sullivan, M, "Perspectives on Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Economic Performance" (2000) Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Economic Performance in the EU, European Institute o f  Business Administration (INSEAD) at 44; see also O'Sullivan, MA (2000) {supra note 5) at 56- 8
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According to O’Sullivan's critique, while the productive coalition model offers a more 
satisfactory account o f the process of wealth creation, it "fails to go beyond the 
neoclassical preoccupation with static resource allocation."225 It omits organizational 
issues (the interaction o f factors o f production cumulatively to produce innovation) and 
strategic issues (the fact that the firm’s environment is taken as given). While she 
recognises Blair's attempts to embed "stakeholder theories... in a framework of economic 
analysis",226 O’Sullivan describes Blair’s notion of firm-specificity variously as a "black 
box"227 and a "deus ex machina.”228 She charges Blair with over-reliance on exchange 
and therefore contract, so that the "returns to all participants (productive factors) in the 
enterprise - in such forms as wages, rent, and interest - remain strictly determined, as they 
are in the neoclassical model, by technological and market forces that are external to the 
operation of the enterprise and human control more generally."229 This means that Blair 
tends to underemphasise organisational processes, and so to treat firm-specific 
investment in a static rather than dynamic evolutionary manner:
"There are economists of innovation [like Lazonick] who have argued that the 
characteristic of firm specificity is an outcome of organizational learning processes 
through which resources are developed and utilized in the economy...the firm specific- 
skills that result from continued innovation are constantly evolving. Firm-specific skills 
that were at one time part of a process that enhanced economic performance may fail to 
do so in another era and may even retard it. To focus on firm-specific skills as the critical 
dimension of the process of wealth creation is to ignore the dynamics of the innovation 
process. Linked to a theory of governance, such a perspective may well encourage the 
entrenchment of the claims of economic actors who have participated in and benefited 
from wealth creation in the past, even when the integration of their skills is no longer a
225 O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 5) at 56226 ibid at 53227 ibid at 55, perhaps making an analogy with pre-Coasean theories of the firm.228 ibid at 42229 ibid at 56
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viable basis on which the economy can generate the returns to meet these claims. That is, 
the stakeholder theory risks becoming a de facto theory of corporate welfare."230
As we have seen, Blair's work is not limited to simple exchange (in the AIchian-Demsetz 
sense, or even in the legal-contractual sense) but focuses on relational and incomplete 
contracts, often of long duration, which create pressure for the development of 
governance structures, and which should be considered organisational rather than purely 
"contractual'' arrangements. It is submitted that once a contract is termed "relational" or 
"incomplete" then to label it simply as "exchange" is unhelpful. It is a "constitutive" 
contract, and the parties and their output are "endogenous" rather than static 231 The 
specialisation of the factor of production is described as "an investment in firm-specific 
capital" because a contractual methodology has been adopted. Theories of company law 
and corporate governance which take into account employee investment in firm-specific 
capital recognise that one cannot know ex ante either the extent of the investment or the 
future returns attributable to it. Further, Blair is explicit that the value and extent of firm- 
specific capital, and the returns attributable to it, will grow as time passes and the 
employee becomes more specialised in the task. The ongoing interaction of the employee 
with the task may in time lead to a change in the nature o f the task and consequential 
innovation. Certainly the absence o f specialisation by the employee would appear to 
preclude any co-evolution o f employee and task.
O'Sullivan’s criticisms are made in the context of a focus on innovation, which she argues 
depends on more than the commitment and specialisation of productive resources. 
However, such a broad focus on innovation is less useful in terms of setting an agenda for 
the law. In particular, the constant change which innovation requires, particularly as 
regards matters of internal organisation, suggests that the law can have little role in laying 
down governance structures, which must evolve on a case-by-case basis. Yet if the law is 
not to play this role, then at the very least the innovative firm will be constantly
230 O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 5) at 56. It might be argued that O'Sullivan’s entrenchment argument applies even more strongly to the doctrine of shareholder value, which underpins returns to unproductive shareholders who simply trade residual claims for the most part based on historically distant capital contributions.
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hampered by transaction costs and rent-seeking as the organisational framework evolves 
through sequential adaptations. The productive coalition model can at least assist with the 
reduction of these costs.
Under O'Sullivan's approach, the crucial rights to determine resource and return 
allocation should be placed "in the hands of decision-makers who are integrated with the 
learning process that generates innovation...inherent in the process of innovation, in the 
need to commit to resources to undertake it and the uncertainty of returns from innovative 
investments, is a need for control of resources by the decision-makers who shape the 
innovation process."231 32 Given that the identity of the "shapers" may change over time and 
across various aspects of the production process, and that those with decision-making 
power may be reluctant to transfer that power to the new "shapers", the law's task seems 
rather difficult. Haggling over the allocation of decision-making power seems likely to 
delay innovation. Perhaps their positions can be reconciled by viewing Blair's work as a 
preliminary step on the road to introducing a notion of productive innovation into 
company law and corporate governance through the proxy of firm-specificity. This view 
casts the role of the law as being to encourage the irreversible commitment of resources 
by employees as well as shareholders, leaving the other elements of innovation to flow 
from the interaction which constitutes the corporate governance process.
Conclusion
As we saw in Chapter 1, the essentially managerialist model of company law has been 
supplemented, or even transformed, by the provision of high-powered incentives to 
management in order to solve the "agency problem". By contrast, the political will to 
implement a political stakeholder model at the level of the company was found to be 
lacking during the 1970s, perhaps because its advocates did not make a more cogent 
economic case for its introduction. The failure of stakeholding to make an impact on 
company law, coupled with the shift to services and high value-added manufacture, has 
led to the development of the productive coalition model. Its prescriptions are less
231 Bowles, S, "What Markets Can - and Cannot - Do" (1991) Challenge 11 at 13232 O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 5) at 60
determinate than those of either of the models which preceded it, but they are not 
completely indeterminate. It recognises that one-size-fits-all corporate governance is not 
likely to maximise efficiency. While there may be some firms which conform to the 
agency model, it is a methodological oversimplification to assume that employees never 
bear risk. Its more sophisticated conception of societal wealth generation carries 
important policy implications for company law and corporate governance. Productive 
coalitions play an increasingly important role in developed economies. However, they 
can only develop where appropriate institutional infrastructure is in place, and their 
continued existence depends on its continued support. If this support is not available, 
economic actors will be reluctant to specialise, allocative efficiency will suffer and the 
wealth of society will not be maximised. Managerialism was one such means of support, 
but has now been co-opted to the pursuit of shareholder value. Legal intervention may be 
appropriate, given the difficulties faced when attempts are made to draw together 
disparate groups into a productive coalition. The law could decree a return to 
managerialism, perhaps prohibiting various groups from offering incentives to 
management to serve their interests. Alternatively, it could provide members of the 
coalition more formalised procedural means to representation of their interests in the 
corporate decision-making process. In particular, full provision of information (even to 
the extent of informational board representation) and (perhaps) consultation fit well with 
all three models.
Part two of the thesis looks at the specific threat to the productive coalition posed by the 
hostile takeover mechanism, and the way in which the law supports and regulates that 
mechanism. It also suggests ways in which takeover regulation may be made more 
conducive to the development and support of productive coalitions.
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Part Two:
Application of the Models 
to Takeover Regulation
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Chapter Four: Takeover Regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States
Introduction
The UK and US systems of corporate governance share many features, including a 
managerialist conception of company law; the strong normative influence of the agency 
model; wide dispersal of shareholders in public corporations; and a high level of market 
capitalisation by reference to GDP. This makes the differences in their systems of 
takeover regulation particularly striking. The UK system suspends the genera! company 
law rule of managerialism from the moment a bid is made, while the US system, which 
differs in its precise details from state to state, theoretically permits management a 
considerable degree o f discretion to defend against hostile takeovers.
This chapter first examines the theoretical issues behind takeover regulation, then looks 
at its evolution in the UK and the US, comparing the two systems against the models of 
the company and identifying their underlying assumptions.
The Scope of Takeover Regulation
Takeovers occur where a bidder, most often a company, gains control of a company 
through the acquisition of a controlling shareholding in it.1 Where control is already 
concentrated, as in many continental European jurisdictions,2 takeovers normally take the 
form of a private sale of a shareholding. By contrast, a bidder seeking control of a 
widely-held corporation normally makes an offer directly to the dispersed shareholding 
public, inviting them to tender their shares in the corporation for a price set at a 
considerable premium above the market price, the offer being expressly conditional upon 
a set level of acceptance being achieved within a given time period.
1 See for example, Roe, "Strong Managers, Weak Owners" (1994) at 151: "Takeovers coalesce ownership structures. If ownership were already coalesced, takeovers could not readily occur."2 See for example, Franks and Mayer, "Ownership and Control in Europe" in Newman, P (ed). The Sew Palgrave Dictionary o f Economics and the Law (1998), 722
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In the conventional view, takeover regulation is not concerned with the merits of a 
proposed takeover (including, but not limited to, its effects on industry structure and 
competition), but simply prescribes the process by which offers are made and responded 
to. A takeover bid is described as "hostile" if  it is not "welcomed" by the board of the 
target company, and "friendly" where the board approves the bid.3 There are various 
reasons for which the incumbent board might not welcome a bid, and some regulatory 
systems attempt to distinguish between them. The board may not approve o f the bidder’s 
plans for the corporation, considering their own plans to be better. In that case, it might 
be argued that the board (with their superior inside knowledge) should be permitted to 
take steps to defend the target against takeover,4 or at least make their position known to 
the shareholders. Alternatively, they may consider the price offered to be too low, giving 
rise to an argument that the board should be obliged to seek additional bidders and hold 
an auction. Finally, the board may fear that the bidder is planning to replace them after 
the takeover has occurred,5 leading to an argument for board neutrality lest the board 
defend the takeover in order to entrench themselves.
Identifying the motive behind the board's defensive action is the main difficulty faced by 
takeover regulation, as may be seen from the different approaches taken by the various 
regulatory systems. In the UK, in the face of the common law's high cost approach of 
reviewing the board's motives in each case, shareholder interests succeeded de facto  in 
outlawing defensive measures by the boards of publicly quoted companies altogether. In 
the most important US jurisdiction, Delaware, an intermediate standard of review was
3 Deakin, S and Slinger, G, "Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm" (1997) 24 Journal o f  Law and Society 124 at 146: "A hostile bid is...an offer for a controlling shareholding which is not welcomed by the incumbent management, whether or not the management later recommends the acceptance of that bid or another one." Similarly, "...the hostility emanates from target management. It is they who are antagonistic to the prospect of a change in ownership and control. In the face of such hostility the tender offer provides a means by which the outside suitor can go over the heads of target management and make an offer directly to the shareholders." (Cohen, "Tender Offers” in Newman, P (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary o f  Economics and the Law  (1998), 580 at 580.)4 Lipton, M and Rosenblum, SA, "A New System o f Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors" (1991) 58 University o f  Chicago Law Review 187 at 196: "antitakeover provisions can be a quite rational tool for a board of directors seeking to preserve the corporation in the face of an attempted takeover that is likely to be detrimental to the long-term health of its business."s Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D, The Economic Structure o f Company Law (1991) at 162: “Managers of the target perceive bids as reflecting poorly on their service, since the bidders commonly propose to change the
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adopted, in which the board is given discretion to defend, but is subject to review against 
the objective criterion o f reasonableness in the circumstances of the particular bid. Other 
US jurisdictions are even more tolerant o f defensive measures, theoretically allowing 
management a very broad discretion to take into account a range of "stakeholder" 
interests, although as an empirical matter, the introduction of "antitakeover" laws has not 
prevented takeovers and further corporate consolidation. In the next chapter we shall see 
that a recent piece of legislation in Germany allows defensive measures where they are 
authorised by the supervisory board, and makes no reference to the motivations of the 
board whatsoever. This is in stark contrast to the proposed EC takeover directive, 
discussed in the final chapter, which follows the UK approach and outlaws defensive 
measures altogether.
In line with the focus of this thesis, the analysis of takeover regulation here concentrates 
on the position of employees. Defensive measures by the board are one way in which the 
employees' position might be taken into account alongside the other interests of "the 
company". Alternatively, provision might be made for direct employee involvement in 
the form of information and consultation; there are no instances o f co-determination by 
shareholders and employees of the outcome o f takeover bids for the simple reason that in 
all the jurisdictions considered, the decision whether or not to sell their shares is for the 
shareholders alone.6 However, given the commercial and financial sensitivity of many 
deals, even apparently lower order procedural obligations, which have the potential to 
delay the bid, may have a significant effect on its outcome. The important point is that 
whether it restricts the board's ability to take defensive measures, or requires employees 
to be informed and consulted, interventionist takeover regulation represents a significant 
deviation from the general board-centred, managerialist view of company law.
way the target is run. Within three years o f an acquisition, half o f all the managers at targets are out o f work.”6 With the limited exception of the "freezeout" rule, discussed below.
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The Market for Corporate Control
Since the emergence of the Berle and Means corporation in the nineteenth century, the 
only rational recourse of dispersed individual shareholders, dissatisfied with the 
performance of management, has been to exit the firm by selling their shares. Their 
collective action problem prevents them from co-ordinating their actions to oust 
management in a proxy contest: other shareholders will "free ride" on the efforts and at 
the expense of those who initiate action. The market measures votes cast with their feet in 
this way, indicating shareholder dissatisfaction by a declining share price. Without more, 
however, a declining share price has little effect on underperforming management, who 
remain in their positions, unthreatened by rationally apathetic shareholders. To the extent 
that management relied upon issuing new stock to raise capital, or on debt financing, the 
lower share price would raise the firm's cost of capital. However, since most firms 
satisfied the bulk of their capital requirements through retained earnings, this imposed 
minimal constraints on management to maximise shareholder value.
Accordingly, agency-model economic analysis suggests that hostile takeovers can reduce 
agency costs and increase allocative efficiency where the Berle and Means corporation is 
dominant by constraining management to advance the shareholders' interests.7 8 This is 
necessary where there are no blockholders with the correct incentives to undertake 
monitoring activities.9 Henry Manne first suggested in 1965 that the market for corporate
7 O'Sullivan, MA, Contests fo r  Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United States and Germany (2000) at 154 notes that "From 1970 to 1989...retained earnings accounted for 91 percent of the net sources o f finance for US non-financial corporations." Unger, RM, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (1998) at 46 and Stiglitz, JE, Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) at 128 note the minor importance o f new equity for satisfying firms' capital requirements. See further the discussion of negative net equity issues in Chapter 3.8 As Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 5) say at 171, "tender offers control the agency costs of management. Their existence makes contractarianism on other subjects practical." Other benefits have been claimed for takeovers and mergers: synergy gains may be made when two formerly separate enterprises are combined, allowing them to rationalise non-productive aspects of their business such as administration, and mergers may also offer tax advantages. The use of takeovers in this way lies outside the scope of this thesis.9 For discussion of the role of blockholders as an alternative mechanism for monitoring management see Roe, MJ, Political Determinants o f  Corporate Governance (2003). As Roe suggests, the direction of causality could be reversed, blockholders being prevented from selling their shares and diversifying by the absence of a market for corporate control, which means that they would not receive full value for their shares.
150
control is the key mechanism for the protection of shareholder interests,10 disciplining 
management through the threat, and occasionally the execution, of takeover bids. 
Certainly when compared with the managerialist norms of English and US company law, 
which emphasise "the interests of the company" and managerial discretion, the market for 
corporate control appears to considerably strengthen the norm of shareholder value.
Groups of potential bidders monitor managerial performance by comparing the current 
share price to its potential, identifying underperforming companies, and making tender 
offers for their share capital.11 Managerial failure may take several forms. First, 
management may act in a self-serving way and direct too much corporate surplus to 
themselves. Second, they may engage in "empire building", or seeking power for power's 
sake, and fail to draw the line between the firm and the market correctly, employing 
capital for a return below that achievable elsewhere. Third (and another aspect of 
"empire-building"), the organisation may have become too large for management's 
decision-making capacity. Finally, management may pursue shareholder interests less 
than fully by making concessions to other corporate constituencies in order to enjoy more 
leisure.12
However, the market for corporate control operates primarily as a background threat, or a 
"stick"13 to encourage management to serve the interests of current shareholders by 
maximising profits.14 The capital markets demand that managers should only make 
"corporate investments in projects that can yield at least the same risk-adjusted rate of 
return that shareholders could receive elsewhere in the economy, or...redistributfe]
10 Manne, H, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control" (1965) 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 at 113: “Compared to this mechanism, the efforts of the SEC and the courts to protect shareholders through the development of a fiduciary duty concept and the shareholder's derivative suit seem small indeed.”11 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 5) at 172-3.12 Manne (in Manne, HG and Wallich, HC, The Modem Corporation and Social Responsibility (1972) at 19) suggests that management can "use for their own purposes any rents produced by the corporation up to the amount it would cost to displace them from their positions." See also Romano, below note 73.13 Lazonick, W and O'Sullivan, M, "Perspectives on Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Economic Performance" (2000) Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Economic Performance in the EU, European Institute o f Business Administration (INSEAD) at 26; the "carrot" is, o f course, the grant of stock options, which are intended to allow the "stick” to be used sparingly.14 Manne, H (1965) (supra note 10) ; also Easterbrook, F and Fischel, DR, "The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer" (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 1161 at 1169-73.
151
revenues to shareholders who can then reallocate these resources themselves in search of 
the highest available returns."15 Failure to comply with the capital market’s demands will 
lead to a shareholder exit or even exodus, depressing the price of shares and rendering 
management vulnerable to would-be bidders. Where the threat does not work, and 4tthe 
internal processes for change in large corporations are too slow, costly and clumsy to 
bring about the required restructuring or change in managers efficiently...”,16 the hostile 
takeover is a "nuclear" mechanism of last resort,17 18
Hostile takeovers only become viable where agency costs in the target firm are higher 
than the sum of the transaction costs of launching a takeover and the payment of a
« Apremium over market price to the shareholders. A contest for control of the corporation 
takes place between the bidders and incumbent management, with the shareholders 
deciding the outcome by referendum. Its supporters claim that the market for corporate 
control redraws the boundary between the firm and the market in the correct position.19 A 
successful bid allows target shareholders to exit the scene (or to join the offeror company 
if shares in the bidder constitute part of the purchase price). The bidder then installs 
management who will prioritise the creation of shareholder value, which, according to the
15 Lazonick, W and O'Sullivan, M (2000) {supra note 13) at 2516 Jensen, MC, "The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence" in Coffee, JC, Lowenstein, L, and Rose-Ackerman, S eds, Knights. Raiders and Targets (1988), 314 at 318; see also Bergstrom, C, Hogfeldt, P, Macey, JR, and Samuelsson, P, "The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions: A Law and Economics Analysis o f European Proposals for Reform" (1995) Columbia Business Law Review 495 at 500: takeovers, especially hostile ones contribute to “improving performance by selling corporate assets to more specialized managers”17 Becht, M, Bolton, P, and Rowell, A, "Corporate Governance and Control" (ECGI Finance Paper No2, October 2002 at 24 describe hostile takeovers as “a radical and spectacular mechanism” which “is highly disruptive and costly” . The transaction costs o f  the takeover, in the form o f  professional fees may amount to a rather high percentage of the corporation's overall value. These high transaction costs suggest that it is desirable that the takeover mechanism be used sparingly, and primarily pour encourager les autres rather than as a routine asset allocation mechanism.18 While a successful takeover bid may mean that the target shareholders collectively do not suffer loss compared with the current market price, if management have been underperforming for some time, there may still be a loss compared to the putative value of the corporation. This o f course is the source of gains to offeror shareholders.19 According to this logic, the market for corporate control should operate to prevent managers from empire-building because, if the empire they build does not produce synergy gains, and therefore a gain in the share price, the enlarged corporation will be vulnerable to takeover and break up. O f course, there is a danger that bidders may also be engaging in empire-building, but they too should be aware of the risk posed to their position by the market for corporate control. We can see from this that while the market for corporate control should allocate assets to where the capital markets value them most highly, this process of
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agency model, maximises the wealth of society.20 The gains made when new managers 
are installed who will serve shareholder interests more keenly (either because they are 
more competent or motivated) are shared between existing and new shareholders. Where 
there is a cash-only offer, the existing shareholders receive their premium and exit the 
scene before the efficiency gains are realised. The new shareholders get the benefit of a 
progressively higher market valuation of their shareholdings as new management 
implements shareholder value strategies.21 Where there is a share-for-share bid, both sets 
o f shareholders must await the market's verdict on the new strategy.
Legal Implementation of the Market for Corporate Control
A market for corporate control cannot operate in a vacuum. It requires constitutive legal 
rules. Agency theoretical arguments have been very influential in normative debates 
about takeover regulation, both in terms of the mechanics of the bid and the role of 
management.
Shareholders will be unwilling to diversify their portfolios fully unless they are assured 
that even small shareholders will share in the control premium which accompanies a 
takeover bid.22 * Takeover regulation frequently interferes with the bidder's normal 
freedom of action on the market in two ways. It may prohibit partial bids, effectively 
forcing the bidder to buy out the minority, and require equal treatment of shareholders, 
allowing all to exit on the same terms, whatever the size of their holding. The effect is 
that the control premium paid by the bidder is shared among all shareholders rather than
"creative destruction" will give rise to significant transaction costs as successive empire-building bidders aTe "rumbled" and their costly actions reversed.20 Jensen, (1988) (supra note 16) at 315 and 318 explains that the “corporate control market generates these gains [for society] by loosening control over vast amounts of resources and enabling them to move more quickly to their highest-valued use.” Further, once management have paid out free cash flow to shareholders (which rational investors can then apply to its best use), management will be subject to capital market discipline when they want to raise funds for further activities, leading to “substantial changes in corporate strategy.”2' Some studies suggest that offeror shareholders are often worse off post-takeover: see the sources cited in Coffee, JC, "The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust- ups" (1988) Wisconsin Law Review 435 at 438 fh 11 and 12.22 Rajan, RG and Zingales, L, Saving Capitalism From the Capitalists (2003) at 160: "dispersed investorsmay find it prohibitively costly to enforce their rights; hence they need an organization like the SEC to represent them and laws to protect them."
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being appropriated as a "private benefit" by those in control.23 The counterpart o f the 
minority's right to exit on change of control is a "squeeze-out" right which allows the 
bidder to compulsorily acquire the holdings of the minority shareholders that did not 
accept the tender offer. Yarrow suggests that compulsory acquisitions prevent free riding 
by minorities on efforts by would-be bidders and so are an essential support for the 
market for corporate control:
"The argument is that shareholders of the target company, believing their own actions 
have a trivially small effect on the probability of success of a particular bid, will have an 
incentive to decline the offer if  they expect others to accept, since in this way they can 
participate in the post-raid improvement in performance of the firm... If all owners expect 
the bid to succeed then it will in fact fail."24
Yarrow suggests that "the granting o f rights to controlling interests to compulsorily 
acquire minority shareholdings...[is] a simple and elegant solution of the free rider 
problem."25 26In the absence of this rule, the market for corporate control would not 
produce the benefits claimed for it by agency theorists. The "squeeze-out" right 
constitutes another important interference with the normal operation of the market, 
denying individual shareholders the right to decide whether they wish to sell their shares, 
which instead becomes a matter for the majority to decide on a case-by-case basis.
In addition, calls are frequently made for prohibitions on defensive measures by 
management, which agency theorists treat as a device for entrenching incumbent 
management at the expense of shareholders, and an obstacle to the operation o f the 
market for corporate control. If the board is permitted to take defensive measures, some 
bids will fail, increasing the costs of outside monitors, making their operations less viable
33 ibid at 5734 Yanow, GK, "Shareholder Protection, Compulsory Acquisition and the Efficiency of the Takeover Process" (1985) 34 Journal o f Industrial Economics 3 at 3-425 ibid at 4. For an example, see ss 429-30 Companies Act 1985, which sets the threshold at 90%.26 ibid at 12
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and increasing agency costs across the economy as a whole.27 Since monitoring is seen as 
a social good, the law is charged with ensuring that nothing is done to discourage a 
constant supply of potential monitors. There is unanimity among those viewing takeovers 
as a mechanism for reducing agency costs that this entails, inter alia, prohibiting 
management from taking defensive measures to oppose or delay bids.
The main point of contention among agency theorists is whether management should be 
encouraged or allowed to auction off the company. Easterbrook and Fischel consider that 
"managers should remain passive and let investors decide whether to tender."28 This 
entails prohibitions on defensive measures and on soliciting other bidders with the aim of 
raising the bid price through auction. The reason is that losing bidders also incur the costs 
o f  pre-bid monitoring and making the bid, so auctions tend to discourage potential 
monitors. In extremis, the price demanded at auction may become so high that the target’s 
shareholders appropriate all the gain arising from the bid, rather than sharing it with the 
bidder, leading to a situation where "no one has an incentive to monitor and make 
offers."29 By contrast, Bebchuk argues that management should be permitted to solicit 
additional bidders in order to hold an auction, with the proviso that these rules should not 
discourage initial bids.30 He argues that the encouragement of competing tender offers is 
“desirable both to targets’ shareholders and to society”31 because they improve the flow 
o f private information about companies.32 An auction rule would not deter first bidders 
since ‘The search costs that first bidders incur do not seem to be at all large.”33 Bebchuk
27 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 5) at 174: "If managers pursue a path of 'independence'... there is no profit in being an outside monitor, hence all firms' stock price falls ex ante. Agency costs increase (and prices fall) to the point where further changes precipitate a change o f control. Because investors prefer the wealth maximizing rule...the optimal legal rule prevents resistance unless expressly authorized by contract ex ante”28 ibid at 17129 ibid at 174. They also argue that the first bid reveals the knowledge of the monitor so an auction allows free-riding, and that maximising the wealth of target shareholders at the expense of the bidder is wasteful "shuffling" because of diversification: "Investors in targets (who are also investors in bidders) want the maximum value for stocks as a whole." (at 189)30 See for example, Bebchuk, LA, "The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers" (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 1028 and Bebchuk, LA, "The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension" (1982) 35 Stanford Law Review 23; see also Gilson, R, "A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers" (1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 819.31 Bebchuk, LA (1982) (supra) at 102932 ibid at 1049-5033 ibid at 1036 for a breakdown of these costs
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argues that auctions have the positive effect o f encouraging the optimal amount of search. 
If premia are minimal and all gains go to the acquirer, then too much search may be 
performed.34 Auctions increase "the likelihood that the target will be acquired by the firm 
to which its assets are most valuable/’35 namely the bidder most likely to realise synergy 
gains rather than an asset-stripper. It may also discourage acquisitions which are 
prompted only by financial speculation or empire-building on the part of the bidder's 
management. An auction rule might even encourage the preservation of firm-specific 
investments, by selling firms more frequently to bidders who will keep the assets in their 
higher value current use.
Explanations of the "Deal Decade"
A particularly "vigorous" market for corporate control emerged during the 1980s in both 
the UK and the US. The phenomenon was so pronounced that the period has been widely 
termed the "deal decade", characterised by "the emergence of hostile transactions, the 
large size of the average target, and the unprecedented reliance on aggressive techniques 
to conclude transfers of corporate control.”36
The deal decade is important because widespread use of the hostile takeover reoriented 
corporate governance from managerialism to a single-minded pursuit of shareholder 
value. The only way in which managers could fend off unwanted suitors and preserve 
their positions was to concentrate on the share price. The deal decade also forms the 
political context in which many states enacted anti-takeover statutes.
Leaving aside the rather implausible hypothesis that all the takeovers were motivated by 
replacing ineffectual management,37 two main competing explanations have been
34 ibid at 104735 ibid at 104836 O’Sullivan, MA (2000) {supra note 7) at 161; Cook, J and Deakin, S, ’’Stakeholding and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence on Economic Performance” (1999) ESRC Centre fo r  Business Research, University o f  Cambridge Working Paper No ?? at 23 refer to "an increase in takeover activity from 1984- 88 and then a decrease over the period 1989-93." Kelly, M, The Divine Right o f  Capital (2003) at 55 cites estimates that in 1990, one third of companies in the Fortune 500 were targeted for hostile takeovers.37 Coffee, JC (1988) {supra note 21) at 441: "managerial incompetence is hardly cyclical.”
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advanced for the enormous growth in takeovers during the deal decade. Which of the two 
explanations one accepts obviously colours one's view of the legitimacy of the regulatory 
regimes put in place in the UK and the US.
i) Deconglomeration
The most frequently advanced perspective within the financial economics literature 
builds on the theory of the market for corporate control, and explains corporate 
restructuring during the 1980s as a necessary response to new competitive pressures,38 
changes in technology39 and growing demand for financial liquidity.40 The competitive 
decline of many US and UK corporations in the face of challenges from, in particular, 
German and Japanese rivals is explained by reference to the agency problem described in 
chapter one and the bounded rationality problem described in chapter three.41 
Management of the Berle and Means corporation, gradually freed from shareholders' 
oversight as those shareholders became more dispersed, either abused, or used 
incompetently, the wide discretion granted to them under Anglo-American systems of 
corporate governance. Corporate decision-makers satisfied their own preferences for 
prestige at the expense of creditors, who bore greater risk, and shareholders, who suffered
38 Jensen, MC, "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences" (1988) 2 Journal o f  Economic Perspectives 21 at 2439 See Holmstrom, B and Kaplan, S, "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s” {MIT Department o f  Economics Working Paper 01-11 February 2001 available at http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf7abstract id=261112). The authors argue at 3 that "shareholder value became dominant in the 1980s and 1990s in part at least because capital markets have a comparative advantage in undertaking the kind of structural reforms that deregulation and technological change necessitated." Their hypothesis is that "Markets are more effective than managers when it comes to moving capital from declining industries to emerging industries." (23)40 O'Sullivan, MA (2000) {supra note 5) at 146-161 who notes in particular changes in savings and pension-provision patterns to favour investments in corporate equities: after restructuring, cash flow, which had until then been allocated by management, was paid out to shareholders who would then reinvest it in the stock market where it received the highest return, thus putting the assets to their most highly valued use. See also Dore, R, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism - Japan and Germany Versus the Anglo- Saxons (2000) who stresses the role of financial deregulation and tax incentives in increasing the flow of savings to the capital markets, and the corresponding pressure to return spare cash flow to shareholders.41 Dore, R (2000) {supra) at 26-32 and 45-8 argues that the reasons for the competitive decline are more fundamental. He refers to differences in the underlying model of the firm, and argues that broad cultural or conventional (rather than legal) differences in systems of corporate governance, as well as differences in financial systems, create institutional interlock. Within a varieties of capitalism perspective, the finance- dominated Anglo-Saxon agency model undermines investments in firm-specific skills and incremental innovation, generating competitive advantage through radical innovation and lower wage costs: (ibid at 233 et seq, this point is taken up in more detail in Chapter 6).
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from lower profitability.42 This unconstrained spree of hierarchy-building led to 
gargantuan inefficiencies as managers built and ran corporations which were too complex 
for them to monitor fully, and the allocation of resources within the firm became sub- 
optimal. Impatient capital seeking out the highest returns restored optimality.
Certainly in retrospect, the exponential growth of conglomerate (or ’'multidivisional") 
corporations from the beginning of the 1960s, which occurred through merger (hostile or 
friendly takeover), rather than organic growth, is striking. However, the conglomeration 
process had itself been justified in terms of allocative efficiency on the basis of two 
related arguments drawn from pre-transaction cost economics and "scientific 
management" theory. First, diversification into lines of business unrelated to the 
company’s core business reduced its exposure to risk in product markets. Second, the loss 
of control on the part of top management, which one would expect in the event of such 
diversification, could be avoided by clear differentiation between strategic decision­
making, which should occur at head office level, and administrative decision-making, at 
divisional level.43 When it became clear that this "strategic segmentation" of operational 
and strategic decision-making did not work because the two areas were interdependent, 
and that management were accordingly not capable of managing the conglomerates 
which they had built, the obvious conclusion was that the companies in question needed 
to restructure or "deconglomerate". The market for corporate control, having originally 
constructed these gigantic corporations, would once again achieve efficiency by 
reallocating underperforming assets among competing purchasers.44
42 Margaret Blair argues that the restructuring process "was largely fueled by the conflict among managers, financial institutions and shareholders about whose interests should take precedence.” (Blair, "Financial Restructuring and the Debate about Corporate Governance” in Blair, MM (ed), The Deal Decade (1993), lat 2)43 See O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 7) at 109-116; Williamson, OE, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) at 279-28144 Coffee, JC (1988) (supra note 21) at 445-6 points out that this reallocation thesis is not as clear-cut as its advocates would suggest: "the 'negative synergy1 that a bust-up’ liberates may stem from the possibility that there are persons who place a more optimistic valuation on each of the firm’s operating divisions." Where the purchaser is optimistic, this simply constitutes a wealth transfer from bidder to target shareholders. It is only where they are actually more efficient users that there is a social gain.
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The deconglomeration process received stimulus from the leveraged buy-out (LBO) 
mechanism, a device by which the bidder (often management) purchases the target’s 
share capital with loan finance, secured against the target's assets and subsequently paid 
off by the target, either out of earnings or by selling off assets. Many previously public 
corporations were taken private in this way by a group of investors. The "junk bond" 
market, which of course demanded increased returns for the higher levels of risk assumed 
by participants, made the LBO more pervasive still. These financing mechanisms pushed 
corporations to assume massive levels of debt during the 1980s.45 From a neoclassical 
perspective, the LBO mechanism was considered an improvement on the standard 
takeover for two reasons. First, LBOs had the effect of eliminating shareholder- 
management agency costs by once more reuniting ownership and control, as takeovers 
became increasingly characterised by "entrepreneurs taking over large and medium-sized 
companies (and less often large companies taking over small ones)."46 Second, debt is 
considered a better device for disciplining managers because lender-borrower agency 
costs are lower than shareholder-manager ones.47 Thus these new controllers bore some 
risk, and were further disciplined by the monitoring of debt-holders. As we shall see 
below, however, the massive increase in debt also led to widespread cost-cutting in order 
to keep up loan repayments, leading some commentators to argue that this undermined 
the productive coalition model of the firm.48
O'Sullivan argues that since the market for corporate control both "served as a willing 
accomplice to a management fad"49 (the process of conglomeration in the 1960s and
45 Blair, (1993) (supra note 42) at 146 Roe, "Takeover Politics" in Blair, MM (ed), The Deal Decade (1993), 321 at 34447 See for example, Jensen's argument that lenders are more equipped to take an active monitoring role in corporate governance. This opens into a broader agency theoretical argument that free cash flow in excess o f what is required for investment should be paid out to investors: Jensen, MC, "Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers" (1986) 76 American Economic Review 323 at 323-9.48 In particular, Shleifer and Summers, "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers" in Auerbach, AJ ed, Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (1988), 33. They argue at 43 that where a bidder has used a substantial amount of debt to finance the acquisition, this usually means that they will cut wages and lay off employees. This raises profitability, at least in the short term, and so "hostile takeovers designed to eliminate a firm’s free cash flows are taken as paradigmatic cases of efficiency improving transactions.” Their arguments are discussed in detail below.49 O’Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 7) at 173
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1970s), and assisted with the reverse process of deconglomeration during the 1980s,50 it 
is "inappropriate to elevate the market for corporate control to the status o f corporate 
governance solution."51 Unless some kind o f underlying productive change, or a change 
in the economic environment, can be pointed to, the dual role o f the market for corporate 
control undermines its claims to produce efficient structures, particularly if  one sets the 
transaction costs associated with corporate engineering against the temporal duration of 
the structures they created.52 It is also a clear illustration of the flip-side of the market for 
corporate control, that where the bidder is also a widely-held corporation, its management 
may be indulging in the very empire-building that the operation of the market for 
corporate control is supposed to prevent in targets, albeit on the back of a strong stock 
valuation.53
ii) Wealth Transfer
In opposition to this, it is argued that takeovers often simply effect wealth transfers 
between corporate constituencies rather than create social value by improving allocative 
efficiency.54 Coffee argued that hostile takeovers involve the breach of the implicit
i0 Similarly Gilson in Roe, (1993) (supra note 46) at 377 in 124, citing Morck, R, Shleifer, A and Vishny, R, "Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?" 45 J Fin (1990): "the source of bust-up gains in the 1980s is the reversal o f the unrelated diversification o f the 1960s and 1970s. Hostile bust-up takeovers simply undo past conglomeration.” Coffee, JC (1988) (supra note 21) also argues at 443-4 that, contrary to the efficiency interpretation of the market for corporate control, the discounting of corporate assets over the corporation's market price may not necessarily reflect managerial incompetence but rather "the market’s preference for ’negative synergy’--that is, for a general downsizing and streamlining of the conglomerate finn in the belief that diversification makes more sense at the shareholder level than at the firm level." The fear may be raised that this is another market "fad", this time financial as opposed to managerial.51 O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 7) at 17252 It is frequently suggested that those in the financial engineering industries, who benefited greatly in terms of fees, did much to stimulate and sustain the takeover boom. Subramanian, G, "The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions" {Harvard Law School Public Law Research Paper, forthcoming in Journal o f  Corporation Law 200J notes at 7 that "Transaction costs in corporate control transactions, including professional service fees and management opportunity cost, are typically 2-5% of deal value..."53 Advocates of the market for corporate control simply respond to this argument by citing the EMH: managers o f a company with a strong stock price are performing well, and if  they engage in empire- building, the stock price will suffer in consequence; critics refer to the various arguments against the EMH discussed below.w See for example, Mitchell, LE, Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export (2001) at 177-8 who explains control premia as coming at the expense of "creditors who see the value of their debtholdings drop as leveraged acquisitions increase default risks, suppliers who see long-term relationships disrupted, employees who are laid off to cut costs." The source of these premia has not been conclusively demonstrated: O’Connor, M, "Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers" (1990) 69 N.C.L.Rev. 1189 at 1212. Stout, LA, "Stock
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contracts between shareholders and managers, which were "an attempt to foster 
investment by managers in 'firm-specific' human capital. To encourage such investment, 
managers must be promised a form of quasi-tenure, because their ’firm-specific’ capital 
will have limited value to the market."* 55 Opportunistic breach of these contracts using the 
takeover mechanism potentially reduces overall social wealth. However, Coffee limits his 
theory to managerial employees, arguing (in terms familiar from Chapter 3) that "[l]ower 
echelon employees contract through other means and institutions (i.e., collective 
bargaining) and are not as exposed to opportunism because they do not invest in much 
’firm-specific' capital or expect an ex post 'settling up.' The real contracting parties are 
chiefly managers and shareholders."56 However, if we follow advocates of the productive 
coalition o f the firm, such as Margaret Blair, and expand Coffee’s analysis beyond the 
managers to include "non-managerial" employees within the category of those who invest 
in firm-specific capital on the basis of the arguments in Chapter 3, then it seems clear that 
employees may also suffer opportunistic breaches of implicit contract.
In their classic exposition of the expropriation explanation, Shleifer and Summers argue 
that takeovers involving breach of implicit contracts are “rent-seeking and not value- 
creating exercises,” institutional changes which reduce social wealth through the 
destruction of non-redeployable investment.57 Management is normally constrained to
Prices and Social Wealth" (Harvard Law School Center fo r Law and Economics Discussion Paper No 301 (November 2000) suggests that while a small holding may be purchased at market price from fairly "pessimistic" investors, a bidder who wants to acquire a 51% majority must acquire shares from "optimistic" shareholders who will insist on an increasing premium over market prices as the bidder moves up the optimism scale. This interesting idea is not developed further in this thesis.55 Coffee, JC (1988) (supra note 21) at 44756 ibid at 449; in his footnote he adds that " In theory, the ’settling up' process is intended to compensate those employees whose contribution to the firm’s productivity cannot be currently estimated...This category will rarely include lower-echelon employees.”57 Shleifer and Summers, (1988) (supra note 48) at 42. In contrast, Williamson’s comment (at 61 in Auerbach, AJ (ed), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences) on Shleifer and Summers’ paper, emphasises changes in competitive conditions, such as reductions in barriers to entry, as important influences on the exercise of managerial discretion. Gilson, "The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment" in Hopt, K and Wymeersch E ed, European Takeovers: Law and Practice (1992), at 72-3 asks whether any provisions were made in the implicit contract for changes in the company's competitive or technological environment. Romano, ("A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation" in Hopt, K and Wymeersch E (eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (1992), 3 at 19) points out further empirical difficulties with testing their hypothesis: “we would need counter-factual data to test the labor expropriation hypothesis fully -  we need to know how many workers would have been laid off of what the wage profile would have looked like if
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honour their non-binding undertakings, either because they desire to build a reputation 
which will allow them to rely in future on implicit contracts,58 or simply because they 
prefer to stand by their word and fulfil the trust which is placed in them. As the firm 
evolves in terms o f capabilities, so these contracts become more fundamental in terms of 
underpinning productive capacity, and so "the shareholders deliberately choose as 
managers individuals for whom value maximisation is subordinate to satisfaction of 
stakeholder claims, and then surrender to them control over the firm's contracts."59 
According to this view, where the company wants to rely on implicit contracts, 
management must be accorded a degree of entrenchment and independence from 
shareholder control in order that they may make credible commitments to employees and 
others.60 Some commentators even argue that the company’s ability to rely on implicit 
contracts becomes an important asset.61
However, once put in place, this type of institutional arrangement obstructs shareholders’ 
ability to maximise their share o f the corporate income, for example by cutting the above­
market wages of employees, which are the deferred portion o f their remuneration, and 
paying employees just above their opportunity cost.62 Incumbent management, bound by
the firm had not been acquired.” O f course, we cannot test the argument that takeovers enhance efficiency against counter-factual data either.ss Reputational protection of implicit contracts was discussed at length in Chapter 3.59 Shleifer and Summers, (1988) {supra note 48) at 4060 They give the example of allowing management to have control of the proxy machinery, and therefore succession.61 In this regard, Gilson (1992) {supra note 57) at 74 aTgues that the "acquirer has no incentive to alter implicit contracts that remain efficient. If a hostile takeover really would dissipate a valuable corporate asset - namely, trust and reputation - why would an acquirer pay more for the target after the loss of this asset than the target was valued by the market in the hands of previous management? In settings where a hostile takeover would somehow unavoidably destroy important implicit contracts, we would expect to see only friendly transactions.” Gilson’s argument relies on the assumption (discussed below) that markets are able to identify and value implicit contracts despite the obvious informational asymmetries. One wonders whether the market is really able to distinguish between managers who do not bargain hard and managers who make implicit contracts. Where quasi-rents are being shared with employees, this leads to a reduction in "profitability" for shareholders, which should be reflected in a reduced rather than increased share price, unless the market can identify long-term benefits accruing to shareholders from the arrangement. Accordingly, a bidder could take advantage o f the lower price to expropriate the employees’ share o f quasi­rents, undermining efficient arrangements but skewing distribution in his favour..62 Alternatively, where "the employee is costing the company more than he is contributing at the moment...his dismissal is a gain to the shareholders" (Shleifer and Summers, (1988) (supra note 48) at 45, emphasis added). Alternatively, shareholders may want to free up cash flow and prevent overinvestment by management. Interrupting management's plans, or reducing their options, in this way may also involve
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reputation or trust, insist on honouring the implicit contracts which they have made with 
the employees and will not consent to the redistribution o f rents from employees to 
shareholders. This means that changing the institutional framework by "ousting the 
managers is a prerequisite to realizing the gains"63 which may be made by breaching the 
implicit contracts. "Not surprisingly, then, takeovers that transfer wealth from 
stakeholders to shareholders must be hostile."64 They must also come as a surprise to both 
management and employees, since if  they could be anticipated, they would undermine the 
initial feasibility of implicit contracts.
Once a hostile takeover has taken place and management has been replaced by new 
managers who are willing to breach the implicit contracts, the new shareholders are able 
to capture the flow of rents. Leaving aside arguments that this expropriation is morally 
suspect because it arises out of a breach of trust, and that the justice of the resulting 
redistribution is questionable, this kind of rent-seeking is economically inefficient 
because it undermines the implicit contracting process, which has an adverse impact both 
on the firm in question, and on firms in general. As discussed in chapter 3, a company 
which breaches implicit contracts will damage its own reputation, and this may prevent it 
from relying on such contracts in the future. Of greater macro-economic significance are 
the "reputational externalities" which arise when hostile takeovers, or rather, the fear of 
them,65 spreads through the economy. They cause employees as a class to be less willing 
to enter implicit contracts, leading either to the higher transaction costs associated with 
explicit contracting, or to "the need to pay them more now in return for their accepting 
uncertainty about future payments, or simply as forgone profitable trade. Whatever form 
this cost takes, it should ultimately show in the declining value o f corporate equity."66
"reducing the wealth o f stakeholders, who did not count on changes in operations when agreeing to work for the firm." (ibid at 41)63 ibid at 4164 ibid65 The fear of hostile takeover may be greater than the actual risk as employees face uncertainty in identifying the types of firms which are at risk o f hostile takeover. Since the share price appears to be the key determinant, and employees apparently have little or no influence over it, this may increase the fear that their future employment depends entirely on factors outside their control.66 Shleifer and Summers, (1988) (supra note 48) at 46, emphasis in original; the damage caused by breaches o f implicit contracts may also be modelled in terms of a reduction of trust across the economy as a whole. As Shleifer and Summers conclude at 53, this "reorganization of the corporation into more of a spot
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The explanation that takeover premia are, inter alia?1 opportunistically expropriated 
from employees directly contradicts the efficiency hypothesis because where "rent 
transfers form a significant part of the takeover gains, the combined share price change of 
the target and the buyer vastly overstates the efficiency gains from takeovers."67 8 Its effect 
on productive coalitions is particularly marked because of accounting practices, discussed 
in Chapter 3, which insist that supra-competitive wages, which often reflect investments 
in firm-specific capital, should be charged against income rather than capital expenditure. 
Outsiders cannot know the reason for these supra-competitive payments and so consider 
them inefficient uses of resources. This view is factored into the share price, reducing it 
and increasing the risk of hostile takeover.69
Critiques of “Deal Decade” Explanations
Neither of these explanations of the deal decade is uncontested, and the conflict between 
the neoclassical and productive coalition models becomes particularly clear in this 
context. Within the neoclassical perspective, implicit contracts are often treated as a 
merely evidentiary problem, “a contract whose terms are observable to the contracting 
parties, but not to third parties, such as courts and hence are not verifiable.”70 Romano 
suggests that the concept is inappropriate where the contract is potentially explicit, for
market system can be socially very costly. To gauge this cost, however, would require an understanding of how trust facilitates contracting, which at this moment we do not have.” In addition, corporate equity may decline in value over time as management ’’respond to capital market pressures by short-term strategies to bolster share prices, thereby sacrificing beneficial long-term projects and investments": Hopner, M and Jackson, G, "An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance" (2001) Max-Planck-Jnstitut fu r  Gesellschaftsforschung MPIfG Discussion Paper 01/4 at 967 Shleifer and Summers, (1988) (supra) at 53 accept that tax savings also contribute significantly, especially in LBOs. See also Blair, (1993) (supra note 42) at 3. Undervaluations of shares by the market may also be a source, but in that case, the takeover involves redistribution from current shareholders to the buyer.6i Shleifer and Summers, ibid69 It might therefore be suggested that firms with a high degree of firm-specific capital are more likely to be taken over. Where firms which rely on firm-specific capital are faced with a takeover, management should carefully scrutinise the bidder's plans to distinguish asset-stripping bids from those predicated on acquiring firm-specific skills in situ, and advise shareholders accordingly.70 Romano, (1992) (supra note 57) at 17
164
example, regarding employee pension entitlements,71 but accepts that t4the level of 
development of firm specific capital is unlikely to be verifiable, and thus could be the 
basis of an implicit contract that a raider will breach.”72 Difficulties in demonstrating the 
existence of firm-specific investments lead neoclassical theorists to argue that the true 
motivation of management in making implicit promises to employees is that they are 
averse to adversarial bargaining, granting favourable terms to support comfortable 
relations between themselves and the company’s employees, thereby ensuring corporate 
stability and increased leisure for themselves.73 Agency costs like ’’empire-building" of 
course are at the heart of the neoclassical rationale for the market for corporate control.74
The expropriation critique challenges the notion that the performance of management 
may be judged accurately on the basis of share price movements. A "fundamental 
premise underlying the market for corporate control"75 is the "Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis" ("EMH"), which suggests that stock markets are informationally efficient 
and so stock prices represent an estimate, based on all publicly-held information,76 of the
71 In the context of a complete contract, a failure to provide for something is consistent with the risk being left where it falls.72 Romano, (1992) (supra note 57) at 1773 ibid at 18: “managers may be burdened with a reputation for weakness from past practices of capitulation to labor demands in order to make their jobs as managers more comfortable, and this affects their reputation as bargainers”; see also Holmstrom, B, “Comment” in Auerbach, A(ed), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences.74 As Roe, MJ (2003) (supra note 9) points out at 33-5, agency costs and employee preferences "fit well" with each other, in particular as regards risk-taking and job stability, while the preferences of dispersed shareholders are likely to differ significantly.75 Manne, H (1965) (supra note 10) at 11276 This is the "semi-strong" EMH, while the "strong" EMH suggests that prices reflect all publicly or privately-held information. Those with greater information, motivated by profit, drive prices to their correct levels through arbitrage: Manne (ibid at 112 fn 10) suggests that these arbitragers base their decisions on "their sense of what constitutes efficient management”. The effect of this insider action is in no way counteracted by those trading on an absence of reliable information because their trades will tend to be “randomly distributed and the effect will therefore be neutral.” By contrast, Shiller, ("Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets" in Coffee, JC, Lowenstein, L, and Rose-Ackerman, S (eds), Knights, Raiders and Targets (1988), 56) argues that “fashions, fads and bubbles do importantly influence prices of speculative assets” as ordinary investors prevail over "smart money". He argues at 65 that the EMH does not take into account psychological evidence which suggests that “there is sometimes excessive enthusiasm for certain financial assets and thus that other financial assets are sometimes ignored.” Others are less sanguine about the prospects for constant arbitrage: Raj an, RG and Zingales, L (2003) (supra note 22) suggest at 96-9 that, although an asset may be mispriced on the market, traders cannot always drive the price to its correct level by risk-free trading where their position has to be closed out in the future, because they must be wary of the danger that mispricing might increase before they close out.
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*7*7present value of future dividends. Managerial efficiency is reflected in the company’s 
share price as monitors trade on the basis of their assessment of performance. Where a 
firm’s competitiveness is based on the productive coalition model, its share price will 
often not reflect the added value created by firm-specific investment for two reasons. 
First, the precise contribution to productivity can only be ascertained by insiders, and so 
cannot be incorporated into the share price by those trading at arm’s length. Second, rents 
paid to employees will tend to lower, rather than increase, the share price, as any 
reduction in returns to shareholders will be reflected in division of rents with employees.
This assumption is absolutely crucial because the market for corporate control reallocates 
assets solely on the basis of share price.7 8 If share price movements fail to accurately 
reflect fundamentals, this opens the way to fads like conglomeration or the techonology 
bubble. Even agency theorists implicitly admit that stock price is only a second-best 
proxy for measuring managerial performance: “Apart from the stock market, we have no 
objective standard of managerial efficiency.”79 80More critical commentators suggest that 
the EMH faces more serious difficulties. O’Sullivan argues that financial economists rely 
exclusively on indirect evidence which is consistent with EMH, and that the deal decade 
may have witnessed a disjunction between stock valuations and institutional 
arrangements on the one hand, and changes in the productive economy on the other. 
The difficulty for the EMH is that it "cannot, in fact, be empirically tested in isolation 
from assumptions about the way in which economic actors price securities."81 An initial 
drop in the share price of a corporation may reflect managerial failure as dissatisfied 
shareholders sell their shares. It may equally be driven by other considerations, such as a 
change in investment strategy by an institutional investor. However, once an initial 
downwards movement has started, the share price may continue to fall as other 
shareholders sell in response to the downwards movement. George Soros terms this the
77 Any publicly available piece o f information will tend to be exploited by investors in competitive capital markets: see Osterman, P, Securing Prosperity (1999) at 151 -2.78 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 5) at 209: "Finance economists have devoted more effort in recent years to understanding tender offers than to any other subject."79 Manne, H (1965) (supra note 10) at 11380 O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 7) at 171-2; see also Shiller, RJ (supra note 76) at 5681 Lazonick, W and O’Sullivan, M, "Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance" {INSB AD Working Paper 2000, now published as (2000) 29 Economy and Society 13 at 29
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"reflexivity" o f markets.82 Share movements are further amplified by the operation of 
investment funds which track and respond to movements in the market, rather than 
trading on information about the underlying productive characteristics and prospects o f 
the corporation in question. In turn, extreme variations in share price cany markets into 
’’far-from-equilibrium territory"83 and affect the "fundamentals" of corporations, as their 
cost of credit increases and they become vulnerable to takeover, or are able to launch 
their own takeovers. Shiller argues that in any given case, a firm may, as the neoclassical 
view suggests, be a takeover target because of inefficient management. Alternatively, it 
might have been "overlooked by ordinary investors”84, or "the takeover premium may 
reflect an overvaluation by those who acquire the firm.”85
The EMH is under sustained pressure after the dot.com bubble and Enron and related 
scandals. Margaret Blair suggests that
"If one lesson of Enron and other corporate disasters in the last few years is that today’s 
share price cannot be counted on to reflect the true underlying value of the equity o f a 
corporation, then the rise in share prices in the short run after the announcement of a
82 See Soros, G, Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism (2000), Chapter 3. Soros explains at 59-60 that the EMH "treats markets as a passive reflection of the fundamentals, and it treats decisions as if  they could be based on information. I contend that participants in financial markets, instead of basing their decisions on rational expectations, cannot avoid introducing a bias in their decision-making...market participants are obliged to exercise an element o f judgment. The important feature of biased judgments is that they are not purely passive: They affect the course of events that they are supposed to reflect. They are reflexive." So the way in which market participants act should (along with their rational expectations) also be factored into any understanding of share price movements. Also at 60-61: "In buying and selling financial instruments, market participants are not trying to discount fundamentals; they seek to anticipate the future prices of the selfsame financial instruments." At 78 he suggests that this herd-like behaviour of investors may contradict economic theory, an increase in prices actually giving rise to an increase in demand. While Soros' theory is broadly criticised for indeterminacy and failing to predict prices, it does contain echoes of Keynes' famous dictum (from The General Theory o f  Employment, Interest and Money (1936))that professional investment resembles a beauty contest in which investors must pick “not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view.” In other words, we devote our intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.” For a discussion of reflexivity in terms o f feedback loops, see Shiller, RJ, Irrational Exuberance (2000), in particular at 60-8.83 ibid at 64. Of course, corrections (or "inflections") inevitably follow, although one would expect the herd mentality to prevail here too.84 Shiller, RJ (1988) (supra note 76) at 5785 ibid at 65-6. For a comprehensive explanation of the periodic overvaluations of companies by public markets, see Shiller, RJ (supra note 82).
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hostile tender offer cannot necessarily be interpreted as reflecting a true increase in value 
that would result from the takeover."86
The UK System
The hostile takeover, in which management is bypassed in favour of a direct approach to 
shareholders, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although friendly takeovers have been a 
familiar part of the corporate landscape, in the UK at least, since the end of the Second 
World War,87 hostile bids were not considered "respectable" business practices and were 
very rare before the late 1950s.88 Instead bidders relied on the practice of "negotiated 
merger", persuading incumbent management to recommend their bid to the 
shareholders.89 This was uncontroversial, providing little reason for the courts to become 
involved, and, "in the financial press of the time, take-over bids were regarded as, on 
balance, a useful stimulus to efficiency."90
Common Law Regulation of Takeovers
The common law did not have much opportunity to regulate hostile takeovers. By the 
time they emerged as a phenomenon worthy o f regulation, the City Panel had already
86 Blair, MM, "Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters" (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review (forthcoming) at 12. In Paramount v Time (571 A.2d 1140, Delaware Supreme Court (1989)) at 1150 fn, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Hit is not breach o f faith for directors to determine that the present stock market price of shares is not representative of true value or that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation's stock."87 Before the war, the typical merger had been an agreed merger between the boards o f the two companies in the same or similar lines of business: see Johnston, A, The City Take-Over Code (1980) at 8. The aim was either to take advantage o f synergies or to gain greater market share. Shareholders were largely passive: their only role was to ratify the board's decision: see Cranston, "The Rise and Rise o f  the Hostile Takeover" in Hopt, K and Wymeersch, E (eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (1992), 77 at 7888 See generally Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 87) at 10-14: in December 1953, the Bank o f England had warned the British Bankers' Association to be wary of lending where there was a "speculative element". The hostile bid emerged even later in the US. O'Sullivan, MA (2000) (supra note 7) at 162 notes that in the US until the 1970s, such bids remained the province of speculators while banks refused to finance them.89 See Hannah, L, "Takeover Bids in Britain before 1950: An Exercise in Business 'Pre-History*" (1974) 16 Business History 65. The board were often in possession o f information to which the shareholders were not privy.90 Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 87) at 10
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effected its own friendly takeover of the task from the courts.91 This is the reason for the 
stunted development of takeover regulation at common law, which comprises merely the 
"proper purpose" rule and a threadbare set of requirements where the board advises the 
shareholders on the merits of the bid.92 Cases concerning takeovers of publicly-listed 
corporations simply do not come before the courts, and therefore the common law rules 
are of little practical application.93 Nevertheless, the way in which the common law 
regulated management’s exercise of their powers in the takeover context provides both 
context for the emergence of the City Code in its legal context, and more importantly, 
clearly illustrates that the Code truncates managerialism as one interest group captures 
the regulatory process.
It is frequently claimed that the common law adapted an existing mechanism, the 
equitable duty of the fiduciary to use his powers for the purpose for which they were 
conferred, to the new task of controlling the actions of the board in the event of a 
takeover bid, recognising the takeover as an occasion when the interests of directors 
potentially conflict with those of the shareholders.94 According to this understanding o f
91 Although the writ had been issued in 1963, the decision in Hogg v Cramphom (the first case to systematically consider the board’s obligations in the event of a hostile takeover) was not delivered until 18th October 1967. On 20* September 1967, "the Bank of England publicly announced the intention o f the City organizations to set up a Panel which would come into operation when the revision o f the Rules had been completed." (Johnston, A (1980) {supra note 87) at 37) As a result, the rules laid out in Hogg were never widely applied to takeovers o f public corporations. Whether the City Code was a response to the anticipated judgment must remain a matter of conjecture.92 In Re A Company (1986) BCLC 382. Hoffmann J held, at a preliminary hearing for the striking out o f a petition, that while the directors are not necessarily under a common law duty to advise the shareholders on the merits, if they decide to do so, "fairness requires that such advice should be factually accurate and given with a view to enabling shareholders (who, ex hypothesi, are being advised to sell) to sell, i f  they so wish, at the best price.” While the case involved a private company, and therefore was not technically governed by the City Code, the court drew inspiration from it, seeing it as "a helpful guide to the City's views on fairness in similar circumstances." This suggests that the assumptions underlying the City Code might begin to feed back into company law and be felt more widely.93 With the rare exception of appeals to the Privy Council from other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The Howard Smith case (discussed below) demonstrates how the courts would have approached the issue in the absence of the City Code. Where companies are not publicly quoted, takeovers will occur by private sale and a different set of concerns, which are outside the scope of this thesis, arise.94 See, for example, Davies, "Defensive Measures: The Anglo-American Approach" in Hopt, K and Wymeersch E ed, European Takeovers: Law and Practice (1992), 195 at 208 who argues that the proper purpose rule became "an objective rule which, like General Principle 7 (of the City Code], shifts decision­making from the board to the shareholders.” The clear implication of this is that the City Code merely codified the decisions of the courts. More neutrally, Parkinson, J, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory o f  Company Law (1993) at 138 considers the proper purpose rule operates as a
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the pre-City Code legal position, the onset of a takeover bid truncates the board's general 
power to manage the company and places decision-making in the hands of the 
shareholders. The directors will be using their powers for an improper purpose if  they 
remove from the shareholders the power to decide on the outcome of a bid. The cases 
which came before the courts concerned the issue o f shares in the face o f a takeover bid, 
but the principle would theoretically apply equally to other defensive measures taken by 
the board using their fiduciary powers of management, such as crown jewels sales or 
poison debt. The reason such actions constitute a breach of duty is that "the directors' 
power to issue new shares was not one that had been conferred upon them by the articles 
to enable them to take away from the shareholders the power to decide on an offer for 
their shares."95 However, it is suggested that, in contrast to this widespread view, the 
proper purpose rule did not in fact impose an absolute rule on management, instead 
focusing on the purpose for which the power was exercised (rather than its effect).
In Hogg v Cramphom Ltd,96 the board of Cramphom Ltd, a public but unquoted 
company, received an unwelcome takeover bid from Baxter. The board advised the 
shareholders of their opinion that "it would have an unsettling effect on the staff’97 and 
"avowedly formulated" a plan to respond to the "situation created by Mr Baxter's offer."98 
They created a trust for the benefit o f the company's employees to which they allotted a 
number of shares, each of which carried the right to exercise ten votes on a poll vote. The 
trustees were to be nominated by the directors. The additional votes provided by these 
shares ensured that the directors retained control of the company through a combination 
of direct (their own shareholding) and indirect (the nominated trustees) means.
The parties agreed that establishing a trust for the employees was not per se an improper 
use of the board's powers99 and it was also “common ground that the scheme of which
guarantee of constitutionality and argues that its role lies in "upholding the allocation of decision-making power made by the Companies Act and the articles."95 Davies, (1992) (supra) at 208-996 (1967) Ch 254, (1966) 3 All ER 42097 (1966) 3 All ER 420 at 42398 ibid99 It is submitted, correctly, on the basis that this "prudential stakeholder” measure fell within their general power of management and is allowed under the Hutton v West Cork Railway ((1883) 23 Ch 654) principle
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this allotment formed part was formulated to meet the threat, as the directors regarded it, 
of Mr Baxter’s offer. The trust deed would not have come into existence, nor would the 
5,707 shares have been issued as they were, but for Mr Baxter’s bid and the threat that it 
constituted to the established management o f the com panyAccordingly it w as clear on 
the facts that "an essential element of the scheme, and indeed its primary purpose, was to 
ensure control of the company by the directors..."100 and prevent the takeover. It was also 
clear that the directors honestly thought101 that their keeping control was in the 
company’s best interests, in the sense that giving "the staff through the trustees a sizeable, 
though indirect, voice in the affairs of the company would benefit both the staff and the 
company."102 This unusual conjunction of facts has cast considerable obscurity over the 
precise scope of this case.
The board had acted primarily for an improper purpose, namely maintaining their control 
of the company, even if their bona fide ultimate goal had been to look after the company's 
best interest by treating the employees in an enlightened manner. Buckley, J accordingly 
asked whether "Was such a manipulation of the voting position a legitimate act on the 
part of the directors?"103 He referred to a long-standing line of cases which established 
that directors breach their fiduciary duty where they issue shares "merely for the purpose 
of maintaining their control or the control of themselves and their friends over the affairs 
of the company, or merely for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority 
of shareholders."104 Where such an improper motive was apparent from the evidence, the
of "cakes and ale... for the benefit of the company". The shares were funded by an interest-free loan out of the company’s reserves, which although described as “Employees’ Benevolent and Pension Fund” was the "absolute property" of the company. The position would now be covered by s309 Companies Act 1985, which requires the board to "have regard in the performance of their functions [to] the interests o f the company’s employees in general".100 (1967) Ch 254 at 266-7101 In accordance with Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd (1942) Ch 304 which decided management were under a duty act "bona fide in the interests of what they consider - not what a court may consider - is in the interests of the company."102 (1967) Ch 254 at 265103 ibid at 266-7, emphasis added104 Per Peterson, J in Piercy v Mills (1920) 1 Ch 77 at 85. Precedent stretched back as far as the 1864 decision in Fraser v Whalley 2 H & M 10, where (at 29) the evidence showed that the directors had "on the faith of this obsolete power entrusted to them for a different purpose...issued [shares] for the very purpose of controlling the ensuing general meeting." Similarly in Punt v Symons & Co Ltd (1903) 2 Ch 506, the board improperly used its fiduciary power to issue shares "for the express purpose of acquiring an unfair majority for the purpose of altering the rights of parties under the articles." (at 517)
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court would intervene because it would not "permit directors to exercise [fiduciary] 
powers...in such a way as to interfere with the exercise by the majority of its 
constitutional rights."105
In this line o f authority, the court does not look beyond primary purpose. It is suggested 
that where the facts are that the board's primary or sole purpose is not to maintain control 
in the face o f an unwelcome takeover bid, but rather is part of their normal management 
of the affairs of the company, their actions will not be caught by this precedent and will 
not constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty. There would arguably have been no breach 
of duty in Hogg if  the board had acted to benefit "the company" by treating its employees 
well, as long as their primary purpose was not to ensure that they retained control. 
Indeed, Buckley, J confirmed that the fiduciary power to issue shares is not granted to the 
board for the sole purpose o f allowing them to raise capital.106 This makes the ratio of 
Hogg very narrow. Hogg only applies where, as a matter o f fact, the board, aware of a 
bid, uses its fiduciary powers fo r the primary purpose of manipulating the voting position 
and frustrating that bid. Accordingly, the motive or purpose for which the fiduciary 
power is exercised is absolutely crucial to establishing whether there has been a breach of 
duty.107 108
In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd,m  the board, faced with two competing 
bidders, issued shares to their preferred bidder, reducing the previous controlling
105 per Buckley, J at 268106 Based on Punt v Symons & Co Ltd (1903) 2 Ch 506 at 516 ("There may be occasions when the directors may fairly and properly issue shares in the case of a company constituted like the present for other reasons”); also Piercy v S. Mills & Co Ltd  (1920) 1 Ch 77. Lord Wilberforce confirmed this in Howard Smith at 835-8 (discussed below).107 In each of the cases in this line of authority, the evidence before the court was unequivocal that the shares were issued for the "very” purpose {Fraser at 29), the "express” purpose {Punt at 517) or "solely" for the purpose {Piercy at 83). This narrow interpretation is confirmed by Megarry, J in Gaiman and others v National Association fo r  Mental Health (1970) 2 All ER 362 at 374 who stated that the "issue of shares with the object...of affecting the balance o f voting power, is thus an exercise o f powers made with a purpose that is ulterior". Once it was clear that "it was an exercise o f a fiduciary power with an improper motive... it was immaterial that the directors believed in good faith that the issue was in the interests of the company.” See also the emphasis placed on the board's motive in Bamford v Bamford (1969) 1 All ER 969 and Lee Panavision Ltd v Lee Lighting Ltd  (1992) BCLC 22108 (1974) AC 821, PC, (1974) 1 AH ER 1126, a case on appeal to the Privy Council from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
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shareholding to a minority interest and allowing an effective takeover offer to be made by 
their preferred bidder. This was held to be an improper use of their fiduciary powers.
As in Hogg, the propriety of the board’s exercise of their powers was determined by a 
factual inquiry into their motivation. The facts are therefore very important. At first 
instance the board had argued that their primary purpose was to raise capital which was 
necessary to keep the company going. This was rejected on the evidence put before him 
by Street CJ, who found that, although the directors had not acted "to gain some personal 
advantage for themselves by way of retention of their seats on the board or by obtaining a 
higher price for their personal shareholding"109, their actions had concerned the "majority 
bloc in the share register. Their intention was to destroy its character as a majority...The 
ultimate purpose was to procure the continuation by Howard Smith’s of the takeover offer 
made by that company."110 The board's motivation had gone beyond "considerations of 
management, within the proper sphere of the directors."111 This finding of fact was 
absolutely crucial to the outcome of the case.
On appeal to the Privy Council, the board sought to argue that Street CJ "should have 
considered whether the purpose of the majority directors in deciding to make the 
allotment to Howard Smith might not have been, at least in part, to secure the company’s 
future as a going concern and to prevent its possible dismemberment."112 However, the 
Privy Council rejected this submission on the basis that this argument had neither been 
advanced at first instance nor was it supported by evidence given at the trial. Howard 
Smith therefore has no bearing on the question of whether the board is entitled to issue 
shares to protect the company "as a going concern" from a predator who intends to break 
it up. The propriety of such action would be wholly dependent on the factual question of 
whether the board's primary purpose was to interfere with the shareholder's rights of 
voting, or to act in the "best interests o f what they... consider to be the interests of the 
company as a whole."
109 (1974) AC 821 at 831110 ibid at 833111 ibid at 837112 ibid at 832
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Lord Wilberforce referred to the need for a "wider investigation"113 into "the state of 
mind those who acted, and the motive on which they acted... collecting from the 
surrounding circumstances all the materials which genuinely throw light upon that 
question of the state of mind of the directors so as to show whether they were honestly 
acting in discharge of their powers in the interests of the company or were acting from 
some bye-motive, possibly of personal advantage, or for any other reason."114 This can 
only be avoided where there is "common ground between the parties". Lord Wilberforce 
suggested that it is impossible "define in advance exact limits beyond which directors 
must not pass".115 This reflects the law's general managerialist orientation and abstention 
from interference in matters of business judgement.
The ratio of the case is that "it must be unconstitutional for directors to use their fiduciary 
powers over the shares in the company purely for the purpose of destroying an existing 
majority or creating a new majority which did not previously exist. To do so is to 
interfere with that element of the company's constitution which is separate from and set 
against their powers."116 The use of the word "purely" is absolutely crucial. Where the 
board exercises their powers of management primarily for a proper purpose (which, Lord 
Wilberforce emphasised, cannot be defined in the abstract), they do not breach their 
fiduciary duty if  they incidentally affect the shareholders1 voting rights.117 Their duty is
113 ibid at 834114 Lord Wilberforce approved this dictum of Viscount Finlay in H indlev John Cotton Ltd ((1919) 56 Sc. L. R. 625 at 630-1lls ibid at 835; here the court recognises that presentation of the directors’ contracts with the company is impossible because of bounded rationality.116 Ibid at 837; emphasis added117 The notion that the directors’ duties and powers o f managing the company may continue even in the face of a takeover bid is confirmed by Damon International pic  v Coats Patons pic (1988) 4 BCC 305 (Court of Session (Outer House)). In this case, the pursuers sought to recover the wasted costs of their abortive takeover bid. Lord Cullen emphasised that "The interests of the company and o f the shareholders as prospective sellers might well diverge." He did "not accept as a general proposition that a company can have no interest in the change o f identity of its shareholders upon a take-over. It appears to me that there will be cases in which its agents, the directors, will see the take-over o f its shares by a particular bidder as beneficial to the company. For example, it may provide the opportunity for integrating or obtaining additional resources. In other cases the directors will see a particular bid as not in the best interests of the company..." He concluded that "The directors are not normally the agents o f the current shareholders...This must not be confused with their duty to consider the interests of the shareholders in the discharge of their duty to the company.. .Directors have but one master, the company." One might therefore conclude that at common law, and subject to factual evidence, the board is free to issue shares to a potential
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only broken if they act solely or primarily for the purpose of affecting the shareholders' 
voting rights.118
Both Hogg and Howard Smith are authority for the proposition that the question of 
purpose must be established before the question of the effect of the decision on the 
shareholders' rights is addressed. Since many actions taken in the ordinary course of 
management may have an effect on shareholder rights, their effect only becomes relevant 
where the board's primary purpose was the improper one of interfering with their rights. 
If the board’s action was primarily referable to their general task of managing the 
company, any effect on shareholder rights is irrelevant. In neither case was it in any 
doubt on the evidence that the board's motivation had been improper. But in every case 
the question of propriety will be a matter of fact and of evidence. The fact that a takeover 
bid is either imminent or known to the board is not decisive of the legality of the action in 
question; it is merely part of the evidentiary matrix to be weighed alongside other issues 
in finding the facts.
Therefore, the common law rules emphatically do not deprive the board of its powers of 
management in the event of a takeover. These cases impose an evidentiary burden on the 
claimant to show that the primary purpose for which the directors used their powers was 
an improper one, for example because they were directly motivated by maintaining their 
positions. This is clearly not an unbearable evidential burden, but it is a burden 
nonetheless. In a given case, it may be easily discharged. Where an aggrieved shareholder 
is able either to produce evidence that the board had acted primarily to prevent the 
takeover and maintain control, or to persuade the court that what the board knew of the 
offeror's plans made preventing the takeover their most likely primary purpose, the action
bidder if  they consider that that bidder’s plans for the company are in the interests of the company as a whole.118 The leading Australian case of Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150, HCA, provides some indication of the route the common law might have taken in dealing with multiple motivations on the part of the board. Dixon J refered to ’’the substantial object, the accomplishment of which formed the real ground o f the board’s action...if, except for some ulterior and illegitimate object, the power would not have been exercised, that which has been attempted as an ostensible exercise o f  the power will be void, notwithstanding that the directors may incidentally bring about a result which is within the purpose o f the power and which they consider desirable." This is generally interpreted as requiring an impermissible purpose to be "causative" of the exercise of the power in order for it to be voidable.
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would be likely to be held in breach of duty. More generally, the absence of similar 
initiatives in the past to act "in the best interests of the company as a whole" by, for 
example, benefiting the employees, would open up a strong argument that preventing the 
takeover was the real reason behind the initiative. Similarly, in situations where the board 
knows about a bid, the conflict of interest to which they were exposed would also weigh 
heavily in the evidential balance. It might even lead the court to develop a rebuttable 
presumption that, once the board has notice o f a bid then they should prove that any 
exercise of their powers was for a primary legitimate purpose. Once the claimant has 
established a prima facie case, it would be for the board to produce contrary evidence. 
For example, if  the board were able to produce evidence that they had discussed, but not 
carried out, the establishment of a trust for the employees before the bid was imminent 
then the claimant's burden would become rather more difficult to discharge.
Understood in this way, the way in which the common law regulated managerial conduct 
during takeover bids is unsurprising. It is entirely consistent with its general policy o f 
defending managerial decision-making autonomy against the demands of shareholders.119 
The business judgement rule is the law's recognition that the courts should not, as a 
general rule, interfere with the way in which the board exercises its discretion to run the 
business. That discretion is limited only by general fiduciary principles, which do not 
apply any differently simply because a takeover bid has been made. Defences against 
takeovers are therefore permitted at common law as long as they can be justified as 
forming part o f the bona fide exercise of the board’s general powers of management.120 
This reading o f the operation of the proper purpose rule suggests that it would have 
operated in a manner broadly similar to the modified business judgement rule applied to 
takeovers in Delaware.
In terms of models of the company, the hands-off approach to managerialism taken by 
the courts conforms with a productive coalition model, with management as mediating
119 Originating with Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co L td  v Cunninghame (1906) 2 Ch 34, CA.120 Compare this conclusion with that o f Parkinson, J (1993) {supra note 94) at 138-9 that "a plea by the directors that they have acted only in accordance with what they considered to be the company's interests will necessarily be misconceived."
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hierarchs. The courts refused to equate the "interests of the company" in the takeover 
context with the immediate interests o f the current shareholders in selling their shares at a 
premium. The board may consider the interests of future shareholders in the continuation 
of the company's business and the interests of the employees, at least as long as this may 
potentially result in some benefit to the company in the long run, a test which seems 
easily satisfied.121 Whether s309 of the Companies Act 1985 would allow the board to 
consider the interests of the employees regardless o f any benefit to the company is not 
clear.122 While the question may appear to be a moot point in most cases, given the 
breadth of the concept of benefit to the company, the answer maybe crucial in a situation 
where the business continues to generate quasi-rents for the employees in the form of 
above-market wages, while profits for shareholders are non-existent.
However, this remains mere conjecture. The advent of self-regulation by the City denied 
the courts appropriate litigation in which to refine their approach. Nevertheless, there is 
no doubt that the proper purpose rule is not especially encouraging of takeover activity. 
While it is likely that in most cases, a motivational nexus could be easily established, any 
challenge to the board's exercise of their fiduciary powers involves an element of 
evidentiary risk which renders the outcome unpredictable. More importantly from the 
perspective of the market for corporate control, this rule makes the obligations of the 
board in the event of a takeover bid less than clear, and the consequent delay pending 
review by the courts risks having a general dampening effect on takeover activity and 
discouraging monitors.
121 It seems that the courts will only interfere where there cannot conceivably be a future benefit to the shareholders; in Hutton itself, the company was about to be wound up.122 Villiers, "Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985: Is it time for a reappraisal?" in Collins, H, Davies, P, and Rideout, R (eds), Legal Regulation o f the Employment Relation (2000), 593
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T h e  E m e rg e n c e  o f  S e lf-R e g u la tio n  a n d  th e  C ity  C o d e
i) Historical Background
The first attempt at self-regulation of the takeover process, the ’’Notes on 
Amalgamations of British Businesses", produced by the Issuing Houses Association in 
1957 at the request of the Bank o f England, had a profound influence on all subsequent 
attempts at self-regulation.123 24 125The Notes set out principles and procedures to deal with the 
then normal practice of "agreed merger" between two boards. They aimed to prevent 
interference with the free market in shares and securities of companies; guarantee 
shareholders free choice in the disposition of their shares; and oblige the board to provide 
shareholders with sufficient information to enable them to make that choice. The Notes 
encouraged bidders to approach the shareholders through the board of the offeree 
company, which was then under an obligation to notify the shareholders within a 
reasonable time. Since the aim was to protect the interests of all shareholders, offers were 
supposed to be made for the entire share capital of the company, with partial bids being 
considered exceptional and to be achieved by making a pro rata offer to all shareholders. 
The Notes were supplemented by a Board of Trade initiative, the "Licensed Dealers 
(Conduct o f Business) Rules" which defined a takeover as an offer to acquire securities 
with the aim of acquiring "control", in the sense of the right to exercise majority voting 
power. This concept remains key in the modem regime o f self-regulation. The Rules also 
prohibited the board from disposing of the whole or substantially the whole of the 
corporation’s assets without shareholder approval.
123 Sir John Donaldson MR (in R  v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex parte Datqfin Pic (1987) 1 QB 815 at 826), described self-regulation as "a system where a group o f people, acting in concert, use their collective power to force themselves and others to comply with a code of conduct of their own devising. This is not necessarily morally wrong or contrary to the public interest, unlawful or even undesirable."124 This section is drawn from Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 87), Ch 3125 Hannah, L (1974) (supra note 89) at 71-2 notes that the bidder was dependent upon support from the board both because they had access to information which was not publicly available (so alone could gauge the adequacy of a bid) and because of "the absence of power to enforce the purchase of minority holdings when it had succeeded in purchasing more than 50 per cent of the shares. They were more likely to achieve something approaching total ownership (which might be desirable for reasons of management and finance) if they had the directors' support." Accordingly, the directors were often offered a large cash payment or a place on the new board. Similarly, the shareholders tended generally to be loyal to the board because they also relied on them for advice.
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This early self-regulatory system appears to have been reasonably effective in protecting 
the interests of shareholders, but proved inadequate to deal with the emergence of the 
hostile takeover. During the post-war period, takeovers had become increasingly 
common, perhaps because many listed companies were undervalued compared with their 
cash and asset holdings. As the 1960s wore on, and suitable targets became rarer (or 
the number of bidders increased), the profile of the typical takeover changed. It became 
common for two or more bidders to be competing for control of the target. More hostile 
bids were made, perhaps motivated by a desire to bypass increasingly obstructive 
corporate boards. The emergence of a class of "corporate raiders", many of whom were 
"outsiders" who did not feel bound by the convention of approaching the incumbent 
board and began to approach the shareholders directly, has been described as "perhaps 
the most important factor" in the emergence of the hostile bid.126 27
Hostile bids raised new concerns. First, competing bidders often bought up large 
quantities of shares on the open market before a bid was announced, causing those 
shareholders who sold at the market price in ignorance that a bid was planned to lose out 
on the premium which was later offered. Second, some takeover bids only benefitted 
those shareholders who acted quickly (considered "coercive" bids), or who held large 
blocks of shares, leaving the others contemplating a reduced offer price and perhaps 
consequently a future as a minority.128 Third, the share-for-share offer raised concerns 
that shareholders may not be receiving adequate consideration for their shares.129 It could 
also be used to coerce the shareholders: cash would be offered to early acceptors of the 
tender offer, shares to those who hesitated. Finally, hostile bids put management in a 
position of conflict of interests where they feared a change of control would cost them
126 Cranston, (1992) (supra note 87) at 79; he also refers to improvements in accounting standards. Hannah, L (1974) (supra note 89) at 75 refers to the role of the Companies Act 1948 in improving the public disclosure of information and making undervalued companies easier to identify.127 Cranston, (1992) (supra note 87) at 82128 Until the middle o f the 1960s, public takeover bids generally took the form of a cash offer to shareholders. The bidder’s ability to raise cash obviously imposed limits on the scope of the bid.129 The share-for-share offer meant that the takeover mechanism was no longer limited to those corporations which had spare cash. Its emergence gave a further push to the movement towards corporate
ii) The Emergence o f  Hostile Takeovers
179
their jobs. Where two or more bidders were competing for control, this gave the board the 
opportunity to favour the one they preferred (which tended to be the one that did not 
threaten their position).* 130
Hi) The City Code
In order to maintain its reputation among investors, and given the delays inherent in the 
courts' investigative approach, the City responded to the unprecedentedly intense period 
of merger and acquisition activity between 1961 and 1968 by instituting a more 
comprehensive scheme of self-regulation. In 1967, the Chairman of the Stock Exchange 
and the Bank of England agreed that a "Panel", consisting of representatives of various 
City institutions,131 would be established to oversee the operation of a new "Code".132 
The Code itself was published on 27th March 1968 and was essentially an extension of its 
predecessors, based around seven general principles and thirty five rules. It responded to 
the concerns which had accompanied the emergence o f hostile takeovers. In particular, 
the board's actions were to be limited: any action which could frustrate an offer required 
advance approval from the general meeting. Various revisions followed, including the 
introduction of a mandatory bid requirement in 1972, to protect minority shareholders 
where control was acquired (the Panel considered a purchase of 30 per cent of shares to 
constitute a change of control whatever the distribution o f the remaining shares). In 1974, 
the Code was amended to require the bidder to disclose his intentions as regards the 
continuance o f the business and future employment within the company. This anomalous 
provision is discussed below.
The Code has the status of "soft law",133 and sanctions for breach are imposed not by the 
courts but by "self-policing"134 within the financial services industry.135 The imposition
conglomerations discussed above. Tax incentives deriving from the 1965 introduction of Capital Gains Tax and Corporation Tax also favoured the use of paper in acquisitions.130 See Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 87), Ch2m  ibid at 37132 To date, the Takeover Panel remains a non-statutory body which wields "immense power de facto". For further discussion see the judgment of Sir John Donaldson, MR, in Datafin (below note 123) at 825-6.133 Deakin, S, Hobbs, R, Nash, D, and Slinger, G, "Implicit Contracts, Takeovers, and Corporate Governance: In the Shadow of the City Code" (2002) ESRC Working Paper No 254 at 6
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of sanctions has been recently formalised by the involvement o f the Financial Services 
Authority (a statutory body) which has endorsed the City Takeover Code as an 
instrument of self-regulation.134 536 By virtue of this endorsement, the FSA is entitled to 
punish violators of the Code by withdrawal of their authority to cany on investment 
business. In the absence of FSA involvement, and if  the Panel does not report a violation 
to another body, the Panel may privately reprimand the wrongdoer or publicly censure 
them.137 138
Its supporters claim that self-regulation offers flexibility of application and interpretation, 
that its rules may be changed inexpensively and relatively frequently, and that those who 
administer the Code are intimately familiar with City practice. Government 
intervention in the regulatory process is considered unlikely while the system continues 
to produce these benefits.139 Johnston argues that the Panel's actions are essentially 
apolitical, and the City Code simply operates within the scope permitted to it by 
Parliament, which retains control over the public policy issue o f whether takeovers are 
desirable.140 The City Panel "imposes restrictions in what it conceives to be the public 
interest",141 defining this in terms of public confidence in the operation of capital 
markets. While intellectual support for this definition of the public interest could be 
found in the claims of the agency model that maximising returns to shareholders 
maximises the wealth of society, this argument is not made explicitly by the Panel.
134 Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 98) at 5135 In the first version of the Code and its predecessors, the only sanction for breach was public censure. The second version of the Code, produced in 1969, envisaged stronger sanctions, which related to depriving a wrongdoer of his access to the Stock Exchange, as well as sanctions front other City institutions where appropriate. Now the Stock Exchange's "Yellow Book" includes compliance with the Code among the "continuing obligations" of a listed company.136 Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s i43, which means that “the FSA may, at the request of the Panel, take enforcement action against a person authorised under the FSMA who contravenes the Code or a Panel ruling. Such action can include public censure, fines, the removal of authorisation, the imposition of injunctions and orders for restitution. In addition, the FSA may, again at the request o f  the Panel, take enforcement action against an individual who is an "approved person" (eg a director of an authorised firm).” (Takeover Code Introduction para 1(c))137 Takeover Code Introduction paras 3(dXl) and (2)138 Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 87) at 4139 These benefits have also inspired the spirited opposition against the proposed EC takeover directive, which was perceived as being excessively legalistic (see further, Chapter 6).140 Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 87) at 8141 ibid at 7.
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Instead, their actions are explained as neutral and technocratic, impartial "experts" taking 
into account all relevant interests with a view to "securing higher ethical standards than 
can be secured by legal regulation".142 The Panel's advocates argued in Datafin that "no 
one can survive in the market without the confidence of others, and that [self-regulatory] 
rules ultimately serve the public interest."143 This market-integrity conception of the 
public interest appears to have been accepted by the Court of Appeal, which stated that it 
was "content to assume for the purposes of this appeal that self-regulation is preferable in 
the public interest"144 and that the Panel's "raisin d'etre [sic] is to do equity between one 
shareholder and another/'145 Accordingly, only limited judicial review lies against 
determinations by the Panel.146
The Current Version of the City Code
i) Aim and Scope
The introduction to the Code states that its aim is "principally to ensure fair and equal 
treatment o f all shareholders in relation to takeovers...."147
The Code applies to all "listed and unlisted public companies (and, where appropriate, 
statutory and chartered companies) considered by the Panel to be resident in the United
142 ibid at 5.145 Datafin (supra note 123) at 820144 ibid at 827. The substance o f  the Panel's conception o f the public interest, and the issue of whether the Code has an impact on non-shareholder constituencies, were not considered: "The principal issue in this appeal, and only issue which may matter in the longer term, is whether this remarkable body is above the law. Its respectability is beyond question. So is its bona fides. I do not doubt for one moment that it is intended to, and does, operate in the public interest and that the enormously wide discretion which it arrogates to itself is necessary i f  it is to function efficiently and effectively." (Datafin at 827 per Sir John Donaldson, MR).145 ibid at 838146 In its Datafin decision at 842, the Court o f Appeal undertook only to review the Panel's decisions ex post on a declaratory basis against the requirements of natural justice.147 Introduction to the City Code, para 1(a). General principle 1 states that "All shareholders of the same class of an offeree company must be treated similarly by an offeror." This principle is fleshed out in Rules 6, 14 and 16. Rules 6.1 and 6.2 require that all shareholders of the same class be offered the highest price paid for shares in the company during the three months before the bid is announced or during the currency of the bid.
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Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle o f Man.”4 *148 It applies to "takeover and merger 
transactions, however effected, of all relevant companies; these include partial offers, 
offers by a parent company for shares in its subsidiary and certain other transactions 
where control of a company... is to be obtained or consolidated.”149 "Control" is defined 
as "a holding, or aggregate holdings, o f shares carrying 30% or more o f the voting 
rights... of a company, irrespective o f whether the holding or holdings gives de facto 
control.” 150
ii) Minority Protection
"Control" is also a central concept in the Code's scheme o f minority protection, which 
underpins the operation of a market for corporate control. Rule 9.1 requires a mandatory 
bid for the whole share capital of the company where a person (including any persons 
acting "in concert" (co-operating) with him) crosses this threshold. The bid must be for 
the entire share capital, and offers for different classes of shares must be "comparable" 
(not necessarily identical). Rule 9.5 requires that the offer "be in cash or be accompanied 
by a cash alternative at not less than the highest price paid by the offeror or any person 
acting in concert with it for shares o f that class during the offer period and within 12 
months prior to its commencement." This rule underpins portfolio diversification by 
guaranteeing minority shareholders the right to share in the premium paid to majority 
shareholders, and the right to exit with that premium in cash. In its absence, they would 
be likely to remain minorities, as many bidders would only purchase sufficient shares to 
ensure control, leaving the minority vulnerable to oppression (or the cost of bringing 
proceedings to prevent this). The counterpart to this scheme of minority protection is 
found in sections 429 and 430 of the Companies Act 1985, which allow a bidder who has
l4S Code introduction para 4(a); the Panel "will normally consider a company to be resident only if  it isincorporated in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man and has its place of centralmanagement in one o f those jurisdictions.”149 Code introduction para 4(b); Rule 36 states that partial offers will normally be consented to where theydo not result in the offeror holding more than 30% of the voting rights in the company.150 See Definitions Section of the Code.
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acquired 90% of the share capital o f a company following a tender offer to issue a notice 
and compulsorily acquire the remainder at the offer price.151
iii) The Role o f the Board under the Code 
a) As information and advice providers
The board has a duty to provide sufficient information to the shareholders to enable them 
to make an informed decision.152 The principle o f equality also applies here.153 The board 
should communicate the bidder's statement of "intentions with regard to the continued 
employment of the employees of the offeree company and of its subsidiaries",154 and also 
"circulate its views on the offer, including any alternative offers".155 Given their potential 
conflict of interest, the board's advice should be accompanied by "the advice given to it 
by the independent advisers".156 In any event, the advice proffered by the board should 
consider "the shareholders' interests taken as a whole, together with those of employees 
and creditors."157 While this provision appears to recognise that the interests of 
employees may be affected by takeovers, employees are wholly excluded from the 
takeover process by the Code and must rely on the shareholders taking their interests into 
account when deciding whether or not to sell their shares at a premium over the market 
price.
Rule 25.2 requires that the "board of the offeree company should, insofar as relevant, 
comment upon the statements in the offer document regarding the offeror's intentions in
151 Under s430A, a remaining minority shareholder can also require to be bought out. See the discussion above about the role of the "squeeze-out" rule in the operation of the market for corporate control.152 General Principle 4. This duty, which is fleshed out in role 23 o f the Code, also applies to the board of the offeror company. All announcements or advertisements made in connection with the takeover process, whether made by offeror or offeree, must fulfil the highest standards o f accuracy (rale 19.1) and contain an explicit statement that the directors accept responsibility (role 19.2). It is not clear that this imposes a higher standard than the duty of care in negligence, but the acceptance o f responsibility should certainly be sufficient for tortious liability under Medley Byrne & C o v  Heller & Partners Ltd (1964) AC 465.153 Rule 20.1 of the Code states that information "must be made equally available to all shareholders as nearly as possible at the same time and in the same manner."Ii4 Under Rule 24.1.155 Rule 25.1(a)156 Ibid; Rule 3.1 states that "The board o f the offeree company must obtain competent independent advice on any offer and the substance of such advice must be made known to its shareholders."
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respect of the offeree company and its employees made pursuant to Rule 24.1."157 58 It is 
not clear what "relevant" means in this Rule. General Principle 9 suggests that comment 
should be made as part of the board's advice, but rule 25.2 limits this to circumstances in 
which the comment is relevant. This presumably means "relevant" to the shareholders' 
decision, and will therefore only apply where the offer consists wholly or partly of shares, 
and the shareholders will accordingly have a continuing interest in the company which 
might be adversely affected by the new incumbents' industrial relations strategy.
The board's obligation to act in an impartial manner159 does not prevent it from 
commenting adversely on the bid and making the case for the company's continued 
independence. In particular where there is a share-for-share offer, the board's analysis 
may go beyond comparing the offer price with anticipated dividend yield; the bidder's 
plans for the company may be scrutinised to see whether alleged synergies are likely to 
be achieved, as well as the bidder's past record of success in integrating acquisitions. The 
shares which are being offered could also be scrutinised by accountants to ensure whether 
they provide good value in terms of share price performance compared with the shares of 
the target or the market as a whole. Finally, where the bidder admits to planning large- 
scale lay-offs, and the employees have invested heavily in firm-specific capital, the 
incumbent board may use the destruction of this source of rents as an argument in favour 
of continued independence.160
b) Not to take defensive measures 
General Principle 7 states that:
"At no time after a bona fide offer has been communicated to the board of the offeree 
company, or after the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide
157 General Principle 9158 Emphasis added.159 General Principle 9: "Directors of an offeror and the offeree company must always, in advising their shareholders, act only in their capacity as directors and not have regard to their personal or family shareholdings or to their personal relationships with the companies."160 However, as we shall see below, such admissions in offer documents are rare.
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offer might be imminent, may any action be taken by the board of the offeree company in 
relation to the affairs of the company, without the approval of the shareholders in general 
meeting, which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the 
shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits."
This Principle is elaborated in rule 21.1:
"During the course of an offer, or even before the date o f the offer if the board of the 
offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the 
board must not, except in pursuance of a contract entered into earlier, without the 
approval of the shareholders in general meeting:
(a) issue any authorised but unissued shares;
(b) issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares;
(c) create or issue, or permit the creation or issue of, any securities carrying rights of 
conversion into or subscription for shares;
(d) sell, dispose of or acquire, or agree to sell, dispose o f or acquire, assets of a material 
amount; or
(e) enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course o f business."161 162
This broad prohibition of defensive measures on the part of the board rules out many of 
the measures adopted in a takeover situation by their US counterparts, including "crown 
jewel sales", "poison pills", sales of unissued shares to a "white squire" etc. The 
prohibition may even kick in before the board are informed, if they have "reason to 
believe" that an offer is imminent. Only narrow exceptions to these rules are permitted.163
161 Rule 21.1 also requires that the notice o f the meeting at which approval of the shareholders is sought should include information about the offer or anticipated offer. Thus a shareholder meeting is unlikely to be called about an offer which is merely "anticipated". In any event this rule may raise issues of confidentiality and insider dealing if  the offer is merely anticipated.162 US defensive measures are discussed below. While the board might attempt to put a poison pill in place before a bid is imminent, their ability to do so is likely to be limited by broad company law requirements of shareholder consent and their fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the company: see Armour, J, Deakin, S, and Konzelmann, S, "Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance" (2003) ESRC Centrefor Business Research, University o f  Cambridge, Working Paper No. 266 at 4.163 Where management had, before the bid came to their attention, discussed the allocation of shares to a third party, but taken no formal action, Rule 21.1 obliges the board to obtain the Panel's consent to proceed.
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The effect of this rule is considerably wider than the rule in Hogg, because the 
prohibitions it contains are absolute (in the absence of shareholder approval), rather than 
dependent upon the purpose for which management acts. It has the effect of making the 
board's power to take significant managerial decisions conditional upon advance 
shareholder approval when a bid is imminent. This is a significant deviation from the 
normal position where the law protects the board's power to manage, and constitutes an 
essential underpinning for the market for corporate control. The closer a corporation is to 
takeover, the more the powers of management are withdrawn from the board and made 
subject to shareholder approval.
The Evolution of the Provisions of the Code Relating to Employees 
From the Code's narrow aim of ensuring fairness to shareholders, one would not expect to 
see many mentions of the interests of employees in the Code; the introduction to the 
Code suggests that the protection of employees in the takeover situation is a matter of 
public policy for Parliament, or presumably for different self-regulatory mechanisms 
such as collective bargaining.
However, since 1974 the offeror has been obliged to disclose their intentions for the 
offeree company. The Panel stated in its Annual Report of 1972/73 that:
"The Panel is concerned that this provision...is not adequately observed by some 
offerors. Not only is it essential that offerors fulfil their obligations in this respect, but it 
is the duty of directors of offeree companies, in the case of agreed take-overs or mergers, 
to insist that they do so."164
Since the Panel's remit was limited to procedural matters, changes were made to the 
Stock Exchange Rules to require a bidder to include a statement in his offer document 
about his policy for "the continuance of the business of the offeree company", including
This would cover a situation similar to the one in Hogg where the board had planned to create a trust of shares for the benefit of the employees.164 Cited in Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 87)at 231
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"for the continued employment of the existing employees o f the offeree company, setting 
out the extent of any steps to be taken towards ceasing such employment."165 In 1974, 
these requirements were added to Rule 15, which had previously been limited to a more 
general statement of the offeror's intentions. In 1976, a requirement was added that the 
board of the offeree company should comment on these statements of intentions as part o f 
an attempt to "secure more precise statements about future intentions".166 Rule 24.1(d) of 
the current Code, which evolved out o f what the former Rule 15, requires the offeror to 
disclose "its intentions with regard to the continued employment of the employees of the 
offeree company and of its subsidiaries".
This rule was introduced during the 1970s when demands for industrial democracy were 
being made across the whole of Europe. The provisions requiring disclosure of the 
bidder's intentions as regards employment might be seen as a CSR measure, driven by the 
growing influence of the political stakeholder model, in particular in its voluntaristic 
form. However, the general aims of the Code suggest that the rule's rationale lies instead 
in facilitating informed decision-making by shareholders. As the Panel suggested in 
1972/3:
"Hie intentions of the offeror as to the future conduct of the offeree's business, and the 
likely effect o f any such intentions on the future livelihood of the offeree company's 
employees, may be a significant factor for shareholders in deciding whether or not to 
accept an offer."167
The bidder's statement should not affect the shareholders' decision where the bid is all­
cash, as their interest in the company will cease at the moment of sale. By contrast, where 
at least part o f the bid is on a share-for-share basis, the employer’s intentions towards the 
employees may be relevant for various reasons to the offeree shareholders, who will 
simply transfer their interests to the combined corporation. Widespread layoffs may lead 
to an industrial relations disaster with consequences for stock price. The offeror's ability
,6S ibid at 84166 ibid at 231-2
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to realise synergy gains will also be crucial to the prospects of the corporation after the 
takeover. If the offeror has good ideas for the employees (whether in cost-cutting terms 
or in terms of improving productivity) this is likely to influence the shareholders in 
favour of the offeror. By contrast, if the offeror is unable to demonstrate clear plans, this 
may be one aspect of the bid which incumbent management might challenge without 
falling foul of the prohibition on defensive measures: it gives them a ground on which to 
advise the shareholders not to accept.
While the provision offers advantages in theory, in practice the requirement is "easily 
satisfied by a boiler-plate formula",167 68 frequently amounting to no more than "window 
dressing"169 and not fulfilling its shareholder information purpose. Coupled with the 
Code’s insistence that the public policy aspects of mergers are for government, it is 
difficult to see why these toothless provisions should continue to be included in the Code. 
It might be suggested that the provision is simply an attempt to head off government 
public-policy intervention on the grounds that steps are already taken by the Code. 
Indeed, the Panel claims that this provision has a non-instrumental employee protection 
rationale after all, stating in its 1997-8 Annual Report that:
“It has always been a Code principle that the interests of employees should be considered 
in addition to those of shareholders.”170
167 Annual Report 1972/3, cited in Johnston, A (1980) (supra note 87) at 231168 Deakin, S, Hobbs, R, Nash, D, and Slinger, G (2002) (supra note 133) at 8. They suggest that "In practice... the bidder simply undertakes to observe the employees’ pre-existing legal rights, something which is little more than a statement of the obvious in this particular context." Slinger, G and Deakin, S, "Company Law as an Instrument of Inclusion: Re-Regulating Stakeholder Relations in the Context of Takeovers” (1999) ESRC Centre fo r  Business Research, University o f Cambridge Working Paper No 145 point out at 15-16 that "It says nothing about the protection of implicit but legally unprotected formulations.”169 Button, M (ed), A Practitioner's Guide to The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 2002/2003 (2002) at 192: "This last requirement is quite often met, particularly in contested bids, with the rather anodyne statement that the employment and other rights of employees will be "safeguarded.”"170 “The Takeover Panel 1997 - 1998 Report on the year ended 31 March 1998”, available at http: //www, thetakeoverpan el .ore, uk. Compare the statement of a former Deputy Director-General o f the Takeover Panel: “The Panel has nothing to say about the merits of an offer. It is almost solely the offeree company’s shareholders whose interest the code has at heart.” (Lee, TP, “Takeover Regulation in the United Kingdom” in Hopt, K and Wymeersch, E, European Takeovers: Law and Practice (1992) at 136)
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This bold statement is undermined by the absence o f any employee rights to information 
and consultation about the bid. The Panel only allows employees to receive information 
and to be consulted when the bid has been made public, in order to preserve “the utmost 
confidentiality and secrecy in order to prevent insider dealing and false markets.”171 The 
Panel suggests that it is willing to make an exception where the company "wishes 
simultaneously to announce significant restructuring or rationalisation"172 or in other 
circumstances. O f course, given the level of disclosure made in offer documents, this is 
unlikely to occur at the time the bid is made public.
The US System
Introduction
Takeover regulation in the United States co-exists at federal and state levels. A minimal 
federal framework was put in place in 1968 by the Williams Act amendments to the 
Securities Exchange Act 1934. The federal framework was then supplemented by a series 
of bursts o f legislative activity by the individual states, which required the federal courts 
to resolve the extent to which action by the individual states had been pre-empted by the 
Williams Act. The general development of the US system is considered here before a 
fairly detailed consideration of Delaware's system of takeover regulation, which is of 
particular practical importance because so many of the largest US corporations are 
incorporated there.173
171 Button, M (2002) (supra note 169) at 36: "The Panel will normally permit consultation with a very restricted number of employee representatives before an offer is publicly announced if  there is to be significant restructuring or rationalisation."172 This may o f course give rise to obligations to inform and consult under EC directives, discussed briefly in Chapter 6. The Panel states that "it will normally be permissible to do so, subject to certain conditions. These include (i) that the information will only be disclosed to specific individuals and on a confidential basis; and (ii) that, if there is a leak, an immediate public announcement will be made.” See further, "The Takeover Panel 1997 - 1998 Report on the year ended 31 March 1998”, supra note 170.173 The latest figures suggest that over half of all publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware, including 58% of Fortune 500 companies, and 50% o f NYSE companies: see Delaware Division of
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Federal Regulation: The Williams Act
In 1968, Congress made the Williams Act amendments174 to the Securities Exchange Act 
1934 in response to the growth of hostile takeover bids.175 The Act was "intended to 
protect investors... But it is also crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect 
the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder."176 The 
Williams Act regime is minimalist, simply imposing certain procedural requirements 
with a view to ensuring investor choice with full information.
Where an acquisition of shares in a publicly traded company takes a purchaser’s total 
shareholding across the 5 per cent threshold,177 this gives rise to an obligation on that 
purchaser to disclose certain information to the company, to the relevant stock exchange 
and to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The purchaser must disclose the 
background and identity of the beneficial owners, the source and amount of the funds or 
other consideration, whether their purpose is to acquire control of the issuer or make any 
other major changes, and the structure of their share ownership.178 The importance of 
these informational obligations is that they must be complied with before a tender offer 
may be lawfully made.179
Corporations, available online at http://www.state.de.us/com. In addition, some 308,000 companies are currently incorporated there.174 Public Law 90-439, 82 STAT. 454,15 U.S.C. 781175 Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) (supra note 5) at 224; it will be noted that this was the same year as the judgment in Hogg and the creation of the City Code. For a discussion of the growth in hostile takeovers in terms of a change social norms, see Eisenberg, MA, "Corporate Law and Social Norms" (1999) 99 Columbia Law Journal 1253 at 1287-91.176 Per White, J in Edgar v Mite 457 U.S. 624 (1982) at 633; the Supreme Court also noted that Congress had been convinced that takeovers provide "a check on entrenched but inefficient management." Roe, (1994) (supra note 1) at 156 describes it as “mildly antitakeover”; Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 5) at 224 suggest that the Act allowed managers to take defensive measures by imposing delay and disclosure.177 The Williams Act had originally set the limit at 10% (si3(d)(1)), but in 1970 Congress lowered this threshold to require disclosure of an acquisition of more than 5% of a company's stock (see Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-567, § 3, 84 Stat. 1497, 1497). The disclosure must be made within ten days o f the acquisition (si 3(d)(1)). The aim of this provision is to limit the extent of secret purchases in advance o f  a bid and has the clear aim of fairness among shareholders generally: see Bebchuk, LA (1982) (supra note 30) at 1054. Disclosure rules of this kind limit the number of shareholders who sell in ignorance of the pending offer, thereby losing out on the premium offered by the bidder.178 § 13(d)(1) A-D; die SEC is entitled to prescribe further particulars. Any subsequent changes to this position should also be notified according to SEC rules (§ 13(d)(2)).§ K d)(l)
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The Williams Act then sets out a timetable for tender offers.180 Shareholders tendering 
their shares are entitled to withdraw them at any time up to seven181 days after the 
publication o f the offer, and "at any time after sixty days from the date of the original 
tender offer".182 Additional regulations made by the SEC require that offers remain open 
for at least 20 days.183 The Act also requires shareholders to be treated equally by the 
bidder. Where the bid is for less than the whole share capital, and the bidder is offered, 
within ten days of the tender offer, more shares than they are willing or able to take up, 
the bidder is bound to take them tip pro rata from the tendering shareholders.184 *Similarly 
any post-bid increase in the consideration offered should be extended to all tendering
I  A fshareholders. Like their counterparts in the City Code, these provisions protect 
minority shareholders by preventing bidders from acting freely on the market.186
State Antitakeover Statutes
Both before and after the enactment of the Williams Act, individual states had begun to 
introduce a "first generation" of antitakeover laws. Virginia introduced the first such 
statute some four months before the Williams Act,187 requiring the disclosure o f certain 
information to shareholders, and regulating the duration of bids. This type o f action by 
the states raised the question of the extent to which the Williams Act pre-empted the
180 § 14(d)(4) permits the SEC to supplement the Williams Act rules "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”181 Amended by the SEC to 15 business days.182 § 14(d)(5)183 17 CFR §240.I4e- fra) (1986). Lipton and Panner ("Takeover Bids and United States Corporate Governance” in Prentice, DD and Holland, PRJ (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (1993), 116) criticise this provision on the basis that it provided bidders with “the ability to employ a wide variety of techniques which coerced shareholders into tendering into an offer rapidly or risk being deprived of much of the value o f  their shares.”184 SEC rules have elaborated the requirements of equality o f treatment of all shareholders.§ 14(d)(7)186 It is, however, notable that only Maine and Pennsylvania have mandatory bid rules: see Berglfif, E and Burkart, M, "European Takeover Regulation" (2003) Economic Policy 172 at 188187 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to 13.1-541 (1973). See Lipton, M and Rowe, PK, "Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson" (2002) 27 The Delaware Journal o f Corporate Law 1 at 4-5; also Romano, R, "The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion" (1988) 57 University o f  Cincinnati Law Review 457 at 458. In its judgment in Edgar v Mite at fh6, the Supreme Court notes that the legislative history of the Williams Act does not show that congress was aware of state antitakeover statutes, but that when "the Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only Virginia had a takeover statute. The Virginia statute...became effective March 5, 1968; the Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19, 1968." The Virginia statute was repealed in 1989.
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individual states' discretion to regulate takeovers. §28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
1934, which was amended by the Williams Act, provided that the jurisdiction o f the 
states was not pre-empted "insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this title 
or the rules and regulations thereunder."188 189Accordingly, in the absence of the Williams 
Act, and subject to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, corporate law, and 
corporate governance more generally, would have remained entirely a matter for the 
individual states.
In Edgar v MITE Corp.,m  the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the Illinois 
Business Take-over Act, which required the offeror to notify the Secretary of State and 
the target company190 of its intent to make an offer, and of the terms of that offer, 20 days 
before the offer was to take effect. During that period, the offeror was not allowed 
contact the shareholders, but the offeree company was allowed to circulate information 
about the offer to the shareholders. In addition, the Secretary o f State was entitled to hold 
a hearing during the 20-day period into the fairness of the proposed offer as concerns the 
shareholders, and could deny registration of the offer if  he considered that it failed to give 
adequate disclosure or was inequitable.
The majority held191 the statute unconstitutional192 for violating the Commerce Clause 
because its effects on inter-state commerce were excessive compared with the local state
188 4 8 Stat. 903189 4 5 7 U.S. 624(1982)190 The statute adopted a very wide definition of "targets": any corporation in which Illinois residents held 10% of the shares which were the subject of the bid would be caught by the Act. Similarly, any corporation where two of the following three criteria were met: "the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under the laws o f Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented within the State."191 The majority opinion is contained in Part VB of the judgment of White, J, which was shared by four other justices. There was also a plurality opinion to the effect that the obligation to give advance notification, as well as the power of the Secretary of State to hold a hearing (which the board as shareholders might even have a right to demand), frustrated the Williams Act's aim of striking a balance between board and bidder. The plurality accordingly decided that the state's action was pre-empted by Congress because it gave the board time to take defensive measures. A "plurality" opinion does not represent the views of the majority (Part III of White, J's opinion was shared by two other justices) and is not binding: see C75 at 81. Posner, J relied on the plurality opinion in the Court of Appeals in the CTS case to strike down the Indiana Statute, but his decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on the facts, leaving the exact status of the plurality opinion uncertain.,92 And accordingly the legislation of some 36 other states: Roe, (1994) {supra note 1) at 158
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interests protected by the statute.193 In particular, the court was influenced by the 
argument that the Statute hindered the reallocative function of the market for corporate 
control and weakened the "incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent 
management to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.”194 However, by 
deciding the case on this point, the Court left the states a modicum of flexibility in 
regulating tender offers to protect their interests.195 Although agency model 
considerations were decisive in this particular case, this would not always be the outcome 
where the court applied the balancing test.
The "deal decade" of the 1980s saw the emergence of a "second generation" o f state anti­
takeover statutes which tested the limits of the M ITE  decision. States adopted a variety o f 
restrictive takeover regulations,196 including control-share provisions, which, in the 
absence of shareholder approval, denied voting rights to those acquiring a certain 
percentage of a company's share capital, and corporate constituency provisions, which 
either permitted or obliged197 the board to take into account a broader range o f interests 
than simply those of the shareholders. Ultimately, a "third generation" of "corporate 
combination" antitakeover statutes emerged which sought to prevent mergers unless 
approved by the board or pending the elapse of a period o f several years from the change
193 MITE at 646. Comparing its effects with the interests sought to be protected, the court emphasised the statute's "nationwide reach" (at 643), while deeming the shareholder protection argument "speculative”, and reasoning that takeovers did not concern the "internal affairs" of corporations (at 645-6).194 MITE at 643. The Court cited, and was clearly influenced by, the work of Easterbrook and Fischel, including, inter alia, Easterbrook, F and Fischel, DR (1981) (supra note 14)195 See, for example, the judgment of Powell, J at 646. He referred to the frequently observed inequalities of resources between offeror and target which characterised the conglomerate era, and the damage which would be done to states where corporate headquarters are relocated out of state.196 For a summary of the different methods of takeover regulation put in place by the states, see Orts, EW, "Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes" (1992) George Washington Law Review 14197 Of all the states to have enacted constituency statutes, only Connecticut mandates consideration of non- shareholder interests: ibid at 29.
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in control.198 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on these, although it seems unlikely, 
given the following judgment that they will be found to be pre-empted.199
In CTS Corp v Dynamics Corp o f America,200 the Supreme Court considered and upheld 
the Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Act. This is a particularly strong example o f a 
control share statute, denying hostile buyers who pass certain shareholding thresholds201 
the right to vote their shares indefinitely until the acquisition is approved by a majority of 
pre-existing disinterested shareholders.202 The Act applied to all Indiana corporations 
which did not opt out of it.203 The test applied by the Supreme Court states that state law 
is only pre-empted where it either makes compliance with both federal and state 
regulation "a physical impossibility”,204 or "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."205 206Concluding that the 
Indiana Act did not make compliance impossible, the Court then asked whether the 
statute frustrated the purposes of the Federal legislation. It found that the statute actually 
furthered the Williams Act's purposes by enabling the shareholders to vote as a group in 
the event of a takeover attempt, circumventing their collective action problem. Such a
198 Delaware's statute (§203, 8 Del Code Ann (1991)),which allows firms to opt out of it in their articles, permits the directors to refuse to approve the transfer of control to a substantial shareholder, subject to contrary approval by 85% of shareholders. Lipton, M ("Pills, Polls and Professors Redux" (2002) 69 Uni Chi L Rev 1037) describes this at 1050 as "a statutory pill that can be neutered by a tender offer that attracts 85 per cent of the shares."199 By 1995, third-generation statutes had been adopted by 28 States: Davids, RS, "Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing Transition Costs?" (1995) 28 Columbia Journal o f  Law and Social Problems 145 at 164200 481 US 69 (1987); the Supreme Court overturned the federal court of appeals (794 F.2d 250) which had held at 264 that "Even if  a corporation's tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with which they are employed and the proportions in which the earnings they generate are divided between management and shareholders depends on the market for corporate control - an interstate...market that the state of Indiana is not authorised to opt out of, as in effect it has done in this statute." (cited in Roe, (1993) (supra note 46)) Agency model assumptions clearly underlay the federal court of appeals'judgment.201 The thresholds were set at 20%, 33 1/3%, or 50%.202 Although the acquiror does have a right to call a meeting of shareholders by following certain procedures.203 It asserted a far narrower jurisdiction than the Act considered in MITE.204 CTS at 79, citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,142-143 (1963)205 Citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941) and Ruy v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158, (1978).206 CTS at 81 and 83.
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statute would only be pre-empted if  it created unreasonable delays, which was not the 
case here.207
Nor did the legislation in question violate the Inter-State Commerce Clause, because it 
did not "prohibit any entity—resident or nonresident— from offering to purchase, or from 
purchasing, shares in Indiana corporations, or from attempting thereby to gain control. It 
only provides regulatory procedures designed for the better protection o f the corporations’ 
shareholders."208 The Court noted that the states have long used their right to make laws 
regulating corporate governance. Since these laws frequently have the effect of 
"prohibiting certain transactions, and regulating others, such laws necessarily affect 
certain aspects o f interstate commerce."209 The Court justified state laws on the basis of 
concession theory: since corporations are creatures of the states,210 the states are entitled 
to "prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their 
shares. A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in 
the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have 
an effective voice in corporate affairs."211 In response to the respondent's argument that 
state legislation should support the crucial role played by tender offers in the functioning 
of the market for corporate control, the Court held that "The Constitution does not require 
the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory. We are not inclined 'to second- 
guess the empirical judgments o f lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation.’"212
207 The Court reasoned (at 86) that "the possibility that the Indiana Act will delay some tender offers is insufficient to require a conclusion that the Williams Act pre-empts the Act. The longstanding prevalence of state regulation in this area suggests that, i f  Congress had intended to pre-empt all state laws that delay the acquisition o f voting control following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly."208 ibid at 93209 ibid at 902.0 ibid at 90. The Court said that "state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product o f state law." The Court approved Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum that "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created." {Trustees o f  Dartmouth College v, Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518,636,4 L.Ed. 518 (1819))2.1 ibid at 91; the Court added at 93-4 that " The very commodity that is traded in the securities market is one whose characteristics are defined by state law. Similarly, the very commodity that is traded in the "market for corporate control"-the corporation-is one that owes its existence and attributes to state law. Indiana need not define these commodities as other States do."212 ibid at 92. The Court (at 92 fn 13) was not prepared to view tender offers as an unqualified good: "No one doubts that some successful tender offers will provide more effective management or other benefits
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Thus a piece of legislation which removed coercion from the tender process was a 
legitimate use of the state's discretion in this field.
On a broad reading of CTS, the decision transcends the agency approach to takeovers, 
and allows the states' systems of company law and corporate governance to take into 
account a range of interests going beyond shareholders.213 The Court’s use of concession 
theory is notable: since state law constitutes the corporation, it has a considerable margin 
of appreciation in defining the rights and duties of corporate constituencies, limited only 
by the requirement that it should not regulate the bidding process (which is pre-empted 
by federal legislation) or discriminate against non-resident shareholders (which would 
interfere with the inter-state Commerce Clause).
Corporate Constituency Statutes
Pennsylvania was the first state to include corporate constituency considerations in its 
corporate statute.214 Many states followed its lead.215 The Pennsylvania statute is 
considered here by way of example. The constituency statute forms part of a panoply of 
anti-takeover provisions, including a “profit disgorgement” clause (obliging a bidder to 
hand over short-term profits made post-bid) and control-share restrictions.216 * The
such as needed diversification. But there is no reason to assume that the type of conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive takeovers necessarily will result in more effective management or otherwise be beneficial to shareholders. The divergent views in the literature-and even now being debated in the Congress-reflect the reality that the type and utility of tender offers vary widely."213 This may be seen as support for a system of regulatory competition, according to which states compete for corporate charters. In a long-running debate on the effects of inter-state competition for charters, two main positions may be discerned. The first, elaborated by Cary, W, "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware" (1974) 83 Yale LJ  663, suggests that there will be a "race to the bottom" from the shareholders’ (and efficiency's) perspective as states offer incorporation on terms which will appeal to management, i.e., which allow them to exploit shareholders. The second, elaborated by Winter, RK, "State law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation" (1977) 6 Journal o f  Legal Studies 251, suggests that management must compete for investments on capital markets, and so must put in place arrangements which favour investors as well as themselves.214 15 PA. CONS. STAT. See Wallman, SMH, "The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Directors’ Duties " (1991) Stetson L Rev 163 at 163; Robilotti, MG, "Codetermination, Stakeholder Rights, and Hostile Takeovers: A Réévaluation of the Evidence from Abroad" (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 536 at 542; Davids, RS (1995) {supra note 199)215 Davids, RS (1995) {supra note 199) notes at 158 that 28 states, including the commercially important New York, had enacted such measures by 1995.216 Where a given corporation opts out of §515, §516, the original constituency provision, will, per §511(b),provide an "alternative standard".
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constituency clause gives the board wide latitude to define "the best interests of the 
corporation" without requiring them "to regard any corporate interest or the interests o f 
any particular group affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or 
factor.”217 The board is permitted to take into account a wide range of constituencies218 
and to consider the "short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including 
benefits that may accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility 
that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the 
corporation."219 This is clearly aimed at allowing the board to take defensive action 
against a takeover precisely where it threatens a productive coalition.
These far-reaching clauses clearly permit a variety of defensive measures as long as they 
can be justified by reference to the "best interests of the corporation", as defined by the 
board under the business judgement rule.220 The business judgement rule does not apply 
any differently in a takeover situation.221 Corporate constituency statutes reiterate the 
law's rhetorical commitment to managerialism.222 Action taken by management to 
frustrate a bid will, in the absence of contrary evidence, be presumed not to be in breach 
of fiduciary duty.223
2,7 §515(b)21 * 15 Pa.C.S,A. § 5I5(aXl), entitled "Exercise of powers generally"219 §515(a)(2). The board is also entitled under §515(a)(3) to consider the "resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential) of any person seeking to acquire control of the corporation".220 This is confirmed by §515(d), which provides that "Absent breach of fiduciary duty, lack of good faith or self-dealing, any act as the board of directors...shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the corporation."221 §515(d) provides that the normal business judgement rule applies in the takeover situation: "there shall not be any greater obligation to justify, or higher burden of proof with respect to, any act as the board of directors...relating to or affecting an acquisition or potential or proposed acquisition of control of the corporation than is applied to any other act as a board of directors...." The presumption will even apply where some board members have an interest in the outcome of the takeover, as long as "a majority of the disinterested directors shall have assented...."222 As Wallman, SMH (1991) (supra note 214) points out at 166, "a few corporation codes specify that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders, not a single state statute specifies that the directors owe a fiduciary duty solely to the shareholders." He refers to the Revlon case (below) as a rare example o f jurisprudence which articulates a rule imposing duties on management to shareholders.223 As Davids, RS (1995) (supra note 199) argues at 148, these statutes constitute a "a potentially radical break with the orthodox view that corporations should confine themselves to activity that maximizes the wealth o f their shareholders. At stake may be a rethinking of the scope and function of corporation law and, at a deeper level, a new vision o f what corporations are -- broad, interdependent networks o f relationships rather than merely shareholder-management agency contracts — and their role in our society."
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Defences at the Level of the Individual Corporation
The freedom permitted to management under US law means that a wide range of 
company-level takeover defences has developed.224 25The "poison pill"223 appears to be the 
most important defensive measure in practice.226 It is a low transaction-cost measure 
adopted unilaterally by management and comes in many varieties. The most common 
variety, the "flip-in" poison pill, is a right issued to shareholders as a dividend. Where a 
bidder acquires a certain percentage of the company’s shares without the board's 
approval, the pill is triggered and the other shareholders become entitled to buy extra 
shares in the company at a discount.227 The company then becomes indigestible to the 
would-be predator because the value of his shareholding is drastically reduced by this 
issue of new shares, and the cost of acquiring control correspondingly higher.228 
Depending, of course, upon their individual terms, pills frequently lapse once a bidder 
acquires a certain amount of stock, e.g., 80%. The target board is normally able to redeem 
the rights at a nominal price before the triggering percentage is reached, and they will do 
this where they consider that the bid is in the best interests o f the company. Where this is 
the case, the pill simply prevents hostile takeovers and encourages the negotiation of 
friendly takeovers with the board.229
The pill is criticised by those who take a neoclassical contractual perspective o f the 
corporation because management may adopt and redeem it unilaterally. They argue that
224 Such as lock-ups, crown jewels sales, white knights, staggered boards, greenmail, the pac-man defence etc. A full discussion of these exotically-named measures lies beyond the scope of this thesis, but brief details are given in the text where they arise. More detailed descriptions and discussions of takeover defences maybe found in Lipton and Panner, (1993) {supra note 183) and elsewhere.225 For a history of the poison pill, originally termed the "Warrant Dividend Plan", see Lipton, M (2002) {supra note 198). The poison pill is normally referred to in the case law as a "shareholder rights plan".226 The poison pill has been adopted by most large US companies. Lipton, (ibid) at 1058 fn 79 states that "the pill has been adopted by thousands o f public companies and has become an essential, commonplace element of the fabric of corporate governance, with no adverse effect on share prices or merger activity."227 See Davies, (1992) (supra note 94) at 210 for more details. By contrast, the "flip-over" pill allows shareholders of the target company to buy shares in the bidder company at a discount after the takeover, encouraging them not to tender their shares.228 Armour, J, Deakin, S, and FConzelmann, S (2003) {supra note 162) at 3 describe poison pills generally as "pre-commitments to engage in some activity or restructuring if  a hostile bid succeeds that will destroy any value the bidder would obtain from the firm."229 Davies, (1992) (supra note 94) at 215
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the pill increases agency costs at the shareholders' expense by undermining the 
disciplining effect of the market for corporate control. The increased difficulty of taking 
control will deter potential bidders, making the displacement of underperforming 
management less likely. Finally, the pill does not satisfy a hypothetical bargaining test 
because the shareholders would not have agreed to it. By contrast, supporters of the pill, 
and managerialism more generally, argue that the pill benefits shareholders precisely 
because it is redeemable by the board. It allows the board to negotiate the best deal 
possible for shareholders, using their greater time resources and inside information about 
the value of the company’s assets, opportunities and business plan.230 The pill also gives 
the board more time to respond to the bid than the twenty days provided by the Williams 
Act. The pill should therefore increase the premia paid to target shareholders,231 and 
therefore fit with a hypothetical bargaining model (in which the shareholders have full 
information).
Finally, the poison pill may support the productive coalition model by allowing 
management to make (and keep) credible commitments to other corporate constituencies. 
The pill means that the company does not have to carry on business under a permanent 
"for sale" notice; since any sale will be negotiated, this will allow at least temporary 
protection of the expectations of managers and employees, at least where this is in the 
long-term interests of the shareholders.232 The existence of a pill demonstrates ex ante to 
employees that management will retain a say in the company's future direction, and 
therefore that their implicit contracts will not necessarily be threatened by a hostile bid.233
Refusal by the board to consent to the proposed takeover and redeem the pill does not 
necessarily mean the end for the proposed takeover. There are two possible ways for a
230 As we saw in the previous chapter, critics such as Bebchuk, LA, "The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers" (2002) 69 University o f  Chicago Law Review 973 at 988 et seq argue that their conflict o f  interests is so great that the board "do not have the best incentives".231 Lipton, M (2002) (supra note 198) at 1041, 1053 fh 59 and 1058 fh 81; Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) (supra note 14) argue at 189 that this amounts to "wasteful shuffling" where investors are diversified.232 Lipton, M (2002) (supra note 198) at 1039233 However, the prevalence o f "adaptive mechanisms" means that the board will be likely to redeem the pill where it suits their interests as shareholders. This is discussed below.
200
bidder to get around a refusal by the board. First, if  the company in question is 
incorporated in Delaware, the shareholders may be able to challenge management’s 
actions under the intermediate standard of review. This is discussed in detail below. If 
this is not possible, either because the corporation is incorporated elsewhere, or because 
the Delaware court holds that management's decision is well-founded, the hostile bidder, 
who has already acquired a base shareholding position, may be able to take control of the 
board through a proxy fight.
In a proxy fight, the bidder qua shareholder solicits the transfer of the proxy votes of 
other shareholders from the incumbent board to the bidder, with a view to replacing the 
board and ultimately redeeming the pill. The proxy fight is essentially a debate about the 
way in which incumbent management are running the company and the reasons for their 
rejection of the bid.234 By giving shareholders a vote about whether or not to reactivate 
the market for corporate control, shareholder choice remains at the centre of the takeover 
process.235 The proxy fight may become more complex where there is a staggered 
board.236 Company constitutions often provide that only one third of the board may be 
replaced in any one year, with the consequence that a bidder who controls the majority of 
the shares has to wait at least a year before their nominees would control the board. Such 
provisions are now very common,237 238and where they are combined with a pill, the bidder 
must begin a proxy fight in the usual way. The difference is that the fight will take more 
than a year, since normally only 1/3 of the board may be replaced each year. Agency 
theorists obviously oppose such a combination of measures because of their dampening 
effect on the market for corporate control and consequent reduction of shareholder 
value. Lipton's managerialist perspective suggests that such a combination enhances
234 Upton, M (2002) (supra note 198) at 1058 fn 81235 ibid at 1037: "It was and is a fundamental aspect of the pill that a proxy fight is the only way in which a raider can override a well-founded decision of the board to reject and block a takeover bid."236 These have long been allowed by state law': Orts, EW (1992) (supra note 196) at 64237See Kahan, M and Rock, EB, "How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law" (2002) 69 Uni Chi L Rev 871 at 885 noting that over 60% of public corporations have this type o f provision in their constitution. As evidence of the unpopularity among shareholders, Kahan and Rock note at 911 that shareholder resolutions calling for the elimination of staggered boards are on the rise.238 See the sources listed in Maher and Andersson, "Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Pefonnance and Economic Growth" in McCahery, JA, Moerland, P, Raaijmakers, T, and Renneboog, L Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (2002), 386 at 409.
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the board's ability to resist an offer which it considers inadequate and therefore raises the 
premia paid to target shareholders.239 From a productive coalition perspective, this 
combination of measures could be considered to give a greater degree o f temporal 
protection to implicit contracts than the pill on its own by preventing the removal o f 
management for at least one year.
Delaware's Intermediate Approach to Takeover Regulation
Delaware's approach differs from that of the states discussed above and from the 
approach of the City Code. Delaware reviews management conduct on a case-by-case 
basis, and does not impose absolute prohibitions on conduct. The parallels with the now- 
redundant Hogg test are striking.240 Delaware's approach offers the advantage of allowing 
management, with their inside knowledge of the company’s prospects, to make decisions 
based on long-term considerations, while limited review undermines objections based on 
the "classic argument" that under a system of pure managerialism the board becomes 
unaccountable and tends to act for the purpose o f self-entrenchment.
Generally, courts in common law jurisdictions refuse to second-guess the board's 
decisions,241 on the basis that there are no appropriate "criteria by which the courts can 
assess the merits of an exercise o f business discretion."242 Delaware corporate law 
operates a general presumption that the directors "acted on an informed basis, in good
239 Upton, M (2002) (supra note 198) at 1058.240 In each of the Delaware cases discussed in this section, the court emphasises that "a meaningful decision upon review turns upon a complete understanding o f the factual background" (Cheff at 497) and the "factual background of this matter bears a significant relationship to its ultimate outcome" ( Unocal at 949).241 Davies, (1992) (supra note 94) at 208: in the UK, this general rule is implicit in the subjective terms in which director’s duties are cast.242 Parkinson, J (1993) (supra note 94) at 108. Given the range o f possible courses of action and the bounded rationality of management, which together make "what the market wants'* unclear, ex post review would clearly be inappropriate: see further Stone, "Public Interest Representation: Economic and Social Policy Inside the Enterprise" in Hopt, KJ and Teubner, G (eds), Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities (1985), 122 at 137. In addition, Strine has argued that "the stockholders have a weak claim that they should be protected by judicially intrusive action to override the results generated by the internal processes of organizations whose shares they voluntarily purchased. Equally important, corporate boards will not function well (it is reasonably feared) if their every decision is subject to relatively unconstrained judicial review. Such easy second-guessing is likely to have a paralyzing effect, and diminish risk-taking, to the larger detriment of stockholders." (Strine, LE, "Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle" (2002) 57 Business Lawyer 1371 at 1376)
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faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company" when they took the decision in question.243 The burden is on anyone alleging 
breach of duty on the part of the board to produce evidence to rebut this presumption. 
However, the business judgement rule is modified in the context of hostile takeovers, to 
create a "middle ground"244 between an absolute prohibition on defences and absolute 
managerialism. An ex-Vice-Chancellor of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine 
considers that the modified rule simply amounts to the court deciding whether "corporate 
decisions have been made in a...[sufficiently trustworthy] manner".245 The rationale for 
the rule lies in the board's conflict of interest and the court's desire to ensure that the 
board are not using their powers of management for the purpose of entrenchment.246 The 
modified rule subjects management decision-making to "enhanced scrutiny", requiring 
management to justify any defensive measures247 by reference to Reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed”,248 and to show that 
the defensive measure was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed".249 This effectively 
reverses the burden of proof of the general business judgement rule250
243 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 at 812 (1984).244 Lipton, M (2002) (supra note 198) at 1046245 Strine, LE (2002) (supra note 242) at 1376; thus it involves analysis of the role of independent directors and the shareholders in the taking of the decision.246 See Cheff v. Mathes 199 A.2d 548 Delaware Supreme Court (1964) where the court permitted greenmail (the purchase by the company of its own shares at a premium from a likely predator) subject to proof by the board of their "true motives”.247 Whether taken in response to the bid or put in place before the bid, such as a poison pill.248 Cheff at 555; affirmed in Unocal Corp. v Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (1985). In Unocal, the Court upheld a rights issue plan (poison pill) put in place in response to fears of a specific takeover by a known predator. In Moran v Household International, Inc., 500 A 2d 1346 (1985), the Delaware Supreme Court also upheld the right of the board to adopt the poison pill as a general corporate antitakeover defence on the basis that "pre-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exercise reasonable judgement." (at 1350) However, any decision to create a poison pill, as well as any decision not to redeem it, would be reviewed against the Unocal rule. Subsequent developments in the Delaware case law have made clear that this tolerance does not extend to measures which deprive shareholders of their right to remove the board, or any new board of their right to manage. It is notable that the court refused to censure the unequal treatment of the undesirable shareholders.249 Unocal at 955. In Unitrim, Inc. v American General Corp 651 A.2d 1361 (Del Sup Ct 1995), the Court emphasised at 1385-7 that the question was not whether the decision was a perfect one but a reasonable one, and in assessing this, the court should look at the overall response, the justification given and the results achieved. In that case the board had put in place a variety of defensive measures.250 The Pennsylvania provisions discussed above technically require a challenger to produce evidence of breach of duty, although where a board’s actions seem disproportionate or unreasonable, it will be easier to produce evidence that the action in question is aimed at entrenchment rather than the best interests of the company. Accordingly, the difference between Pennsylvania and Delaware is merely one of the burden of proof.
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The first limb requires the directors to show good faith and reasonable investigation.251 
The second limb requires "an analysis by the directors o f the nature of the takeover bid 
and its effect on the corporate enterprise.'’252 The "corporate enterprise" is understood in a 
broad, pluralistic sense, and the board are entitled to take into account a range of factors 
in assessing the threat, including "inadequacy o f the price offered, nature and timing of 
the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other than shareholders 
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the 
risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange."253 
In a recent case, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasised that "a board o f directors, 
while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to 
maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover."254
This pluralistic conception of the "corporate enterprise" is only suspended where a sale of 
the company becomes “inevitable” (for example, where the board holds an auction 
among competing bidders).255 In that case, the board comes under a duty to obtain the 
highest price possible for shareholders. Management’s plans for the business cease to be 
relevant and “concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate" because "the object 
no longer is to protect, or maintain the corporate enterprise, but to sell it to the highest 
bidder.”256
251 The opinion of non-executive directors will be crucial in establishing the purpose of the action under challenge. The Court in Unocal stated at 955 that "such proof is materially enhanced, as here, by the approval o f a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards.”252 ibid253 ibid. Kahan, "Jurisprudential and Transactional Developments in Takeovers" in Hopt, KJ, Kanda, H, Roe, MJ, Wymeersch, E, and Prigge, S (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: The State o f  the Art and Emerging Research (1998), 683at 684 considers this burden easily discharged ("no Supreme Court case has ever invalidated a board's defensive action under VnocaF), and argues that, as applied by the Delaware courts, "the Unocal test demands for a rejection o f a tender offer little more than the backing by the board's independent directors and an investment banker's opinion stating that the price offered is inadequate." Lipton, M (2002) (supra note 198) at 1061 disagrees, referring to the large amount o f economic evidence which has been placed on the court record in some cases.254 Paramount v Time 571 A.2d 1140 Delaware Supreme Court (1989) at 1150255 Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews <& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A 2d 173 (Del Sup Ct, 1986).236 Ibid at 182. Jensen criticises this from an agency perspective: “I f  the business judgement rule is applied to conflicts over control rights between principals and agents, the courts are effectively giving the agent the right to change the control rights unilaterally. In the long run, this interpretation of the contract will destroy
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Although in Revlon itself it was "apparent to all that the break-up of the company was 
inevitable",257 identifying an "inevitable" sale may pose practical difficulties in other 
cases. A company moving into “Revlon mode” is both “ambiguous and commonplace, 
since its occurrence may be difficult to pinpoint in a hostile takeover, and yet it must 
arise in every friendly acquisition.”258 259The difficulties of interpretation faced by the 
courts may be seen from the different judgments delivered in two factually rather similar 
cases.
•yenIn Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., the Court found that Time's board 
had "steadfastly maintained it was not placing itself up for sale",260 planning a merger 
with Warner which would allow them to retain control over the joint governance 
structure (which would preserve Time’s "culture" o f "journalistic integrity"), and which 
"offered a greater long-term value for the stockholders".261 On these facts, the board's 
mandate to manage subsisted and included "authority to set a corporate course of action, 
including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability." It was open to the 
directors to determine that "the present stock market price o f shares is not representative 
of true value or that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation's 
stock."262
By contrast, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v QVC Network, Inc., the Court 
distinguished Time on the basis that the proposed sale to Viacom involved a change of 
control, and so the company had entered Revlon mode. This meant the board had to
the possibility of such cooperative agreements, because it will leave principals with few effective rights.1’ Jensen, MC (1988) {supra note 16) at 43257 Revlon at 182. The board had redeemed a poison pill in order to facilitate a bid by their preferred bidder, and subsequently proposed to introduce further defensive measures to discourage an undesired rival bidder.258 Gilson, R and Kraakman, R, "What Triggers Revlon?" (1990) 25 Wake Forest L Rev 37 at 38259 571 A.2d 1140 Delaware Supreme Court (1989)260 At 1145261 at 1149262 at 1150, footnote added. See also Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (1985 Del Sup Ct) at 875. The Court said there that "A substantial premium may provide one reason to recommend a merger, but in the absence of other sound valuation information, the fact of a premium alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess the fairness of an offering price." There the assessment was made on the basis of the company’s "historically depressed" market price.
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"secure the best value reasonably available to the stockholders"263 64 and the various 
defensive measures taken against QVC’s bid were unlawful. The Court explained that 
Revlon does not require "inevitable...'break-upn'; a change of control is sufficient to 
oblige the board not to prefer one bidder over another.265 In this case, control of the 
corporation, which had been "vested in the fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders" 
would be transferred to the bidder.266 This had important economic implications for 
existing shareholders because they would "have no leverage in the future to demand 
another control premium."267 The Time case was distinguished on the basis that control of 
Time remained vested in the aggregation of market shareholders.
♦
Accordingly, subject to these procedural safeguards, the business judgement rule keeps 
managerialism at the heart of Delaware corporate law, even in the takeover context268 In 
Unocal, the court referred to the board's "fundamental duty and obligation to protect the 
corporate enterprise" and emphasised that "in the broad context of corporate governance, 
including issues of fundamental corporate change, a board of directors is not a passive 
instrumentality."269
However, the court in Revlon suggested that this principle of managerialism is limited to 
"enlightened shareholder value":
"A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."270
Such a limitation on the board’s discretion is not made explicit in Unocal It may well be 
that the court assumed implicitly that corporate law, as a general rule, requires
263 637 A .2d 34 (1993 Del Sup Ct)264 ibid at 37265 ibid at 46266 ibid at 43267 ibid268 Unocal at 954269 At 954; this appears to be a guarded rejection of the agency model in the takeover context. The Court added at 958 that "If the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers o f corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out"270 at 182
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managerial action to be aimed at producing future gains for shareholders. However, it 
repeatedly used the formulation that the board should consider whether an offer is f’in the 
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”271 With its refusal to consider the 
board a "passive instrumentality" of the shareholders, the court seems to recognise a 
corporate interest independent from the shareholders.272 Most of the time, of course, this 
will not be a significant distinction because shareholder interests and the "corporate 
interest" will coincide, at least in the long run.273 Both the Unocal and Revlon 
formulations allow a board which intends to maintain a company’s independence to take 
into account investments by employees in firm-specific capital in making allocation 
decisions, on the basis that such investments might be expected to produce enhanced 
returns to current and future shareholders in the longer term. The Revlon formulation 
suggests that such an entitlement would cease in the narrow situation where the 
employees’ investments continue to generate rents for themselves in the form of super- 
competitive salaries, but no longer generate profits for the shareholders, and are not 
expected to do so in the future. Under the Unocal formulation, it is arguable that the 
board's entitlement to consider the interests of employees in formulating the "best 
interests of the corporation" would subsist in this situation, although the continued 
absence of profits might entice the shareholders to exercise their democratic rights to 
remove the board.274
Finally, Delaware has a "short form merger” mie which allows a parent company to 
"squeeze out" minority shareholders when it acquires 90% of the share capital, regardless 
of their consent.275 By contrast, it does not have a mandatory bid mie, allowing bidders to 
purchase only the shares they want during a takeover. It might be argued that this 
configuration of rules is coercive for tendering shareholders.
271 Unocal at 954272 Teubner, G, "Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the "Essence” of the Legal Person" (1988) 36 American Journal o f Comparative Law  130, Teubner, "Company Interest: The Public Interest of the Enterprise 'in Itself" in Rogowksi, R and Wilthagen, T (eds), Reflexive Labour Law ( 1994),.273 See Wallman, SMH (1991) (supra note 214) at 183-187274 See Unocal at 958 where the Court drew attention to the shareholders' right to remove the board where they are not happy with its performance,275 Under §253 Del Code Ann. A dissatisfied shareholder may seek an appraisal remedy.
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r a n o n t t
Theoretical Perspectives on UK and US Takeover Regulation
i) UK
Although communications from the Panel and those involved in the self-regulatory 
process do not explicitly adopt the language o f agency theory, the UK model is widely 
praised for its role in supporting an active market for corporate control and reducing 
agency costs. 276 This is not surprising, given the rationale for its introduction and the 
identity o f its promoters, and agency theory assumptions are immanent in the Code. Its 
rule of managerial passivity limits the hoard’s ability to impose agency costs on 
shareholders because of their desire to remain in their posts. Mandatory bid provisions 
support and protect dispersed minority shareholders by allowing all to exit on the same 
terms and share in the control premium, while "squeeze-out” rules ensure that existing 
shareholders are unable to free ride on the efforts made by corporate monitors. This 
ensures a supply of willing bidders. These rules constitute important modifications to the 
operation of capital markets and managerialist company law which underpin the 
operation of a market for corporate control and make shareholder value the dominant 
norm of corporate governance.
By contrast, when viewed through the productive coalition lens, the UK model's 
suspension of managerialism during takeovers becomes more controversial. Where 
agency theory does not recognise any adverse effects for other corporate constituencies, 
the productive coalition model sees the wasteful destruction of networks of implicit 
contracts. The position of employees in the City Code is undertheorised at best, 
incoherent at worst. If one assumes that an articulation of employee interests during the 
takeover process is unnecessary because they are fully protected by their contracts, the 
City Code's provisions dealing with employees appear redundant because they do not 
enhance the quality of shareholder decision-making. Absent this assumption, the Code's 
provisions do not adequately protect the interests of employees in the modem corporation 
from expropriation. Despite the Panel's claims that the Code takes into account employee
276 See, for example, Bebchuk, LA (2002) (supra note 230) and Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) {supra note 5), whose prescriptions for US takeover law conform very closely to the City Code.
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interests and recognition that takeovers may affect the "future livelihood" of employees, 
employees must rely on the board making a good argument to the shareholders to 
consider the employees’ interests (in maintaining their firm-specific investments or 
otherwise), and hope that their interests either coincide with those of the shareholders, or 
that the shareholders act altruistically. Relying on dispersed shareholders taking the 
employees' contractually unprotected interests into account and not selling their shares to 
the highest bidder appears to be an unlikely route to protection.
As an example of capture of the regulatory process by sectional interests, the City Code 
constitutes an anomalous but very important deviation from the common law’s 
managerialist approach, effectively replacing it with shareholder value in the context of 
takeovers. However, the Code's effects extend well beyond the takeover situation and the 
destruction of existing productive coalitions. As management's focus is constantly 
directed towards the share price in order to ward off hostile takeovers, any possibility of 
management assuming a neutral stance among the various constituencies is undermined. 
Management is unwilling to take any steps which might adversely affect the share price, 
including making long-term commitments to employees. This focus on shareholder value 
undermines the prospects for the emergence of new corporations based on a trust-based 
productive coalition model or the adoption of such a strategy by existing companies.
ii) Non-Delaware US
The criticisms of the non-Delaware US model run in precisely the opposite direction. The 
CTS decision in particular is often blamed for the ’’epidemic-like"277 spread of 
antitakeover laws.278 State antitakeover laws are widely criticised as measures of political 
choice, enacted at the behest of management and increasing agency costs for
277 Coffee, JC (1988) {supra note 21) at 436278 See Roe, (1993) (supra note 46) at 337. Georgakopoulos, NL, "Corporate Defense Law for Dispersed Ownership" (2001) 30 Hofstra Law Review 1 la t 27 argues that 25 other states enacted similar legislation in response to this decision. By mid-1995, this had increased to some 41 states per Robilotti, MG (1997) (supra note 214) at 536. For a contrary view on cause and effect, see Lipton's comment on Roe's article in Blair, MM, The Deal Decade (1993)at 353-357. Lipton argues that the "explosion of state antitakeover moves" did not follow the CTS case; rather the states’ response began immediately after the MITE decision.
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shareholders, while offering little in the way of additional protection to employees. 
Political expediency trumps economic good sense as losses suffered by management and 
employees reverberate politically in state elections, and corporate constituencies based in 
the state of incorporation rationally lobby their elected representatives to protect their 
interests.279 80 In comparison, the dispersed shareholders of US public corporations face a 
collective action problem. Their losses are felt over a range of companies across many 
jurisdictions281 and diversification makes it irrational for them to incur costs lobbying or 
co-ordinating shareholder action in the first place. Critics further charge that antitakeover 
legislation does not mitigate the social impact of hostile takeovers, and simply gives 
management discretion to serve the interests o f that group which most closely coincide 
with their own.282 Similarly, the poison pill, which is adopted unilaterally by managers, 
does not fit with a contractual model because shareholders would not have agreed to it, 
yet is tolerated by state courts.
*70
279 As Roe, MJ (2003) (supra note 9) says at 45, "One might cynically see these laws as made by and for managers, who wanted freedom to oppose hostile takeovers and, once they had it, offered employees little more." Roe, (1994) (supra note 1) at 160-1 argues that managers lobby for state legislation in order to circumvent the shareholder voting process. See also Robilotti, MG (1997) (supra note 214) at 544. Jensen, MC (1988) (supra note 16) at 45-6 argues that these statutes are "another example of special interests using the democratic political system to change the rules of the game to benefit themselves at the expense o f  society as a whole. In this case the special interests are top level corporate managers and other groups who stand to lose from competition in the market for corporate control.” O f course, as we saw above, a political stakeholder or productive coalition perspective would make this very criticism of the City Code. Robilotti, MG (1997) (supra) at 542 explains constituency statutes by reference to "the tremendous social and economic dislocation caused by takeovers, along with the perception in state legislatures that Wall Street reaps its huge financial gains off the back o f Main Street.” Similarly, Orts, EW (1992) (supra note 196) at 25 confirms that, although the Pennsylvania Chamber o f Commerce sponsored that state's antitakeover legislation, it was later sustained by a  broader coalition. Davids, RS (1995) (supra note 199) at 154 confirms that "it appears that it was the involvement o f labor and other interests, rather than the business community, which was decisive in the bill's enactment."280 Roe, (1993) (supra note 46) at 330-1. Orts, EW (1992) (supra note 196) at 23 argues that “the more persuasive view is that state legislatures passed antitakeover statutes largely in response to their constituents, many of whom perceived hostile takeovers negatively.” Romano, R (1988) (supra note 187) at 461-2 emphasises the role o f large local coiporations, which are vulnerable to hostile takeover, in the political process leading to legislation.281 Similarly, any "efficiency gains are spread through the economy. Dispersed winners do not even know they have won.” (Roe, (1993) (supra note 46) at 331)282 For use of the "classic argument" in this context, see Bechuk, L and Ferrell, A, "Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers" (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 1168; Davies, P, "The Board of Directors: Composition, Structure, Duties and Powers" (2000) OECD Paper Presented at Conference ”Company Law Reform in OECD Countries A Comparative Outlook o f  Current T r e n d s 7-8 December 2000 at 17 comments that the position o f stakeholders is unlikely to be improved by these regulations "unless the courts adopt a bold and interventionist stance when reviewing management's choice among the conflicting stakeholder interests...In both cases, entrenchment of incumbent management is likely to be the largest effect o f such rules."
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It appears to be not the element o f political choice which these commentators find 
objectionable, but the fact that the resultant legislative output does not conform with their 
notions of efficiency. Their criticisms are based on agency model assumptions, and 
accordingly, only the shareholders can have residual claims. Reasoning backwards from 
an assumption that the market for corporate control maximises the wealth of society, 
takeover regulation which tolerates defensive measures must be motivated by private 
benefit rather than economic efficiency.283 The UK rules, which conform very well to an 
agency model of the company, but are also the result of political choice, are not subject to 
a similar bombardment of criticism. Commentators also argue that these laws are 
anticontractual. Since antitakeover and constituency statutes could be put in place at the 
level of individual companies, their imposition by state law is only necessary because 
shareholders would not consent to them 284 If these commentators adopted productive 
coalition assumptions, they could instead seek to justify imposition at state level as a 
public good: these laws save transaction costs by providing the terms that "almost 
everyone [involved in a productive coalition] would want to adopt".285 The assumptions 
of the agency model transform transaction cost saving measures into inefficient 
regulatory interference with the operation of the market for corporate control.
Moving beyond the political choice argument, constituency statutes might be evaluated 
against the productive coalition model by asking to what extent they allow management 
to act as "mediating hierarchs", freed from the tyranny of the hostile takeover mechanism 
to establish nexuses of implicit contracts and build high-skill, high-productivity 
businesses. Perhaps because of the broad way in which constituencies are defined, these 
measures are rarely considered as part of a productive coalition model.286 The classic
283 See for example, Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) {supra note 5) at 167: "For contracting to work optimally, the markets must be completely free." Note however, the distortion of the market’s nonnal operation by the "freeze out" rule.284 See Roe, (1994) {supra note 1) at 160-1285 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D (1991) {supra note 5) at 34-5286 Although Orts, EW (1992) {supra note 196) notes at 19 that they "harbor potential for positive change...[they] may enable American corporations to emulate corporate governance configurations followed in competing nations within the world economy, such as Germany, Japan, and the nations o f the European Community... [which] already seem to operate in a manner that constituency statutes prom ote- to take seriously corporate interests beyond those of shareholders."
211
* 0 ' Targument about managerial unaccountability aside, constituency statutes certainly give 
management legal freedom to take into account non-shareholder interests, and therefore 
form the basis for an imperfect productive coalition model.287 88 The difficulty with this 
argument is that market adaptations have occurred which reinforce shareholder value and 
bypass state antitakeover laws. These adaptations are discussed below.
iii) Delaware
The Delaware courts' controversial decision to supervise managerial decision-making in 
the takeover context reflects their commitment to managerialism. Corporate governance 
becomes analogous to representative democracy.289 The Unocal decision affirms the 
board’s role as government, including, within the limits of review, "the power to decide 
whether or not to accept a takeover bid."290 The company gains the benefit of the board's 
expertise and inside information about the true value o f the firm and its prospects.291 The 
shareholders' role as voters is limited to the right to elect a board which shares their 
views, and if  they are "dissatisfied with a board decision to reject a takeover, their proper 
response is to elect another board."292 The employees merely have the status of election
287 For an argument that management of a productive coalition may be relied on to act in a trustworthy manner, see Blair, MM and Stout, LA, "Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law" (2000) Georgetown University Law Center 2000 Working Paper Series in Business, Economics, and Regulatory Law Working Paper No. 241403 .288 See the discussion of Blair and Stout’s "mediating hierarchs" model in Chapter 3.289 Kahan, M, "Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence" (1994) 19 J. Corp. L  583290 ibid at 685. See also Unocal at 958.291 However, Strine, LE (2002) (supra note 242) points out at 1399 that the popular argument that the board know more about the corporation's business than the shareholders may be undermined by the events at Enron: "The parade of Enron executives and directors who went before the Congress to plead guilty to ignorance about key financial issues is arguably difficult to reconcile with the ideal of paternalistic and all­knowing directors acting as the faithful market intermediaries for the stockholders." This may simply undermine the weight to be attached to the opinion of independent directors in applying the Unocal test. However, it might have more far-reaching implications, undermining the Delaware jurisprudence because "Without a credible basis to believe that the directors generally know best, articulators of the corporate law will not be as well positioned to permit directors to, in essence, make such fundamental investment decisions for owners of securities." If both constituencies are equally ill-informed, it does, o f  course, make economic sense to give decision-making power to the constituency which bears the risk, and in mainstream corporate governance debate, that is always the shareholders. But, as Strine points out at 1400, the Enron affair also cuts against the EMH, where the "marketplace [is] dominated by speculators, caught up in a frenzied desire to Boogie Board on the big wave, rather than by careful investors whose investments follow a careful examination of fundamental drivers of long-tenn corporate performance."292 Kahan, (1998) (supra note 289) at 685
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observers. The courts will not interfere with government decision-making except where it 
impinges upon this division of power or is motivated by bad faith.
Lipton and Rowe emphasise the beneficial effects of this managerial orientation and 
partial rejection of the EMH in protecting "shareholders, corporations, and directors from 
pressure to respond immediately to short-term dislocations in the stock market."293 The 
board’s ability to defend against takeovers in these circumstances was particularly 
valuable during the recent boom and bust in technology stocks where the dislocation was 
particularly pronounced. Looked at in terms of a productive coalition model, Delaware's 
takeover rules provide a more reliable underpinning for a nexus of incomplete contracts 
by assuring some continuity o f managerial personnel. By requiring the board to be able to 
produce economic evidence backing up their resistance to a given bid, the rules reduce 
the possibility of action aimed at entrenchment and ensure that management will use their 
mediating hierarch role in an economically rational manner rather than simply to favour 
client groups. This method implicitly recognises that one-size-fits-all regulation o f the 
takeover process will not be optimal for all companies.
By contrast, Roe offers a more pragmatic, political explanation o f Delaware's 
jurisprudence, but recognises that there is a "public-regarding dimension to antitakeover 
legislation."294. He argues that Delaware's original stance towards takeovers was fairly 
neutral, fearing that federal intervention might follow attempts to protect managers. 
When this fear proved unfounded, Delaware took a more antitakeover stance with the aim 
both of retaining corporations already present there, whose management were being 
tempted to reincoiporate by states offering more antitakeover regimes, and of attracting 
corporations incorporated elsewhere.295 The inefficient outcome of inter-state 
competition for corporate charters seems to be resolvable only by federal legislation.296
293 Lipton, M and Rowe, PK (2002) {supra note 187) at 27.294 Roe, (1994) {supra note I) at 16729i ibid at 163-6 and Roe, (1993) {supra note 46) at 340-9; similarly Bechuk, L and FerTell, A (1999) {supra note 282) at 1173.296 As recommended by Cary, W (1974) {supra note 213), calling for “federal standards of corporate responsibility” to prevent this particular ’’race to the bottom", a position supported recently by Bebchuk and Ferrell.
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Adaptive Responses by the Market to Takeover Regulation
Whatever the precise rationale for their enactment, it is clear that Delaware's takeover 
rules (like those of the other states) have not prevented takeovers from occurring.297 
Analysis o f takeover regulation in the abstract might lead to the conclusion that the 
movement back towards managerialism in many states means that the US system of 
corporate governance is less driven by agency theory than the UK system. Such a 
suggestion requires reconsideration in the light of what Ronald Dore terms the "capitalist- 
manager's counter revolution":298 the alignment of managerial interests with those o f 
shareholders through their remuneration packages. This adaptive response to regulatory 
permissiveness makes takeovers more friendly and consensual by contracting away 
managerial opposition. A board whose interests have been correctly aligned299 with those 
of shareholders is only likely to adopt defensive measures where this furthers the interests 
of target company shareholders (for example, by holding an auction or increasing the bid 
price). Stock options have been performing the hostile takeover's role since its 
disciplining effects were undermined (and its costs increased) as a result of the wider 
availability of defensive measures.
The exponential growth o f stock options is clearly referable to the spread of constituency 
statutes.300 Like the hostile takeover mechanism, these high-powered market incentives 
align the interests of management and shareholders through the medium of the share 
price, but replace the threat with an appeal to self-interest. Management's attention
297 Kahan, M and Rock, EB (2002) {supra note 237) note at 879 that the year 2000 saw over 10,000 takeover deals worth more than $ 1.285 trillion, an increase on 1988 o f over 400% in dollar terms and 300% in the number of deals.298 Dore, R (2000) {supra note 40) at 12299 Correct alignment requires that their interests qua shareholder should considerably outweigh their interests qua employee.800 Even the relatively mild Delaware takeover laws provoked this type of market response, including “significant changes in the structure o f compensation contracts...with features such as accelerated vesting upon a change of control. Such compensation devices provide substantial incentives to managers to accept an unsolicited bid...managers in companies with antitakeover provisions receive more valuable options, and managers of companies with large blockholders receive fewer options.” (Kahan, M and Rock, EB (2002) (supra note 237) at 896-7) Millon, D, "Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?" (2002) 70 George Washington Law Review 890 at 906 notes that "During the 1990s, the number o f options outstanding increased from 5 to 15 percent of all outstanding shares. Options now account for 60 percent of a typical CEO's compensation package." In the UK, their spread must be attributable to their lower transaction costs, compared with hostile takeovers.
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remains fixed on the share price, not as before through fear o f displacement, but because 
any action which harmed the company's share price would affect their remuneration* 
These changes to remuneration structure had their desired effect as, after a dip around 
1990, takeover activity during the 1990s once more approached its 1980s peak, but this 
time without the hostility. "Shareholder value became an ally rather than an enemy"301 302of 
management following the changes. The new coalition between management and 
shareholders rested on an understanding that management would be remunerated in 
proportion to the value they generated for shareholders (or more accurately, in line with 
the share price). State laws giving management back their discretion to act in a more 
pluralistic manner accordingly had little effect.
Stock options are only one of a number of mechanisms adopted by the capital market in 
response to the retreat of the hostile takeover to the corporate governance background. 
Other adaptive mechanisms like the progressive reduction of managerial tenure and 
improved corporate metrics, in particular quarterly earnings targets, discussed in Chapter 
one, wield enormous influence over management. Severe consequences follow failure to 
achieve expected earnings per share, while a "predictability premium" is awarded to 
companies which produce regular increments in earnings. These factors have induced the 
"management" (or "smoothing") of corporate earnings to maximise beneficial share price 
effects.303 Further dispersal of shareholders increased the power of institutional investors 
who "promote the Anglo-American model with a vengeance",304 their focus on financial 
and share price performance leading to high portfolio turnover. A growing number o f day
301 Holmstrom, B and Kaplan, S (.supra note 39) at 3302 Millon, D (2002) (supra note 300) notes at 909 that "A recent study finds abnormal declines in stock prices just prior to issuance o f options...These findings support the view that executives who are compensated by stock options allow their own self-interest to influence exercise of their managerial authority." Such incidents demonstrate the difficulty of measuring the creation of shareholder value where the EMH does not hold. Similarly, Stout LA, "On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board) " (UCLA School o f Law Law and Economics Research Paper 03-08 at 4 fn 9 points out that "stock-based compensation... can encourage directors to take actions that can raise share price in the short run rather effectively, while hanning the firm’s long-run prospects. Accounting fraud provides an extreme example of this phenomenon."303 See further Millon, D (2002) (supra note 300) at 897. This might involve, for example, setting aside reserves against notional contingent liabilities, which are then declared not to have arisen when the time is right. Millon suggests at 900 that "Earnings management, like earnings inflation, is symptomatic of a corporate culture emphasizing current stock prices over creation of longer-term value."304 Mitchell, LE (2001) (supra note 54) at 171
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traders tom over a high proportion of their shares simply on the basis of these metrics. 
Neither group has the resources or the incentive to observe the underlying businesses o f 
the corporations in which they invest Further, social norms of shareholder value and the 
’financialisation' of executives contribute to an increasing focus on accounting matters 
and the disjunction of management from the underlying productive business.
The constant focus on share price driven by these mechanisms undermines the viability 
o f the productive coalition model just as much as the hostile takeover did. Management 
now have strong incentives not to take into account employee interests, and employees 
have no countervailing political power to exert over management. Where investors rely 
solely on the share price and its supporting metrics as a proxy for the creation o f 
shareholder value, this, coupled with the reflexivity of markets, causes severe difficulties 
for companies which want to make investments in training with a view to developing the 
firm’s future competencies. Without detailed knowledge of an individual company’s 
circumstances, it is impossible to for investors to attach a precise value to these 
investments.305 Even if  it were possible, it would require an investor to go ’’against trend" 
in his market activities, a course of action which is unlikely to be sustainable for 
institutional investors who are judged against benchmarks like stock market indices over 
shorter time horizons,306 and a very risky one for small investors who have to close out 
their position within a limited time span.307
To allow the capture o f the board's mediating power by one constituency through the 
provision of incentives to serve that constituency's interests would appear to contradict 
the managerialist notion that the board serves the company as a whole rather than simply 
the shareholders. This issue is of particular salience for the law in the wake of the Enron 
debacle. The policy question now being faced by regulators is whether to try to introduce
305 See Osterman, P (1999) {supra note 77) at 152. He points out that even institutional investors "do not seem to develop the kind of in-depth knowledge that might lead them to support human resource investments that are shunned by more conventional analysts." The problem is, of course, with free riders, as even institutional investors do not hold large enough stakes to justify the necessary monitoring.306 See Mitchell, LE (2001) (supra note 54) Ch 7. Mitchell also notes at 170 that fund managers are remunerated on the basis of how much money they make, "a fact which focuses his attention on the short­term performance of his portfolio corporations."307 See Raj an and Zingales* critique of the EMH, supra note 76.
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still more measures which will force the board to maximise shareholder value, for 
example, by defining shareholder value more clearly or by improving external 
monitoring.308 Alternatively, the increasing intensity of adaptive mechanisms means that 
legal support for companies based on a productive coalition model requires more than 
just reform of takeover regulation. Managerial insulation from capital market pressures 
needs to be restored, but must not result in diminished accountability. Breaking the link 
between managerial remuneration and short teim stock price is necessary, and reform of 
accounting standards to reflect the changing nature of capital is essential, but unlikely, 
particularly given the level of opposition to reform of the treatment of stock options. 
Regulators might consider reforming monitoring structures to involve other 
constituencies, such as employees, as a way of improving managerial accountability. 
Similarly, information and consultation may serve useful articulative functions if  the 
intensity of adaptive mechanisms is somewhat reduced. More explicit guidance for the 
board about when to take into account other constituencies might be helpful; voluntary 
statements of CSR, such as codes of conduct, may play an important role in setting out 
management's game plan and maintaining confidence of the various constituencies in the 
corporate decision-making process. Similarly, social accounting may convey useful 
information to the various corporate constituencies. More research is needed on ways in 
which managerial insulation could be enhanced without leading to unaccountability.
Conclusion
While the differences between US and UK systems of takeover regulation are striking, in 
particular as regards the role of managerialism, takeover regulation is only one among 
several influences on the prominence and dynamism of the takeover mechanism. It is 
suggested that hostile takeovers originally undermined managerialism, but that 
shareholder value is now underpinned by a more complex mix of aligned incentives and 
other market mechanisms, with the hostile takeover relegated to the background, standing 
by in case managerialism should once more rear its head. Management are now unlikely 
to oppose takeovers where they stand to gain from their share options. This suggests that
i0i See for example, the recent "Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors"
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in jurisdictions where shareholder value has strong roots, the precise configuration o f 
takeover regulation is only one o f a number of factors competing for influence.
While unlikely to have a causal effect on its own, a rule of strict management neutrality 
may contribute to undermining the viability of the productive coalition model - lack o f  
managerial entrenchment undermines their ability to make credible commitments and act 
as mediating hierarchs. The firm-specific investments which are the basis of the 
productive coalition model are fragile, and are unlikely to be made without a legal 
framework.309 Allowing management to take some defensive measures appears to be 
more compatible with a productive coalition model, although there is the well-publicised 
risk that they will act in a self-serving way.
Where either model is pursued, regulatory interventions may be justified in pursuit of a 
specific notion of efficiency. The debate about takeover regulation revolves around which 
model of the company should prevail, which notion of efficiency is more appropriate, and 
ultimately, whose interests should take precedence. The "political conflict over 
takeovers...divides shareholders and stakeholders, and thus transcends the usually narrow 
concerns of corporate law."310 This conflict is, of course, an aspect o f the broader debate 
about corporate governance and the model o f the company which should be pursued in 
order to enrich society. Each legislator must decide whether to concern themselves with 
"the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment"311 or with developing "mechanisms that give the firm the 
power to provide incentives to human capital."312
produced by Derek Higgs for the DTI in January 2003.09 See the argument of Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S, "Labour Co-Determination and Corporate Governance in Germany: The Economic Impact of Marginal and Symbolic Rights" (Quint- Essenzen Nr 65, August 2001, IAAEG in favour of legal intervention to this end, discussed in Chapter 3.310 Coffee, JC (1988) (supra note 21) at 440311 Shleifer, A and Vishny, RW, "A Survey of Corporate Governance" (1997) 52 Journal o f  Finance 737 at 737312 Rajan and Zingales, "The Governance of the New Enterprise" in Vives, X (ed), Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives (2000), 201 at 203
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Chapter Five: Takeover Regulation in Germany
Introduction
In this chapter I look at takeover regulation in Germany. This forms an instructive 
counterpoint to the UK and US regulatory systems because the German system of 
corporate governance as a whole is rather different from the Anglo-American one. It is 
often categorised as the paradigmatic example of an 'insider' system of corporate control, 
"with small numbers of quoted companies, concentrated share ownership and 
comparatively low levels of takeover activity," in contrast to Anglo-American ’outsider’ 
systems, which are characterised by "large equity markets, dispersed ownership and 
active markets in corporate control."1 Corporate constituencies, rather than the market, 
tend to monitor the actions of corporate managers.2 Since shareholdings are, on the 
whole, concentrated, the collective action problem and rational apathy do not arise 
because large shareholders receive the benefits of their efforts and do not have the ready 
exit option enjoyed by dispersed shareholders in the Anglo-American system. Block 
shareholders monitor both formally through their representatives on the supervisory 
board, and notably, informally through "out-of-the-boardroom shareholder caucuses and 
meetings [with] managers",3 committees and long-standing relational networks. In large 
corporations, employees also play a monitoring role through their representatives on the 
supervisory board.4
1 See for example, Franks, JR and Mayer, C, "Ownership and Control o f German Corporations" (2001) CEPR Discussion Paper No 2898, July 2001 at 1* It is often argued that blockholders in this system perform the same role as the market for corporate control does in the UK and the US. Bergstrom, C, Hogfeldt, P, Macey, JR, and Samuelsson, P, "The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions: A Law and Economics Analysis of European Proposals for Reform" (1995) Columbia Business Law Review 495 argue that, as a result o f “unique historical economic conditions”, banks only exercise vetoes rather than actively monitoring and demanding US-style restructuring. Banks are often both equity and debt holders, and so have a preference for a lower level of risk-taking, and so do not pressurise management to maximise shareholder value exclusively.3 Roe, MJ, Political Determinants o f  Corporate Governance (2003) at 724 However, where blockholders adopt informal monitoring mechanisms, this may have the effect of "sapping" the supervisory board's power Roe, MJ (2003) (supra) at 72. This may be seen as an adaptive response on the part of blockholders to mandatory co-determination.
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However, ’insider' systems of corporate governance like the German model are widely 
considered to be under pressure5 because of globalisation and, in particular, liberalisation 
of capital markets, increased competition in product markets, and the corresponding 
cultural diffusion of norms of shareholder value6 and "marketisation."7 *'Progress' in a 
more market-orientated direction is being hindered both by structural factors and the legal 
model o f corporate decision-making. This chapter first considers the structure of German 
corporate governance and the laws relating to corporate decision-making as they apply to 
employees. It then analyses their effect on hostile takeovers. Finally, it discusses the 
evolution of takeover regulation and the new German Takeover Law which came into 
force in 2002, analysing it in terms of the models of the company and in terms of its place 
in the broader system of German corporate governance.
Structure and Operation of Germ an Corporate Governance
The dominance of large shareholders means that the Berle and Means corporation is not 
prevalent in Germany. Banks dominate the German system of corporate governance. 
Some surveys have found banks controlling up to 95% of the shares in large public
Acorporations. Along with insurance companies, they are committed long-term 
shareholders who hold large shareholdings in enterprises, as well as directorships on the 
supervisory board.9 A high level o f holding clearly puts them in a strong position to
5 The pressure on the co-determination model has been increased by the current economic downturn in Germany. The Financial Times reported on Friday, 20th June 2003 that 58.3 per cent of Lufthansa shareholders had adopted a resolution condemning the supervisory board vice-chairman and head of the Verdi trade union, Frank Bsirske, for encouraging strikes. Critics of co-determination use this to support their argument that co-determination institutionalises conflict rather than co-operation within the corporation. For a more nuanced discussion of the relationship between conflict and co-determination, see Pistor, K, “Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities” in Blair, MM and Roe, MJ (eds), Employees & Corporate Governance (Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 1999)6 Lane, C, "Changes in Corporate Governance of German Corporations: Convergence to the Anglo- American Model?" (2003) ESRC Centre fo r  Business Research, University o f Cambridge Working Paper No 259 at 107 Dore, R, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism - Japan and Germany Versus the Anglo-Saxons (2000) at 171* See Jürgens, U and Rupp, J, "The German System o f Corporate Governance - Characteristics and Changes" (2001) INSEAD Paper form ing part o f Corporate Governance, Innovation and Economic Performance in the EUResearch Project at 5-6 for an English language review.9 Although Hopt, "The German Two-Tier Board: Experience, Theories, Reforms" in Hopt, KJ, Randa, H, Roe, MJ, Wymeersch, E, and Prigge, S (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: The State o f the Art and Emerging Research (1998), 227 at 253 notes that there may be a trend toward banks withdrawing from
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monitor management without vulnerability to the free-rider problem. However, it should 
not be assumed that banks monitor solely with a view to ensuring shareholder value.10 
The traditional explanation of the banks’ role in corporate governance has been that their 
long-term relational ties mean that their ’’interests as creditors took precedence over their 
interests as shareholders.”11 Their role as house banks involves long-term credit links and 
gives them "deep insight into the credit-taking corporation."12 In addition, social and 
cultural factors may lead banks to "feel they have obligations to other stakeholders such 
as employees and managers."13
Generally, the Hausbank model, where a bank has close relational ties with a particular 
company through a combination of interconnections, is considered to be of decreasing 
importance as competition in financial markets increasingly pushes banks to adopt a 
model of investment banking. While the banks' most visible role in corporate governance 
may be declining as they are driven to sell off their long-held core shareholdings, many 
other links, both financial and more broadly relational, continue to tie them to large 
corporations. For example, banks retain considerable indirect influence in corporate 
governance through their shareholdings in large insurance companies.14 More 
importantly, their voting rights are boosted by the depository system (Depotstimmrecht), 
whereby banks vote the shares which are placed on deposit with them by dispersed
their supervisory board positions. Jürgens, U and Rupp, J (2001) (supra) at 24 confirms this, although the speed of change is hardly dramatic and the starting point for the decline is at a very high level: "between 1986 and 1993, private banks reduced the number of seats held on the supervisory boards of the 100 largest German companies from 114 to 99."10 This is the view o f agency theorists who argue that the agency problem arises between depositors and the bank rather than between shareholders and management.11 Davies, P, "Employee Representation and Corporate Law Reform: A Comment from the United Kingdom” (2000) 22 Comp. Labor Law & Policy Journal 135 at 141; Beinert, D, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers in Germany (2000) points out at 70 that "German companies rely heavily on debt finance and the banks are often the largest creditors of the target."12 Hopt, "Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?" in McCahery, JA, Moerland, P, Raaijmakers, T, and Renneboog, L (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (2002), 175 at 186; per Dore, R (2000) (supra note 7) at 175, "their ties with the firms they serve have been multistranded, covering insurance, securities underwriting, and trading and business consulting as well as the usual commercial credit and longer-term finance."13 Franks and Mayer, "Bank Control, Takeovers, and Corporate Governance in Germany" in Hopt, Kanda et al (\99%)(supra note 9), 641 at 642. This factor may be expected to diminish with increasing liberalisation of financial markets and the growing involvement of lenders not bound by such social norms.14 Thanks to Dieter Sadowski for this point; banks and insurance companies frequently hold long-term cross-shareholdings
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shareholders.15 In the absence of specific instructions on how to vote (which is usually 
the case), the banks must clearly state to shareholders how they will vote. In fact, they 
usually vote with management, subject to a legal duty to act in the interest of the client.16
Despite recent changes to capital gains tax rules (discussed below) which allow 
corporations to divest themselves of corporate cross-holdings without incurring huge 
capital gains tax liabilities, many corporations continue to hold large shareholdings in 
other companies. Corporate cross-shareholdings are in fact the most prevalent form of 
shareholding in the German economy.17 In firms where banks do not hold large 
shareholdings, this form of cross-shareholding may be particularly important in 
maintaining long-term relationships between firms, since "ownership strongly overlaps 
with a variety of other commercial relations."18 Although they may be shareholders, 
cross-shareholding corporations take a long-term productive view of their relationship 
with each other.
There are also many personal links between companies. Like banks, as noted above, 
many companies (including, in particular, insurance companies) provide each other with 
board members, both at the supervisory and management board levels.19 Since the 
priority o f these representatives is generally the maintenance of long-term stable 
relations, their widespread presence is likely to prevent the pursuit of shareholder value 
becoming the corporation's dominant aim, at least in the short term, as "interlocking 
directorates and direct and indirect reciprocal personal links create interdependencies
15 Beinert, D (2000) (supra note 11) at 70: "It is estimated that the five largest banks in Germany own about15 per cent of the country’s listed shares and that the banks control an additional 20 per cent by way of proxy votes.” A similar arrangement applies to associations o f shareholders which may control sizeable chunks of company stock.16 Hopt, (2002) (supra note 12) at 186-717 Dore, R (2000) (supra note 7)at 175; Jurgens, U and Rupp, J (2001) (supra note 8) at 7 note that in 1999 non-financial companies held 29.3% of shares in DAX30 companies compared to 13,5% held by banks.18 HSpner, M and Jackson, G, "An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance" (2001) Max-Planck-Institut fu r  Gesellschaftsforschung MP1JG Discussion Paper 01/4 at 619 Prigge, "A Survey of German Corporate Governance" in Hopt, Kanda et al (1998Xsupra note 9), 943 at 959
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among their members that might result in an atmosphere o f mutual consideration at the 
expense of shareholders.”20
In addition to this combination of bank and other corporation holdings, large family 
holdings should also be mentioned for their contribution to the concentration of 
ownership of many corporations.21
Barriers to Hostile Takeovers
This degree of concentration of ownership, coupled with the small number of public 
corporations,22 means that targets for hostile bids have been hard to find.23 The large but 
private GmbH, which makes up 44% of the companies subject to "quasi-parity” co­
determination,24 is normally controlled by large shareholders, meaning it is a step 
removed from the model of the Berle-Means corporation and not an appropriate target for 
a hostile bid. Similarly, public AGs,25 which "represent a significant but not dominant 
part of the German economy", and make up the rest of the co-determined companies, also 
tend to have a concentrated ownership structure, dominated by the large stakes held by 
the groups discussed above.26 Further, even if a suitable target can be identified, a bidder 
faces the further obstacle o f having to identify and locate smaller shareholders, since 
most shares are bearer shares, and notification requirements only apply above 5, 10, 25,
20 ibid at 96121 See for example, Prigge (1998) (supra note 19) at 975 who notes that in 1992, 18.9% of the shares of the largest 500 companies were held by families.22 Per Beinert, D (2000) (supra note 11) at 67, "there are only about 870 German corporations listed on a German stock exchange, a large number of which are in turn affiliated with other companies, i.e., not really publicly held. Notwithstanding the increasing number of listings in recent years, it is estimated that the number o f candidates suitable for a tender offer does not currently exceed about 100."23 The hostile bid is a rare phenomenon in Germany, with only a handful since 1945. See for example Prigge, (1998) {supra note 19) at 992 and Franks and Mayer, (1998) {supra note 1) at 642. Recently there have been tentative signs of an upturn in activity, such as Vodafone's successful hostile bid for Mannesmann in 2000 (see further H8pner, M and Jackson, G (2001) {supra note 18)) and Krupp’s unsuccessful 1997 hostile bid for Thyssen (one of the rare widely held companies) which came to a negotiated settlement. See also Franks and Mayer, "Ownership and Control in Europe" in Newman, P (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary o f Economics and the Law (1998), 722, vol. II, 722 at 722 and 72724 Prigge, (1998) {supra note 19) at 95125 In February 1997 there were 4088 o f them: Hopt, (1998) {supra note 9) at 25726 The exact pattern of ownership is complex: for detailed analysis see e.g., Prigge, (1998) {supra note 19) at 968-978. One striking illustration of the degree of concentration is that the stake of the largest shareholder at 65.4% o f listed AG s in 1983 was over 50%.
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50 and 75% thresholds. Smaller shareholders must initially be sought through the media, 
but once a bid has been launched, the depository banks are obliged to disclose the identity 
of the depositors.
The long-term perspective which many large shareholders take leads to fewer conflicts o f  
interest between their representatives and the representatives o f employees on the 
supervisory board, where decisions are almost always made by consensus. This aspect is 
discussed further below. Further, this identity of interests also plays a role in 
discouraging hostile bids, and while these positions are maintained, "there may be little 
that a strict neutrality rule, or any other rule o f corporate law, can do to facilitate an 
active market for corporate control.. ."27
These factors have contributed significantly to the virtual absence to date of hostile 
takeovers in the German marketplace. In addition, a period of industrial prosperity has 
coincided with popular (and managerial) opposition to hostile takeovers. Many shares 
never reach the market in the first place, and where they do, the sellers are likely to be 
influenced in their choice of buyer by their additional interests (beyond maximising their 
gain on their shareholdings).
The lack o f liquidity in stock markets means that Germany does not have a functioning 
market for corporate control in the sense that market participants monitor management 
performance by reference to share prices.28 Internal monitoring of management, 
performed by a combination of committed shareholders and labour representatives on the 
supervisory board, may constitute a functional equivalent of the market for corporate 
control.29 However, the identity and interests o f the monitors, coupled with the fact that
27 Painter, R and Kirchner, C, "European Takeover Law - Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for Takeover Law" (2000) 1 European Business Organization Law Review 353 at 391; this is because "Few bidders are willing to enter a market where the success or failure of tender offers is determined not by wealth maximizing shareholders, but by managers of other companies who are themselves hostile to hostile takeovers."28 Dorè, R (2000) (supra note 7) at 174 suggests that "the equity market has hitherto served as a market only in income-yielding assets, not also as a market in corporate control"29 Monitoring internally may be more appropriate where there is a large degree o f firm-specific investment, since only those on the inside of the corporation are able to assess its extent, which as we have seen, is impossible for the market.
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the monitoring occurs by reference to criteria other than the publicly-quoted share price, 
means that, management are not monitored exclusively according to the criterion of 
shareholder value.
The absence o f hostile takeovers does not mean that German corporations do not merge 
and consolidate. In fact mergers play an important role in fostering industrial efficiency 
(by creating synergies and economies of scale), but this is functionally separated from the 
internal task o f disciplining management. Takeovers normally take the form of a 
privately-agreed sale, with "managers getting the agreement, in face-to-face contact, of 
representatives o f large blocks of holdings"30 1 for the acquisition of a controlling stake, 
rather than a market-based tender offer leading to a contest for control. Since the 
blockholder is likely to have long-term strategic interests in common with the corporation 
whose shares are being sought, they are likely to scrutinise the offeror’s business plan 
carefully. Consent is only likely to be forthcoming if the bidder sets forth a stable 
business policy.32 It has been suggested that the transfer o f block shareholdings "may 
serve as a substitute for the Anglo-American type o f market for corporate control” as the 
incoming shareholders begin to monitor management.33 However, a more common view 
is that the mergers which are witnessed in Germany "are based less on financial or 
governance logic than they are on industrial logic: horizontal and vertical mergers 
between firms in the same industry aim at rationalization and economies of scale, while 
horizontal mergers diversify into new but related product areas.”34
If a change in control occurs by reason of a transfer of a controlling shareholding, the 
party gaining control is required to make a mandatory tender offer to the other
30 Of couTse, the sale may well be opposed by management: Franks and Mayer, (1998) (supra note 23) at 64331 Dore, R (2000) (supra note 7) at 17432 See further Lutter and Lammers, "Hostile Takeovers: Possibilities and Limitations According to German Law" in Maeijer, JMM and Geens, K (eds), Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers in the Common Market (1990), 113at 135: "A raider has the best opportunities of rapidly acquiring extensive influence in a company if he is able to convince the representatives of the banks of his further intentions."33 Prigge, (1998) (supra note 17) at 993. Purchasers normally pay a premium to the selling blockholder, but this tends to be lower than the premia paid in hostile takeovers in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Another important difference is that minority shareholders normally do not receive a share of the premium. See Franks, JR and Mayer, C (2001) (supra note 1) at 3.
225
shareholders, a requirement which is clearly aimed at protecting minority shareholders.34 5 
Alternatively, the acquiring company may make a voluntary public tender offer for the 
remainder of the shares.36 37As a major business transaction, either of these methods is 
likely to require the approval o f the supervisory board of the offeror company, or the 
shareholders if there is none.
The absence of a market for coiporate control has important consequences for the way in 
which corporations are governed. It means that "firms retain the option of pursuing 
strategies other than maximizing the return on equity...firms can absorb higher labor 
costs, thus avoiding layoffs more easily during cyclical downturns and thereby protecting 
employee morale and firm-specific human capital."38 Hopner and Jackson argue that this 
‘insider’ system may lead to a different equilibrium than that reached under the Anglo- 
American system in which "markets for corporate control make the ‘equilibrium* of 
lower market capitalization and lower distribution of value-added for shareholders more 
difficult to sustain."39
Signs of Change in German Corporate Governance
There are signs that the above picture of long-term stability and commitment on the part 
of shareholders may be beginning to change.
First there have been several important legal changes. Capital Gains Tax was abolished 
on the sale of cross-holdings from the commencement o f the 2002 tax year. This is likely
34 Hopner, M and Jackson, G (2001) {supra note 18) at 1535 This provision applies in various situations where control changes, see Beinert, D (2000) {supra note 11 ) at 66 for further details: "mandatory tender offers are not used to acquire control. Rather, they are a legal consequence of corporate measures taken by a shareholder already holding a controlling interest."36 This is a very unusual route, and is not usually for the purpose o f gaining control: Per Beinert, D (2000) {supra note 11) at 67, "during the period from 1995 to mid-1999, there were only 105 cases. In most of these cases, the goal of the offer was not to acquire control."37 Beinert, D (2000) {supra note 11) at 66: however if no internal authorisation has been obtained, the transaction will normally be binding unless the other party knows that the transaction is ultra vires. This rule does appear to offer some protection to the shareholders o f the offeror company against empire­building on the part of the board of the offeror company.38 Hopner, M and Jackson, G (2001) {supra note 18) at 1239 ibid at 48
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to facilitate the sale of shareholdings which have been held for long periods of time.40 
Further, there has been incremental financial market deregulation, including the creation 
of a Federal Supervisoiy Office for Securities Trading, the relaxation of rules on 
investment companies, and permission for companies to engage in share buy-backs and 
the issue of stock options to management. These measures have gone some way towards 
creating a capital market framework which supports the pursuit of shareholder value.41 
The growing number US (and to a lesser extent, UK) pension funds and other 
institutional investors, who bring their corporate governance standards with them, will 
seek to use these reforms to push for greater focus on shareholder value.42
Second, the growth of international competition may have increased the vulnerability of 
German publicly owned corporations to hostile takeover, as evidenced by Vodafone's 
successful hostile takeover of Mannesmann. German banks are under competitive 
pressure from European and global rivals, and their need to produce increased returns is 
generally considered to have reduced the scope for patient investment strategies o f the 
kind which have been historically dominant in Germany.43 In addition, financial 
deregulation has put German banks under pressure to raise their share price in order to 
fight off the threat of hostile takeover by overseas competitors.44 Accordingly, German 
banks focus increasingly on lucrative investment banking at the expense of relational 
banking. Greater attention to the bottom line is likely to increase the availability o f  large 
blocks of shares in those publicly-traded corporations which are underperforming (in 
terms o f creating shareholder value). The danger that blockholders might exit is likely to 
turn the attention of management of those corporations towards enhancing shareholder
40 As Hopt, KJ, "Takeovers, Secrecy, and Conflicts of Interest: Problems for Boards and Banks" (2002) ECGI Working Paper 03/2002 points out at 4, some of the holdings date back as far as the mid-19* Century.41 See in particular, the 1998 law (Control and Transparency Act -  KonTraG).42 Lannoo, K, "A European Perspective on Corporate Governance" (1999) 37 Journal o f  Common Market Studies 269 at 28843 Dore, R (2000) (supra note 7), Ch 844 Dore (ibid at 177) notes that in this climate, banks have become "more cautious/calculative about landing themselves with the risk of having to perform the traditional role of a major bank shareholder - namely to bail out, or in extreme cases get involved the management of, failing firms." Jürgens, U and Rupp, J (2001) {supra note 8) at 24 note the "major shift from ‘patient capital’ to shareholder value orientation in the German banking sector" means that shares are now viewed as investments and expected to produce a return.
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value with the aim of maintaining a stable shareholder base. Further stimulus is given to 
the whole process by the above changes in capital gains tax rules which have spurred on 
the banks to sell off some of their shareholdings and to use the resulting liquidity to seek 
higher returns from the market.45 These changes mean that banks are no longer as reliable 
a defence to hostile takeover as they were, although the erosion of these longstanding 
networks o f relationships will clearly be a slow process.
The Legal Position before the Enactment of the New Takeover Act
Social norms, the ownership structure described above, and post-bid restrictions on 
taking control, rather than German company law, led to the virtual absence of hostile bids 
in Germany. From a legal perspective, those rare companies with dispersed shareholders 
appeared particularly vulnerable because German company law before the new Takeover 
Act only permitted the board to take limited defensive measures in the face of an 
unwelcome bid.
The position before the enactment of the new Takeover Act remains important because, 
as we shall see below, the new German takeover law permits the shareholders in general 
meeting or the supervisory board to authorise the management board to take defensive 
measures against the bid; presumably the range of defensive measures which may be 
authorised in this way is determined by general company law.
i) Availability o f Defensive Measures to the Board
As a preliminary matter it should be noted that the board owe duties to act in the best 
interests o f the company and in the face of a bid are obliged to provide the shareholders 
with their opinion of the bid so that the shareholders may make an informed decision.46
45 However, The Economist, A Survey o f  Germany, 7* December 2002 at 10 reported that "the sell-off has been slower than expected" because markets started to "plummet" around the time of the legal changes.46 Lutter and Lammers, (1990) (supra note 32) at 118
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a) Voting rights limitations
Generally the rule of one share, one vote holds, although listed preference shares without 
voting rights are fairly common.47 Multiple voting shares have been prohibited in 
principle since 1937.48 Perhaps the most common defensive measure was, until recently, 
the limitation of voting rights to a specified percentage, which tended to be between 5% 
and 15% of the votes.49 These limits applied to all blockholders, including banks, but not 
to the banks in their capacity as proxies for depositors. This rule further strengthened the 
bank's governance position. The introduction of new limitations on voting rights has been 
prohibited for listed companies since the law was changed in 1998, and those limitations 
which did exist lost their effectiveness on 1st June 2000.50 This is a particularly 
significant change because, among the 20 or so AGs which had maximum voting rights 
provisions in force, many have widely dispersed shareholders.51 These corporations are 
presumably now considerably more vulnerable to hostile takeover.
b) Registered shares
A company may still change its articles to require that the shares of the company be 
registered, effectively requiring the company's approval for registration. This would give 
the management board broad discretion over whether to register the new owner. As a 
defensive measure, this course of action is of limited use if the provision is not already 
included in the articles, because every shareholder must consent to the change. They are 
unlikely to do so because of its effect on the marketability of their shares. Furthermore, 
any potential bidder who has already gained a "toe-hold" in the company will clearly not 
consent. Finally, this does not appear a viable option for listed companies in the light of 
the requirement of Article 46 of Directive 2001/34/EC that publicly listed shares be 
freely transferrable.
47 Prigge, (1998) (supra note 19) at 97948 Lutter and Lammers, (1990) (supra note 32) at 13249 Franks and Mayer, (1998) (supra note 13) at 644 note that "In a list o f 19 companies which had votingright restrictions in 1988, we found that 17 had no single shareholder owning more than 25% of the shares. so Pursuant to the provisions of FContraG, see Beinert, D (2000) (supra note 11) at 7251 See Prigge, (1998) (supra note 19) at 979 for more details
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c) Poison pills and other increases in share capital
An increase in share capital to respond to the bid also faces fairly intractable difficulties. 
First, the notice period required to call a meeting to increase share capital is unviable 
once a bid becomes live.52 Second, under §202-6 of AktG, the board may be authorised 
for up to five years to increase the share capital of the company provided the consent of 
the supervisory board is obtained. For this to be effective against a raider, however, 
requires the removal of his statutory pre-emption rights under §186 AktG. While the 
virtual absence of hostile takeovers to date makes this a rather theoretical issue, it appears 
unlikely that the requirements for the withdrawal of pre-emption rights will be satisfied 
where the aim is to avert a hostile takeover.53
d) Reduction of share capital or "greenmail”
The company may attempt to reduce its share capital by buying back shares on the 
market in order to head off the takeover threat. Up to 10% of the share capital may be 
repurchased for transfer to the employees and this may form a partial defence.54 Since the 
KontraG law of 1998, the rules on share buy-backs have been greatly relaxed,55 which 
may mean it becomes a more important defensive strategy.
e) Other strategies
Asset sales and seeking a white knight appear to be viable options under German 
company law.
ii) Post-bid Obstacles to Gaining Control: Co-determination
Even where a bidder succeeds in gaining a majority of the shares, there are further 
obstacles to the exercise of control, in the form of "...regular company law [which]...
52 Four weeks notice must be given and a range of formalities observed per § 184 AktG: Lutter and Lammers, ( 1990) (supra note 32) at 11953 Lutter and Lammers, (1990) {supra note 32) at 120-122; withdrawal of pre-emption rights must be in the interests o f the company, must be necessary and suited to the aim pursued, and compatible with the requirement of reasonableness. These requirements are unlikely to be met where the board does not have full information about the bidder's intentions.54 §71(1) No.2 AktG55 See Jürgens, U and Rupp, J (2001) {supra note 8) at 15-16
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slows down the rapid influence of a majority shareholder on the fortunes of "his*' 
company."56 In combination with the structural factors discussed above, this appears to 
have been an important factor in discouraging hostile bids.
The co-determined two-tier board, 57 58with its employee representatives, which governs 
decision-making in large Geiman corporations appears to have been instituted for 
political reasons. However, its impact on the German system of corporate governance is 
fundamental in both political and economic terms. Co-determination fits with Germany’s 
broad political requirement that corporations act in the public interest, and has created 
institutional complementarities between governance structure and the source of 
competitive advantage of German corporations.59 These issues are dealt with further 
below.
In contrast to American constituency statutes and s309 of the Companies Act 1985, 
which apparently permit the board to take stakeholder interests into account, the German 
system of co-determination is based on the twin mechanisms of employee representation 
on the supervisory boards of large corporations {Aufsichtsrat) and representation through
56 Lutter and Lammers, (1990) {supra note 32) at 14057 For an account of the historical evolution of co-determination see Hopt, (1998) {supra note 9) and Robilotti, MG, "Codetermination, Stakeholder Rights, and Hostile Takeovers: A Réévaluation of the Evidence from Abroad" (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 536 and the sources cited therein. In particular, it is notable that the "mandatory supervisory board of 1870 and mandatory disclosure were the prices set by lawmakers for permanently giving up their charter requirement and former state control. Therefore, the German supervisory board is historically the incarnation of the idea of a strictly separate outside board to control the management board for the sake of the shareholders, but also to protect the public interest. Public interest was considered both before and after 1870 to extend beyond the mere shareholders" (Hopt, (1998) {supra note 9) at 230)58 Dore, R (2000) {supra note 7) notes at 182 that "This system has its roots in 1890s laws of catholic corporatist inspiration designed to promote works councils, thereby mitigating class conflict by institutionalizing the positive-sum elements of the capitalist employment relation." Hopt, 1998 {supra note 9) at 236-7: "Formal boardroom co-determination beyond mere works council representation was introduced first in 1920 and again in 1952, i.e., both times after the wars when solidarity was badly needed. A further factor may have been the massive loss of private savings by superinflation and two currency reforms. This not only hindered the development of broad capital markets, but it equalized German society more than in other Western countries. Cooperation and consensus were the forces needed to deal with collective crises." In addition, many writers note the role of the allies post WWII in encouraging co­determination, see for example, Dore, R (2000) {supra) at 183. On the history of co-determination, see also Thelen, K, Union o f  Parts (1991).59 Roe, MJ (2003) {supra note 3) also points to an institutional complementarity between the persistence of blockholders and co-determination. Blockholders have the advantage over dispersed shareholders that they can bypass the co-determined supervisory board and monitor management directly.
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works councils at plant level. This means that there are often multiple works councils 
within a single corporation or group.60 A more detailed analysis of German co­
determination would also take into account the German system of collective bargaining 
which is concentrated at sectoral level. However, it is on board level representation that 
this analysis will focus, because it is there that employees potentially have the 
opportunity to exercise voice and/or influence the outcome of takeover bids.
The division of power within the two-tier board is strict.61 The "incompatibility"62 rule 
states that the management board ( Vorstand) runs the firm in the interests of the entire 
organisation,63 while the Aufsichtsrat's duties include the selection and appointment of 
the management board, its supervision (at least four supervisory board meetings per year 
are mandated64) and, if  necessary, its dismissal.65 The shareholders are not allowed to 
give instructions to the Aufsichtsrat and if  they exercise undue influence over the 
management board, they may be liable for damages.66
The supervisory board is described as a "relationship board" which is only the legal 
representation of the "network" which historically supported German industrial 
development, with the clear implication that even if  it did not exist formally it would still 
find expression through voluntary advisory mechanisms.67 This network of co-operation, 
which we encountered above in the form of long-term shareholdings by banks and other 
corporations, forms a marked historical, cultural and economic difference from Anglo- 
American industrial organisation, which was more market-led.
60 Works Councils co-determine matters relating to pay, hours, leave etc, and are consulted or informed on other matters.61 Aoki, M, The Cooperative Game Theory o f  the Firm (1984) at 157 that "German law establishes two levels o f control in the corporation. Its aim is to separate the responsibility o f monitoring management from the actual managing of the corporation."62 Hopt, (1998) (supra note 9) at 22963 §76 o f the German Stock Corporation Act, Aktiengesetz (AktG)64 §110 AktG; introduced by the 1998 German board reform law. Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S, "The German Model of Corporate and Labor Governance" (2000) 22 Comp. Labor Law & Policy Journal 33 at 36 note that this number is rarely exceeded.65 Although "the appointment and dismissal of members of the management board is in general prepared by the chairman of the supervisory board." (Hopt, (1998) (supra note 9) at 245)66 Beinert, D (2000) (supra note 11) at 69 for more details of these mechanisms.
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The extent of the employee presence on the supervisory board depends on the size of the 
company. Where there are more than 500 employees (whatever the legal status o f the 
company), one third of the supervisory board will be employee representatives and the 
board will make decisions by simple majority.67 8 In companies with more than 2000 
employees, on the other hand, "quasi-parity” representation applies, meaning that there 
are equal numbers of employee and shareholder representatives on the board, subject to a 
proviso that the chairman (a representative of the shareholders) has a casting vote in the 
event of a tie.69 A resolution to appoint or remove representatives to the management 
board requires a two-thirds majority in the first ballot, and if this is not achieved, a 
conciliation committee (consisting of two shareholder and two employee representatives) 
must be convened before the chairman can exercise his casting vote.70 In any event, the 
casting vote is rarely exercised and "it is common for shareholder and labor 
representatives to vote with one voice."71 This is above all a corporate governance 
mechanism: the "employee representatives should not be regarded as a homogeneous 
group. The instructive contributions by internal employee representatives...are said to be 
focused on the company, whereas [external members provided by unions] are thought to 
have a broader, at least sectoral, perspective and to pursue union interests."72
67 Known as Beirat: see further on this, Hopt, (1998) {supra note 9) at 234-5, who doubts whether the labour representatives on the supervisory board may yet be considered part of this network, despite occasional coalitions with the banking constituency.68 Under §76(1) o f the Works Constitution Act 1952 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). This applies to some 40,000 corporations: see the figures cited in Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S (2000) (supra note 64) at 3969 Under the Codetermination Law 1976 (Mitbestimmungsgesetz). This applies to some 728 corporations. 41 companies in the coal and steel industries have been subject to absolute parity since the Co- Determination Act of the Coal and Steel Industry of 1951 (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz).70 Per Aoki, M (1984) {supra note 61) at 158: ’’Since the shareholder representatives may find it imprudent to force a candidate into office by means o f this cumbersome procedure, the procedure in effect is likely to result in a veto power of employee representatives.”71 Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S (2000) {supra note 64) at 38; they explain that in the "exceptional" cases where such consensus has not been possible, the voice of the employees has had a strongly persuasive effect and the proposal in question has been modified. For example, the shareholders' preferred candidate for the post of CEO in BMW declined to take up the post in the face of opposition from employee representatives. In addition, the employee constituency played an important role in modifying the proposed takeover of Thyssen by Krupp. Also Prigge, (1998) {supra note 19) at 1010.72 Prigge, (1998) {supra note 19) at 1010. Note the recent controversy at Lufthansa about the role o f  union representatives on the supervisory board, supra note 5.
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There is some evidence that information flow from the management board to the 
supervisory board is restricted because o f the employee presence.73 Shareholder 
representatives may hold informal separate meetings to avoid disclosing information to 
the employee representatives.74 756 Further, separate meetings o f the employee and 
shareholder sides of the board before the main meeting, which tends to be mainly 
concerned with issues of interest to the labour side, are increasingly common. 
Committees are also prevalent. However, given the flow of information to dominant 
shareholders through their other links with corporations, and the flow to employees 
through their involvement in works councils, the supervisory board should have access in 
practice to plenty of information about the activities of the management board. This 
information dissemination is backed up by statutory rights to call for information. The 
chairman is the best-informed and decisive member, while his deputy, a representative o f 
the employees, "seems to play no accentuated role."78 Other commentators note that 
much depends on the relationship between the chairman and his deputy. However, the 
little evidence available suggests that "supervisory board co-determination weakens 
intensity of supervisory board control."79 While not generally cast in terms o f a principal- 
agent problem in German corporate governance scholarship, and depending on the role 
played by the dominant blockholder, management may enjoy a considerable degree o f 
latitude in decision-making.
73 See for example, Roe, MJ (2003) {supra note 3), chapter 8.74 Becht, M, Bolton, P, and Rowell, A, "Corporate Governance and Control" (ECGI Finance Paper No2, October 2002 at 5375 Hopt, (1998) {supra note 9) at 24776 Theisen, "Empirical Evidence and Economic Comments on Board Structure in Germany" in Hopt, Kanda et al (1998) {supra note 9) 259 at 261-2. These two mechanisms are explained as "the historical and proven way to deal with the temporal and organizational restrictions the plenary sessions of the supervisory board have to cope with."77 In addition to regular reports from management (§90 Abs, 1 Nr 1-3 AktG), any member of the supervisory board is entitled to request a special report on any of the firm's activities (§90 Abs. 3 AktG)78 Prigge, (1998) {supra note 19) at 963. Also Hopt, (1998) {supra note 9) at 244-5: "It is common knowledge that the information flow both from the management board to the supervisory board and within the supervisory board from its chairman to the normal members is deficient. It is particularly striking that in many corporations the auditor's report is not handed out to the supervisory board members ahead of the session, a practice which purportedly is to prevent the details o f  the report leaking out via the labor side."79 At least in terms of pursuing shareholder value: see Prigge, (1998) {supra note 19) at 1010; Roe, MJ (2003) {supra note 3).
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German co-determination law has come under pressure recently from European 
Community rules on freedom of establishment. German law imposes co-determination on 
all companies which have their "real seat" (or "siège réel") in Germany, applying a 
factual test to determine where a company has its central administration. This is in 
contrast to Member States, such as the UK, which apply the more liberal incorporation 
rule, allowing corporations incorporated anywhere to carry on business there without 
intervening in their governance structures. In its recent Centros,80 Überseering81 and 
Inspire Art82 judgments, where EC nationals challenged a refusal by one Member State to 
recognise a company incorporated in another Member State, the ECJ held that Member 
States should not apply the real seat rule in such a way as to amount to an outright denial 
of the freedom of establishment.83 In each case, the action taken had been 
disproportionate to its aims. In Centros, registration of a foreign company was denied, 
while in Überseering, legal capacity was denied to the company in question. In Inspire 
Art, a branch of a company incorporated in another Member State had to be described as 
a “formally foreign company” and comply with Dutch rules imposing minimum capital 
requirements. The ECJ did accept that Member States are permitted to take action in 
pursuit of "imperative requirements in the general interest", including the protection of 
employees, provided they fulfil the criteria for rules restricting fundamental freedoms.84 
However, on the facts of each case, these requirements were not satisfied.
While the precise scope of the “imperative requirements” exception remains in some 
doubt, it seems very likely that German co-determination would be found to be a
80 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyretsen [1999] ECR1-145981 Uberseering BV  v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR 1-991982 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd (Case C-l 67/01), judgment delivered by ECJ 30* September 2003The application of this doctrine does, strictly speaking, contradict the logic of a single market, wherein "companies should be able to move freely across borders with a single incorporation.” (Lannoo, K (1999) (supra note 42) at 280)84 Centros, Para 34, requiring the action also to be non-discriminatory, suitable and proportionate in accordance with Gebhard v Consiglio delVOrdine degli Awocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I- 4165, paragraph 37. In Uberseering, the Court stated at 92 that "It is not inconceivable that overriding requirements relating to the general interest, such as the protection of the interests o f creditors, minority shareholders, employees and even the taxation authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of establishment.” Following the decision in Inspire Art, arguments based on the protection of creditors now appear unlikely to succeed because of the possibility of
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permissible restriction on freedom of establishment. It could be argued that mandatory 
rules are the only way to establish a governance structure which supports and sustains 
investment by employees in firm-specific human capital. The absence of Community 
legislation in the field of co-determination, despite a legislative power in Article 137(3) 
of the EC Treaty, would support the argument that the Member States retain some 
discretion in this area.85 The Second Winter Report86 offers a slightly different 
interpretation of the potential effect of these decisions on co-determination. It suggests 
that any restrictions on the freedom should be proportionate and based on an appropriate 
connecting factor. They envisage that imposition o f local law would be hard to justify 
where fewer than 50% of employees are employed in the "host” state. This might 
eventually undermine co-determination of German corporations if the stage is ever 
reached where the majority o f their employees are employed outside Germany. The 
Report suggests that liquidation and reincorporation should be a last resort following 
failure to agree on an appropriate system of representation.
Ex Post Impact of Co-determination on Takeovers
In the normal situation where the merger in question is consensual, co-determination is 
unlikely to present great obstacles. Hostile bids may be more problematic. While the b id 
itself falls outside the scope of co-determination, the successful bidder must gain 
approval of the supervisory board for their nominees to the management board. A simple 
majority in general meeting is not necessarily sufficient to do this. While the management 
board is appointed by the supervisory board, its members normally serve five year terms 
and cannot be removed except for cause. Further, "staggered appointments are 
customary”.87 Where the articles grant individual shareholders a right to designate a 
member of the supervisory board, only they may remove their representative. Subject to
self-help and the role of the fourth and eleventh company law directives in setting out a system o f  protection for creditors: see paragraphs 135 etseg of the judgment.85 The contrast with protection of creditors is clean the provision of information to employees under Community law is not sufficient to enable them to use self-help because of the contracting difficulties they face. The role of mandatory co-determination in sustaining firm-specific investments is discussed in detail below.86 See "Report of the High Level Group o f Company Law Experts on a Modem Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe", Brussels, 4th November 2002 at 102-106
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these restrictions, the bidder may remove the supervisory board shareholder 
representatives with a resolution backed by three-quarters of the votes cast. Then the 
supervisory board may appoint the management board by simple majority. Finally, where 
quasi-parity co-determination applies, the employee representatives (who cannot be 
removed by shareholders) will be able to delay these changes at least until a second 
resolution can be proposed. The ability and right of employee representatives to make 
their voice heard may be important in the case of a takeover: as the price for their 
approval of the subsequent merger, they may make demands as to the future conduct of 
the business.
"Takeovers fall outside the realm of co-determination and upset the existing set of 
implicit contracts between stakeholders."87 8 This potentially adverse effect on their 
interests means that "Employee representatives are likely to support defensive actions 
taken by management in the event of takeover battles. Co-determination can be 
particularly decisive if the shareholder side of the Supervisory Board is divided among 
competing factions."89 German corporation law has accordingly been described as "The 
biggest poison pill of all",90 preventing a bidder from realising all the gains available 
from replacing management with nominees who will breach implicit contracts and 
concentrate on shareholder value.
Co-determination and Theories of the Company
The wider conception of the company in German law has given rise to familiar critiques. 
For example, in a variety of the "classic argument", Hopt insists that "Legally, widening 
the scope of responsibility of the board beyond shareholders not only exacerbates the
87 Beinert, D (2000) (supra note 11) at 6888 H6pner, M and Jackson, G (2001) (supra note 18) at 4889 Hbpner, M and Jackson, G (2001) (.supra note 18) at 18-1990 Maier-Reimer, "Protection Against Hostile Takeovers in Germany: Banks and Limitations on Voting Rights" in Hopt, K and Wymeersch E ed, European Takeovers: Law and Practice (1992), 242 at 242. Jurgens, U and Rupp, J (2001) (supra note 8) at 33 note that management, who tend to praise co­determination, might have "ulterior motives for praising a system which serves as a protection for incumbent management against hostile takeovers".
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agency problem for the latter, but it adds the agency problem for labor and gives an 
excuse for respecting neither of these responsibilities."91 92
The legal imposition o f co-determination has been criticised by economists who take a 
contractual approach to corporate governance. Jensen and Meckling argue that if it were 
pareto efficient, it would have been adopted by firms voluntarily rather than being 
imposed upon them by legislation. This of course is a difficult claim to refute given that 
there is no counterfactual data on the voluntary adoption of codetermination 
arrangements in Germany. To compare Anglo-Saxon data risks not comparing like with 
like since the underlying organisations are different. However, in opposing this claim, 
Sadowksi et al argue that firms considering voluntarily introducing codetermination face 
a prisoner's dilemma. Co-determination could be justified on the basis of a productive 
coalition model of corporate governance, but such a strategy faces the risk of adverse 
selection, namely the "danger that codetermination rights would attract precisely the less 
productive employees"93 because it is harder to dismiss employees under co­
determination. These authors to argue that, assuming co-determination is desirable from 
an efficiency standpoint, only imposing co-determination by law can get around this 
problem since no firm will be the first to act.
Roe has also considered whether German co-determination may be reconciled with a 
contractual, and, more specifically, a productive coalition, approach to the corporation. 
He suggests that "[c]©determination might be seen as part of German employees’ 
investment in human capital and deferred wages in the firm. Having invested in the firm, 
the employees get governance rights."94 However, he concludes, this argument suffers 
from two main weaknesses. First, the explanation fails the transaction cost test o f  
company law because the "co-determination contract...[is not] hard to write, thus raising 
the question of why legal mandates are necessary for codetermination...w'hen the
91 Hopt, (1998) (supra note 9) at 23792 Jensen, M and Meckling WH, "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination" (1979) 52 Journal o f Business93 Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S (2000) (supra note 64) at 4594 Roe, MJ, "German "Populism" and the Large Public Corporation" (1994) 14 International Review o f Law  and Economics 187-202 at 201
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corporate form could be adapted...without mandating codetermination."95 Instead, given 
an insistence on co-determination by the legislator, there will tend to be a "contractarian 
reaction...as parties try to remold the framework - to re-contract - to the most efficient 
forms."96 Secondly, the institution of co-determination tends to have political rather than 
economic aims. These "rules tend to be put into place during or after periods of social 
unrest, suggesting that rational private contract-making was subsidiary to stabilizing the 
political system."97
In response to his first point, and retaining a contractualist perspective, one might argue 
that the codetermination contract is just as difficult to write as the shareholders* contract. 
Indeed, if one accepts that the employees are also residual claimants by virtue o f their 
firm-specific investment, their needs for governance protection are not qualitatively 
different from those of the shareholders. The point is that drafting a governance structure 
to protect the investments of either of these groups gives rise to costs, not that it is 
analytically difficult. Since these costs would be incurred every time a corporate contract 
is concluded, the adoption of a standard form contract may enable a reduction in 
transaction costs across the economy as a whole. The provision of these standard form 
contracts will save costs where they are likely to be used more often than they are 
rejected.
Further, where the law provides a standard form governance structure, this gives rise to 
the distinct advantage that the courts in that jurisdiction may then develop a set of rules to 
determine rights and responsibilities of the actors involved as and when problems arise.98 
The introduction of a range of individually-tailored governance structures for either 
shareholders or employees would be likely to give rise to great legal uncertainty, and,
95 ibid96 ibid97 ibid; see further note 58 above.98 Easterbrook, F and Fischel, D, The Economic Structure o f  Company Law (1991) at 35 suggest that "court systems have a comparative advantage [over the drafters of contracts] in supplying answers to questions that do not occur in time to be resolved ex ante. Common law systems need not answer questions unless they occur. This is an economizing device.” Note also the arguments about network externalities made by Klausner, M, "Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts" (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 757, discussed in chapter 1.
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through repeated and extensive litigation, considerable transaction costs. The only reason 
to force employees to fall back on self-drafted protection would be on the basis that more 
firms would bargain around the standard form contract than would accept it, leading to  
higher costs. The answer to this question depends on both the amount o f firm-specific 
investment in the economy as a whole and the amount which is desired. Varieties o f  
capitalism analysis suggests that firm-specific investment cannot be looked at in isolation 
from the institutional background, including co-determination.
One might go further and seek to justify mandatory co-determination on the basis that i f  
it were not mandatory, this would tend to undermine the productive coalition. Imposition 
by law is a mechanism to steer market actors towards consensual, trust-based relations by  
facilitating the making of credible commitments. The imposition of mandatory co­
determination significantly conditions the evolution of a political economy by ruling out 
certain courses of action. Of course, if one takes the view that economic efficiency can 
only be achieved by maximising the return to shareholders then co-determination must 
reduce economic efficiency since it introduces greater agency costs and reduces the 
likelihood of shareholder value being pursued. However, advocates o f the view that 
contractual remoulding of the mandated governance structure should be permitted must 
rebut the assertion firm-specific investments by employees contribute to the productive 
efficiency of enterprises and the economy.
The answer to Roe's second point requires a move outside the contractualist perspective. 
For the contractualist, the corporation is a matter of purely private ordering established to 
govern the central incomplete contract, so external, public interference is illegitimate and 
inefficient. Similarly, the use by one corporate constituency o f its political power to 
persuade the government to use its law-making power to grant it rights in corporate 
governance, which they could not achieve through bargaining, is illegitimate. However, 
within the German political economy, the corporation is not conceived of as a matter o f
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purely private ordering, and, being considered to have elements of a public social 
organisation, is a legitimate target of political interference."
Looking at co-determination in exclusively political terms, Streeck considers it as a 
measure attaching to the "status" o f industrial citizenship, and, as a non-contractual 
measure, is not open to being bought or sold because "industrial citizenship constitutes 
part o f the public machinery for the social regulation of labour markets and employment, 
as an institution of public rather than private governance. Created to balance the 
fundamental asymmetry of power involved in relations of employment, it would cease to 
be what it is if it were open to renegotiation in the shadow of this asymmetry."9 100
In any event, the fact that a rule might have been introduced for politically-imperative 
reasons does not necessarily mean that it cannot contribute to economic efficiency. 
Mandatory co-determination may also be considered from the evolutionary perspective of 
path dependency, treating it as one of the decisions which was made in the past and 
which has sent the German political economy down the route which it has taken. The 
corporate governance system as created by law has interacted with relational investors 
and a historically strong apprenticeship system for training employees to produce an 
equilibrium. While the German system has certainly been constrained in the choices 
available to it by the existence of the codetermination laws, comparative political 
economists argue that these "beneficial constraints" support "flexible and high-skill
99 Streeck, W, "The Transformation of Corporate Organization in Europe: An Overview" (2001) MPIfG Working Paper 01/8, December 2001 notes that in continental systems generally, corporations are treated "as "constitutional associations" whose internal structures o f decision-making are a matter of public concern... As a consequence, governments assume a right to intervene in the internal structures and governance arrangements of corporations, in order to institutionalize the public obligations of firms within their internal bargaining or decision-making arrangements." Similarly, Hutton, W, The World We’re In (2002)at 67 says that "Property is not a right or a simple network of private contracts; rather it is a concession made by the society o f which it is part that has to be continually earned and deserved." Also Teubner, G, "Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the "Essence" of the Legal Person" (1988) 36 American Journal o f Comparative Law 130 at 131: "internal pluralism is legitimate only insofar as it is oriented towards the corporate actor’s goals, which in turn must be legitimized by the fimi's function and performance in society."100 Streeck, W, "Industrial Ctizenship under Regime Competition: the Case of the European Works Councils" (1997) 4 Journal o f European Public Policy 643 at 644
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internal labour markets",101 leading to the development of comparative advantage based 
on diversified quality production102 with incremental innovation in manufactured goods.
In any event, it appears beyond dispute that the rationale for co-determination rules was 
political rather than economic. There is no evidence that historically co-determination 
was introduced specifically in order to facilitate investment by employees in firm-specific 
capital.103 However, in combination with other environmental factors (such as the 
institutional structure of the broader political economy104 and social norms of corporate 
behaviour which differ from maximising shareholder value), the "German system [of co­
determination] also reduces the risk that employees' human capital will be expropriated 
by the company by increasing the information flow to workers through their 
representatives on the supervisory board."105 This is one of the modem arguments in 
favour of maintaining co-determination. As Sadowski et al point out, "The German co­
determination regulations do not differentiate according to this criterion (one difficult to 
operationalize), but require all companies to bear the costs involved in co­
determination."106 Differentiation on the basis of firm-specific investment would be 
practically impossible since one would have to measure not only the extent to which 
employees have made investments, but also estimate the extent to which they would do 
so, and to which this would benefit the firm in question, if rules were put in place. 
Different industries, and even different firms within the same industry would have 
different needs depending on their strategy for competitiveness. Perhaps the most one can 
say is that in economies where firm-specific investment is important (or desired as a
101 Hôpner, M and Jackson, G (2001) (supra note 18) at 12102 Streeck, "Productive Constraints: on the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production" in Streeck, W (ed), Social Institutions and Economic Performance (1992),,oî As Streeck, W (2001) (supra note 99) explains, the Kommission Mitbestimmung 1998 "did not undertake to establish a direct causal connection between co-determination and the prosperity of the German economy. It pointed out, however, that strong rights o f  workforces to information, consultation and co-decision making had obviously not interfered with international competitiveness. It also suggested that co-determination might have contributed to the evolution of a specific mode of production in Germany that emphasizes the cultivation of human resources and of dedicated, long-term employed workforces."104 See Hall, PA and Soskice, D, Introduction to Varieties o f  Capitalism (2001) , Casper, "The Legal Framework for Corporate Governance: The Influence o f Contract Law on Company Strategies in Germany and the United States" in Hall, PA and Soskice, D (eds), Varieties o f  Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations o f  Comparative Advantage (2001), 387105 Robilotti, MG (1997) (supra note 57) at 552106 Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S (2000) (supra note 64) at 43
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source of competitive advantage), the co-determination rule can help to get around the 
prisoner’s dilemma of the first mover, to reduce the transaction costs of negotiating and 
establishing the system, and to provide a free flow o f information which will facilitate the 
making of credible commitments.
These institutional measures push firms towards a strategy o f firm- or industry-specific 
skills:
"Put in a nutshell, co-determination, and in particular, parity co-determination, has 
contributed to making labor as a factor of production less variable and more fixed than it 
traditionally was in capitalist enterprises...For many practical purposes labor in co­
determined enterprises is almost as difficult and costly to dispose of as fixed capital. In 
this sense the status of capital and labor as factors of production has been made more 
similar by co-determination, and this may be exactly what 'parity* in economic terms is all
Legal Position after 2nd January 2002
i) Voluntary Self-Regulation: The Takeover Code
Before the enactment of the new takeover law, the rare takeovers which occurred were 
regulated voluntarily. The voluntary self-regulatory takeover code (Ubernahmekodex) 
was introduced in October 1995, and amended in 1998. It regulated the contents of an 
offer and the duties of the bidder and the target. It permitted partial bids, but required a 
mandatory bid within 18 months of the acquisition o f 50% of voting rights. The ultimate 
decision on the outcome of the bid was a matter for shareholders, who were given 28 
days to decide. This was reinforced by a requirement that "the target company must 
refrain from any measures that may impede the takeover offer"107 08 unless permission was
107 Streeck, ''Co-determination: After Four Decades" in Streeck, W (ed), Social Institutions and Economic Performance (1992), at 159108 Baumann, "Takeovers in Germany and EU Regulation: Experience and Practice” in Hopt, Kanda et al (1998) (supra note 9) 659 at 662
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given by means of a "shareholders' meeting decision."109 Otherwise, the role o f 
management was limited to advising the shareholders on the merits o f the bid.
The only sanction available to the takeover commission (Übemahmekommission) was to 
publicise breach. Many commentators found the impact of the code "disappointing”.110 
Widely accepted by listed companies in 1997,111 the code was strengthened in 1998 when 
recognition became a precondition for listing on DAX and MDAX, withdrawal leading to 
exclusion.112 Like the City Code, this code had the aim of securing "the reputation o f 
Germany as a centre of finance, and to set up a reliable framework for takeover offers so 
that investors from in- and outside Germany would know how public offers are to be 
conducted."113
ii) The New German Takeover Law
The new law may be considered as a reaction to the failure of the second draft Takeover 
Directive in 2001, or as a reaction to the hostile takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone. 
In either case, it can be seen as a clear statement of Germany’s current political position 
that hostile takeovers need to be regulated. While the Mannesmann takeover may have 
been exceptional in the sense that the company was particularly vulnerable, the draft o f  
the directive which was rejected, as we shall see in the next chapter, was largely based on 
the UK’s City Code and was aimed at the introduction of a market for corporate control. 
While in the UK, this gave rise to rather narrow concerns about whether the proposed 
directive would allow the continuation of the self-regulatory system, more far-reaching 
concerns about its effects on the structure and operation of the productive economy were 
raised in Germany.
109 ibid110 Prigge, (1998) (supra note 19) at 9931,1 Baumann, (1998) (supra note 108) at 662. He also points out the practice of banks requiring their clients to observe the code when they provide takeover finance.111 As it did for Metallgesellschaft: see Prigge, (1998) (supra note 19) at 994; despite this, Hopner, M andJackson, G (2001) (supra note 18) at 22 describe compliance with the Code as "very weak"113 Baumann, (1998) (supra note 108) at 660
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The draft Purchase of Shares and Takeover Law ( Wertpapiererwerbs- und 
Ubernahmegesetz or WpUG) was first presented on 29th June 2000.114 This interrupted 
the second revision of the voluntary code which had begun in 2000.115 The Act was 
finally passed on 15th November, 2001, and came into force on 1st January, 2002. Article 
3 of the Act contains 5 general principles, including that the "management board and 
supervisory board of the target company must act in the target company’s interests."
The version which was finally enacted, and was not published by the German 
government until after the fate of the takeover directive was known, grants the 
management board of the target considerable discretion when faced with a bid, provided 
they can gain the approval of the supervisory board. This is in stark contrast to earlier 
versions, which had at first outlawed all defensive measures in line with the proposed 
second draft takeover directive.116 Following reservations from politicians, trade 
associations and trade unions, this position was then softened to allow an exception for 
defensive measures authorised in advance by the shareholders (by a 75% majority of 
votes cast) which would last up to 18 months (effectively requiring annual approval).117 
The Act which eventually entered into force allows the managing board even more scope. 
They may also take frustrating measures which "a prudent and conscientious manager of 
a company that is not subject to a takeover bid would have taken”,118 they may seek a 
white knight, and they may take measures which have been approved by the supervisory 
board.119 As in earlier drafts, measures authorised by the shareholders up to 18 months in
114 Payne, "Introduction” in Payne, J (ed), Takeovers in English and German Law (2002), I at 1. She points out that this was "partly in response" to the success of the Vodafone bid, which had made it clear that "the existing non-binding Takeover Code, which operated by way of voluntary self-regulation, had not created an appropriate legal framework within which takeovers could take place in Germany and should be replaced.”1,5 The voluntary code has now lapsed: see Krause, N, "Germany: The New German Takeover Law" (2002) 23 Company Lawyer 319 at 319116 With the exceptions of seeking a "white knight" and actions taken in the ordinary course of business for the benefit of the company: see Mennicke, P, "The Draft German Takeover Act" (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 34 at 381.7 Mueller, "A New Takeover Regime for Germany: German Act on Acquisitions and Takeovers" in Payne, J (ed), Takeovers in English and German Law (2002), 173 at 173-41.8 Including in the company’s interest under Article 76 of the AktG.119 Section 33(1); the approval of the shareholders is only required if the defensive measure falls within the scope of authority of the shareholders’ meeting. As stated above, the supervisory board may presumably authorise only those defensive measures which are permissible under German company law, discussed above. Krause, N (2002) (supra note 115) at 323 suggests, for example, that the board could seek to defend
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advance are also permitted, but must be specified in detail and approved by at least a 75% 
majority* 120 *12and then specifically authorised by the supervisory board.
It is notable that there are no limitations on the power of the supervisory board or
Delaware-style provisions for review of the proportionality of any defensive measures
taken by the board, or o f any decision to break up the company in order to keep it out of
the bidder's hands. Gordon argues that boards are likely to take the kind of irreversible
value-destroying defensive measures which were superseded in the US by the poison pill,
•  ^1such as "crown jewels" sales to friendly buyers and tin parachutes for employees. 
Unlike the redeemable poison pill, these tactics are irreversible. These critics argue that 
the position of shareholders is further weakened by the limited cultural and managerial 
norms o f shareholder value in Germany, as well as the dilution of their influence by the 
stakeholder concerns o f the supervisory board.
Theories of the Company and the New German Law
From an agency perspective, the German law, like the regulation put in place by many 
US states, must be seen as a political choice measure. The provisions allowing defensive 
measures are likely to allow the board to entrench themselves where they get approval 
from one shareholder representative along with the representatives of the employees. 
The introduction of a market for corporate control, already complicated by the structural 
factors described above, has become more difficult because the management and
itself by placing newly authorised capital with shareholders who will not sell to the bidder, subject to the difficulty of finding a suitable shareholder.120 Advance shareholder authorizations under section 33(2) of the takeover law are considered unlikely because “before having had the opportunity of seeing the actual offer, the shareholders cannot really evaluate whether it is worthwhile or not...Indeed, such a shareholder resolution could signal that the enterprise considers itself a candidate for takeover, which may have unwelcome consequences at the stock market.”120 (Hopt, K.J (2002) {supra note 12) at 22),:1 Gordon, JN, "An American Perspective on the New Gennan Anti-takeover Law" (2003) European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper No. 02/2002122 Painter, R and Kirchner, C, "Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform" (2002) 50 American Journal o f  Comparative Law  201 at 218. This is not unlikely while block shareholders concerned with more than shareholder value continue to play an important role in German corporate governance. For example, one of the shareholder representatives to the supervisory board could have been appointed by a bank which has very different priorities from the rest o f the shareholders.
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supervisory boards have been granted unreviewable discretion to prevent its operation. 
Despite changes in the law, the use of adaptive mechanisms to align shareholder and 
management interests is likely to "run afoul of strong cultural constraints on managerial 
compensation."123 Hopt describes the measure as “worse than a pyrrhic victory”124 and 
echoes Roe’s political explanation o f US takeover regulation: “Hostile takeovers are still 
highly unpopular with many in Germany, particularly with trade unions and labor but 
also among large parts of German industry and the German press. As everywhere, 
politicians who live but for reelection reckon with such fears. Therefore, the German 
takeover act was prepared with great care.”125 HOpner and Jackson argue that "it is not 
surprising the takeover of Mannesmann has raised demands for a more target-friendly 
law that would protect domestic finns."126 127It is notable that the unions supported the 
proposal that the supervisory board be allowed to determine the defensive measures 
permitted to management, while industry associations also wanted broader powers for
127management.
Besides the "classic argument" about managerial unaccountability, it is also argued that 
the German law is likely to hinder the cross-border mergers which are essential for 
enterprises to "rapidly grow large enough to take advantage of the huge potential scale 
economies of EU-wide commerce."128 The risk of "home country bias" and "economic 
nationalism" by the acquiror is best dealt with by rules which ensure "the mutual 
vulnerability to takeover bids by both firms in question."129 This requires the 
establishment of a market for corporate control, which will ensure that the threat of
123 Gordon, JN (2003) {supra note 121) at 8. However, that social norm may be at a "tipping point", supported by legal changes allowing companies to buy back their shares: see Eisenberg, MA, "Corporate Law and Social Norms" (1999) 99 Columbia Law Journal 1253 at 1263-4.124 Hopt, KJ (2002) {supra note 12) at 4125 Hopt, KJ (2002) {supra note 12) at 4; elsewhere, Hopt refers to "post-bid defensive measures o f the board...perhaps with permission of the supervisory board; a popular demand in business circles." (Hopt, "The Duties of the Directors of the Target Company in Hostile Takeovers - German and European Perspectives" in Ferrarini, G, Hopt, KJ, and Wymeersch, E (eds), Capital Markets in the Age o f  the Euro: Cross-Border Transactions, Listed Companies and Regulation (2002), 391 at 407)126 Hopner, M and Jackson, G (2001) {supra note 18) at 36127 ibid at 44 fh 23128 Gordon, JN, "An American Perspective on the New German Anti-Takeover Law” (2002) Columbia Law School Center fo r  Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No 209 (available at http://ssm.com/abstractJd=336420 at 4; this does appear to ignore the existing German mechanisms of industrial consolidation which occur by the transfer of a controlling block, discussed above.
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hostile takeover hangs over all firms. Rather than seeing the German measure as simple 
protectionism, Gordon suggests that the new German rules may simply be "a bargaining 
chip in a kind of trade negotiation, a raising o f barriers designed to precipitate a crisis and 
force a new round of negotiations that would lower trade barriers - here, takeover 
protections - across the board.”129 30 Alternatively, it might be suggested that the new 
German law is a response to developments in EU takeover regulation, and in particular, 
constitutes a clarification of the permissible scope of defensive measures in German law.
If one moves beyond the agency model to take a political stakeholder or productive 
coalition perspective, a different explanation begins to emerge. Looking at co­
determination rules as a political measure of industrial citizenship, as Streeck suggests, 
means that an outright prohibition on defensive measures would result in a 
disenfranchisement of the supervisory board in the takeover context. If co-determination 
rules at board level are indeed supposed to "interfere with the rights of owners in the 
firm”131, then there is no apparent political reason why these joint rights of supervision 
over management should be abrogated just because a takeover bid is made. Indeed the 
opposite is true: if the employees' representatives rights did cease, then this would 
undermine the value o f the co-determination rights from the beginning, as any conflict at 
the level of the supervisory board could be met by threats of hostile takeover. We saw in 
the previous chapter that the establishment o f a market for corporate control re-orientated 
US and UK corporate governance around shareholder value. Liberalisation of takeover 
rules would also contradict the model of the firm which underlies the structure of German 
company law, namely that it should be run in the public interest rather than in the private 
interest o f the shareholders.
129 Ibid at 4130 Gordon, JN, "An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence o f Corporate Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Union, 1990-2000" (2003) European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 06/2003, 7 February 2003 available at SSRN http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-374620 at 6. This certainly appears to be reflected in the Germany's opposition to the new draft takeover directive, based on the fact that it prohibits German defensive measures at board level, while tolerating French and Swedish defensive measures in the form of multiple voting rights. See further, Financial Times, 3rd February, 2003 at 10.131 Streeck, W, "Industrial Citizenship under Regime Competition: the Case of the European Works Councils" (1997) 4 Journal o f  European Public Policy 643 at 644
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The new German rules may also be justified from a productive coalition perspective. 
They simply reflect the investor coalition represented on the supervisory board. If the 
system of co-determination is considered as one of the interdependent institutions of the 
German political economy which operate to encourage the making of investments in 
firm-specific skills by employees, then the new German rules simply further that 
conception of the institution's role. The supervisory board will not oppose takeovers 
which respect the networks of implicit contracts which constitute the corporation. The 
rights granted to the supervisory board are potentially very important in this respect as 
they should encourage bidders to take these considerations into account in framing their 
bid. By contrast, the introduction of a requirement of board neutrality would conflict with 
the overall co-operative schema of German corporate decision-making, by reserving for 
one constituency the exclusive right to make a decision on a key corporate transition 
which might adversely affect other constituencies.
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Chapter Six: Takeover Regulation in the European Union
Introduction
This chapter traces the evolution of the proposed European takeover directive, and 
analyses it from the perspective of the theories developed in the first part. The various 
drafts o f the Takeover Directive, which were seen during its long gestation period, were 
largely based on an agency model of the corporation. However, the compromise text 
which was recently adopted gives Member States more latitude to allow companies to 
take defensive measures. The chapter also considers the extent to which, as advocates of 
an agency model takeover directive argued, labour law measures requiring information 
and consultation of the workforce offer sufficient protection for the interests of 
employees during a takeover. It is concluded that the Commission’s insistence on a 
system of takeover regulation based on agency model assumptions was a key factor in 
preventing the adoption of the directive for so long. It is also suggested that the 
compromise which was reached is more appropriate if  one takes a "varieties of 
capitalism" perspective on the diverse systems of corporate governance within the 
European Union.
The Changing Rationale for European Company Law
The rationale for European Company Law measures has evolved considerably over time. 
During the 1960s, the goal appeared to be full harmonisation of "all provisions 
concerning structure and organs of companies"1 on the basis that the different rules in 
force in the Member States distorted the free movement of capital and the exercise of the 
right of establishment,2 and so were an obstacle to the single market. The proposals have
1 Wouters, J, "European Company Law: Quo Vadis?" (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 257-307 at 268, citing the Berkhouwer report of 1966 (document 10/1964-1965); see also Ebke, WF, "Company Law and the European Union: Centralized versus Decentralized Lawmaking" (1997) 31 International Lawyer 961 at 973-42 Wouters, ibid, considers this the most appropriate among early justifications for Community action in the field o f company law.
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also been justified on the basis that harmonisation would prevent a Delaware-style 'race 
to the bottom’3 and would guarantee legal certainty.
During the mid- to late-1970s the Commission's harmonisation proposals began to reflect 
widespread demands for industrial democracy.4 5The Commission's Green Paper of 1975s 
clearly reflects this new policy orientation, and a "political stakeholder" content may be 
seen in many proposals of this era, in particular the Fifth Company Law Directive in 
1972,6 and the Vredeling Directive in 1980.7 If enacted as initially drafted, the Fifth 
Directive would have radically altered corporate structures across the EC. The proposal 
required all public companies to have a two-tier board, with employee representation on 
the supervisory board. As we saw in the previous chapter, these rules would have further 
hindered the market for corporate control by limiting the extent to which a successful 
bidder is able to take control over the company’s governance mechanisms.
The failure of both o f these important proposals8 gave impetus to a gradual shift in 
Commission policy away from full harmonisation. It became clear that the Member 
States could not agree on company law proposals dealing with employee participation or 
on full harmonisation of company law because no agreement could be reached as to the 
correct scope of company law. Member States whose company law focused solely on the 
central agency relationship would not accept the inclusion of employees within its scope,
3 Wouters, J (2000) (supra note ]) notes at 269 that harmonisation under Article 54(3)(g) was included in the treaty as a "quid pro quo for the liberal grant o f  a right of establishment to companies...[so that) the Netherlands, which was famous at the time for the flexibility o f its company law, should not become a European 'Delaware'." However, it is not clear that a Delaware-effect was ever likely: regulatory competition among systems of company law does not (yet) exist in the EC because the Member States apply different tests to determine whether or not a company is established in a particular member state. See the discussion on challenges to German co-determination in Chapter 5.4 Streeck, W, "Industrial Citizenship under Regime Competition: the Case of the European Works Councils" (1997) 4 Journal o f European Public Policy 643 at 646 notes that the "leading objective was harmonization of industrial citizenship arrangements by means of statutory intervention superseding or homogenizing national systems and proceeding primarily in the realm of company law."5 Commission Green Paper, "Employee Participation and Company Structure in the European Community", Bull Supp 8/75.6 COM (1972)887 final, OJ C 131,13.12.1972. See also Bull Supp 10/72.7 “Proposal for a Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting the Employees o f  Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings”, OJ C 297, 15.11.80; see also European Industrial Relations Review No 82 (November 1980) at 228 No vote was ever taken on the Vredeling Directive, and the Fifth Directive was recently definitively withdrawn: see COM (2001) 763 final at 23
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while those which included employees (to whatever extent) in corporate decision-making 
could not accept harmonisation on an agency model.
The Commission's response to this impasse in the company law programme9 was to begin 
framing employee participation proposals as labour law directives containing "menus of 
alternative solutions for actors to choose from."10 While the Member States were far from 
unanimous about the need for harmonisation of labour law protections,11 the move to 
labour law did at least have the advantage of unblocking the company law programme. 
The Commission's new approach to company law from the 1980s onwards can best be 
characterised as a "pragmatic" one, with "hardly any trace of an over-arching vision in 
the harmonization process."12 A good example of this new approach is the amended 
proposal for a Fifth Directive which retreated from harmonising employee involvement at 
board level in favour of allowing Member States a series o f options of purportedly 
equivalent effect.13
In terms of models of the company, Streeck refers to the "relegation" during this period 
of industrial citizenship measures from company law to labour law, and from regulatory 
intervention to "voluntarism, first of national governments, and later of multinational 
firms."14 The Commission is now encouraging national corporations to take voluntary 
measures of corporate social responsibility.15 This reflects the changing centre of gravity
9 Streeck and Vitols, "Europe: Between Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information" in Rogers and Streeck (eds), Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Co-Operation in Industrial Relations (1995), at 249-5010 Streeck, W (1997) (supra note 4) at 64611 For more details, see, for example, Barnard, "EC “Social” Policy" in Craig, P and De Burca, G (eds), The Evolution o f EU Law (1999), 479 or Simitis and Lyon-Caen, "Community Labour Law: A Critical Introduction to its History" in Davies, P, Lyon-Caen, G, Sciarra, S, and Simitis, S (eds), European Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives: Liber Amicorum Lord Wedderbum (1996),12 Wouters, J (2000) (supra note 1) at 271-213 Following the European Parliament's opinion of 1982 (OJ C 149 (1982), p.17), a revised proposal was put forward in 1983 (COM (1983) 185 final, OJ C 240,9.9.1983, Bull Supp 6/83) which allowed Member States to offer companies a choice between the one- and two-tier board. It also made the employee board participation measures optional where a majority of employees were opposed and provided four distinct participation models. Two were based on the German and Dutch methods of participation, the third allowed employee representation in a separate body (presaging the Works Council Directive), and the fourth allowed for participation to be provided for by collective agreement where this provided equivalent rights.14 Streeck, W (1997) {supra note 4) at 647,s The Commission's CSR initiative is discussed below.
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of the political stakeholding debate, from industrial democracy during the 1970s to 
voluntary measures of CSR in the 1990s. By contrast, the agency model has been 
"promoted", no longer relying on adaptive contractual measures, to form the basis o f  
legislative harmonisation proposals, in the form of capital market measures, and in 
particular, the takeover directive.
The Evolution of the European Takeover Directive
While the first draft appeared as long ago as November 1973, the Thirteenth Company 
Law Directive still has not been enacted. Professor Robert Pennington of Birmingham 
University produced a draft directive at the request of the Commission which was 
discussed for a couple o f years before being rejected as premature.16 Broad differences in 
their corporate governance systems not only meant that hostile takeovers were more or 
less unknown in some Member States (and therefore that "take-over practice had not 
settled down to a pattem"17), but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, that there was no 
agreement on the question of the desirability of encouraging takeovers or otherwise. In 
this climate, the idea o f a European takeover directive went into abeyance for a while. 
The continued absence of hostile takeovers from the continental corporate governance 
scene is widely attributed to concentrated share ownership.18
16 The Pennington proposal reference is “internal working paper, doc XI/56/74”, cited in Clausen, NJ and Sorensen, KE, Takeover Bids (1998) at 13; see also Hopt, "European Takeover Regulation: Barriers to and Problems of Harmonizing Takeover Law in the European Community" in Hopt, K and Wymeersch E (eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (1992), 165 at 166. The Commission did issue a Recommendation to the Member States that they should introduce rules governing mandatory bids: see Commission Recommendation 77/534 OJ L 212,37 et seq17 Johnston, A, The City Take-Over Code (1980) at 183: even in the unlikely event of agreement, the version adopted may have been obsolescent.18 With the striking exception of the UK, most Member States of the EU have concentrated share ownership. The German position was discussed in the last chapter. For fiirther details o f the concentration of continental shareholding structures see Becht, M and Rowell, A, "Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison" (1999) 43 European Economic Review 1049 at 1051: "In several countries, the median largest voting stake in listed companies is over 50%, suggesting that voting control by a large blockholder is the rule rather than the exception". The highly dispersed UK is the real outlier of the group. See also Becht, M, Bolton, P, and Rowell, A, "Corporate Governance and Control" (ECGI Finance Paper No2f October 2002 . These structural conditions make hostile bids impossible, since the controlling shareholder by definition sides with incumbent management; any takeover takes the form of a negotiated acquisition.
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The influence o f the Pennington proposal may still be felt: all subsequent proposals have, 
to a greater or lesser extent, drawn their inspiration from the UK City Code. However, 
this thesis suggests that basing a pan-European legislative proposal on a purely agency 
approach to the company undermined its chances o f adoption.
The First Commission Proposal
The first official reference by the Commission to the takeover directive is found in the 
White Paper programme for completing the internal market19 and the first proposal was 
published by the Commission on 19th January 1989.20
i) Restriction o f Defensive Measures
Article 8 of the draft prohibits the board, once the bid has been made public, from issuing 
"securities carrying voting rights or which may be converted into such securities'' without 
the authorisation of the general meeting.21 23This provision rules out the board issuing 
shares to a friendly party or creating a poison pill, actions often aimed at entrenchment, 
unless authorised by the general meeting. Article 8 further prohibits the board from 
engaging in other "transactions which do not have the character of current operations 
concluded under normal conditions", unless either authorised by the general meeting, or 
"the competent supervisory authority has authorized them, giving its reasons for such 
authorization." Two interpretations o f this clause are possible. The first is that the board 
retains full rights of management in the face of the bid. The role of the supervisory 
authority is simply to protect the shareholders by reviewing any action taken by
19 According to Bull Supp 3/89 at 1. The White Paper is COM (85)310, June 1985 at 3420 O.J. 14.3.1989, C64/8. An explanatory memorandum was published as Bull Supp 3/8921 It appears from the amended first directive that, as originally drafted, this provision would have allowed the shareholders to provide consent in advance of the bid.22 Note the Commission's statement that "company law in several Member States also allows companies to adopt a range of defensive measures to ensure that control of the company remains in the hands of friendly shareholders. These defensive measures are very widely used in some Member States. As a consequence, the conditions in which a takeover bid is carried out vary considerably between Member States." (Bull. Supp 3/89 para 13). This point was, somewhat bizairely, raised in the context of whether a reciprocity clause should be imposed on bidders from third countries.23 The supervisory authority is dealt with in Article 6. The Member States are obliged to designate the body which will exercise supervisory functions within their jurisdiction.
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management which does not fall into the category of "current operations"24 to ensure that 
these actions are not taken for defensive or entrenchment purposes. The second 
interpretation is that this was an exception from the rule requiring general meeting 
authorisation of all defensive measures. The supervisory authority in each Member State 
would be given discretion to authorise specific defensive measures not involving the 
issue of securities, such as "greenmail" or a sale of key assets. The requirement of reasons 
presumably means that authorisation would have to be given on case-by-case basis. 
Whatever the correct interpretation, had this provision become law, its lack of specificity 
means that divergences in the approach of different national supervisory authorities could 
have been expected. This would have undermined the Commission's aim of equivalent 
protection across the EEC (discussed below). Unfortunately, no explanation for this 
clause is included in the draft or the explanatory memorandum, although the Commission 
does state that the board "must at all times act in the interests of the company."25 26
These interpretations indicate a slight movement away from the agency model and 
absolute shareholder choice, towards allowing the board to take into account the interests 
of other stakeholders, perhaps with a view to calming the controversy over defensive 
measures. An outright prohibition would have had a strong effect on the systems o f  
company law of those Member States, such as Germany, which adopt a more institutional 
view of the company with a pluralistic board mediating among the competing claims o f  
the various constituencies. Making space for the national authority to review measures 
taken by the board would allow a distinction to be made between action taken by the 
board to entrench themselves at the expense o f the shareholders, and action taken with 
the aim of protecting the longer-term interests of "the company" (such as taking into 
account the interests o f employees). However, this distinction between defensive 
measures involving the issue of shares and those involving other actions was not 
maintained in the second and third draft directives.
24 In the Explanatory Memorandum at 9, the Commisssion explains that this refers to "operations of an exceptional nature which might cause a substantial loss o f the company’s assets.” This would include sales of key assets or assumption o f large amounts of debt.25 Bull Supp 3/89 at 926 The effect of the City Code on the UK's managerialist system of company law was discussed in Chapter 4.
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In the absence o f shareholder or supervisory authority permission to take defensive 
measures, the board could only make their opposition to the bid known through their 
obligatory report under Art 14(1), hoping that the shareholders would accept their plan
for the company.
ii) Protection o f Employee Interests
More direct reference to the protection of employee interests is found in Articles 10(1)(1) 
and 19. Article 10(1)(1) requires the offeror to include in his offer document a statement 
of his
"intentions..., explicitly expressed, regarding the continuation of the business of the 
offeree company, including the use o f its assets, the composition of its board and its 
employees."
The inclusion of this requirement was explained by the Commission on the basis that:
"In the interests of all parties to the bid and taking into account the social policy o f the 
Commission, it seems indispensable to make clear in the offer document the intentions of 
the offeror concerning the future o f the offeree company, especially as regards its
27activities, including the use of its assets but also as regards its management and staff." 
Article 19 states that:
"The board of the offeree company shall communicate to its worker's representatives, as 
designated by national legislation or customary practice in Member States, the offer 
document and [other reports relating to the bidder’s financial position]...as well as its 
own reports as referred to in Article 14 [stating whether the board is in agreement with 27
27 Bull Supp3/89 page 10
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the offeror on the bid] and, if  appropriate, the expert's report as referred to in Article 
14(2).”
The combined effect of these provisions is to inform the employees about the offeror's 
intentions, at least in so far as they are disclosed by the offeror. It is notable that there is 
no provision for consultation of the employee representatives. While information may be 
considered a weak form of participation within a political stakeholder model, it must be 
timely in order to be treated in this way. Given that a hostile offer will normally have 
been published by the time the employees hear about it, these provisions should be 
considered as labour law measures aimed at giving advance warning to the employees of 
the likely approach of new management. Any protection of their interests will be 
achieved through adversarial labour law measures rather than more unitary company law 
mechanisms. The Commission's explanation o f Article 19 makes it clear that these 
provisions aim to mitigate the social consequences o f the takeover by facilitating a 
collective adversarial reaction rather than by allowing employees to become involved in 
the corporate decision-making process:
"One of the fundamental objectives of this Directive is to inform those chiefly concerned 
by the operation o f its consequences. Among the persons mainly concerned are the 
employees of the target company, for whom the operation may have serious 
repercussions."28
Hi) Rationale fo r  the First Draft Directive
The Explanatory Memorandum stated that the aim of introducing this coordination 
measure was "to afford shareholders and other interested parties equivalent standards of 
protection before the law in all Member States."29 The Commission argued that the
28 Bull Supp 3/89 at 13, emphasis added29 Bull. Supp 3/89 para 2; the identity o f  the "other interested parties" is not clear: the Commission's explanatory memorandum pays a great deal of attention to the position of shareholders, and does not, for example, consider the position of creditors or employees, the two most likely "other parties", While on its face, Art 44 (ex-54) of the EC Treaty allows measures aimed at protecting employees (referring to "the protection of the interests of members and others") as well as shareholders, measures aimed at protecting
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growing use o f the takeover mechanism for corporate reconstructions in Europe, and the 
highly uneven development of takeover regulation across the various Member States, 
made regulation of takeovers (or "share mergers" as the Commission described them) 
imperative, particularly in view of the progress of legislation in other merger-related 
fields.
The directives’ main goals were to ensure shareholder equality,30 and to put the 
shareholders in a position to make an informed decision on the outcome of any bid. These 
goals were to be achieved through the provision of "full and substantiated information"31 32
including a detailed, reasoned opinion from the board; the imposition of mandatory bid 
rules to protect minority shareholders by allowing them to exit on the same terms as those 
shareholders who tendered or sold on the market; and, most importantly for our 
purposes, the imposition of severe restrictions on the use of defensive measures by the 
board.33
The equal treatment of shareholders may be understood as being aimed at ensuring the 
free movement o f capital in an undistorted market. Equal treatment may be considered in 
a broad sense to require that shareholders of all public corporations in all Member States 
should be ”afford[ed] equivalent standards of protection before the law in all Member 
States."34 This would solve the problem of information costs discouraging investors from 
investing in other Member States, but requires fairly detailed harmonisation of national 
takeover rules. Rules relating to provision of information and mandatory bids can clearly 
be seen in terms o f providing equivalent protection for shareholders and preventing
employees have in fact not been made under the company law provisions o f Art 44, but rather under the labour law provisions of Art 137 (ex-118).30 Art 3 provides that "shareholders who are in the same position shall be treated equally".31 Para 12 of the Explanatory Memorandum. It was anticipated that these provisions would particularly benefit small shareholders, who have access to very little information about the company, in other Member States given that the "company making the bid is usually better informed about the situation of the target company and the value of its shares than the company's shareholders, because it has taken the initiative."32 Article 4 obliged a bidder "aiming to acquire a number or percentage of securities which, added to any existing holdings, gives him a percentage of the voting rights in a company which may not be fixed at more than 33 1/3% shall be obliged to make a bid to acquire all the securities of that company." It is notable that there is no equivalent "squeeze-out" right.33 The Commission drew specific attention to the wide divergence among Member States in the extent to which they permit defensive measures as one of die causes of the unequal treatment of shareholders.
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discrimination among them. The prohibition on defensive measures is more problematic. 
It appears to have a substantive aim, which goes beyond making protection equivalent for 
all shareholders, namely to ensure that shareholders rather than any other constituency 
decide on the outcome of the bid. Granting shareholders an absolute right to decide does 
not necessarily arise from the aim of equality: the directive could achieve its aim of 
equivalent protection by the uniform imposition across the EC of, for example, a 
Delaware-style review rule, or some other rule which allows other corporate 
constituencies to be taken into account.34 5 Accordingly, a single market explanation for 
the introduction of a strong prohibition on defensive measures is insufficient; rather, it 
depends on the additional rationale of the establishment of a pan-European market for 
corporate control, with its alleged effects o f beneficial industrial consolidation36 and 
better monitoring of management, and leading eventually to the prioritisation of 
shareholder value as the goal of the corporation. However, these aims remained tacit: the 
restructuring rationale was not discussed officially until the revised second draft, and the 
market for corporate control more generally was not discussed until the Third draft 
directive was published in 2002.
Remaining within a neoclassical perspective, and relying on its central Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis, one might go further and argue that harmonisation of defensive measures is 
not required for the protection o f shareholders. According to that hypothesis, regardless 
of whether they have informed themselves of the legal regime in place, potential 
investors are automatically protected as the efficient operation of markets (driven by the 
actions of informed investors) factors into the share price the extent to which the board
34 Bull Supp 3/89, para 235 In any event, it is not clear that an absolute prohibition is necessarily in the best interests of the target company’s shareholders: see, for example, Camey, WJ, "Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model" (1988) Wisconsin Law Review 385, who argues at 392 that "there are widely varying outcomes for target shareholders for every [defensive] tactic. This means that any rule, whether of contract or law, that effectively prohibits any of these tactics is likely to be costly for some shareholders." He argues that many defensive measures are likely to increase shareholder wealth when used in the right circumstances, even greenmail, the most "vilified" defensive mechanism, may increase shareholder wealth because it "may be an effective means used by good managers to communicate private information as to how much the true value o f a firm exceeds its market value, in the face of a bid which target managers believe undervalues the firm....” Alternatively, he suggests, greenmail may be paid by inferior managers who value the rents they are currently extracting from shareholders.
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are permitted to maximise the utility of constituencies other than the shareholders, for 
example, by taking defensive measures. On this view, the efficient operation and 
interpenetration of capital markets could simply be backed up by detailed disclosure 
requirements about the defensive measures which are in place.36 7
iv) The Revised First Proposal
When the first draft "met with more criticism than approval" in the UK,38 Germany and 
the Netherlands,39 the Commission produced a revised proposal on 14th September 
1990.40 In the revised draft, the limitations on defensive measures in the original proposal 
were expanded and fleshed out. Article 8(1) was amended to require shareholder 
authorisation to be given "within the period for acceptance". This was explained on the 
basis that it would "enable the holders of securities of the offeree company to take a 
decision in full knowledge of the conditions of the bid."41 Article 8(1 )(c) added a 
prohibition against the corporation acquiring its own shares during a bid in the absence of 
general meeting approval. The Commission pointed out that this was an express 
derogation from the Second Company Law Directive.42
36 Although note in this context the role played by the market for corporate control in the conglomeration and deconglomeration processes in the UK and US, discussed in chapter four.37 In its Recommendation of 25* July 1977, the Commission explains at para 2 that "the lack o f full information on the securities themselves and ignorance or misunderstanding of the rules governing the various markets have certainly helped to confine the investments of the great majority of savers to the markets of the countries in which they live or to a few well-known major international securities." It should be noted that the Winter Report concluded at 22 that the position had not changed greatly and that "efficient markets do not exist across Europe. The securities markets in Member States differ widely in levels of development."38 In the UK, fears were raised for the future of the UK self-regulatory system both in a DTI consultative document and in a report of the Company Law Committee o f  the Law Society for England and Wales in 1989: see Dine, J and Hughes, P, EC Company Law  (1991) at 11-2 -  11-3; Consultative Document paras 18 and 20; Memorandum on the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law (the Law Society Nov 1990, No 244). Specifically, it was argued that the principle that the courts would not intervene during the course of the bid itself was under threat, and so the speed and flexibility of the UK system, which are widely perceived as two of its great strengths, were threatened. The Commission sought to allay these concerns by pointing out that the question of how "this regulatory system is organized is left to the Member States, provided the authorities have the power to effectively police the takeover rules" (Bull. Supp 3/89 para 11).39 Hopt, (1992) {supra note 16) at 167. The revised draft allowed certain exemptions from the mandatory bid requirement.40 O.J., 26.9.90 C240/7, COM(90) 416 final. This was as amended unanimously by the Council under Art 1494^  COM (90) 416 final at 742 ibid; Art 19(1 )(a) of Directive 77/91/EEC provided that the general meeting could authorise the board to repurchase shares for a period of up to 18 months. The effect of the revised first draft would have been to
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The preamble and Article 6a set out "principles" to guide the supervisory authority in the 
exercise of their powers. The requirement of equal treatment of shareholders in the same 
position was promoted to the status of general principle. The supervisory authority’s task 
was to "seek to ensure" that "the board of an offeree company acts in the interests of all 
the shareholders, and cannot frustrate the bid."43 The Directive explicitly stated that this 
principle would apply to the authority’s power to grant exemptions under Article 8(1 Xb)44 
with the aim of ensuring both flexibility and legal certainty. These amendments curtail 
any discretion conferred on the supervisory authority by the first draft to authorise 
defensive measures. The revised directive's clearly stated aim of preventing frustration 
would only allow the supervisory authority to authorise abnormal transactions45 where 
this did not prejudice the bid's prospects. It appears that the only discretion given to 
Member States in this regard would be a choice between a rule of managerial passivity in 
the face o f bids and a rule of management auctioning the company.
As for the rights of employees, Article 10( 1 )(I) was amended to require the offeror to 
include in the offer document certain information, including its plans for the continuation 
in office of the current board o f the offeree company and the projected future 
employment policy of the offeree company. In addition, the offeror was obliged to 
disclose any intended "restructuring of the offeree company and of companies controlled 
by it". Presumably any disclosure o f future redundancies in the offer document could 
trigger the provisions of the Collective Redundancies Directive.46 This amended Article 
required the bidder to state his "objectives" and "intentions", but the reference to 
"explicitly expressed" was dropped. The bidder is also obliged to set out "any special
change this to mean that, once a bid became public, specific permission would have to be sought from the general meeting.4Î C240/8 and 17; the inclusion o f these principles was requested by the Parliament in its opinion: see COM(90) 416 final at 644 Which, as reformulated in the revised proposal, prohibited the board without authorisation from the general meeting from engaging "in transactions which would have the effect of altering significantly the assets or liabilities of the company or resulting in the company entering into commitments without consideration, unless the supervisory authority authorizes such transactions, giving reasons."45 Art 8(1 )(b) refers to "transactions which would have the effect of altering significantly the assets or liabilities of the company or resulting in the company entering into commitments without consideration"46 Directive 75/129/EEC (see text accompanying notes 168-171 below).
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arrangements concerning employees' rights of participation which the offeror intends to 
maintain or to introduce.” A bidder could always argue that the tender offer stage is too 
early to reach definitive conclusions on the details of restructuring, and one wonders 
whether in fact this requirement would have been easily satisfied, as is frequently the 
case under the City Code, by the inclusion of a "boiler-plate" formula in the offer 
document to the effect that the bidder intends to respect the employees' rights.47
Finally Article 19(2) provided for disclosure of the offer document to the employees, 
which was to occur "immediately after they are made public in accordance with Article 
11(1)"- The first draft did not specify the timing of disclosure o f the offer document and 
could arguably have allowed the board to disclose the report to the employees before 
publication (if they themselves had it, which is unlikely in the case o f a hostile offer).
The Commission explains the failure of this "ambitious" amended proposal on the 
grounds of "strong opposition from certain Member States [as the economic situation 
changed]."48 This thesis suggests that the tighter restrictions on defensive measures by the 
board, reinforced by the notion that the board should acting in the interests of "all the 
shareholders" rather than "the company as whole”, meant that the amended directive was 
more clearly based on an agency model of the firm.
The Second Commission Proposal
The proposal was entirely recast in 1996,49 taking the form of a framework directive 
"consisting of certain common principles and a limited number o f general requirements 
which Member States will be required to implement through more detailed rules
47 See further, Chapter 4, note 168.48 See the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum dated 2nd October 2002, OJ C 45E/1. Defriez, A, "The Future of the Takeover Panel: Statutory or Non-Statutoiy?" (LSE Financial Markets Group ESRC Special Paper Series No 113 May 1999 notes at 12 that "we [the UK] objected to the legislative approach and for most other countries our concepts of shareholder protection did not meet with their then perceived requirements. The Germans, for instance, were adamantly opposed to any mandatory bid obligation and the Dutch objected to restrictions on frustrating action."49 O.J. Cl 62/5,6.6.1996, COM(95) 655 final.
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according to their national systems and their cultural contexts."50 The preamble to the 
directive offers a justification in terms of subsidiarity, claiming that "only action at 
Community level can ensure an adequate level o f protection for shareholders throughout 
the Union and provide for minimum guidelines for the conduct of takeover bids..."51
i) Prohibition o f Defensive Measures
While the second draft allows the Member States more freedom in terms of 
implementation, its prohibition on defensive measures by the board is stricter. Article 5 
sets out general principles, which the Member States are obliged to respect52 
Implementing legislation should respect equality of shareholders in the same position, 
require the board to act "in the best interests o f the company as a whole", and ensure that 
shareholders have sufficient time and information to reach an informed decision on the 
bid. These general principles are then followed by more detailed minimum requirements 
to be met by rules put in place by each Member State.
Article 8 (a), which imposes a broad prohibition on defensive measures by the board is a 
considerable simplification when compared with its predecessor. It states that:
"after receiving the information concerning the bid and until the result of the bid is made 
public, the board of the offeree company should abstain from any action which may
50 Preamble to the Directive; a "framework** directive does not appear to differ greatly from a directive as defined in Art 249 (ex 189) of the EC Treaty: "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved...but shall leave to the national authorities the choice o f  form and methods." It seems that in a framework directive issues o f implementation are more broadly construed, and some areas, such as Article 9, require regulation of issues without in any way specifying their content beyond that they should conform with broad principles. The difference in emphasis may have been designed to allay the fears of the British, expressly allowing more discretion as to the means of implementation to the Member States, and permitting self-regulation. This appears to be confirmed by a statement in the preamble that "it is desirable to encourage the voluntary control exercised by self-regulatory bodies in order to avoid recourse to administrative or judicial action.”51 This hints at an underlying fear that regime competition does not necessarily lead to agency model efficient rules, as many commentators in the US since Cary, W, "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware" (1974) 83 Yale LJ 663 have suggested. Individual Member States might prefer to compete to attract incorporations on the basis of protecting management and employees, leading to a "race to the bottom" in shareholder value terms. In addition, Member States acting individually are not able to impose rules protecting shareholders where there is a cross-border takeover.
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result in the frustration of the offer, and notably from the issuing of shares which may 
result in a lasting impediment to the offerer to obtain control over the offeree company, 
unless it has the prior authorization of the general meeting of the shareholders given for 
this purpose."
This simpler formulation does not give the Member States any room for manoeuvre as 
regards managerial action during the bid. In particular, the supervisory authority is not 
allowed to authorise extraordinary measures not involving the issue of shares; in the new 
formulation, the issue o f shares in the face of a bid is simply a "notable" defensive 
measure, but is not otherwise distinctive. This strict rule of managerial passivity reflects 
Article 7 of the City Code, on which it is clearly modelled.52 3 This gives an agency 
interpretation to the general principle that the board should act in the best interests of the 
company as a whole, which has no equivalent in the City Code.54 Read in light of the 
absolute mle of managerial passivity, this principle equates the company with the best 
interests of the current shareholders, rather than an ongoing productive coalition or 
entity. Where the board considers that an offer is inadequate, for example because they 
think their plans for the corporation will produce more value, or that there is a temporary 
disjunction between the share price and the corporation's true value, their only option is 
to inform the shareholders via their opinion published in accordance with Article 8(b), 
and hope that the shareholders take a longer term view. They have no stronger means of 
protecting either the shareholders against an inadequate bid, or other corporate 
constituencies against a bid which threatens their implicit contracts. It is then up to the
52 This differs from the amended first draft, where the general principles were a matter specifically for the supervisory authority.53 For criticism of this rule, see Painter, R  and Kirchner, C, "Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New Geiman Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform" (2002) 50 American Journal o f Comparative Law 201 at 209 and Painter, R and Kirchner, C, "European Takeover Law - Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for Takeover Law" (2000) 1 European Business Organization Law Review 353 at 382-394. One point which only indirectly concerns employees, but which featured strongly in debates about the second draft directive was that the passivity rule threatened to give US corporations an unfair advantage as regards hostile takeovers because differences in the extent to which defensive measures are permitted would make takeovers by US corporations easier and cheaper. The authors also feared that the strictness of the rule might "encourage managers and other stakeholders to make a political case to regulators rather than an economic case to directors."
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shareholders to decide between the incumbent board's plans and the bidder’s offer. While 
this type of rule may be uncontroversial within an agency perspective on the firm, this 
legal vulnerability to "bust-up" takeovers would tend to undermine management's ability 
to make credible commitments to employees.
ii) Protection o f Employee Interests
Article 6(3) maintains the requirement of a statement in the offer document concerning 
"the offerer’s intentions with regard to the future business and undertakings o f the offeree 
company, its employees and its management." Compared to its predecessor, this requires 
less "explicit expression", and so could more easily be met by a standard clause to the 
effect that contractual obligations will be honoured. In addition, there is no provision for 
informing the employees of the terms of the offer document, although given that the 
previous directive only informed the employees when the document was made public, 
this does not appear to make the employees' position any worse as their representatives 
may pick up the details on publication.
iii) The Revised Second Proposal
The Second Proposal was presented in revised form on 11 November 1997, taking into 
account some of the amendments proposed by the Economic and Social Committee54 *6 and 
the European Parliament.57 Certain changes were made as regards the position o f 
employees. Of the general principles, Art 5(1 )(c) was amended to include "employment" 
among "the interests o f the company as a whole."58 While this would not have made a 
great difference to the practical effect of the directive, given the absolute prohibition on
54 Although General Principle 9 states that "It is the shareholders' interests taken as a whole, together with those of employees and creditors, which should be considered when the directors are giving advice to shareholders.”Si O.J., 13.12.97, C378/10, COM(97) 565 final.56 03 C 295/1, 7.10.9657 OJ C 222/20,21.7.97.ss This followed a proposed amendment by the Parliament to include "safeguarding jobs” among the interests: see C222/22
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defensive measures,59 it at least paid lip-service to the idea that the company 
encompasses more interests than simply those of the shareholders. The preamble added 
that "appropriate information should also be given to the representatives of the company's 
employees or, failing that, to the employees directly." To this end, Article 6(1), which in 
the previous draft dealt with the publication of information concerning the bid, was 
amended to include a provision that
"As soon as the bid has been made public, the board of the offeree company shall inform 
the representatives of its employees, or, where there are no such representatives, the 
employees themselves."
While based on a proposal from the Parliament,60 this amendment simply reintroduces 
the provisions about employee information from the first draft directive. Given that the 
Member States already had an obligation under Article 6 to ensure general publicity for 
the bid, this does not appear greatly to affect the position of the employees. On the 
suggestion of Parliament, Article 7(2) was also amended to include the employees among 
the beneficiaries of rules requiring disclosure of all information and documents.61 While 
these changes undoubtedly brought the interests of the employees to the forefront, they 
do not have any real impact on their ability to affect the outcome of the bid.
In contrast to these rather cosmetic amendments, the Parliament had also proposed an 
amendment to Article 8(b) requiring the board to consult the employees before finalising 
their opinion to the shareholders. This proposal was unfortunately rejected. It would have 
introduced a meaningful political stakeholder measure which ensured that the employees 
"had their say" about the takeover.
59 As regards defensive measures, Article 8(a) was amended to require the consent of the general meeting to be given "during the period o f acceptance of the bid." This amendment, which was proposed by the Parliament (see OJ C 222/24, 21.7.97), clarified that there was no possibility of authorisation of defensive measures before the bid.60 See O JC  222/23, 21.7.9761 Parliament amendment at OJ C 222/24
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iv) Rationale fo r  the Revised Second Proposal
In the Commission’s communication to the Parliament of its position regarding the 
revised second draft directive, it emphasises the two main aims of the proposal: the 
protection of minority shareholders through a mandatory bid rule, and the 
"harmonisfation of] national rules on takeover bids, particularly regarding the 
transparency of the procedure, in order to facilitate restructuring throughout Europe."62 3
The prohibition on defensive measures is not necessary to protect minority shareholders, 
who will be adequately protected by the mandatory bid rule, and by rules requiring that 
they be offered a fair price, however this is calculated. Since an absolute prohibition on 
defensive measures is not necessary to ensure "equivalent safeguards" for shareholders, it 
can only be understood in terms of encouraging the necessary process of corporate 
restructuring. While the Commission first admitted its instrumental use of the takeover 
directive in this context, it had long been clear to commentators that the directive was 
aimed at enabling corporations to adapt to and fully exploit the single market.64
The second draft’s much-vaunted respect for national contexts did not extend as far as 
tolerating defensive measures or the grant of significant procedural rights to employees, 
and therefore models o f the company other than the agency model. This was the reason 
for Germany's continued opposition to the directive.65 Since it would have given the 
shareholders sole competence to decide on the fate of a takeover bid, the directive would 
have marginalised the role of the employee representatives on the supervisory board. The
62 SEC(2000) 1300 final, 26.07.2000fi3 ibid at 264 Note in this regard Gilson's comment in Roe, "Takeover Politics” in Blair, MM (ed), The Deal Decade (1993), 321 at 379-80 fn 136 that "corporate acquisitions are an equilibrating mechanism that becomes important only following a change in technology, and hostile takeovers become important only when some managers resist the change. Consistent with this analysis, the current effort on the part of the European Community to reduce the barriers to takeovers is openly instrumental. Takeovers are to be encouraged because in the view of the Community, a technological change has increased the efficient scale of enterprise."65 Berglof, E and Burkart, M, "'Breakthrough' in European Takeover Regulation?" (Site Staff Papers 02/03, Stockholm School o f  Economics and CEPR note at 10 fh 4 that “German opposition was intense throughout this process, and ultimately Germany no longer backed the common position in the Council, but was voted down 14 to 1 three times within the Council.” Painter, R and Kirchner, C (2002) (supra note 53) describe German opposition to the requirement of shareholder approval, which within the permissible timescales is practically impossible, as the "linchpin" o f the German position.
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strict neutrality rule risked undermining the consensual system of corporate governance. 
Whether one considers it a matter of economics or politics, Germany's opposition 
response to such a threat to its system of corporate governance was not surprising.
v) The Fate o f the Revised Second Proposal
In any event, the directive failed. After the Council rejected a number of the amendments 
proposed in the Parliament's opinion,66 it adopted a common position on the directive on 
19th June 2000.67 68In the common position, Article 6(3)(h) required the offer document to 
contain a statement of "the offeror’s intentions with regard to the future business of the 
offeree company, its employees and its management, including any material change in 
the conditions o f Employment." Two changes were made to the position concerning 
defensive measures. First the board would be permitted to seek alternative bids. Second, 
an amendment was introduced which allowed Member States to permit the board o f the 
offeree company to increase the share capital o f the company during the period for 
acceptance of the bid, provided that this had been authorised by the general meeting not 
more than 18 months previously, and that the company honoured the pre-emption rights69 
of all shareholders.70
The Parliament rejected the common position and proposed further amendments giving 
the employees a role in deciding on the outcome of the bid.71 Many of the amendments 
are clearly aimed at the German co-determination situation.72 The proposed amendments
66 O JC  222,21.7.1997, p.2067 OJ C 23, 24.1.2001, p. 1. See also the Commission's communication to the Parliament of its position: SEC(2000) 1300 final, 26.07.2000. That communication repeated the Commission's view that the twin aims of the proposal were protection o f minority shareholders and transparency for the purposes of restructuring.68 Art 9(1 )(a) as amended, although this was arguably already possible.69 Contained in Article 29(1) of the Second Company Law Directive, 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976.70 Art 9(2) of the Common Position. The Commission in its Communication to the Parliament (SEC(2000) 1300 final, 26.07,2000) noted that they had "accepted this limited derogation from the principle of neutrality of the board of the offeree company in order to arrive at a consensus on the basic principle without, however, compromising it."71 O JC  232,17.8.2001, p. 168.72 For example the amendment to Article 9(1 )(a) requiring the supervisory board's consent to any defensive measures.
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extended the general principles to include the interests of the employees as well as the 
shareholders. Art 3(1 )(c) was extended to state that:
"the board of an offeree company is to act in the interests of the company as a whole, in 
particular in the interests o f corporate policy and in continuation, shareholders and staff, 
and with a view to safeguarding jobs, and must not deny the holders o f securities the 
opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid.”73
Further Art 3(l)(b) provided that:
"holders of securities of an offeree company and its employees or their representatives 
are to have sufficient time and information to enable them to reach a properly informed 
decision on the bid."74
The disclosure requirements o f Art 6(3)(h) were also elaborated, adding a requirement 
that the offer statement set out the:
"offeror’s strategic planning for the offeree company, the effect o f such plans on job and 
location, their impact on labour law standards, social standards and collective 
undertakings and the consequences for bodies representing the interests of the workers."
The Parliament also proposed an amendment to Article 6(4), which gave the supervisory 
authority power to request information, extending it to allow the employees' 
representatives to request information at any time during the bid. They also proposed that 
if an opinion was available from the employees' representatives, it should be published.75
73 Of C 232, 17.8.2001, p. 169, emphasis showing change. They also proposed changes which would have allowed the supervisory authority of a Member State to lay down guidelines setting out the permissibility o f  defensive measures not caught in para 9( 1 )(a)74 OJ C 232, 17.8.2001, p. 169. This amendment only makes sense where the employees have some kind of decision-making power in the first place.75 Art 9(1 )(b); this replaced an earlier proposed amendment, which went even further, in which the Parliament proposed that before drawing up their opinion on the offer document, management should consult with the employee representatives or the employees themselves: see Recommendation for Second Reading (A5-0368/2000 FINAL) at 16
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Finally, and most controversially, the Parliament attempted to revive and extend the 
provision from the first draft directive, allowing the national supervisory authority to 
"adopt guidelines as to the permissibility of any other defensive measures."76 They also 
set out a number of optional models as regards the authorisation of defensive measures.
The Commission's response to attempts by the Parliament to change the theoretical basis 
of the directive was not surprising. The Commission perfunctorily rejected all these 
proposed amendments in its Opinion on the grounds that "they have no place in these 
provisions."77 The requirement that the employees should have sufficient information to 
make an informed decision was dismissed by the Commission on the grounds that "only 
the holders of securities can decide whether or not to sell them and they are therefore the 
only parties concerned by [the bid]."78 The Commission considered the provision to 
employees of the same information as the supervisory authority inappropriate because 
"the system was established to provide information to the supervisory authorities, and 
they are therefore the only parties concerned by it."79 80The amendment to Art 3(1 )(c) was 
rejected on the basis that "an excessively detailed list has no place in a framework
Q/Vdirective, and there is invariably the added risk that it may not be exhaustive."
The amendments to Art 6(3)(h), which required more detailed information to be set out in 
the offer document, were rejected on the basis that "the purpose of the Directive is to 
harmonise company law, Amendment 13 tends to focus on labour law, which is already 
governed by other directives...." The proposal to publish the employees' opinion was 
rejected on the same basis. Protection of employees is to take place as a remedial matter 
after the takeover has been completed. Finally, the proposal allowing the supervisory 
authority to authorise a broader range of defensive measures was rejected because:
76 Art 9(2a)(a)77 COM (2001) 77 final at 578 ibid at 579 ibid80 This objection appears to be close to disingenuous: the list has no place in the directive because the board has no power to take into account these wider interests because its powers of management have been truncated. Similarly, fears that the list would not be exhaustive would be better served by an attempt at completing the list, for example, by adding customers, suppliers and the community.
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"1) it is incompatible with the spirit of the rule whereby only the holders of securities can 
determine a company's future; 2) the supervisory authority must act as an arbiter, and it is 
not its role to take sides between two companies; 3) involvement of the courts may result 
in delays which are unacceptable to all parties to the bid, and should be avoided."
vi) The 'Conciliated' Version o f the Second Proposal
The Council also rejected the Parliament's amendments and so the matter went to the 
conciliation committee in accordance with Article 251(3) of the EC Treaty. At that 
hearing, the German Government's proposal to grant the board wide discretion to take 
defensive measures was rejected.81 A compromise was agreed in the conciliation 
committee on 6th June 2001.82 The general principles were in line with those originally 
proposed by the Commission. Employees were to be informed on publication of the bid, 
and have information about the bid disclosed to them at the same time as the 
shareholders. Article 6(3)(h) was considerably narrower than the Parliament's proposed 
disclosure, merely requiring a statement of:
"the offeror's intentions with regard to the continuation of the business of the offeree 
company and, so far as affected by the bid, o f the offeror company, and with regard to the 
continued employment o f  their employees and their management, including any material 
change in the conditions of employment. This relates in particular to the offeror's 
strategic planning for those companies and the likely impact on jobs and locations."
Article 9(1 )(d) required the board to make public its opinion on the bid and the offeror's 
statement of intentions, and "at the same time communicate this opinion to the 
representatives of its employees or, where there are no such representatives, to the 
employees themselves. Where a separate opinion of the employees' representatives on the 
effects of implementation on employment is made available to the board of the offeree 
company in sufficient time, it shall be enclosed." If the employees desired to make public
81 Mueller, "A New Takeover Regime for Germany: German Act on Acquisitions and Takeovers" in Payne,J (ed), Takeovers in English and German Law (2002), 173 at 174
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such an opinion, they would, like the board, be operating on a very strict timescale, given 
that they would only have been made aware of the takeover bid when it was made public 
(under Art 6(2)). Given that Art 7(1) requires an acceptance period of not less than two 
weeks or more than ten weeks from publication, and that they are only notified at the 
beginning of that period, the employees would usually find this rather difficult.
Article 9(1 )(a) prohibited the board from taking frustrating measures, with the exception 
of "seeking alternative bids" and action specifically approved by the shareholders. The 
requirement of shareholder consent was extended to decisions taken before the bid but 
not implemented, where the decision in question is outside the ordinary course of 
business. Given the requirement of at least two weeks' notice of any general meeting 
called for this purpose (Art 9(1 )(c)), consent would be procedurally difficult to obtain, 
even where the shareholders are willing.
However, the "conciliated" text was rejected by the Parliament on 4th July 2001 by a tied 
vote of 273 votes to 273.83 The narrowness of the margin was perhaps the most surprising 
thing about the Parliament's rejection o f the text, given the extent to which their proposed 
amendments were not reflected in the conciliated text. In a subsequent Communication, 
the Commission reported that the Parliament had rejected the draft directive on "political 
grounds". The prohibition on defensive measures without shareholder approval was 
rejected both because it created an uneven playing field with US competitors, making it 
easier and cheaper for them to take over European companies, and because the directive 
as a whole did not create a level playing field for companies in Europe facing takeovers. 
In addition, the Parliament did not feel that employee interests were not adequately 
protected.84
8~ The text of the "conciliated" directive is available as Annex 6 to the Winter Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids.8Î OJC65E/112, 14.3.2002.84 See Commission Communication of 2nd October 2002 which accompanied the first publication o f the third draft directive, now published at OJ C 45E/1,25.2.2003.
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The Third Commission Proposal
The dramatic late failure of the Second Draft Directive led the Commission in September 
2001 to instruct a "High Level Group" of experts, led by Jaap Winter, to report and 
provide independent advice on the issue of takeovers, and to assist with the preparation of 
a new draft.85 The Commission's mandate sought advice on three distinct issues: how to 
"ensure the existence of a level playing field in the EU concerning the equal treatment of 
shareholders across Member States"; the definition of an "equitable price" to be paid to 
minority shareholders; and, for the first time in the Directive's history, rules concerning a 
"squeeze out" procedure, which would give a majority shareholder a right to buy out 
minority shareholders. The inclusion of a squeeze out right reveals clearly for the first 
time the Commission's aim of establishing a market for corporate control; this protection 
for bidders is the counterpart of the mandatory bid rule. While the Commission claims 
that its mandate reflected the positions of the Council and the Parliament during 
negotiations on the previous draft, the absence of any reference to employees is striking, 
given the number of amendments concerning employee rights proposed by the 
Parliament, and the Commission’s explanation of the Parliament's rejection o f the second 
draft directive.
i) The Winter Report
A capital market logic permeates the Winter Report which was produced in accordance 
with this mandate. The Winter Report is particularly salient for this thesis because it 
makes plain the assumptions which underlie the current draft directive with regard to the 
position of employees and the way in which their protection is envisaged. While the 
Report did not deal explicitly with the productive coalition argument that employees
85 The mandate may be found as Annex 1 to the group's report, the "Report of the High Level Group o f Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids" of 10th January 2002 (referred to in this chapter as "the Winter Report”). The High Level Group were also asked to produce a broader report considering other issues of EU company law. The "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modem Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe" (referred to in this thesis as "the Winter Report on Company Law Reform in Europe") was published on 4th November 2002.
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should often be considered residual claimants,86 it is implicitly rejected in their 
assumption that
"proportionality between ultimate economic risk and control means that share capital 
which has an unlimited right to participate in the profits of the company or in the residue 
on liquidation, and only such share capital, should normally carry control rights, in 
proportion to the risk carried."87
This assumption leads to the Winter Report’s conclusion that the establishment of a "level 
playing field"88 for shareholders should be guided by two principles: "shareholder 
decision-making" and "proportionality between risk-bearing and control".89 The 
implementation of these principles should "enable liquid and coherent markets in capital 
and corporate control to operate throughout the Union."90 As in earlier drafts, the agency 
model rather than the need for a "level playing field” underpins the prohibition of 
defensive measures. A level playing field simply requires uniform rules across the EU, 
which could, for example, allow management to take defensive measures where they are 
able to satisfy a Delaware-style intermediate standard of judicial review, or grant rights o f 
consultation or even co-decision to employees before the bid is completed.91
The Winter Report rules out the EMH argument that shareholders are protected by the 
price they pay for their shares. While it accepts that "in a fully integrated and well 
developed securities market, whether or not companies should adhere to the 
proportionality principle should be left to the market itself', it concludes that "such
86 The High Level Group's mandate did not require it to deal specifically with the issue of protection of employee rights: see the Winter Report at 16.87 Winter Report at 3, terming this constituency "risk-bearing capital”; this principle also requires the rejection of corporate structures which "grant disproportionate control rights to some $hareholder(s)" because they may "operate to frustrate an otherwise successful bid for the risk bearing capital of the company." (at 21)88 According to the Winter Report at 18, a "level playing field” does not exist where "takeover bids cannot be undertaken with the same expectation of success in the different Member States and shareholders in Member States do not have equivalent opportunities to tender their shares.”89 ibid at 2090 ibid at 2691 While the Delaware-style rule would appear to be acceptable to most Member States except the UK, it would be impossible to reach agreement on employee co-decision.
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efficient markets do not [currently] exist across Europe.”92 The Report also argues, 
somewhat laconically, that shareholder decision-making could also be left to the market, 
but that "the conflict of interest of the board may well lead to market failure in this 
context."93
Since the Winter Committee's assumptions directly contradict the productive coalition 
model set out in Chapter Three, and heavily influence the Report's recommendations, the 
justifications offered for them by the Winter Committee will be considered here in some 
detail.
In considering the preliminary public policy issue o f whether takeovers should be 
encouraged at all, the Winter Report, in line with its assumptions, concludes that takeover 
bids are "basically beneficial” because their effects in creating synergies, disciplining 
management and allocating resources where shareholders are dispersed are "in the long 
term... in the best interests of all stakeholders, and society at large."94 However, this is 
tempered by a recognition that takeover bids are not "always beneficial for the companies 
concerned, the target and the bidder, and their respective shareholders."95 Offeror 
shareholders, for example, may suffer a detriment where management in an inefficient 
market indulge in "empire building".96
The Report also recognises that “the interests o f other stakeholders and in particular 
employees may be at stake in the context of a takeover bid". However, the Committee 
"believes that this in itself does not justify defensive measures by the board which deny 
shareholders the opportunity to successfully tender their shares to a bidder who is willing 
to buy their shares.”97 Use of defensive measures by the board to take into account the
92 Winter Report at 3 and 2293 ibid94 ibid at 295 ibid at 1996 The Report notes that "Whether or not it [the board] should confer with it shareholders before executing the bid, is a matter of general corporate governance principles as applying to the bidder. It is outside the scope of the Directive."97 Winter Report at 16
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Q gemployees' interests is rejected on the grounds that they are "often costly" in the sense 
that "any regime which confers discretion on a board to impede or facilitate a bid 
inevitably involves unacceptable cost and risk.”98 9 These costs are agency costs to 
shareholders. The risk is that the board’s decisions will be tainted by conflict of interest. 
The Report is unequivocal that this risk is high: the board's "claims to represent the 
interests of shareholders or other stakeholders are likely to be tainted by self-interest."100 
Accordingly, "Shareholders should be able to decide for themselves and stakeholders 
should be protected by specific rules (e.g. on labour law or environmental law)."101
These three arguments will be addressed in turn. First, the argument about the board's 
conflict of interest when faced with a takeover has been discussed at length in previous 
chapters. However, we have seen that in Delaware, the courts inquire into the board's 
motivations, invalidating only action aimed at entrenchment. Similarly, the English 
courts appeared willing to do so before the introduction o f the City Code. Thus a total 
prohibition on defensive measures is not the only way of getting around the board's 
conflict of interest. The courts are able to distinguish between illegitimate self-serving 
behaviour on the part of the board, and genuine "mediating behaviour" which is to be 
encouraged where quasi-rent generating implicit contracts are at stake. An outright 
prohibition on defensive measures is a mechanism to constrain management to pursue 
shareholder value; it is not an essential element of creating a "level playing field".
The Winter Report acknowledges the Parliament's concerns about the lack of a level 
playing field with the US as regards defensive measures,102 but argues that, although
98 ibid at 299 at 21100 ibid, emphasis added.,0‘ ibid102 See the Parliament’s "Recommendation for Second Reading” dated 29* November 2000 (A5-0368/2000 Final) at 21-2. The Report recognises that its proposals differ from "controversial" US rules permitting defensive measures, and suggests that any remaining "political concerns" might be met by restricting the effect o f these two guiding principles to "European listed companies making general takeover bids for other European listed companies, to the extent this would not violate international agreements and could practically be enforced," (Winter Report at 42). However, Painter, R and Kirchner, C (2002) (supra note 53) at 221 comment that "such an approach would go to the opposite extreme from that feared by opponents of the Thirteenth Directive and create a market for corporate control within Europe that would be impregnable from outside."
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there is no US federal regulation of defensive measures, management of US public 
corporations operate in a very different context from their HU counterparts: social, 
cultural and market norms put pressure on boards to enhance shareholder value, and they 
are "judged by their performance on the capital markets."103 In addition, the needs of the 
European Union are altogether different from those of the US, given its stated aim of 
developing an integrated capital market by 2005, something the US has had for a 
considerable time.104
The second argument, that the shareholders alone should decide on the bid, rests on an 
agency analysis of the corporation, and in particular on the Committee's assumption that 
shareholders are the only residual claimants. The Committee concludes, correctly on the 
basis of its assumptions, that "holders of these rights to the residual profits and assets of 
the company are best equipped to decide on the affairs of the company as the ultimate 
effects o f their decisions will be borne by them."105 If the Committee had instead 
assumed that other corporate constituencies might also be residual claimants, they would 
presumably have recognised that allowing them some input would add legitimacy to the 
takeover process and at the same time enhance efficiency. It is crucial to note that it is the 
agency theoretical assumption that only shareholders bear risk, rather than the creation of 
a "level playing field", which is the basis for the outright prohibition on defensive 
measures. ■ ?
Finally, the Report argues that employees are better protected through labour law, rather 
than company law, measures,106 and suggests that the second draft o f the directive in any 
event "provided for extensive information requirements towards the employees."107 To 
describe the provision o f information to employees at the same time as it is made public 
as "extensive" is overstatement. Details of the offer will be widely circulated in any
103 Winter Report at 40. These "post-hostile takeover" adaptive mechanisms were discussed at length in Chapter 4.104 ibid.105 ibid at 3106 This echoes the point made by Paul Davies, discussed in Chapter two, that regulation of the employment relationship should not depend on the legal vehicle adopted by the employer: see Davies, P, Introduction to Company Law  (2002) at 272.107 Winter Report at 16
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event, and UK experience with a similar provision suggests that disclosure o f the 
offeror's intentions as regards future employment is likely to be superficial. The report 
also claims that employees already receive adequate labour law protection in the form of 
"specific legislation providing for information and consultation of employees and for 
their protection in the event o f a bid leading to restructuring."108 The EWC, CRD and the 
general information and consultation directives will be binding on the bidder after the 
acquisition, meaning that the "decision to sell by target company shareholders does not 
affect the legal protections afforded to employees and other stakeholders.”109 This 
reliance on ex post measures rejects (or at least does not consider) the argument that 
some employees rely on implicit contracts.
In Annex 3, the Group reports that it received suggestions that there should be a "re­
examination of the social issues and recognition of the right for the employees to be 
consulted, and not only informed about the conditions of the bid" and that "the Board 
should consult the employees before preparing its report on the bid, in order to have a 
joint evaluation of the bid and possible defensive measures.”110 The Report is not explicit 
as to the reasons for the rejection o f these suggestions. Certainly they would have 
exceeded their mandate had they addressed them. In addition, the Group's assumption 
that labour law mechanisms, reinforced by rights to information and consultation, provide 
employees with adequate protection means additional measures ex ante the takeover 
would serve no useful purpose. The impact of takeovers on implicit contracts does not 
appear to have been raised.
ii) The Committee's Recommendations
The Committee distinguishes pre- and post-bid structures. Pre-bid structures "have the 
effect of concentrating control rights in the hands of the board and/or minority 
shareholders."111 Annex four lists the numerous structural deviations from the two
108 ibidm  ibid at 16-17. O f course, the Directive supplementing the European Company Statute Regulation will only apply where the company in question decides to adopt that form.110 ibid at 73; the European Parliament proposed similar amendments to the second draft directive.1,1 ibid at 7 and 23
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guiding principles which exist across the EC, forming pre-bid barriers to takeovers by 
preventing the bidder taking control. These measures include voting caps, registration 
restrictions, multiple voting rights and even co-determination, although this is not 
normally a company-specific "deviation", but rather a requirement of law. The 
Committee recognises that many of these deviations frequently have a justification which 
transcends simply preventing takeover bids, such as responding to country-specific 
governance problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. For 
example, they suggest that "depository receipt structures have arguably been developed 
to protect a company with dispersed ownership against a small minority dominating the 
general meeting."12 13 Accordingly, they accept that it is not possible to deal 
comprehensively with all these barriers.114 While the Committee was not convinced that 
the operation of the market would eradicate the mechanisms which were the most 
harmful to shareholders - because "efficient markets do not exist across Europe"115 - it 
did propose a general, permanent rule that listed companies "be required to fully disclose 
their capital and control structures" both for the benefit o f investors "in order to enable 
them to assess the value of and risks related to their investment" and so that "markets 
[can] properly judge the efficiency of companies with different capital and control 
structures."116
The Group also recommended the introduction of a rule which would allow a successful 
bidder117 to immediately "break-through" pre-bid measures118 contained "in the articles of 
association and related constitutional documents of the company which deviate from the 
principles o f shareholder decision-making and proportionality", and to exercise
112 There is no indication that the Committee considered any measures in terms of dealing with governance problems beyond the agency model.1,3 Winter Report at 24114 Which would have involved looking at each measure in context and checking whether it could still be justified. The Committee was in any event unsure whether general agreement could be reached "on which structures could remain as acceptable deviations'* and in any event this would involve addressing the underlying governance problems that the structures were put in place to deal with, (ibid at 24)MS ibid at 22116 ibid at 251,7 Success being defined as crossing a threshold not exceeding 75%.118 Or measures put in place post-bid: ibid at 34
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proportionate control.119 Control is o f course limited to the "core control rights that 
company law grants” and the ’’break-through” rule would exclude "nomination or 
appointment rights of third parties which are mandatory in the company law of the 
Member States", such as co-determination. The break-through rule would not apply to 
contractual barriers to bids, like golden parachutes and shareholder agreements or to 
pyramid holdings.120
In terms of post-bid measures, the Winter Group recommended a prohibition of defensive 
measures after announcement of the bid in very similar terms to earlier draft directives. 
Management would be permitted to take measures where they were specifically 
authorised by the general meeting, provided that the authorisation also complied with the 
proportionality principle.121 The Committee rejected the idea that the board should be 
allowed to take defensive measures on the basis of a general advance authorisation 
because, before the bid, the shareholders would not be able to take into account all the 
relevant factors, because these are essentially unknowable ex ante. In fact, the 
"circumstances leading shareholders to authorise the board to frustrate a potential future 
bid may very well have changed fundamentally by the time a bid is actually made."122 
The rejection o f any defensive measures means that the role of the board would be 
limited to advising the shareholders on the merits o f the bid, and, if  appropriate, seeking 
alternative bids for consideration by the shareholders.123
119 ibid at 29-31. The Group suggested this should apply to golden shares whether held by the state or a private party. In fact, as regards the state, the ECJ subsequently niled in Commission v. Belgium, (Case C- 503/99, 4 June 2002), that golden shares “may be relied on only if  there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.” This requirement was to be “interpreted strictly” and the power reserved for golden shares also must be proportionate to the objective pursued. While the Belgian shareholding was upheld on the basis of national interest in energy supply, state-held golden shares were ruled unlawful in Commission v. Portugal, Case C-367-98, and Commission v. France, Case C-483-99, (Elf-Aquitaine) decided on the same day.120 Although the Group suggested that it should be considered outside the context of the directive whether these measures should remain binding.121 ibid at 28, i.e., "an authorisation by the general meeting of shareholders to take actions frustrating the bid would only be valid if made by a majority of votes exercised by the holders of the proportionate majority of the risk bearing capital of the company."122 ibid at 28123 ibid at 20
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Finally, as regards "squeeze out”124 and "sell out"125 rights following a takeover, the 
Group recommended harmonisation across the EU. Member States would broadly be free 
to fix the threshold between 90% and 95%, and the price paid in the takeover 
presumptively fair. Squeeze out rights are justified in terms of preventing minority 
shareholders abusing their position and imposing costs on bidder. The ability to 
consolidate control keeps takeovers attractive to bidders. It does not conflict with 
property rights because of the "general and public interest in having companies 
efficiently managed on the one hand, and securities markets sufficiently liquid on the 
other hand."126 The sell out right is justified to prevent shareholders being pressured to 
tender, to protect minorities with small shareholdings from abuse, and "as a fair 
counterpart for the squeeze-out right conferred on the majority shareholders and a 
component in the proportionality o f the squeeze-out solution."
Hi) The Commission's Third Proposal
The third draft proposal takes "broad account"127 of the Winter Committee's 
recommendations, and rests on its principles and assumptions. The draft, which was 
published by the Commission on 2nd October 20 02,128 follows the format o f the second 
proposal, with general principles being supplemented by more specific rules. The legal 
basis is also the same.129
iv) The Position o f Employees under the Third Proposal
The offer document should be disclosed promptly to the shareholders and the employees 
(Art 8(2)). Article 9(5) provides that the employees should receive a copy of the board's
124 This refers to the bidder's right to compulsorily acquire the remaining shares when he crosses a certain threshold.125 This refers to the right of remaining minority shareholders to require the bidder to purchase their shares.126 Ibid at 61127 O JC  45/2,25.2.2003128 See Commission Communication o f  2nd October 2002, now published at OJ C 45/1,25.2.2003129 The original directive was based on Art 54(3)(g); the second and third proposals on Article 44(2Xg); Hopt, (1992) {supra note 16) comments at 174 that "even without further workforce protection, the Directive is not really a company law measure since it clearly goes beyond company law and regulates a transaction which takes place not within the company, but in the capital market."
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opinion of the bid at the same time as it is made public.130 It also gives the employees the 
opportunity to append a separate opinion to the board's opinion, where the board receives 
this "in good time". Both board and employees will be working to a very strict timetable, 
and their opinions will only reach the shareholders rather late in the day, given the 
provision in Article 7 that the period for acceptance of the bid should be between 2 and 
10 weeks. This provision of the third draft repeats almost verbatim Art 9(1 )(d) of the text 
approved before the Conciliation Committee.131
In its explanatory notes accompanying the proposal, the Commission explains that the 
aim of these provisions is to ensure that the "offeree company's employees should be 
associated with the opinion and should be able, if  they disagree, to communicate their 
own opinion at the same time. These opinions are addressed to the shareholders, who 
have the responsibility to decide on the bid.”132 This raises an important issue. The 
employees are to be "associated" with the board's opinion, but must rely on the 
shareholders accepting that opinion. The reason for the inclusion of these provisions is 
obscure. If one assumes that employees are fully protected by their contracts, then these 
provisions are redundant from an employee protection perspective. Otherwise, as with the 
position under the City Code, being able to make representations to the shareholder 
decision-makers is unlikely to be sufficient given the premium on offer. Accordingly, the 
opinion of employees is likely to be of use to shareholders only where they are being 
offered shares rather than cash.
Beyond these provisions concerning publication of the offer document and the board's 
opinion, Article 13 adds that:
“Without prejudice to the provisions of this Directive, the provision of information to and 
consultation of representatives of the employees of the offeror and the offeree company
130 Art 9(5) requires the board to produce “a document setting out its opinion on the bid, together with the reasons on which it is based, including its views on the effects on all the interests of the company, including employment, and on the offeror’s strategic plans for the offeree company and their likely effects on employment and the locations of the company's places of business as set out in the offer document in accordance with Article 6(3)(h).”131 PE-CONS 3629/1/01 REV 1 dated 19 June 2001, annexed to the Winter Report at Annex 6
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shall be governed by the relevant national provisions, and in particular those adopted 
pursuant to Directives 94/45/EC, 98/59/EC and 2002/14/EC.”
The interaction between the proposed takeover directive and this trio of directives dealing 
with information and consultation is considered below. According to the Commission, 
Article 13 "confirms that the close and effective involvement of the companies' 
employees, via their representatives, is an important factor not only for the success of the 
operation but also for proper consideration of the different interests that may be affected 
by the takeover."132 33 • v
However, it should also be noted that employee information and consultation under this 
draft is narrower than under the City Code, which theoretically allows management to 
consult the employees before the bid is made public, subject to appropriate 
confidentiality safeguards.134 . ,
v) The Position o f Shareholders under the Third Proposal
The third draft goes considerably further than its predecessors in strengthening the 
position o f shareholders both pre- and post-bid. Article 9 prohibits defensive measures 
unless specifically authorised by the general meeting, a meeting in which restrictions on 
voting become unenforceable, reinstating the proportionality principle. In accordance 
with the Winter report's recommendations, Article 10 makes detailed provision for 
disclosure of information in the company's annual report about capital structure, 
restrictions and intra-corporate contracts in order to allow the market to reflect these 
arrangements in the share price.135
132 OJ C45/6,25.2.2003133 OJ C45/7,25.2.2003134 The draft directive's proposal only to inform employees after the event remained a clear point of contention in the public debate over the directive: See "New takeover directive needs further improvement, say experts", European Parliament News Report, 30th January 2003, available at: http.7/www2.europarl-eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+PRESS+NR-20030130- +0+DQC+XML+V0//EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S135 Art 10(3) provides that these "structural aspects and defensive mechanisms" should be put to a vote in the general meeting at least every two years.
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The break-through proposals were not adopted in full because they "met with opposition 
from virtually all Member States and interested parties" both because of legal problems 
like compensation and because they "would have had far-reaching implications for 
company law."136 Instead, Article 11 renders transfer restrictions unenforceable during 
the bid; renders voting restrictions imposed by the articles or contract without effect 
during any vote on defensive measures; and renders voting restrictions concerning the 
right to appoint the board or amend the articles unenforceable at the first general meeting 
following closure of the bid. Consequently, this rule affects a narrower range of structural 
barriers to the exercise of control than the Winter Report’s proposed break-through rule, 
in particular as regards multiple voting rights.137 The break-through rule set out in the 
draft does not affect employee rights, such as co-determination, which are imposed by 
national law. It is explicitly limited to the control which the bidder can take “under the 
applicable national law”, and so only allows break-through of restrictions on voting 
contained in the articles or in contractual arrangements. Articles 14 and 15 do adopt the 
Report's proposals as regards squeeze-out and sell-out rights.
vi) The Rationale fo r  the Third Proposal
The aims of the proposal are confirmed in the explanatory notes which accompany the 
third draft directive.138 Alongside the integration of European markets in accordance with 
the 1998 Financial Services Action Plan,139 which aims to create an integrated capital
136 03 C 45E/2,25.2.2003137 The notes to the directive state that “It can be argued that securities with multiple voting rights form part of a system for financing companies and that there is no proof that their existence renders takeover bids impossible. The same applies to securities with double voting rights, which may make for a stable shareholder base.” This is a point of contention for Germany, which opposes the directive on the basis that this prevents a "level playing field". While German-style defensive measures are prohibited by the directive, the Commission is not seeking to prohibit multiple voting rights, which are a key defensive mechanism in France and Scandinavian countries (where "the majority of listed companies are based on a multiple voting structure"), "since it fears that such a ban might be interpreted as “expropriation” and “give rise to questions o f a constitutional nature that could jeopardise or at least delay for a long time the adoption o f the Directive.” See also European News Report supra note 134.138 O JC 45E /2,25.2.2003139 See Commission Communication entitled Financial Services: Building a Framework fo r  Action, COM (1998) 625, 18.10.98 ("Building a Framework"), which responded to a call from the Cardiff European Council to produce a "framework for action" (Pt. 17, Presidency Conclusions from Cardiff European Council (15/16 June 1998)), and its follow up, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework fo r  Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232, 11.5.99 ("Implementing the Framework”)
285
^ I f th h ^ A A A W Q U ü ü û û f l^ ^  -----------
market by 2005, and the facilitation of corporate restructuring,140 which are described as 
"general objectives", the directive is intended to strengthen legal certainty of cross-border 
takeover bids "in the interests of all concerned" and to ensure protection for minority 
shareholders.
Alongside the financing of consumer credit, the Plan focuses on the creation of "deep and 
liquid European capital markets which serve both issuers and investors better” and which 
"can serve as the motor for growth, job-creation and the competitiveness of the European 
economy.” The aim is to reduce the cost of capital to companies by removing the existing 
barriers to cross-border activities, and "ensuring a level playing field for financial 
operators is one of the key elements of an integrated market for financial services."141 
Certainly within an agency-based approach to corporate governance, the provision of 
efficient capital markets and the maintenance o f investor confidence are key aspects of 
the system. One way of maintaining investor confidence is to introduce mechanisms 
which increase board accountability to shareholders, although as we saw in Chapter 1, it 
is unlikely that dispersed capital market investors will spend their own resources to do 
this. In Building the Framework the Commission comments that while "there is no single 
model o f good corporate governance which could facilitate integration of wholesale 
markets",142 a capital market consensus is emerging around the equitable treatment of 
shareholders and the transparency and accountability of the corporate process. 
Accordingly, the directive implements an agency model of corporate governance, in 
which accountability o f the board and the equitable treatment of shareholders are 
equated. A market for corporate control, which is a central mechanism for ensuring 
management accountability, is established by the Directive.
The second important aim o f the takeover directive which emerges from the 
Commission's Plan is that it will assist in the task of creating corporations large enough 
to take advantage of the single market, by eliminating those "differences in styles and
u0 The Commission discusses the directive's role in contributing "to the development and reorganisation of European firms, a key condition for withstanding international competition."141 Building a Framework at 3142 ibid at 10
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forms of governance [which] can limit cross-border investment and hinder the creation of 
supra-European corporations."143 The European Company Statute (which after a long and 
tortuous process to rival that o f that o f the takeover directive, is now in place144) and the 
Takeover Directive are of "fundamental importance"145 to this process. The Directive 
aims to create "EU-wide clarity and transparency in respect o f legal issues to be settled in 
event of take-over bid" and to prevent "patterns of EU corporate restructuring from being 
distorted by arbitrary differences in governance and management cultures."
This distinction between "arbitrary" and "non-arbitrary" differences appears to be a 
difficult one to draw. The Commission does not, however, term all differences in 
corporate governance systems "arbitrary", and therefore to be eliminated. It draws a 
distinction between, on the one hand, differences in "corporate governance arrangements 
[which] could give rise to legal or administrative barriers which might frustrate the 
development of an EU financial market (e.g. practical arrangements for the exercise of 
voting rights by shareholders in partner countries)", and on the other, "a wide series of 
issues whose ramifications for the single financial market are at present unclear."146 
Arrangements in this latter category, which "spring from long-standing legal and socio­
economic traditions”147 raise more difficult questions and "[a]t the present juncture, any 
EU involvement in this area should be confined to identifying any barriers to the 
development of the EU financial market resulting from corporate governance 
arrangements."148
143 ibid at 10144 Regulation 2157/2001 and the supplementary directive 2001/86/EC, which, per recital 19 of the Regulation is an "indissociable complement" and "must be applied concomitantly."145 Implementing the Framework at 4146 ibid at 15147 ibid148 ibid. The review of corporate governance arrangements, prepared at the Commission’s request, recognises that differences in the degree of involvement of employees in corporate governance present a formidable obstacle to harmonisation. Although given a low degree of priority in the Plan, this review has now been published: Comparative Study O f Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union And Its Member States, January 2002 (STUDY CONTRACT ETD/2000/B5-3001/F/53). At 33-4 it discusses the role o f employees: "The greatest difference among EU Member States relates to the role of employees in corporate governance, a difference that is usually embedded in law... legal systems in EU Member States make different choices about how best to ensure that the interests of certain resource providers are protected. They express different conclusions on issues such as... Whether labour concerns and protection of creditors can be sufficiently protected by contract and other specific laws tailored to address such concerns, or whether such concerns are better addressed through board structures and other
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The history of the EEC company law programme demonstrates that wholesale 
harmonisation o f corporate governance is impossible because of the Member States’ 
differences in approach. Yet the Commission has insisted on presenting the third draft of 
the takeover directive as a technocratic measure, based on an "emerging consensus" 
which would benefit capital markets and shareholders by creating a "level playing field", 
while not adversely affecting other corporate constituencies. These assertions rested 
firmly on an agency conception o f the company, and the vain hope that the directive 
would not "spill over" into broader issues of corporate governance and the organisation 
of the productive economy.149
If the third draft takeover directive had been adopted as originally drafted, but no 
progress made on the broader harmonisation project, Member States would have retained 
responsibility for their own national corporate governance systems, with the exception of 
the law relating to takeovers which would have been largely determined at the 
supranational level. A clear, functional separation would have been unlikely because the 
various elements of corporate governance systems are interlocking and interdependent.150 
The most obvious spill-overs were already apparent at the time the directive was 
proposed. It would have had the effect of reorientating European corporate governance 
systems from managerialism towards shareholder value. For example, a prohibition on all 
defensive measures would have adversely affected the ability of the German supervisory 
board to act as a corporate constitutional representation of a coalition of specialised 
investors.151 By insisting that shareholders should be accorded an exclusive right to 
decide on the outcome o f a bid, the directive sought to impose a norm of shareholder 
primacy, albeit in narrow circumstances, to replace the more cooperative, consensus
company law requirements... Although a significant degree of company law standardisation has been achieved throughout the European Union, some commentators suggest that the remaining legal differences are the ones most deeply grounded in national attitudes, and hence, the most difficult to change."149 The preamble to the third draft of the directive makes it clear that the Member States are firmly opposed to a takeover directive which has "far-reaching implications for company law."150 This is discussed below.151 See further Sadowski, D, Junkes, J, and Lindenthal, S, "Labour Co-Determination and Corporate Governance in Germany: The Economic Impact of Marginal and Symbolic Rights" (Quint-Essenzen Nr 65, August 2001,1AAEG
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decision-making process which currently prevails on supervisory boards. This may have 
undermined allocative efficiency as shareholders "may favour takeovers that increase the 
value of their shares even if they involve greater losses for unprotected creditors or 
employees."152 A transfer of decision-making responsibilities from management to 
shareholders would have had an adverse effect on the ability of management across the 
economy as a whole to make credible commitments to employees. UK and US 
experience suggests that truncating managerialism and introducing a market for corporate 
control would have increased managerial focus on shareholder value far beyond the 
narrow confines o f the hostile takeover. In this way, the directive would have had an 
indirect but substantial impact on Member States’ systems of corporate governance going 
far beyond takeovers. To judge from the German response to the second draft directive 
(discussed in chapter five), it might be argued that the threat was anticipated.
From the perspective of bidders, many structural barriers to the assumption of control 
would have remained; the third draft o f the directive would only have prevented the 
board from putting up barriers to a takeover once it had been announced. Apart from this 
restriction, and the third draft's prohibition on voting right and transferability restrictions, 
the question of whether the bidder can take control of the board and the company would 
have remained largely a question of domestic company law. National measures of 
company law would therefore have been likely to continue to distort the market for 
corporate control. This means that the Directive would not really have satisfied anyone.
vii) The Fate o f the Third Proposal
In the light of the long history of deadlock, the third draft of the takeover directive always 
had rather uncertain prospects. Although it only required a qualified majority, the 
opposition of Germany seemed almost certain, particularly in light of the contents of the 
new German takeover law.153 It also became apparent that Britain would support 
Germany’s insistence that any prohibition on defensive measures should extend beyond
152 Becht, M, Bolton, P, and Rowell, A (2002) {supra note 18) at 20153 While the third draft sought to outlaw the archetypal German defensive measure, action by the board, it would have allowed the practice of attaching multiple voting rights to certain shares to continue.
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the board to take in multiple voting rights and similar techniques in return for support in 
opposing the temporary workers directive.154 The formation of this coalition led to 
growing French reservations about the prospective introduction o f  a prohibition on 
multiple voting rights. Accordingly, the Commission suggested that the prohibition 
should be "grandfathered", not coming into force until 2010, and should provide for 
compensation.155
In addition, despite the rhetoric of the Commission and the Winter Committee, the draft 
did deal fully with the concerns of the Parliament as regards the protection of employees. 
This undermined its chances of obtaining a majority in the Parliament, given that the 
narrow failure of the previous draft was widely ascribed to the same defects. Parliament’s 
concerns about an uneven playing field with the US also remained unresolved. 
Commentators began to argue that the directive’s prospects had been "perhaps diminished 
by the sharp decline in stock market values, the related decline in cross-border merger 
activity throughout the world, and the loss in prestige of the shareholder capitalism model 
in light of the potential weaknesses revealed by the Enron and WorldCom financial 
frauds."156 Finally, financial commentators suggested that Germany's economic 
difficulties and low growth were creating political pressure to protect German enterprises 
from takeover by foreign companies.157
However, the issues raised by the draft directive went beyond simple political 
disagreement. The draft directive threatened to extend the City Code's agency model of 
takeover regulation across continental Europe. Despite the influence and perceived 
strengths of the UK method, there were, and remain, good reasons to be cautious about its 
generalisation across the EC. In particular, the UK system of takeover regulation is path 
dependent. The rapidly increasing dispersal o f shareholdings after 1945 and the approach 
taken by the courts to takeover regulation led the City o f London to take over the mantle
154 See The Economist, 24* May 2003, pp 62-3 for a pessimistic assessment of the draft's prospects.155 See The Financial Times, 15th February 2003.156 Gordon, JN, "An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence of Corporate Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Union, 1990-2000" (2003) European CorporateGovernance Institute (ECG1), Law Working Paper No. 06/2003, 7 February 2003 available at SSRN http://papers.ssm. com/abstract=3 74620 at 57
290
of de facto regulator from the courts, in order to pursue their sectional interests through 
more informal means. The UK government did not oppose this privatisation of regulation 
and UK industry has survived, (depending on one's point of view) because of or despite 
this. Agency theorists assume that even removing only some of the barriers to the market 
for corporate control will cause improvements in the quality of management and the 
allocation of resources, with no adverse consequences for other corporate constituencies. 
From this perspective, the takeover directive would simply hasten the process of 
corporate governance convergence, already underway as a result of globalisation, around 
the agency model norms and the ideology of shareholder value.158 By contrast, European 
systems of corporate governance do not share any single theoretical orientation, and 
incorporate aspects of political stakeholding or productive coalition models to varying 
degrees. There are also huge variations in the concentration of shareholdings across the 
Member States, and as the Winter Report demonstrates, there are many other structural 
barriers to the assumption of corporate control by a takeover bidder, including 
codetermination. The introduction of norms drawn from any single model are likely to 
upset the equilibrium of these systems. Interdependency and co-evolution within 
corporate governance systems means that alterations to one aspect are likely to have 
consequences in others. Further, differences between corporate governance systems mean 
that the introduction of new ‘extrinsic’ norms are likely to produce differing results in 
different systems.
In this context, an assumption that harmonisation o f capital market regulation along UK 
lines was desirable and would not have an impact on other corporate constituencies was 
questionable, and, it is submitted, led to the failure of the third draft of the directive as 
proposed following the Winter Report.
137 See, for example, The Financial Times, 20th December 2001 and 27* February 2002138 Hansmann, H and Kraakman, R, ("The End of History for Corporate Law" (2000) Discussion Paper No 280 Harvard Law School Centre fo r  Law, Economics and Business (Olin Center)) expect convergence on a shareholder value model without intervention as competitive pressures drive legislators to create an attractive environment for capital investors.
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viii) A Compromise is Reached
When it became apparent that agreement would not be reached on the third draft of the 
directive,159 a compromise text was presented by the Italian Presidency at the European 
Council of 26th and 27th November 2003.160 The compromise text essentially makes the 
proposed prohibition on defensive measures and the proposed break-through mle 
optional. Article 11A(1) allows Member States to reserve the right not to apply Articles 
9(2) and (3) and Article 11 to publicly-listed companies “having their registered office on 
their territory.”161 Article 11 A(2) obliges Member States which exercise this option to 
give companies with their registered office in their territory the right to apply those 
articles. Further, Article 11 A(3) states that Member States may exempt companies which 
apply these articles (presumably either as a matter of national law or as a matter of 
choice) from applying them “if they become subject to an offer launched by a company 
which does not apply the same Articles as they do”. This would presumably also apply 
where a bid is launched by a company incorporated outside the European Union, since by 
definition they would not apply articles from the Takeover Directive.162
The Council voted unanimously to adopt the compromise, with the abstention of the 
Spanish delegation.163 The Commission did not support the compromise text.164 The 
compromise accepted by the Council should also be seen in the light o f the many 
amendments proposed by the Parliament, including in particular an opt-out from Articles
159 The Financial Times (19th May 2003) reported German opposition to Article 9, which prohibited defensive measures, and Nordic opposition to Article 11 which allowed for break-through against multiple voting rights.160 See Council of the European Union Interinstitutional File 2002/0240 (COD) (15476/03 DRS 106 CODEC 1702). At the time of writing the text of the compromise has not been officially published.161 The adoption o f the lex loci incorporationis in preference to the siège réel as the connecting factor is notable in light of the difficulties posed for national systems of company law by EC provisions on freedom of establishment, discussed in chapter five. There is no doubt that this injects a degree of certainty into the directive. It also raises many interesting questions as regards regulatory competition which lie beyond the scope of this thesis. For example, the US literature (see further chapter 4, footnote 213 and the sources cited there) suggests the competing hypotheses that Member States might compete to attract incorporations by allowing managers to entrench themselves and that the need to attract investors might prevail.162 This provision seems to allay the oft-repeated fear of the Parliament concerning the lack of a level playing field with the US as regards takeover regulation. It should also be noted that Article 11 (4a) provides that “equitable compensation must be provided for any loss incurred by the holders of... rights” which are affected by breakthrough.163 See Conclusion of2547th Meeting o f Competitiveness Council (15141/03) at 9-10
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9 and 11, and its continuing insistence on a discrete right to information and consultation 
for employees in the takeover context.* 165 On 16th December 2003, the Parliament voted to 
accept the compromise text.166
Protection of Employee Interests Through Existing European Labour Law?
The second and third drafts of the takeover directive consistently ruled out defensive 
measures by the board as a means o f protecting the interests o f the employees, and both 
the Winter Report and the Third Draft Directive claim that sufficient protection for 
employees is already provided by various labour law directives. It is therefore appropriate 
to consider briefly the operation of the three directives, 94/45/EC, 98/59/EC and 
2002/14/EC in the takeover context in terms of their effectiveness in protecting employee 
interests, both explicit and implicit.
i) The Works Council Directive167 168
The EWC Directive, the successor to the failed Vredeling proposal, is a political 
stakeholding measure, which requires transnational employers to inform and consult their
« / Aemployees where they "are affected by their decisions”. It recognises that European 
integration is likely to result in the consolidation and transnationalisation o f enterprises, 
and proposes that cross-border information and consultation procedures must be 
developed if "economic activities are to develop in a harmonious fashion".
IM ibid. See also the comments made by Commissioner Bolkestein during the Parliamentary debate on 15th December 2003.165 The report produced for the Parliament by its rapporteur (A5-0469/2003 FINAL) included (in Amendment 23) a proposal for an article 11 a in terms broadly similar to that included in the adopted compromise. See also PE 327.329/Amendments 415-431 of 9th October 2003 - of particular note are Amendments 422 and 423, which sought to delete Articles 9 and 11 on the grounds o f subsidiarity; Amendment 427 which sought to supplement the reference to existing EC employee information and consultation measures in Article 13 with a provision permitting Member States to require companies to inform and consult employee in good time before any takeover; and Amendment 428 proposed that Article 13 should state that “The boards of the offeror and offeree company must inform and consult the representatives of their respective employees, or where there are no such representatives, their employees themselves in a detailed and comprehensive manner in sufficient time before and during all stages o f the takeover.”166 Parliament voted by 321 votes to 219 to adopt the compromise, with 9 absentions.167 94/45/EC, OJ L 254/64,30/09/1994168 Preamble
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The Directive potentially has an effect before the takeover where the target is a 
community-scale undertaking. The right of employees to information and consultation 
before completion of the takeover will then depend on whether the target has a Works 
Council agreement (whether made pursuant to the directive, or pre-dating it and covered 
by Article 13). Where the absence o f a negotiated agreement means that the default 
provisions contained in the Annex come into effect, the Works Council has a right to an 
annual meeting with central management, and to be informed and consulted, inter alia, 
on "substantial changes concerning organization, introduction of new working methods 
or production processes, transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs or closures of 
undertakings, establishments or important parts thereof, and collective redundancies."169 
Depending on the timing of the bid, this might encompass information and consultation 
relating to the takeover, although as noted above, it is unlikely that the bid will be 
sufficiently specific as regards its consequences.
In addition, management is required to inform the Works Council where "there are 
exceptional circumstances affecting the employees’ interests to a considerable extent, 
particularly in the event of relocations, the closure of establishments or undertakings or 
collective redundancies".170 The Council then has a right to demand a consultative 
meeting on the matter. Again, the value of this provision depends upon disclosure by the 
bidder of his post-takeover plans. Both sets of provisions are aimed at facilitating 
protection through collective bargaining, rather than allowing employees to influence the 
fate of the proposed action.
If the offeror already has a Works Council, the target company’s employees presumably 
come within its scope after completion. It is unlikely to be tailored to the precise 
circumstances of the target’s employees. If the offeror does not have a Works Council, its 
taking control of the target171 will trigger an obligation to establish one if the acquisition
169 Para 2 of the Annex to the Directive.170 ibid, para 3.171 Art 3(2) presumes that the "controlling undertaking" can exercise a "dominant influence” where it "(a) holds a majority of that undertaking's subscribed capital; or (b) controls a majority of the votes attached to
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takes the combined enterprise over the threshold of 1000 employees in all Member 
States, including two establishments in different Member States, each employing at least 
150 people.172 173In this case, the employees of the target company will bargain alongside 
the offeror's employees. If the enterprise remains based solely in one Member State, 
Directive 2002/14/EC should be considered instead.
___ ƒ 7 ?ii) The General Information and Consultation Directive
The "GIC" directive makes provision for information and consultation with the dual aims 
of making employees aware of the need for adaptability and employability,174 and of 
"promoting] employee involvement in the operation and future of the undertaking and 
increasing] its competitiveness.''175 The second aim seems to reflect to some extent a 
productive coalition model of the firm. However, the main thrust appears not to be to 
encourage the development of firm-specific competencies, but rather consultation with a 
view to "offsetting the negative developments or their consequences [arising from change 
anticipated by the employer] and increasing the employability and adaptability of the 
employees likely to be affected."176 In other words, the main goal o f the directive is 
remedial in the sense of giving employees more notice o f change, brought on by global 
competition, which will adversely affect their interests. The directive envisages that its 
assistance in anticipating change will be an improvement on the "a posteriori approach" 
adopted by the rules in place for employee information and consultation at Community 
and national level.177
The employer is obliged to provide information to the employees' representatives on "the 
recent and probable development of the undertaking's or the establishment's activities and
that undertaking's issued share capital; or (c) can appoint more than half of the members o f that undertaking’s administrative, management or supervisory body.”172 Art 2(1 Xa).173 Directive Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees in the European Community: 2002/14/EC, OJ L 80/29,23.3.2002.174 As discussed in the Gyllenhammar Report (Interim Report of the High Level Expert Group on the Economic and Social Impact of Industrial Change)175 Preamble paragraph 7176 Preamble paragraph 8177 Preamble paragraph 13
295
economie situation"; to inform and consult them on "the situation, structure and probable 
development of employment within the undertaking or establishment and on any 
anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular where there is a threat to employment"; 
and to inform and consult "on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organisation or in contractual relations, including those covered by the Community 
provisions referred to in Article 9(1) [including the Collective Redundancies 
Directive]." The Directive requires that "the timing, method and content [of the 
consultation]...are appropriate". It should occur "in such a way as to enable employees' 
representatives to meet the employer and obtain a response, and the reasons for that 
response, to any opinion they might formulate" and "with a view to reaching agreement 
on decisions within the scope of the employer’s powers".178 79 Non-compliance with, or 
infringement of, these requirements will be met by appropriate sanctions put in place 
under the law of the Member State.180
a) Application of the GIC Directive in the Takeover Context
The GIC directive clearly obliges incumbent management to inform and consult 
employees where the offer document indicates that the bidder intends to dismiss some 
employees. An obligation would also arise where, before the takeover is completed, 
management anticipates that some dismissals are likely, for example, where the financial 
arrangements underlying the bid suggest cost-cutting will be necessary. Arguably, the 
incumbent board should also consult where they consider that the bidder is unlikely to 
honour the employees' implicit contracts, if it is accepted that the reference in Article 
4(2)(c) to "contractual relations" embodies explicit contracts while "work organisation" 
refers to implicit contracts. One might go even further and insist that once management 
becomes aware that the company may be a takeover target, for example where the share 
price drops below the net asset value of the corporation, they should consult with the 
employees as just discussed about the increased risk to their positions from predators.
178 Art4(2)(a), (b)and(c)179 Art 4(4Xa), (d) and (e)180 Art 8(1) and (2)
If this interpretation of the incidence o f management's obligations to inform and consult 
is correct, then Article 6(1) of the draft takeover directive, which requires the board to 
notify the employees "as soon as the bid has been made public", effectively sets out the 
latest time at which the board may inform the employees. If the board are aware of the 
bid before it is made public, they may decide to inform the employees before publication 
of the bid. Of course, any employee representatives who are informed and consulted in 
this way will be bound by a national law obligation of confidentiality under Art 6(1) of 
the GIC Directive. However, since such a bid would not be hostile, it seems unlikely that 
management would choose to inform the employees. This illustrates the difficulty with 
the assertion in the current draft of the takeover directive that the GIC directive applies to 
takeovers. The GIC directive envisages an adversarial process, whereas in a hostile 
takeover situation, the procedure is likely to be more consensual, because of the well- 
documented identity of interest between management and employees. The directive does 
not appear to have been drafted for application in this rather exceptional situation, and 
many of its provisions do not make sense in this context. For example, Art 6(2) allows 
the Member States to provide that the employer is not obliged to "communicate 
information or undertake consultation where the nature of that information or 
consultation is such that, according to objective criteria, it would seriously harm the 
functioning of the undertaking or establishment or would be prejudicial to it." There is 
also the logical difficulty that, in the takeover context, there is little point in consulting 
the employees "with a view to reaching an agreement" on the use of managerial 
prerogative, when that prerogative will be truncated by the takeover directive's 
prohibition on defensive measures by the board. Similarly a strong obligation to inform 
does not have much effect where the "employer" does not have access to the relevant 
information. For these reasons, it would be more appropriate and convenient to spell out 
explicitly in the takeover directive the precise parameters of the employees' rights to 
information and consultation in the takeover situation. *
,B1 Art 4(4)(e)
297
t o  yHi) The Collective Redundancies Directive
The CRD was designed to protect the rights of employees in the event of the 
rationalisation of the enterprise for which they work. Along with the Acquired Rights 
Directive, it forms part of the "industrial restructuring" legislation enacted by the EEC 
during the 1970s in response to the economic climate during that period.182 83
The Directive is triggered by the dismissal o f at least 10 employees, or, in larger 
establishments, at least 10% of the workforce. Where the employer is "contemplating 
collective redundancies he shall begin consultations with the workers’ representatives in 
good time with a view to reaching an agreement.”184 185The Directive establishes an 
important labour law dialogue between employer and employee in the situation where 
collective redundancies are contemplated. It might be considered a limited political 
stakeholder measure on the basis that, although employees are not given decision-making 
power, they are informed about the reasons for the decision and consulted about ways of 
mitigating its harmful effects. In productive coalition terms, Deakin and Armour argue 
that the CRD (and also the ARD) ”give[s] employees important process rights on events 
which may have a significant impact on the value of their firm-specific human capital, or on
185their entitlements to share m quasi-rents."
However, the directive will not apply in the takeover situation until the bid is completed 
First, the offeror does not become the "employer" until the bid is completed, and 
incumbent management is unlikely to have access to their plans. Second, if they follow 
UK practice, offerors will confine disclosures in the offer document to a statement that 
they intend to respect the employees’ contracts, delaying application of the directive until 
after the bid in any event. Third, even if the offeror states that some redundancies may be 
necessary because of duplication of work in the enlarged organisation, it would be
182 The original directive was 75/I29/EEC, OJ L 48 (1975), p.29. The directive was amended in 1992 and became 92/56/EC, OJ L 245 (1992), p.3. The consolidated version is 98/59/EC, OJ L 225 (1998), p.16.183 Lyon-Caen, "Subsidiarity" in Davies, P, Lyon-Caen, G, Sciarra, S, and Simitis, S (eds), European Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives: Liber Amicorum Lord Wedderbum (1996), 49 at 58184 Art 2(1); the workers’ representatives are defined by the laws or practices of the Member State in question: Art l(l)(b).185 Armour, J and Deakin, S, "Insolvency and Employment Protection: the Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights Directive" (ESRC Working Paper 2002) at 12
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difficult to argue that such redundancies are actually "contemplated", because until the 
offeror's management takes control of the target, it will not be possible to spell out in any 
detail the extent to which redundancies will be necessary. In short, any projected 
redundancies would arguably be too nebulous to be "contemplated".
Since it can only take effect after the bid, the directive is unlikely to protect the 
employees' implicit contracts. Where wide restructuring is contemplated, and implicit 
contracts are particularly threatened, incumbent management is also likely to be removed 
and replaced by new management who feel less obliged to honour the commitments of 
their predecessors. Thus while this directive may mitigate some of the effects of 
collective redundancies, it will not inspire confidence in employees that any reliance they 
place on implicit undertakings from management will be safeguarded in the event of a 
hostile takeover bid.
iv) Voluntary Protection o f  Employee Interests by Companies
In its Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility,186 the Commission suggests that 
socially responsible adaptation to change should form part of the "internai" dimension of 
a company’s corporate social responsibility. Acting responsibly in a reconstruction 
situation may assist the company with its "objectives of reducing costs, increasing 
productivity and improving quality and customer service". The reason that these goals are 
often not achieved is because restructuring operations "often cause the motivation, 
loyalty, creativity and productivity of the employees to suffer." According to the 
Commission, socially responsible restructuring:
"means to balance and take into consideration the interests and concerns o f all those who 
are affected by the changes and decisions. In practice the process is often as important as 
the substance to the success of restructuring. In particular this involves seeking the
186 COM (2001) 366 final, 18.7.2001 at 8-10
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participation and involvement o f  those affected through open information and 
consultation."187
This may be seen as an attempt by the Commission to persuade companies voluntarily to 
introduce political stakeholding measures in order to temper the consequences of its 
agency-orientated takeover directive. Alternatively, it may be seen as encouraging 
companies to publicise the implicit commitments that they make to their employees so 
that the reputation mechanism makes compliance more likely.
After the Green Paper consultation, the Commission published the results in a 
Communication.188 It argues that CSR will assist the development of the knowledge- 
based economy,189 although the exact way in which this will occur is not specified. 
However, it is then argued that voluntary initiatives are more appropriate because the aim 
of an enterprise is to make a profit for its owners and accordingly improve the welfare o f 
society.190 These two positions appear to be contradictory, since there is no recognition 
that in a knowledge-based economy, the employees' non-transferrable skills contribute to 
wealth-generation. The Commission refers to "market-oriented yet responsible 
behaviour",191 which seems to be referring to "prudential" CSR in the sense of a 
management tool to assist with the problems o f bounded rationality. CSR becomes more 
important as "knowledge and innovation become increasingly important for 
competitiveness, [and] enterprises have a higher interest in retaining skilled and 
competent personnel."192 The Commission refers to the role of voluntary initiatives in 
creating "an atmosphere o f trust within companies, which leads to a stronger commitment 
of employees and higher innovation performance."193 CSR is given a very broad scope as 
far as employees are concerned: "CSR relates to quality employment, lifelong learning,
187 ibid at 10188 COM (2002) 347 final, 2.7.2002189 ibid at 3190 This takes a narrow view of wealth creation; see Blair, MM, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century (1995) at 203-4191 COM (2002) 347 final at 5192 ibid at 6193 ibid at 8
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information, consultation and participation of workers."194 The difficulty is that while 
voluntary measures may contribute to developing trust, the legal prohibition against 
management taking defensive measures in order to protect a productive coalition which 
was contained in the various drafts o f the takeover directive would have made the 
vulnerability o f non-binding arrangements very clear to all concerned. Presumably, the 
Commission will continue to push for voluntary CSR measures despite its defeat on 
defensive measures in the takeover directive.
194 ibid at 19
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Convergence is Not the Only Hypothesis: Varieties of Capitalism
"It is not possible to conclude on the basis of economic analysis alone that there is a 
unique set of optimal rules that are universally applicable to all corporations and 
economies, just as there is no single political constitution that is universally best for all 
nations."195
The picture presented by the "varieties of capitalism"196 approach to political economy, 
which is sympathetic to institutional variation, is more complex than that o f the agency 
model. Drawing on the insights of systems theory, it counsels against wholesale 
importation of norms from one area of one political economy to a nominally equivalent 
area of another. This caution is based not only on the complementarities which exist 
between, for example, systems of corporate governance and underlying relations of 
industrial production, but also on the very different roles which are played by apparently 
similar mechanisms different political economies.197 Differences in the organisation of 
political economy cannot simply be explained in historical and cultural terms.
This complements the discussion o f the models of the company developed in part one: 
the differences between the UK and Germany in terms of takeover regulation (and 
corporate governance structures more generally) reflect different underlying models of 
the company and different productive strengths. This is not to say that the laws in 
question necessarily formed part o f a conscious implementation of the models. Laws may 
be put in place for a number of reasons, whether in response to the changing needs of the 
productive economy or as public choice measures where the regulatory process is 
captured by a sectional interest group. Yet legislative choices made long ago condition 
the institutional structure, including the legal framework underpinning the system of
195 Becht, M, Bolton, P, and Rowell, A (2002) {supra note 18) at 58196 See in particular the collection edited by Hall, PA and Soskice, D, Varieties o f  Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations o f  Comparative Advantage (2001)197 Conversely, very different mechanisms may be functionally equivalent.
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corporate governance, and make the configuration of each political economy unique.198 
This path-dependency199 then limits the range o f viable future changes because the 
institutions which constrain and offer incentives to actors increasingly operate in a 
mutually complementary manner as they move towards a stable productive equilibrium.
In order to generalise these patterns o f institutional complementarity, the varieties of 
capitalism literature draws a broad (and admittedly, not uncontroversial) distinction 
between liberal market economies (LMEs), in which co-ordination and resource 
allocation are determined "primarily via hierarchies and competitive market 
arrangements",200 and co-ordinated market economies (CMEs), in which "firms depend 
more heavily on non-market relationships...to construct their core competencies... 
[which] generally entail more extensive relational or incomplete contracting...."201 The 
difference between these two types is one of degree and emphasis. With the development 
of institutions (in response to the needs of firms or for other reasons), these tendencies 
tend to become self-reinforcing as firms "gravitate towards the mode of coordination for 
which there is institutional support."202 Firms which do not take advantage of the 
available institutional structure will either never come into existence, or will fail, or will 
now relocate to a jurisdiction which offers a more institutionally-appropriate 
environment.
All parts of the system are interdependent because they have co-evolved and are in 
(fairly) stable interaction. In LMEs, an agency conception of corporate governance tends 
to have evolved alongside and pursuant to the demands of an arm's-length system of 
corporate finance, which is based on dispersed shareholders and market-led lending, 
backed up by important provisions of public information disclosure; this kind of 
financing system requires liquidity and so demands a productive system based on
198 There may be some "loose convergence" in the sense that while "institutions are not exactly replicated across advanced economies, there exist functional equivalents." (Amable,B, "Institutional Complementarity and Diversity of Social Systems of Innovation and Production" (2000) 7 Review o f International Political Economy 645 at 647)199 See Roe, MJ, "Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics" (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 641200 Hall, PA and Soskice, D, Introduction to Varieties o f Capitalism (2001) at 8201 ibid202 ibid at 9
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employees having general, redeployable skills allocated through market contracting, 
allowing firms to construct and dismantle competencies quickly in line with market 
demand. Within this type of system, competitive advantage stems from "radical 
innovation" or lower labour costs. By contrast, the more relational approach to questions 
of corporate governance in the CME complements a system of financing which tends to 
be more long-term with less public disclosure; this more "patient" framework allows 
companies to rely on firm- or industry-specific skills, and leads to a system of industrial 
relations which relies heavily on dialogue and joint decision-making, and in which the 
market plays less of a role in resource allocation than governance structures such as 
internal job markets. This type of system is considered to generate "incremental 
innovation", and draws its competitive advantage from "diversified quality production" 
rather than wage costs.
In contrast to agency theorists’ expectations of convergence,20 *03 the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach expects diversity to persist because of the role it plays in sustaining 
the competitive advantage of different political economies.204 205 While regulatory 
competition may be expected to lead some companies to relocate away from CMEs in 
search of lower costs (a "Delaware effect"), many firms will not do so because "firms are 
not essentially similar across nations". A reduction in wage costs may not be sufficient 
to compensate for the loss of "competitive advantages [arising] from the institutions in 
their home country that support specific types of inter- and intra-firm relationships". 
Hall and Soskice argue that firms based in LMEs are more likely to relocate to lower- 
burden jurisdictions because they "already coordinate their endeavors using the market 
structures that less developed nations usually provide, while [CMEs] often pursue
20i Hansmann, H and Kraakman, R (2000)(5«pra note 158)204 However, in a recent paper, Lane offers a more pessimistic view, noting a tendency towardsconvergence of corporate governance systems on the LME model, with negative consequences for labour.In particular, the changing demands of the financial system, supported by powerful actors within firms and the political system, has "fundamentally changed the logic which governs relations". Since "hybridisation" (a mixture of market and non-market co-ordination) is a temporary state, this movement will "spill-over" into other dependent parts of the system, restoring complementarity, but centred on the demands of the financial system. (Lane, C, "Changes in Corporate Governance o f German Corporations: Convergence to the Anglo-American Model?" (2003) ESRC Centre fo r  Business Research, University o f  Cambridge Working Paper No 259 )205 Hall, PA and Soskice, D (2001) (supra note 196) at 56
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corporate strategies that rely on high skills and institutional infrastructure difficult to 
secure elsewhere."207
The normal criticism of this dichotomy is that while it adequately differentiates Germany 
and Japan from the US and the UK, it does not account so well for France and Italy, for 
example.208 Despite these criticisms of the descriptive merits of its dominant 
categorisation, the varieties of capitalism approach is an important counter-weight to 
agency theory in the context of an analysis of the takeover directive. As an approach 
grounded in systems theory, it recognises that the imposition of a one-size-fits-all 
takeover regulation on differentiated systems o f industrial organisation will have 
important consequences for the stability of those systems.209 Accordingly, the 
introduction o f takeover regulation must be expected to have implications for the broader 
system of corporate governance. To approach the issue on the basis that it only affects 
capital markets is too simplistic because "the introduction o f more competition in the 
financial system threatens the stability of long term relationships."210 The introduction of 
a takeover directive premised on agency model considerations would have undermined 
those corporations which rely on more relational systems o f governance. Whether a less 
relational model will be more efficient depends on a whole host of interlocking factors, 
including, in particular as far as employees are concerned, the extent of firm-specific 
investments in human capital, and their importance to competitive advantage. With a 
recognition that every firm is relational to some extent,211 comes the conclusion that the 
efficiency of corporate governance arrangements cannot be measured in abstracto. The
207 ibid at 57; this of course is not to suggest that firms might not relocate certain divisions according to the logic of cost-cutting or acquiring specific skills only available elsewhere.208 Amable, B (2000) (supra note 198) at 669.209 Casper, "The Legal Framework for Corporate Governance: The Influence of Contract Law on Company Strategies in Germany and the United States" in Hall, PA and Soskice, D (eds), Varieties o f  Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations o f  Comparative Advantage (2001), 387 at 414: "The legal system is not an autonomous institution. Rather the character of laws is strongly determined by the broader configuration of the political economy. An institutional complementarity exists between the legal system and the system of business coordination within the economy.*'210 Amable, B (2000) (supra note 198) at 658211 Hall, PA and Soskice, D (2001) (supra note 196) conceive o f the firm as a bundle of "core competencies" or "dynamic capabilities" which are kept in place through framework which may be more or less relational. The relational nature of the firm means that it suffers from co-ordination problems which should be met by the development of appropriate governance arrangements.
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imposition of regulation aimed at reducing agency costs between management and 
shareholders will not necessarily increase efficiency where it does this either at the 
expense of massively increasing transaction costs by requiring contracts to be more fully 
presentiated, or at the expense o f employees' willingness to make firm-specific 
investments in the first place.
The vulnerability of institutional complementarities, and the system as a whole, to non- 
evolutionary reforms has important economic policy implications. It should
"preclude any sort of 'institutional tinkering' that some politicians have in mind when 
they mention the absolute necessity o f reforming a specific area of the economic system 
(for example, liberalizing the financial system, making the labour market more flexible). 
Changing one element o f the system may have consequences well beyond the area 
concerned and threaten a certain pattern of complementarity."212
The reason that the takeover directive faced such opposition and took so long to be 
adopted is that it ignored these complementarities. Its focus on providing rights to 
financial capital, and accompanying denial that this had broader implications, threatened 
to undermine productive coalition governance arrangements. Hall and Soskice suggest 
that the imposition of "high levels of regulatory homogeneity on the member-states 
would be to compromise the institutions and firm strategies on which national 
comparative advantages depend."213 The Fifth Company Law Directive was not 
acceptable because it attempted to impose a German-style stakeholder-orientated board 
structure and a conception of the company going beyond the agency model on all 
Member States regardless of context.214 In the same way, the takeover directive attempted 
to impose a capital market logic on all Member States regardless of the way in which 
their economies are organised. Despite the insistence of the drafters in each case,
212 Amable, B (2000) (supra note 198) at 658213 Hall, PA and Soskice, D (2001) {supra note 196) at 542,4 Ebke, WF (1997) {supra note 1) at 975-7. These differences have characterised the company law harmonisation programme from the beginning as "each Member State felt the specificities of its own system were not properly appreciated by the Brussels lawmakers, and would unnecessarily disappear in the
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complementarities in political economy mean that one issue, such as takeover or board 
structure cannot be looked at in isolation from all others. The dangers posed by the 
takeover directive to national systems of productive organisation were reflected in the 
high level of opposition to it. If the third draft had been introduced, it would have been 
likely to hinder those corporations across the EU which rely on firm-specific skills, in 
particular in the increasingly important service sectors o f all the EU Member States. 
Furthermore, by undermining employees' willingness to make firm-specific investments, 
it would have contradicted the goal set by the Lisbon European Council for the European 
Union “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion.”215
The compromise which has been adopted will no doubt be criticised by agency theorists 
for failing to introduce a market for corporate control and for allowing management to 
entrench themselves. However, it might be defended on the grounds that it is appropriate 
to provide Member States with a menu of options to choose from. Viewed in this way, 
the takeover directive is another measure of reflexive harmonisation, which is sensitive to 
the diversity o f the Member States' systems of productive organisation. It is capable of 
encompassing systems of takeover regulation based purely on agency model 
considerations, as well as systems which seek to reflect productive coalition 
considerations.
Conclusion on the Takeover Directive
Leaving aside considerations of industrial consolidation, an agency perspective on j corporate governance suggests that the takeover directive which was enacted will not
| achieve anything. A prohibition on defensive measures was needed in Europe because
j hostile takeovers have not yet sufficiently inculcated shareholder value in European
| management. Prohibiting defensive measures would have been the essential catalyst to
II ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| harmonization process.” (Lannoo, K, "A European Perspective on Corporate Governance" (1999) 37, Journal o f  Common Market Studies 269 at 270)I 215 Lisbon European Council Conclusions, 23rd-24a March 2000, para 5
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kick-start the pursuit of shareholder value in corporations across the whole EU. The 
failure of the directive to include such a provision means that the takeover directive will 
not drive European capital markets towards "maturity", i.e., dispersal of shareholders, 
diversification of investors and an increased use of lower transaction-cost adaptive 
mechanisms, like stock options, which further prioritise shareholder value on a system- 
wide basis.
If the Commission, with its insistence that the takeover directive was purely a capital 
market measure dealing with the accountability of management to the holders of share 
capital, had prevailed, the takeover directive would have exercised a strong gravitational 
pull upon the systems of corporate governance in all Member States. The British 
experience suggests that the introduction of a market for corporate control would have 
caused a shift away from managerialism towards an agency model, and focused 
management’s attention squarely on creating shareholder value. However, a system of 
takeover regulation based on the agency model alone would have been highly 
controversial and caused systemic instability for those Member States’ systems of 
corporate governance which include productive coalition or political stakeholding 
considerations. This is because, as we have seen in this chapter (and the two which 
preceded it), managerial decision-making in the takeover situation is not necessarily 
qualitatively different, and therefore cannot be separated, from broader issues of 
corporate governance. Thus, the introduction of takeover regulation based on an agency 
model o f the firm would not have caused any further "irritation"216 to a system of 
corporate governance which is broadly orientated around neoclassical conceptions of the 
firm, such as the British one. However, where institutions of corporate governance exist 
to produce and underpin an equilibrium around a productive coalition model, the 
introduction of norms drawn from an agency model would have caused serious systemic 
disturbances. The diversity of corporate governance systems across Europe means that 
the flexibility offered by the ‘compromise’ takeover directive should be interpreted in 
these terms and welcomed.
216 Teubner, "Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences" in Hall, PA and Soskice, D (eds), Varieties o f  Capitalism (2001), 417
308
Conclusion
Until recently, corporate governance debate remained polarised between the agency 
model o f the corporation, which insisted that companies had the narrow aim of enriching 
their shareholders, and the political stakeholder model, which insisted that they ought to 
take a wider range of interests into account. The choice was a straight dichotomy between 
between efficiency and democratic considerations. An intensive conflict between the two 
models ensued, and the subsequent failure of the political will to make changes in support 
of industrial democracy led to the triumph of the agency model, and the relegation of 
political stakeholding to voluntarism.
Or so it seemed. Recent work on corporate governance has built on the insights of 
institutional economics and relational contracting to challenge many of the assumptions 
on which the normative arguments of the agency model rest. In particular, the assumption 
that employees are protected by fully “presentiated” contracts looks like an 
oversimplification at best, and increasingly anachronistic in modem productive 
conditions. Market-based contracting is less and less appropriate as a basis both for 
developing the competencies which firms need to compete, and for ensuring continuity of 
supply of increasingly specialised factors of production. Accordingly, the productive 
coalition model suggests, more sophisticated, consensual governance is not only 
appropriate, but essential in conditions of globalisation and increased competition.
The main difficulty created by the emergence of this new, more complex paradigm of the 
company is that, unlike its predecessors, it does not yield easy prescriptions. One-size- 
fits-all governance is not appropriate for the differentiated, modem, service-orientated 
corporation. It might be argued, as Margaret Blair does, that the law already provides a 
sufficiently flexible system, as company law offers a default governance structure as a 
public good. Looked at through the lens of company law alone, corporate governance is 
basically managerialism, that is, co-ordination and exercise of discretion by central 
management in response to the firm's environment, subject only to the minimal control o f 
the general meeting. Managerialism is certainly one route by which a productive coalition
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may be sustained, with management mediating between the demands of the various 
constituencies, although the "classic argument" about the dangers of managerial 
unaccountability has been well rehearsed.
The second, more conflictual, route would see all those with incomplete contracts 
represented at some level o f the corporate hierarchy, whether management or supervisory 
board, or some new organ. The political difficulties o f achieving such radical change 
have been highlighted by the recent definitive shelving o f the EC's Fifth Company Law 
Directive. Movement in the direction of interest group representation is now limited. 
Employers are now subject to information and consultation obligations towards their 
employees, and these may turn out to be powerful procedural rights in the event of threats 
to firm-specific human capital. They may also formalise an opportunity for the 
articulation of employee interests in the decision-making process.
Finally, voluntaristic measures of Corporate Social Responsibility may offer a way for a 
company to “operationalise” its reputation. However, the lack of formal representation 
within the corporate decision-making structure suggests that conceiving of management 
as mediating hierarchs appears to be the simplest way in which the law might support the 
increased allocative efficiency promised by the productive coalition model. The well- 
documented systemic tendency towards managerial unaccountability may be countered 
by the grant of procedural rights to the various constituencies to articulate their interests 
in the rent-seeking process, and perhaps even to monitor management.
Most agency theorists do not address the theoretical claims of the productive coalition 
model, let alone address empirical matters. They simply assert that adequate protection is 
already available through existing mechanisms, such as reputation and collective 
organisation on the part of employees. They do not offer a qualitative reason why 
employees should have to rely on informal or self-constructed mechanisms for the 
protection o f their interests while shareholders receive company law as a "public good". 
Their refusal to address systematically the claims o f the productive coalition model is
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unsatisfactory, particularly as agency model considerations justify the market for 
corporate control and its related "adaptive mechanisms".
While the letter o f the law has remained managerialist, corporate governance outside law 
has gradually become "shareholder value", as the post-hostile takeover era witnesses the 
alignment of managerial incentives with the interests o f shareholders and the 
development of other market pressures, which compel management to focus on the share 
price. From an agency perspective, these changes are heading in the right direction, albeit 
that recent corporate scandals have demonstrated that the short-term share price is not 
necessarily an optimal proxy for measuring the creation of shareholder value, and a more 
sophisticated system is needed to ensure that managerial remuneration actually reflects 
achievement From a productive coalition perspective, however, these changes are a 
disaster. They undermine management's neutrality, and so reduce their ability to make 
credible commitments to employees about their future treatment. This in turn makes 
employees less willing to make the "sunk", co-specialised investments which are needed 
to generate quasi-rents and maximise the wealth o f society. This decline in the level of 
trust, which means that contracts must become more explicit, raises transaction costs 
across the economy as a whole. The likely result is the "de-institutionalisation", or 
"marketisation", of the corporation, which becomes ephemeral and able to expand and 
contract at will, but at the price of a reduction in efficiency as corporate participants 
become less specialised to their functions. The corporation comes to resemble a spot 
market on which commodities are traded rather than a framework in which investors co­
operate for mutual benefit. Certainly, in the short term, returns to shareholders are 
enhanced as the capital markets put pressure on management to allocate “spare” cash 
flow to investors. Yet there must be a danger that this process simply "hollows out" 
corporations, replacing networks of skilled individuals, who interact and develop with 
each other, with unskilled, commodity labour, undermining tomorrow’s productive 
capacity to achieve today's desired distribution.
The agency model was pushed hard in the UK and the US in the 1980s, and takeover 
laws in those countries are testament to what occurred there. In the UK, the regulatory
311
process was captured early from the courts and has remained in private hands ever since. 
The US witnessed a more dynamic regulatory process as the states responded to threats to 
employment within their jurisdiction with increasingly powerful antitakeover laws. This 
then generated a counter-reaction from the capital markets, in which managerial contracts 
were adapted to reflect the capital market's demands, linking the bulk of their 
remuneration to short-term movements in the share price. Compared with the hostile 
takeover, this was a relatively low-cost and unspectacular step, which has gradually 
spread to the UK too. Once the neutrality o f managerialism had been undermined by the 
capital market's hostile takeover mechanism, adaptive mechanisms were a cheaper and 
more "friendly" way of carrying out restructuring and redistributing wealth from human 
capital investors to financial capital investors.
In many countries in Europe, a model more akin to a productive coalition has held sway, 
albeit to different degrees. The institutional configuration of each country’s political 
economy reflects its history and politics, and ultimately contributes significantly to its 
competitive advantage. Capital markets have traditionally played a minor role in 
monitoring management, this role being played by various coalitions of insiders. 
Recently, however, pressure has been increasing for the introduction of agency model 
norms into this picture. The Commission’s steadfast commitment to an agency-model 
Takeover Directive clearly illustrates the increasing normative influence of capital market 
considerations. Meanwhile, market actors are urged by the Commission to take into 
account the “social” aspects of their actions in codes of conduct and similar documents.
Arguments in favour o f takeover regulation reform emphasise that, as a capital market 
measure, it may be compartmentalised, having no “spill over” effects on other corporate 
constituencies. These assertions rest on agency model assumptions of contractual 
completeness and a belief that the political stakeholder model may be confined to 
voluntarism without any adverse effect on efficiency. However, changing the role of 
management to make them more accountable to shareholders at the expense of employees 
and creditors is very risky where corporate governance has been based on a productive 
coalition model. The introduction of an "irritating" extraneous norm risks alienating the
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latter constituencies, and the destruction of trust will make the long-term supply of 
human or loan capital far more expensive, or even impossible. Meanwhile, the US and 
UK experience suggests that the new favoured constituency will actually become the 
"least productive stakeholder" -  a net withdrawer of equity capital -  at least so far as 
established businesses are concerned.
This thesis has demonstrated that Anglo-American takeover regulation, adaptive 
mechanisms and the general system o f corporate governance strongly support shareholder 
interests. In the UK and the US, a public policy choice has been made to allow 
shareholder interests to take priority over those o f other constituencies. During the 
evolution of the takeover directive, it was proposed that that policy choice should be 
generalised across the EU. This thesis has demonstrated that the possible adverse 
consequences o f doing so require that the arguments for and against be made with more 
clarity and in more depth, in particular taking into account the insights of the productive 
coalition model.
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